From Counterinsurgency to Peace Enforcement:  
New Names for Old Games?

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When the great Prussian theorist Karl von Clausewitz wrote his famous treatise, he noted that "the fog of war" descends on the battlefield, rendering the most carefully laid plans of strategists problematic at best. Had he lived in the twentieth century instead of the nineteenth, he might have observed that the "fog" is thickest at the low end of the conflict spectrum, where arguably it never dissipates. The constantly changing and imprecise array of terms created to name such conflicts reflects the profound discomfort of conventional armed forces with unconventional war. "Small Wars," "imperial policing," "counterinsurgency," "counter-revolutionary warfare," "Low Intensity Conflict," and "Military Operations Other than War," have been offered up to describe essentially the same phenomenon.  

This same shifting and imprecise use of terminology has also come to characterize the literature of peace operations. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace identifies five types of peace operation, none of which exist as a pure form in the real world: "preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace making, peace enforcement, and post conflict peace-building". Despite their questionable utility these categories have been accepted, apparently without question by most western armies. Any discussion of the similarity between peace operations and counterinsurgency must, therefore, begin with a clear definition of terms, for the

1 "Small Wars" wars is a nineteenth century term given wide circulation by the British writer Charles Calwell in a book of that title, Small Wars — Their Principles and Practice (London, 1903; 1st ed., 1896), which has been reprinted in paper back by the University of Nebraska Press, 1996; "Imperial Policing," used to designate low-level conflicts within the British empire, was also the subject of Charles Gwyn's, Imperial Policing (London: Macmillan, 1934); "Counter-insurgency" became the operative term for the Cold-War campaigns against Communist "wars of national liberation"; "Counter-revolutionary" warfare replaced this term in the British lexicon of the 1960s; "Low-intensity Conflict" was the umbrella term of the 1970s U.S., British and other western militaries, inspired perhaps by Frank Kitson's, Low-Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London: Faber and Faber, 1991; 1st ed. 1971); "Military Operations Other Than War" is the current catch-all term employed by the U.S. army to include all activities other than conventional war fighting.


language describing such activities has become so imprecise as to impede analysis.  

"Insurgency" is an organized effort to overthrow a nation from within using a combination of subversion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Operating within a disaffected population, insurgents persuade people that the revolutionary movement will provide them a better life while demonstrating the inability of the government to either protect people or meet their needs. Insurgent guerrillas will attack isolated government outposts, assassinate officials, and attack infrastructure, always disappearing into the larger population when conventional forces arrive. They often provoke these forces into retaliating indiscriminately against people already alienated from the government. In classical, Maoist insurgency, the guerrillas will dominate rural areas, slowly expanding their base to "drown" the cities in a sea of peasant unrest.

"Counterinsurgency," as the term implies, consists of denying the insurgents their objective. However, a threatened government that remains purely reactive loses the war. Successful counterinsurgency requires that the state identify the legitimate grievances on which the insurgency feeds and make some effort to address them, in effect outbidding the insurgents for the loyalty of the people. Military operations against the guerrillas require the highly selective and very discriminate use of force. Massive applications of firepower do more harm than good, as the American experience in Vietnam revealed. Force can only be applied selectively if government troops have precise information on the insurgents' identity and whereabouts. This information must be provided by the very people who initially supported the insurgents. "The problem of defeating the enemy," concluded retired British general and counter-insurgency expert Frank Kitson, "consists very largely in finding him."

Counterinsurgency, of course, violates the fundamental principles of classical United Nations peacekeeping. As practiced during the Cold War, peacekeeping entailed the deployment of a neutral interposition force between warring parties who had agreed both to a cease-fire and to the deployment of the U.N. force. The peacekeepers would be lightly armed and highly visible in their characteristic blue helmets and white armored personnel carriers. They could use their weapons only in self-defence, defence of their position, or "defence of the mandate," a rather imprecise notion that they could shoot at anyone who was not a combatant.

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7 Kitson, Low-intensity Conflict, p. 96.
interfering with the conduct of their mission. In any case, peacekeepers could use only the minimum force necessary to achieve their objective. The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) separating Greeks and Turks represents the best example of the "thin Blue line".

The United Nations Charter makes no provision for classical operations. The founders of the organization envisioned it as an instrument of collective security, a League of Nations with teeth, capable of deterring and if need be combating aggression. The Cold-War Security Council deadlock precluded any such action, and with the exception of the Korean Conflict (1950-3) and the Gulf War (1990-1), no conventional enforcement operations have been launched. Peacekeeping arose out of the Suez Crisis (1956) in which both superpowers saw the need for a neutral interposition force. The first U.N. Emergency Force dispatched to the Sinai, the brain child of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson, set the pattern for future operations. The legal basis for such missions could be found by combining Chapter VI, Article 40 of the Charter, which empowers the Security Council to take "provisional measures" to restore the peace and Chapter V, Article 29, which allows the council to create "subsidiary organs" necessary to perform its work. A peacekeeping operation is thus a "provisional measure" and the peacekeeping force itself, a "subsidiary organ" of the United Nations. Such reasoning stretched the legal imagination of the international body, but it served a valuable purpose for almost fifty years.

Unfortunately, the post-cold-war world has produced conflicts far more challenging than those of the Cold War. Recent intra-state wars have seen nations break apart into component provinces or even clan territories. They have been characterized by intense ethnic strife in which peoples rather than armies have been pitted against one another, often resulting in genocide. Fighting in such conflicts has combined both conventional and unconventional tactics. These wars have also produced massive humanitarian crises, including famine and refugees.

Conflicts such as those in Somalia (1992-5) and the former Yugoslavia (1992-present) have confounded the assumptions of classical peacekeeping. The belligerents in a civil war recognize no neutrals and interpret every action by an outside agency as either helping or hindering their cause. Lightly armed, highly visible peacekeepers have little deterrent effect as the U.N. troops in Sarajevo quickly discovered. Carefully defined rules of engagement and debates over Chapter VI and VII mandates meant little to soldiers facing tanks and artillery.

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with rifles and armored personnel carriers. Even well armed troops such as the U.S. army rangers in Mogadishu found that the physical and human environment of a city neutralized many of the technological advantages enjoyed by a modern conventional army. In contemporary ethnic conflicts there clearly has been no peace to keep.

Intrastate conflicts thus have more in common with insurgency than they do with any other type of warfare. Both involve belligerents who do not accept the legitimacy of the established state. In each the combatants seek to win the loyalty of people with legitimate grievances against the established order. The most recent U.S. army peace operations manual highlights the similarity between the two while avoiding the direct comparison:

> peace operations may often take place in environments that are less well-defined than in war. The identity of belligerents may be uncertain and the relationship between a specific operations and a campaign plan may be less clear than would normally be the case in combat . . . Loosely organized groups of irregulars, terrorist, or other conflicting segments of a population may predominate. These segments will attempt to capitalize on perceptions of disaffection within the population."

This description is virtually identical to that of insurgency found in any Cold-War publication.

If an ethnic civil war resembles an insurgency, then intervention to end it must be based on sound counterinsurgency principles. Unfortunately, the counterinsurgency record of the west has been almost as disappointing as its performance in peace operations. A new model for intervention must therefore be derived from a clear understanding of the nature of civil conflict and careful study of truly relevant historical examples. Far too much writing on this subject has grouped disparate cases with little in common. Only three U.N. missions have required large-scale intervention in an active civil war: the Congo (1960-4), Somalia (1992-5), and the former Yugoslavia (1992- the present). Each of these operations was at best a limited success largely because none of them was based on a clear, consistent, and effective strategy. However, analysis of these three cases may yield valuable lessons that could inform the conduct of future operations. To the analysis of these missions must be added a consideration of the relevant counterinsurgency experience of member states, most notably the United Kingdom, which has enjoyed more success at this type of war far than any other nation. From such an analyses might emerge a new model for peace operations to end civil conflict as well as some indication of under what circumstances such interventions might succeed.

11 FM 100-23: Peace Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 16 April 1994), p. iii.

Contrary to popular belief the U.N.'s first experience with civil conflict occurred not in Northern Iraq, Somalia, or Bosnia in the 1990s but in the Congo from 1960-64. Less than a fortnight after its independence the former Belgian colony degenerated into civil war as copper rich Katanga Province ceded from the country led by a puppet government representing European mining interests. Other provinces followed Katanga's example as the nation split along ethnic lines. To protect their nationals, and presumably their economic interests as well, the Belgians sent in troops, whom the newly created government accused of violating Congolese sovereignty. Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba appealed to the U.N., first for "technical assistance in the field of security administration" and then for troops to "protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace." For complex reasons both the Soviet Union and the United States found it expedient to deploy a peace keeping mission to the Congo, although they had different visions of what it would accomplish.

"A threat to international peace" thus became the pretext for a mission that would escalate from classical peacekeeping to enforcement, although the Security Council never gave it a Chapter VII mandate. At its height the Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) numbered 19,828; thirty countries contributed to the mission. During the four years of its existence ONUC protected European residents while ushering them out of the Congo, supervised withdrawal of Belgian forces from the country, separated warring factions, safeguarded humanitarian aid, and helped to restore a semblance of law and order. All of these tasks exceeded what peacekeepers in the Sinai were being asked to do and what the Congolese government had originally requested.

With no peace to keep ONUC could either move to stop the fighting or leave. It chose the former course and became a defacto enforcement operation although it never received Chapter VII powers. This fact became abundantly clear as the mission accomplished its most challenging and controversial task, ending the secession of Katanga province. To accomplish this goal the U.N. attempted to round up and deport European mercenaries working for the secessionist government and the Union Minière mining firm. Such efforts naturally led to intense fighting. At the end of the day ONUC found itself employing an infantry brigade supported by aircraft in operations that could hardly be characterized as defensive. By January 1963 U.N. troops captured Kolwezi, the last rebel stronghold in Katanga Province, bringing the secession to an end. In September the Secretary-General declared the goals of ONUC accomplished, and the last troops left the Congo the following June.

13 The request for technical assistance is noted by Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold, pp. 389-94, who cites unpublished sources; the request for military assistance came in a telegram to the Secretary-General from the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister, and the Supreme Commander of the Army, U.N. document, S/4382, 12 July 1960.

14 The Blue Helmets, pp. 435-6.
The subsequent sad history of the Congo (renamed Zaire) precludes calling ONUC a success. However, the operation probably accomplished all that it could in the restrictive environment of the Cold War. It restored some semblance of law and order to the country and ended the secession of Katanga Province. The West, however, supported Joseph Mobutu, who systematically exploited the country for the next thirty years and plunged it back into civil war at the end of his life. Although colonial rule formally ended, foreigners maintained control of the country's lucrative mining interests.

The Congo episode revealed a great deal about the nature of peace operations and could have provided guidance for future interventions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. From the outset the struggle in the central African nation combined elements of civil war and insurgency that required firm measures to halt. ONUC was an enforcement operation despite protests to the contrary. It might have been a more successful intervention had this fact been recognized, even tacitly from the beginning. Instead the Security Council gradually escalated the role of the force, deploying more and more troops to the country while expanding its mandate. This escalation revealed that the distinction between Chapter VI and Chapter VII may not be as significant as many in New York suppose. Pundits would do well to read the conclusions of the first Special Committee to Consider the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations, which described such distinctions as academic and suggested that the charter is more flexible than most realize. ONUC further revealed the need for a comprehensive response to civil conflict, a response combing humanitarian aid, diplomacy and nation building under the security umbrella of a military force — a response not unlike a counterinsurgency campaign.

Rather than draw any of these conclusions, however, the U.N. determined that the costs of a mission such as ONUC were simply too high to bear. The operation, after all, nearly bankrupted the U.N., brought the Soviet Union to the brink of being expelled from the organization, and cost Secretary-General Dag Hammar skjöld his life. As a result the lessons of the Congo remained sealed in U.N. archive files, largely forgotten. It would take almost thirty years and the end of the Cold War for the international organization to get over the trauma of ONUC and attempt another peace enforcement operation.

The opportunity for such intervention came once again in Africa and under circumstances very similar to those that had prevailed in the former Belgian colony. Just as the end of colonialism had created a power vacuum that destabilized the Congo, so the end of the Cold War produced a similar void that unsettled Somalia. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had pumped arms and money into the country enabling the corrupt dictator Siad Barre to stay in power. In 1991, following a decade of civil war to oust him, the East African

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nation disintegrated into rival clan territories whose leaders vied for control of the country. The fratricide destroyed the Somali infrastructure, particularly the food delivery system. Four million of the Somalia's 5.1 million people lived in famine afflicted areas, and 330,000 faced imminent starvation. The international community responded with a massive food aid program. However, Non-governmental Organizations (NGO's) soon found that the security environment made relief work almost impossible. Gunmen from the various factions stole 50% of the food aid and resold it; organized looting became the basis of the Somali economy.

Realizing that relief work cannot be done in an atmosphere of anarchy, the U.N. moved to intervene. The organization first attempted to mount a classical peacekeeping operation. With that end in mind the new Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali got the principal clan leaders, Mohammed Farah Aidid and Mohamed Ali Mahdi to agree to "an immediate cessation of hostilities and to the maintenance of a cease-fire in Mogadishu" in February 1992. Having secured this agreement, he then proposed sending a technical team to assist in the relief effort. As fighting continued, however, the need for a peacekeeping force became clear. The Secretary-General got qualified agreement from the clan leaders for deployment of a small number of troops, and the Security Council approved the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) on April 24, 1992.

Before this force could even deploy, however, the situation in Somalia deteriorated further and the willingness of the clan leaders to abide by their agreements proved illusory. Nothing short of a full-scale military intervention would stop the fighting and end the famine. Although he would have preferred the U.N. to lead such an operation, the Secretary-General could not secure the needed resources. Fortunately, by the fall of 1992, the "CNN factor" had brought the suffering to the attention of lame-duck U.S. President George Bush. In one of his last acts before leaving office, Bush authorized deployment of 20,000 U.S. troops as the core of an American led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) for Somalia. The Security Council accepted the offer and on December 3, 1992 approved the mission under a Chapter VII mandate, authorizing it to "use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."

So broad a charge must have conjured up the word "counterinsurgency" to at least some U.S. soldiers, who had avoided the activity and even the term since the debacle of Vietnam twenty years before. Consistent with American

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17 Ibid., p. 102.
interventions of the 1980s, however, Bush assured the American people that the deployment would be short term and for the limited, attainable objective of ending the famine. America's recent victory in the Gulf War and its success conducting Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq lent credence to the notion that the U.S. could accomplish a great deal in a short while. In addition, the President favored a more limited approach than the Secretary-General. Boutros-Ghali urged UNITAF to secure the heavy weapons of the Somali factions and disarm their forces in order to "create a secure environment throughout Somalia."\textsuperscript{21} The UNITAF mission statement set more modest goals:

- to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations, and food distribution points,
- to provide open and free passage of relief supplies,
- provide security for convoys and relief organization operations and
- assist UN/NGO's in providing humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices. Upon
- establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations,
- USCINCCENT [U.S. Commander-in-Chief Central] terminates and transfers relief operations to U.N. peacekeeping forces.\textsuperscript{22}

A clear mission statement with a six-month end date might allay domestic fears, but they could not eliminate the need to conduct internal security operations. The Somali gunmen had made a living off of looting and selling relief supplies and would not give up their trade without a fight. The U.S. force commander Marine Corps Lieutenant General Robert Johnston translated the mission statements into four "no's": on the streets of Mogadishu there must be "no technicals [trucks or other vehicles with crew-serviced weapons such as heavy machine guns] . . . ; no banditry; no roadblocks; no visible weapons."\textsuperscript{23} After a few intense fire-fights that demonstrated Marine resolve, the Somalis complied with General Johnston's terms.

Through its combination of clear rules of engagement, limited and attainable goals, and constant communication with the Somali leaders, UNITAF succeeded in securing delivery of humanitarian aid. In accomplishing this mission they came very close to forging the kind of coherent civil-military strategy characteristic of counterinsurgency. At the center of this approach was

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
the Civil/Military Operations Center (CMOC). CMOC aimed to provide a workable interface between the NGO's, who coordinated their efforts through the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), and UNITAF. By collocating CMOC and HOC and by holding daily meetings, this liaison produced some level of coordination, mirrored in varying degrees by cooperation at the local level. CMOC/HOC did not always work well, and Marine and NGO perceptions of its success vary widely. Relief workers who had been in country for a long time resented the Marines' "take charge attitude," and considered the soldiers insensitive to local culture. The Marines in turn believed that the NGO's withheld valuable information on the Somali factions and cooperated with the military only when it suited them.24

These frustrations notwithstanding, UNITAF should be considered a success in that it accomplished its primary mission of stopping the famine. The intervention saved thousands of lives. Had it remained in the field longer, it might have restored a modicum of normalcy to Somalia. At least relief and diplomatic efforts could have continued under the shield of UNITAF. Given the U.S. military's dislike for open-ended commitments to limited war, though, it was perhaps too much to expect the UNITAF deployment to exceed the six-month end date embraced by the Low-Intensity Conflict manuals of the 1980s.25 The hardest lesson of counterinsurgency and peace operations remains that they take an incredibly long time to succeed. Patience, however, has never been an American virtue. In May 1993, UNITAF handed operations back to the U.N., which in March had created a new mission, UNOSOM II, to deal with Somalia. Had this hands-off been complete with the U.S. removing itself entirely from the mission, the disasters of the coming year might have been avoided. Instead the U.S. ignored the counterinsurgency experience of the past thirty years and even its experience with UNITAF.

From its inception UNOSOM II combined the worst elements of a U.N. and a U.S. led mission. The new mandate empowered the force to act throughout the whole of Somalia even though it would have fewer troops than UNOSOM I. It also emphasized "the crucial importance of disarmament" to establishing a secure environment.26 While UNITAF had insisted that the guns be off the streets, UNOSOM II planned to seek out and seize munitions dumps. Even the most cursory look at counterinsurgency would have revealed the danger of such an approach. Disarmament can only occur as part of a comprehensive strategy that provides positive incentives for the belligerents to surrender their weapons. While the U.S. did not openly support this approach, it remained sufficiently engaged in the operation to be implicated in the consequences. Although the American commitment to UNOSOM II consisted primarily of 3,000 support troops and logistics personnel, the U.S. also kept a 1,150 strong rapid deployment force in the theater. Because of the American refusal to have its troops serve under foreign command, these troops were led by Major General

24 Conclusions based on conversations with military and NGO personnel.
Thomas Montgomery, who also served as UNOSOM II deputy force commander under Turkish General Cevic Bir. These arrangements produced a top-heavy and incredibly snarled command and control system, allowing the American forces just enough independence to get into trouble.

The denouement was not long in coming as a series of incidents produced a chain reaction leading to the failure and withdrawal of UNOSOM II. On June 5, 1993, forces of General Aidid's United Somali Congress ambushed a contingent of Pakistanis sent to inspect an arms depot located at Mogadishu radio, killing 24 of them. This action forced both UNOSOM II and many of the NGO's into a cantonment mentality, disconnecting them from the day to day realities of Somali life. The "fifth of June incident" also provoked retaliation, which took the form of air strikes against Aidid's stronghold of South Mogadishu. The concomitant collateral damage- further alienated ordinary Somalis and cost the U.S. much of the credibility it had won during UNITAF. Finally, because Aidid's forces had perpetrated the massacre, the Secretary-General was determined to capture Aidid himself. Instead of remaining in constant touch with the Somali leader and combining firmness with clear and continual communication as UNITAF had done, UNOSOM II demonized Aidid and broke contact with him. Persuaded that capturing the "war lord" was necessary, the U.S. committed Delta Force Commandos and U.S. Army Rangers to an October 3 raid on Aidid's headquarters that bagged 27 of his associates but not the general himself. During the withdrawal the troops were pinned down trying to rescue a helicopter pilot. The soldiers lacked air and armor support, owing in considerable measure to the tangled command arrangements of UNOSOM II, and eighteen of them were killed. The October 3 incident led to the withdrawal of U.S. and other troops contingents and ultimately to the end of the mission itself.

Somalia revealed the same lessons as the Congo had thirty years before. The object of military operations should have been to separate the people from the gun-men, not drive the two together through an over-reliance on firepower that killed indiscriminately. UNITAF had found an appropriate mix of humanitarian aid and the use of force to protect its delivery and had kept in constant touch with the Somali faction leaders. UNOSOM II placed military activity ahead of diplomatic and humanitarian, over-relied on firepower, and concentrated too much on arresting individuals rather than on stabilizing the situation.

Sadly UNOSOM II would not be the only such failure of the early 1990's. As one mission in Africa was unraveling, another in Europe was failing to get off the ground. If the case of Somalia demonstrates the consequences of relying on military force to solve a political and humanitarian problem, that of the former Yugoslavia reveals what can happen when lightly armed peacekeepers are inserted into an active civil war. Thousands of lives and much destruction might have been avoided had the international community intervened with a properly equipped force empowered to enforce a cease-fire on the belligerents.

The Yugoslav Federation disintegrated into civil war when the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia seceded rather than remain in what they perceived to be a
Serb dominated entity. Although the conflict had its origins in the politics of post-World-War II Yugoslavia and in the deepening economic crisis of the 1980s, the violence played itself out along ethnic lines. With a population over 90% Slovene and Roman Catholic, Slovenia escaped relatively unscathed. Croatia was less fortunate. Its Serb populations of the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia insisted on Union with Serbia proper, or at least Serb nationalists made this claim on their behalf. Separatist Croat Serbs backed by the Serb-dominated Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA in Serbo-Croatian) captured a third of Croatia in a bitter 1991 conflict that first introduced the term "ethnic cleansing" into the international lexicon.

However, by the end of the year the fighting had subsided, the U.N. had brokered a cease-fire, and the belligerents faced each other across relatively clear and stable lines. Both sides had also agreed to the need for an interposition force to secure the uneasy truce. All of the ingredients for a traditional peacekeeping operation appeared to be in place. On February 21, 1992, the Security Council authorized creation of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with a twelve-month mandate. Before UNPROFOR could even deploy, however, the fighting had spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most heterogeneous of the Yugoslav Republics with no national majority and various minorities distributed in a patch work quilt that defied separation by a peacekeeping force. Although it was clearly ill suited to handle the spreading conflict, the Security Council extended UNPROFOR's mandate to include Bosnia-Herzegovina (as well as Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro) without giving it enforcement powers or heavy equipment.

This decision to insert peacekeepers into an active civil war would be a source of trouble for the next four years. Critics of the decision should remember, however, that in 1992 the prestige of the U.N. stood high, the disaster of Somalia had yet to occur, and many believed that the Gulf War example would deter anyone from challenging the authority of the world body. Before the fallacy of these assumptions became clear, UNPROFOR had become so deeply committed to the conflict that its extrication would have been extremely difficult. Nor could it easily have been upgraded to an enforcement mission. ONUC had experienced such a transition, but the Katanga government had nowhere near the resources of the Bosnian Serbs, who together with their backers in Belgrade controlled most of the military assets of the former JNA. Thus by the Spring of 1994, UNPROFOR had 22,000 troops in Bosnia-

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27 For an analysis of the causes, see Susan Woodward's excellent account, Balkan tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1995).


Herzegovina, but they remained lightly armed, highly visible and dispersed in "penny packets" which could be easily isolated and/or taken hostage.30

Under these difficult circumstances, the peacekeepers made the best of a bad situation that grew steadily worse. They negotiated local cease-fires, shepherded relief convoys into isolated areas, and protected civilians as best they could. Quietly and off the record, they conducted successful anti-sniper actions in Sarajevo. They coordinated with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross, and a host of NGO's, who were discovering like their counterparts in Somalia that security is essential for relief work. While UNITAF and to a lesser extent UNOSOM II had the firepower to provide this security; however, UNPROFOR did not. It would take another two years and thousands more deaths before the international community would intervene to stop the fighting.

As the situation deteriorated, the Security Council attempted to do from the air what it could not do on the ground. The Bosnian Serbs dominated the countryside and had pushed the Muslims (and in some areas Croats) into isolated pockets that could easily be starved or over-run.

In April 1993 the Council declared the eastern Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica a "safe area" to be protected by threat of NATO air strikes; in May they extended the same "protection" to Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and Sarajevo.31 Although this strategy may have saved some of the enclaves, the safe area approach was largely ineffective. First, air strikes required both NATO and U.N. approval (the dual-key approach); and second, such strikes relied on "precision-bombing" (which many UNPROFOR commanders considered an oxymoron) to knock out Serb tanks, artillery, and mortar tubes. The Bosnian Serbs harassed all of the safe areas throughout the conflict, almost over-ran Bihac in the fall of 1994, and captured Zepa and Srebrenica in 1995, massacring Muslim civilians in an act of genocide that finally provoked massive intervention to stop the fighting.

The difficulty of transitioning a peacekeeping mission to an enforcement operation became clear in May 1995, when Bosnian Serbs captured UNPROFOR soldiers, chaining some of them to bridges and other strategic targets to prevent NATO bombing. After negotiating their release in return for halting air strikes, the U.N. command began pulling its troops out of exposed positions while a heavily armed rapid deployment force dug in on mount Igman above Sarajevo. Following the massacres at Srebrenica in July, the international community drew a line in the sand around the remaining safe areas. When the Bosnian Serbs crossed the line with a mortar attack on the Sarajevo market place in August, NATO launched a month of air strikes, the gunners on mount Igman established dominance around Sarajevo, and the Bosnian Fifth Army

Corps advanced out of the Bihac pocket in the northwest. An American trained and rebuilt Croat army had driven the Serbs from the Krajina in early August. Amidst this rapid change in their fortunes, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to a cease-fire.

The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in Paris in December 1995 stopped four years of fighting and marked the end of UNPROFOR. The U.N. handed over to a NATO-based Implementation Force (IFOR) built around the U.S. first armored division pulled out of Germany for duty in Bosnia. IFOR kept the peace for a year and then in turn handed over to a smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) which currently shows signs of becoming a long-term presence in the Balkans. Behind this NATO shield some rebuilding has occurred in the Croat and Muslim parts of Bosnia, almost none in the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb Republic. Very few indicted war criminals have even been apprehended, let alone tried, and only a small number of refugees have returned to their homes. The former Yugoslavia has a long way to go before there is peace.

While it is too early to judge the long term effectiveness of IFOR/SFOR, some meaningful conclusions may be drawn about the U.N. mission. The sad experience of UNPROFOR underscores the lessons of the Congo and Somalia. Intervention in an active civil war is enforcement, no matter what the Security Council declares in its resolutions, and the intervention force should be adequately equipped to deal with a worst-case scenario. While a force equipped for combat can throttle back to peacekeeping duties, a peacekeeping mission cannot easily upgrade to combat capability, especially when the belligerents determine to prevent it from doing so. Former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s insistence that peacekeeping and peace enforcement must be discrete activities and not points on a continuum, makes little sense in the real world of civil conflict intervention. Soldiers like diplomats and NGO personnel must be prepared to do a variety of tasks as part of an evolving peace mission. Clearly classical peacekeeping does not provide any base for such a comprehensive approach. U.N. troops in Bosnia were worse off than their counterparts in either UNITAF or UNOSOM II. They could set up a joint military/NGO headquarters in Sarajevo, but they could not provide the one thing that only soldiers should be able to provide: security.

The three conflicts examined so closely resemble insurgency as to suggest that counterinsurgency might be a more suitable model for peace enforcement operations to end civil conflict than classical peacekeeping. This conclusion, however, begs another question. Whose counterinsurgency methods should be employed? Unfortunately, the record of most nations in this type of conflict looks as disappointing as the record of the U.N. in recent peace operations. The U.S. decision to over-rely on firepower in Somalia repeated the mistake of Vietnam and can only be understood in the context of America's long and

largely unsuccessful experience with unconventional war. The Russians most recently in Chechnya but previously in Azerbaijan, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Baltics have always used an iron-fisted approach to ending a revolt. The most extensive body of counterinsurgency experience belongs to the former colonial powers who developed it in acquiring, maintaining, and ultimately disengaging from empire. However, the various approaches of these imperial states have met with mixed success. No one would want to repeat the French experience in Algeria, the Belgian in the Congo or the Portuguese in Mozambique.

Of all the nations beset with insurgency throughout the twentieth century, only Britain has met with any sustained degree of success in combating this most difficult threat to peace. While British counterinsurgency does not offer a silver bullet for peace enforcement operations, it has produced results often enough to be worth closer examination. The British approach to civil unrest developed out of a concept of aid to the civil power. Any British subject could be called upon to assist the civil authorities in quelling disturbances. While the military would naturally be the ones pressed into such duty, English Common law made no distinction between them and ordinary civilians. In acting to suppress disturbances the soldier could only use "minimum force". This principle applied to all forms of unrest. "The sole object of military intervention in civil disputes, or dealing with general unrest or even widespread insurrection or violence, is the restoration of law and order by military means when other methods have failed," one manual advised. "There is, however, one principle that must be observed in all action taken by the troops: no more force shall be applied than the situation demands."

A clear understanding that the soldier is always subordinate to the civil authority and that troops must use minimum force had significant consequences when "imperial policing" became counterinsurgency after the Second World War. "Minimum force" increasingly meant selective force, and force could only be applied selectively if the authorities got precise information on the whereabouts of the insurgents. Such intelligence would only be forthcoming when disaffected people believed that government could meet their needs. "Winning the hearts and minds of the people" meant nothing more than addressing the legitimate grievances of people, whether such redress meant land reform or colonial independence. Since coordinating the "hearts-and-minds" campaign with the security operations by the military and the police, the British created elaborate committee systems at all tactical and operational levels. At district level these committees consisted of three people: the police chief, the district officer (head of the colonial administration), and the military commander whose troops had been brought to "aid the civil" power. At the top

33 See Mockaitis, "Unconventional War," pp. 385-416, for a detailed discussion of the American approach to limited war.
of the pyramid stood the Director of Operations in whose person unity of command and effort was achieved. Unity of effort, however, did not mean rigid control. Counterinsurgency requires a highly decentralized system of command. Junior officers and NCO's must be free to take initiative against the insurgents while understanding that the actions of even the lowest ranking private have political implications.

While the British approach to counterinsurgency reached its fullest development during the Malayan Emergency (1949-1960), British advisors successfully applied it against a Communist insurgency in Oman (1970-5), suggesting its applicability to the post-colonial era. Adapted to the infinitely more complex circumstances of a modern urban insurgency, it has been employed in Northern Ireland. British troops have maintained order through twenty-eight difficult years, keeping casualties on all sides very low by the standards of ethnic conflict while understanding full well that only a political solution can bring lasting peace. The soldiers in any civil conflict can do no more than stop the fighting and provide a shield behind which non-military peacemaking activities can occur.

The comprehensive nature of British counterinsurgency has much to commend it as a model for peace enforcement operations to end active civil conflicts. Planning should begin with a clear understanding that such intervention is enforcement, and that the troops need to be given the resources necessary to do their jobs. Troop contributors should expect the mission to evolve and the tasks assigned their troops to change. This natural evolution should be anticipated and not denigrated as "mission creep." The military, civilian authorities, and NGO's need to coordinate activities both at the planning stage and in the field. Such coordination requires institutions and mechanisms to facilitate cooperation. Only through joint training conducted on a regular basis will the military and civilian components learn to work together. The CMOC developed in Somalia made a valuable step towards such unity of effort, but much more needs to be done. Finally, soldiers and politicians alike must understand that peacekeeping takes years and not months. Announcing that a force will withdraw by a certain calendar date invites the belligerents to lie low and wait the peacekeepers out.

The requirements for successful peace enforcement operations like those for counterinsurgency can be easily stated in principle, but they remain incredibly difficult to achieve in practice. No comparison between the two would be complete without consideration of when and by whom interventions might be mounted. Peace enforcement should only be attempted by nations who can field a large conventional force (at least a division) or by regional alliances whose

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37 Ironically, the British peace operations manual, *Wider Peacekeeping*, does not make adequate use of British counterinsurgency experience.
troops have very high degrees of interoperability. ONUC could end the secession of Katanga only because the Independent Indian brigade contributed 6,000 combat troops capable of conducting offensive operations. UNITAF accomplished what it did because, once again, a single nation contributed 20,000 troops. UNPROFOR had no such comparably equipped force. IFOR consisted overwhelmingly of NATO units, but even though these troops had been working on interoperability for forty years, they experienced enormous difficulty conducting their first out-of-area unconventional operation.38

The number of players who can commit the assets necessary to mount a successful peace enforcement operation are few, arguably only the U.S. and its NATO allies, although the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of Arab States may one day acquire a capability comparable to that of NATO. What seems painfully clear is that the United Nations, the one international body with the legal right to intervene, does not have such assets and will probably not acquire them in the foreseeable future. The best the U.N. can do is delegate responsibility for enforcement operations as it did in the Korean Conflict, the Gulf War, and the UNITAF operation in Somalia.

Whoever undertakes interventions though should remember that peace enforcement like counterinsurgency or conventional war is a military operation. Like all military operations it requires two things to succeed: the resources to accomplish the mission and the political will to see the mission through to a successful conclusion. Somalia demonstrated that no amount of resources will substitute for political will, and Bosnia revealed that determination cannot produce results without resources. Any nation or coalition unwilling to commit both of these ingredients would do well to avoid peace operations entirely.