Preface by the Editors

As in the rest of Europe, September 11th and its global consequences have triggered an intensive security-political debate in the European Union, the effects of which will become noticeable in the field of the Reform of the Security Sector. Although there was considerable awareness for the dangers of terrorism even before the devastating attacks in the United States, which stem from memories of potential terrorists attacks by extremist political or religious groups, complete awareness of the dangers of terror were limited to few European countries (which experienced separatist movements). After 9/11, the "war on terrorism" was rapidly turned into the central security-political issue and found entrance into all strategic documents and policy and military planning scenarios.

Nearly all over Europe, the increased attention security forces need to pay to preventing and defending against potential terror threats have lead to strains in civil-military relationships. On the one hand, civilians showed an increased need for security, but on the other hand, one fears that through concentration of power with security forces, civil rights could be undermined and democratic control of armed forces and the police weakened.

Within the context of coping with these new security-political tasks, civil-military relations have become a new challenge to the reform countries in South East Europe. Different than in the well-established democracies and market societies in Western and Middle Europe, where the population demonstrates a high level of acceptance versus security institutions, South East European citizens fact their own security apparatuses with massive mistrust. The reasons for this damaged relationship are numerous: they range from negative experiences with security forces in the past authoritarian communist regimes, which dominated the region until 1990/91 to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the Yugoslav wars of dissolution in the 1990s, which made it difficult to differentiate between the practices of paramilitaries and “regular” armed forces.

Even following the end of the fighting, “weak states” in the Western Balkans struggle to make their population find confidence in government institutions again. In this context, the European Union and NATO play a central role. The perspective of future membership in these two organisations has become the main propulsive factors for reforms of the security sector. The EU and NATO will have to stand up to the responsibility of promoting the establishment of democratic mechanisms for regulating and controlling civil-military relationships – in spite of, or even in the face of the danger of global terror.

European and Euro-Atlantic institutions have engaged South East Europe in a comprehensive discourse on the comprehensive reform of state and societal institutions. Structured and well-planned reform programmes aimed at creating integrated European institutions and norms have inevitably created a focus on Brussels, Strasbourg, The Hague, and Washington D.C., adding extra demands to each national government's domestic, regional and international activities. This is not always to the advantage of the government in office: exceeding compliance with international reform programmes while at the Same time under-focusing on the socio-economic needs of voters may lead to a failure to achieve re-election, as in the case of the last Bulgarian government.

The explicit understanding is that all South East European states should be considered eligible for membership of the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Reforms therefore coincide largely with programmes whose ultimate objective is integration. The tacit understanding is that security sector reform cannot ultimately be successful without democratic-institutional reform, and improvement of socio-economic conditions. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe has explicitly made this three-pronged approach its own, and added a so-called 'table' for regional programmes to it. Other European and Euro-Atlantic organizations focus on one or the other point.
The Invitation to reform the security sector has as its objective an improvement of the security institutions and security-providing services as a change of the very 'culture of security'. What is at stake is a shift from the 'culture of state security' to a 'culture of cooperative security', embedded in the Euro-Atlantic system of cooperative security.

This again implies not only a process of insightful adaptation to Euro-Atlantic standards, norms and procedures. It also implies a process of 'unlearning' the past. Accountability – the construction of transparent lines of responsibility for each individual regardless of their position in government – will need to replace the expectation of collective responsibility. Parliamentary and public democratic oversight of the security sector budgets and personnel will need to replace the expectation that state security comes before individual security, and that budgets are therefore best kept secret and security-providing services best kept beyond the reach of parliamentary and public control. Civil-military relations with a strong accent on civilian political leadership structures within Ministries of Defense, and the successful integration of the General Staff within them, will have to replace the expectation that the military forms a state within the state. Civil society organizations will develop the sufficient competence and expertise to independently assess security sector governance, replacing the para-state or para-party organizations that previously disseminated ideas to the public (for good or as vested political interests dictated). Collective cooperative security, as provided by an alliance of sovereign states, will replace the expectation of a rigid System of artificially homogenized and integrated states and their militaries, as well as expectations of Darwinian battles of nation against nation. The concept of human security will replace the concept of security for one's nation alone.

Though the whole of South East Europe is engaged in a discourse on security sector reform, democratic oversight of the security sector, and civil-military relations, it would be incorrect to assume that the joint efforts of European, Transatlantic, regional and national actors (including the media, civil society and academia) have yet led to homogenous or at least symmetrical and sustainable progress. The added challenge of joining the global coalition in the ‘fight against terrorism’ has accelerated development in some departments of the security sector (even Bosnia-Herzegovina is preparing participation in peacekeeping operations). It has, however, at the same time led to a standoff if not a backlash in the evolution of a culture of human and civil rights, not to mention international humanitarian law. As security sector reform unfolds in South East Europe, human rights and will need to triumph over all supposed justifications to curb them.

While security sector reform undoubtedly progresses in South East Europe, the same cannot be said about global developments in the security sector. As Robin Luckham points out in Governing Insecurity\(^1\), the triumphal advance of Western liberal democracy in some parts of the world is paralleled by international inequalities and a new form of military politics. Whereas coups and military governance have been on rapid decline, new forms of civilian autocracies are emerging, based on coalitions of the ruling elites with security services other than the traditional military. Whereas many countries are ‘in transition’, it remains doubtful what this transition will lead to. The image of one ‘happy Transatlantic security family’ as cherished by securocrats on both sides of the Atlantic is thus put seriously into question when we decide to apply finer instruments of heuristic concepts such as assessing ‘countries genuinely in transit’, those that are ‘challenged democracies’, ‘democracies managed by elites’, and those that are regressing toward authoritarianism behind a smoke-screen of democracy. In most ‘transition’ democracies there remains a struggle over who defines ‘national security' and national security policy. The revival of international realpolitik in the last two years could also raise a demand for strategically placed military regimes (in places

such as in Pakistan and Colombia).

The dissenting and disaffected in South East Europe, those who believe that things were better for everyone before, because in nostalgic retrospect they were better for them, will be hard to please. Their voices are hardly ever heard at meetings at the governmental level, for governmental policies foresee compliance with (or at least the need not to challenge) the stipulations of security sector reform. They are, however, most unlikely at this point in time to try to voice their grievances by means other than the democratically permitted ones: demonstrations; votes for Opposition Parties; and lengthy declarations read out at meetings (often made possible by well-meaning non-governmental organizations funded by the same governments which propose security sector reform as a transfer of norms).

It would thus be insincere to claim that all citizens of South East European states (1) understand and (2) willingly accept security sector reform, or in fact, the trinity of democratic-, economic- and security sector- reform, as it would be insincere to claim that most citizens of the Euro-Atlantic community member states (1) understand and would (2) gladly accept far-reaching interferences with their customary lifestyles, even though their ultimate goal may be substantial improvement of people's welfare and security. Security sector reform because of its strong impact on society is a negotiated process. The incentive of ultimately being able to join the very institutions which propose security sector reform may, however, itself be as strong a motivation as added human security is.

The present study, supported by many enthusiastic experts, provides and excellent outline to the Status of civil-military relations in South East Europe – from Slovenia to Turkey – and reflects on the progress, problems and challenges to the Reform of the Security Sector. Additional value can be found that its authors seek to view these topics in the light of the current global security-political issues, above all in the war against terrorism. It is to be hoped that the effort to independently monitor South East European reforms in the security sector will be continued.

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