The European Union’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policies and Austria’s Ambitions

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**Introduction**

As a result of the geopolitical changes of the 1990s, the United States’ strategic focus is no longer Europe. This conclusion is reinforced by the events of 11 September 2001, the subsequent declaration of the war on terror, and the Iraq crisis of early 2003. This new strategic reality requires the European Union not only to strike a new transatlantic bargain, but to renew its attempts to develop a credible Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including a European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP). Consequently, it is expected that the debate on how to develop the Union’s Rapid Reaction Force (EURFF) into a credible force for peace support and combat operations will remain high on the agenda. Moreover, after the ratification of the Union’s "Constitution" and the publication of its Defence White Book and Strategic Concept this development could even get a new push.

This project defines Austria’s role in this process and the consequences for the structure of its armed forces. The first part of this report deals with the development of the CFSP and its ESDP. It will conclude with Austria’s role and place in it. Part two deals with the possible future contribution of Austria’s armed forces. In this part the following issues will be dealt with:

- What kind of contribution to CFSP/ESDP could be expected from a country with the standing of Austria, which is a highly developed, industrialized democracy with interests beyond its own borders? How does one define the level of political ambition?
- Should Austria, given the size of its defence budget limit itself to specific contributions to international coalitions? If so, should Austria focus on niche capabilities or should it contribute with general-purpose forces?
- European forces are being transformed into expeditionary armed forces making use of Network Centric Warfare. What are the consequences for the structure and the required capabilities for Austria’s armed forces? What are the basic building blocks of such a force?
- Is there a balance between forces for conventional and unconventional military operations? Is it possible to use the same forces for both types of operation?
- How does the debate on homeland security affect the debate on force structuring and force capabilities?
- How do the conclusions of this report relate to present commitments to the European Union?
- What are the overall recommendations to be drawn from our analyses?

This report must be considered as an attempt to provide a broad, conceptual approach to Austria’s armed forces, as an input both for the internal and external debate of Austria’s future armed forces.

If there is agreement on the conceptual basis for force transformation, a more detailed discussion is needed to answer the following questions:

- The size and composition of Austria’s homeland defence forces;
- The size and composition of Austria’s forces for deployment abroad;
- Interoperability requirements;
- Doctrinal requirements.

Such discussion could be supported and "objectively validated" through qualitative and quantitative analyses.

The Development of CFSP and ESDP

The Geopolitical Changes

The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union had important implications for transatlantic relations. During the Cold War European allies had grown accustomed to American engagement. However, this engagement was forced upon the Americans by the Cold War, which was an exceptional period in history when America’s interests in Europe were being threatened. After the Cold War America’s interests were more likely to be at stake in the Far East (the Koreas and Taiwan), Central Asia (the oil-rich Caspian Sea region), the oil-rich Persian Gulf Region (Iraq and Iran), the Middle East (Israel and Palestine) and Central and South America (the war on drugs in Colombia). It is only logical that the United States refocused its attention to these regions. Moreover, as Europe no longer is America’s number one security preoccupation, the transatlantic security relationship will change. Now that Europe is not threatened and the EU is economically an equal partner, the United States expects Europe to take care of its own backyard. In addition, the Americans expect European support if their interests are threatened. For the Europeans this requires a change from
security consumer to security provider, for which they are mentally, organizationally and militarily not equipped.

Due to the geopolitical changes of the 1990s and response to the events of the early 21st century some fundamental differences have become visible between the United States and its traditional European allies, with the exception of the United Kingdom.

First, there are considerable transatlantic differences in threat perception. On the one hand, the measures taken in 1998 and 1999 expressed a growing American fear of the consequences of missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and the threat of catastrophic terrorism. This fear led to a feeling of vulnerability, as a result of which the freedom to act in foreign policy would be limited and its hegemonic position would be encroached upon. War against the United States was unlikely in the past and will be unlikely in the future, but United States territory is by no means safe. WMD, their means of delivery and terrorism are the only instruments available to the weak. Enemies will not confront the United States head-on, because they are no match to its army, navy, air force and marines.

They will exploit the inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities of its open, liberal, democratic and industrialised society through asymmetrical forms of warfare, most notably terrorist attacks on American soil but also against its interests abroad. Thus, for the US, terrorism and missiles are very real threats, although over the last decades only a small portion of the total terror-related casualties were Americans.¹

On the other hand, Europeans have learned to live with a complex security situation. Throughout its history Europe experienced numerous and disastrous wars as an essential element of a continuous process of nation-building. Apart from all this, Europeans are also not unfamiliar with terrorism and at present it is considered to be the only threat to European societies. Over the last decades Europeans have endured many incidents of terrorism, from the IRA in Northern Ireland to the Bader-Meinhof Group in Germany and from the Red Brigades in Italy to the ETA in Spain. Moreover, European governments are familiar with rogue states, for example, in 1986 Libya fired a missile at Lampedusa, an uninhabited Italian island. This was the only direct attack on NATO territory in the existence of the Alliance, but it did not result in a European call for missile defences. In Europe the security risks of WMD and missiles are simply not perceived as substantial enough to justify the spending of taxpayers’ money. Many European policymakers consider the NMD-project (now known as Ground Based Midcourse Defence) as a disproportionate measure against a distant threat.

Second, there are transatlantic differences of opinion about how security could be provided. European governments do not underestimate the threats of wars, terrorism, and rogue states, they are simply used to managing complex security situations. The problem of terror is managed through a combination of practical measures and political means. For example, Irish separatism was dealt with by the British armed forces by fighting militant IRA members and by political dialogue with Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA. European security management aimed at preventing wars has traditionally been done through engagement, i.e. regimes and treaties. The emphasis on multilateralism and loss of sovereignty go hand in hand. As a result of European integration Europeans have been steadily giving up powers to Brussels. Americans do not see any source of democratic legitimacy higher than the constitutional nation state.

This supports the view of Robert Kagan, who argued that the Europeans believe that a peaceful world is one governed by law, norms, and international agreements. In this world, power politics have become obsolete. Americans, by contrast, believe power-politics is needed to deal with Iraq.

Al Qaeda and other malign forces. Kagan argues however that the Europeans do not understand that their safety is ultimately guaranteed by American military power.2

To oversimplify, Europeans prefer international law and norms because they are weaker than the United States; the Americans turn to unilateralism because the US is the only remaining superpower. Consequently, European governments seek relative security whereas Americans seek absolute security. Generally speaking, Europeans try to manage the risks and minimise the problems whereas Americans seek military victory.

Europeans put more emphasis on intent; the United States stresses capability. Europe overemphasizes economics whilst the United States overemphasizes political and military issues.

As a result, Europeans and Americans differ fundamentally in the methods of dealing with contemporary security threats. Europeans put emphasis on "soft security", i.e. diplomacy, sanctions and incentives such as economic aid and peace support operations. Americans emphasize "hard security", i.e. limited wars of intervention to defend interests and promote regional security. Of course, the Americans got involved in diplomatic efforts and peace support operations, like those in the Balkans, but in most cases European allies asked them to. America’s security situation is less complex because, with the exception of the Civil War, no war has taken place on its soil. By definition US armed forces are expeditionary forces for deployment outside the Continental US to defend its interests.

Third, in contrast to most European powers, the United States needs an enemy to focus its foreign and security policy. The United States has a problem-solving, materialistic culture and without an enemy there is no problem to solve. American history is full of examples of its unwillingness and inability to organise its policy well until there is a specific threat. Watershed events in American history such as the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbour, the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea, the blockade of Berlin, the 1962 Cuba crisis and most recently, the September 11 attacks have had a catalysing effect on American society which mobilised political will to act decisively. European policymakers, probably with the exception of the British, underestimate the effects of these events since they tend to interpret American action as "unilateralist".

Hard-liners Prevail

With the inauguration of George W. Bush as President of the United States in 2001 the difference between Europe and the US became even more visible. Already in its first six months in office the Bush Administration moved towards a hard-line unilateralist position. It decided to deploy NMD; abrogated the 1972 ABM Treaty; rejected the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; refused to ratify the Rio Pact on biodiversity, opposed the ban on landmines, withdrew from the Biological Weapons Convention ratified by the United States in 1975; and withdrew from the treaty on the International Criminal Court (ICC) which had been signed by the previous President shortly before leaving office. These decisions conflicted with European views on the value of regimes and treaties.

On September 20, 2001, Bush declared war on terrorism during a speech to Congress. This speech is considered to be the most important statement on grand strategy since President Truman’s speech of March 12, 1947 when the United States declared to fight communism world-wide. After September 11 the Administration refused an offer from NATO to help, which had invoked Article 5 (its collective defence clause), for the first time in history. Bush reluctantly accepted British military aid during the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Next, the American President wanted immunity from the ICC, which

had been formed on July 1, 2002, for American peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.

For that reason, he threatened to block a UN mandate for the continued deployment of the International Police Task Force in the Balkans. This not only put the entire NATO mission in the Balkans at risk, but also led to severe criticism from America's closest allies. In the United States this policy was widely supported, because the ICC was believed to undermine American sovereignty. President Bush also put the nuclear issue on the agenda. He showed renewed interest in nuclear-armed missile interceptors in an NMD and low-yield nuclear ground penetrators to destroy hardened underground bunkers and tunnel complexes because conventional means would be less efficient. In this context the Nuclear Posture Review of January 8, 2002 caused much unease among allies because it explicitly called for a capability to destroy "hard and deeply buried targets".3

The real policy change came with the State of the Union address on January 29, 2002. Referring to North Korea, Iran and Iraq, Bush stated that "States like these constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic".4 Elaborating on the "axis of evil" speech, he announced a major policy shift during the Graduation Speech at West Point on June 1, 2002: "For much of the last century, America's defence relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment (...) Deterrence -the promise of massive retaliation against nations- means nothing against shadowy terrorists with no nation or citizen to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorists (...) our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive action, when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives".5 Thus, a new unilateralist, first strike policy of "defensive intervention" was announced. Vice president Dick Cheney underscored the need for such a strategy during a hawkish speech delivered to war veterans on August 26, 2002. He argued that pre-emption against Iraq was necessary because "there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbours". Quoting former foreign secretary Henry Kissinger, Cheney argued that this produces "an imperative for preventive action." In addition, "our job would be more difficult in the face of a nuclear armed Saddan Hussein".6 This policy change was confirmed with the 2002 National Security Strategy, published in September of that year.

Key officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, and Richard Perle and his colleagues of the now influential Defence Policy Board at the Pentagon support this grand strategy. Their thinking is clearly expressed in the Statement of Principles of the neoconservative Project for the New American Century. They gained victory over moderate officials who favoured an approach based on multilateralism, such as the then Secretary of Defence Colin Powell.

Bush' grand strategy is based on the principles mentioned above. It is based on the firm belief

6 D. Cheney, Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, Washington DC, 26 August 2002.
that the United States is powerful enough to go at it alone if this is in its best interest. According to the aforementioned Statement the United States must "shape a new century favourable to American principles", whilst national leadership must accept "the United States global responsibilities". According to the neoconservatists the strategy is aimed at maintaining America’s pre-eminence, precluding the rise of a great power, and shaping the international order in line with American principles and interests. Institutions, treaties and rules are merely obstacles to this grand strategy. The events of September 11 reinforced the arguments of those favouring this grand strategy. September 11 was seen as an attack on America and everything it stands for and, consequently, America’s vital interests are at stake. Indeed, this is a very powerful motivation to go alone and to adopt a new doctrine of "pre-emption" and "defensive intervention". For that reason the current administration is reforming its defence apparatus to allow the United States to project force from the continental US, rather than from overseas bases in Europe, Asia and the Middle East and to be able to deal with contemporary challenges, including asymmetrical warfare.

Balancing of Dominant American Power

According to the Realist school of thought in international relations coalitions, or great powers would try to counterbalance American hegemonic power in order to achieve freedom of action. There have been some attempts to counterbalance American power indeed. In the mid-1990’s, the Russian minister of foreign Affairs, Yevgeny Primakov, put forward his theory of "multipolarity". He asserted that a counterbalance to the United States was necessary and he emphasised the importance of co-operation with China, India, Iran, Iraq, Syria and other states that were not kindly disposed towards the West. Primakov believed that co-operating too closely with NATO would impede the formation of a new, multipolar world. By means of an active dialogue with NATO, Russia would have to prevent, however, that the alliance could harm its interests. The decision to agree to the establishment of the Permanent Joint Council should therefore be seen in this context.

Furthermore, the special relationship between Germany and Russia, the "strategic triangle" of Russia, China and India, the "strategic partnership" of Russia and China can all be explained as attempts to counterbalance the United States. The CFSP and the ESDP can also be explained as attempts to counterbalance American power and to come to terms with the new strategic reality.

So far, all attempts to counterbalance have failed. Moreover, the rise of an international order dominated by American power has not yet triggered a global backlash and the strategic rivalry and competitive balancing among the great powers is actually quite limited. There are two possible explanations. First, balancing involves economic, military and political costs, which neither Russia, China or the European Union are willing to bear. Both Russia and China lack resources, whilst the European Union is not willing to spend more on defence to give its ESDP more substance. In addition, the blossoming of the relationship between Russia and the United States was one of the unexpected changes resulting from 9/11. The Americans need the Russians for intelligence-gathering and cooperation in other areas; the Russians consider the war on terrorism a unique opportunity to turn Russia into the indispensable partner for the United States and to gain economically.

Second, unlike Russia or the United Kingdom, the United States is not a traditional imperial power trying to enlarge its territory. America’s "imperialism" is of an ideological nature seeing as

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7 Project for the New American Century, Statement of Principles, see <newamericancentury.com>.
the United States considers itself as the champion of democracy and the free market economy, whose values are universal and should be exported all over the world. Nevertheless, for other cultures, most notably the Islamic world, this behaviour could be threatening. It is one of the explanations that keeps the struggle between the United States and the militant representatives of political Islam alive. Interestingly, in the United States a debate is emerging on American imperialism. Conservative Realists, like Andrew J. Bacevich argue that the United States should go its own way. It should not have its foreign and security policy restricted by international law and institutions. Rather, an "empire of freedom" should be established, one that is ruled by the United States and founded on specific values and norms, such as democracy, free market economy and human rights. Thus a new unipolar order or Pax Americana will be created.

Revitalisation of the CFSP

Nevertheless, because of the geopolitical changes mentioned and the new realities of U.S. foreign policy, the European Union has no other choice but to strike a new transatlantic bargain, one that is based on a strategic vision of equal partnership. If Europeans fail to do so, Europe and America will drift apart, Europe will be marginalized and run the risk of becoming entangled in a security competition among Germany, France, the United Kingdom and possibly Italy. The first signs of this were visible during the Iraq crisis of late 2002 and early 2003.

In the present debate on European integration the consequences of American unilateralism is usually overlooked or ignored. The initiatives for the ESDP have not only been the result of Europe's ongoing process of integration, but were prompted by the worry about America's security commitment to Europe as well.

Many feared that European security would decouple as a result of probable American unilateralism and the consequences of the increased technological gap. EU Commissioner Chris Patten expressed this concern about American unilateralism explicitly in an internal paper for the European Commission. He asserted that the Union has the obligation to contribute to the increase of stability, because the world is one in which the United States increasingly acts without giving any thought to the concerns of others.

However, the Iraq crisis of early 2003 also demonstrated that disunity among the Europeans could undermine the integration process as well. Spain, Italy and most East Europeans supported the United States and the United Kingdom, whilst Germany and France tried to prevent them from a quick decision to go to war. Thus the Union and the further development of the CFSP and the ESDP are a prerequisite for political stability.

Unfortunately, the historical record of the CFSP, established with the Maastricht Treaty on the EU (TEU) of 1992, and the incorporation of the ESDP in the Amsterdam TEU of 1997 are not very impressive. The only significant Europe-led operation was the WEU mine countermeasure force deployed in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988 during the Iran-Iraq war. During the early 1990s the WEU carried out a naval operation to enforce the UN embargo against Iraq. Since 1992, the WEU has been involved in the enforcement of the UN embargo on the former Yugoslavia, first in the Adriatic Sea, then along the river Danube. In 1994 the WEU was requested to organise a police force in the EU-administered city of Mostar. During the late 1990s the Union asked WEU-support in planning the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) in Albania, organising a de-mining operation in Croatia, and monitoring the situation in Kosovo through imagery provided by the WEU Satellite Centre.

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A chance to carry out more demanding operations came in 1997. Albania was on the brink of civil war due to the collapse of its pyramid investment schemes. As the WEU refrained from organising a force it seemed that the organisation had no real role to play in the new Europe. There was evidently no political will to carry out a large-scale European-led military operation in what was considered a high-risk environment. For Dutch policy makers, this reinforced the belief that NATO should take the lead in the most demanding operations.

In March the Security Council authorised Italy to lead a 7,000-strong multinational peace force in Albania. This clearly undermined the development of the CFSP, as the “S” of security within the CFSP remained in fact a dead letter. Not surprisingly, the Union was criticised by the Americans for being unable to deal with security risks in their own backyard.

In the late 1990s Britain and France took the lead in the Union by deciding to revitalise the defence component within the CFSP. Being unable to join the European Monetary Union, the new Blair government chooses to show its dedication to European integration through an initiative in the field of the ESDP. In addition Blair strongly believed that the Union should be a "force for good", i.e. should contribute to a better world.  

At their meeting in December 1998 in St. Malo French president Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair agreed that the member states of the European Union should have a "capacity for autonomous European action". The importance of the St. Malo declaration is that it has complemented the debate on institutional matters with a discussion on capabilities.

The lack of such a European autonomous capacity was clearly demonstrated during the War on Kosovo in 1999. Operation Allied Force underlined the conclusion that Europe had no capability for autonomous action and should develop a force projection capability for operations in an out-of-area environment. The war on Kosovo showed that the countries of the European Union are largely dependent on the Americans for carrying out large-scale military operations. In practice the Americans led the air campaign. They carried out 65% of all the flights and, within that figure, 80 percent of all combat missions. In addition, the Americans dominated the command lines so that the air campaign was chiefly carried out according to an American recipe. This military-technological gap between Europe and the US has promoted the decoupling of European and American security, as coalition wars with the United States turn out to be a myth. The major reason for this gap is inefficiency in defence spending. While Union member states have a collective gross national product similar to the US, they spend only 65 % of what Washington spends on its armed forces. Due to poor co-ordination and basically Cold War force structures, Europeans get a disproportional low return from their budgets in key areas such as procurement and research and development. In some areas the European allies have collectively only 10 to 15% of the assets of the Americans.

Of importance to the development of the ESDP has been the fact that during operation Allied Force, NATO's much-praised political consultation mechanism turned out to function unsatisfactorily. Compared to its role as a military organisation, NATO played no role of importance as a political organisation. This led to considerable uneasiness among a number of smaller allies. Harmonisation of policies took place in the Contact Group for the Former Yugoslavia, the Quint (the five NATO members of the Contact Group) and the G-8 (the seven largest industrial nations and Russia). Apparently these were discussion clubs with honeyed decision-making processes, which were not crisis-resistant. The result was that institutions, which

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12 This view was expressed by Roger Liddle (Cabinet office London) during Paris Transatlantic Conference of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, 21–22 June 2001.

had been established for the prevention of conflicts and the management of crises, have actually become organisations that carried out the decisions of informal directorates. In practice the United States was in control. Consequently, many countries, particularly smaller ones like the Netherlands were left out. In some European capitals, including The Hague, this has led to the conclusion that decision-making should be less dependent on Washington and that Europe’s decision-making machinery concerning security matters should be improved.

During the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the European heads of state and government declared that the union must have the ability and the capacity to take decisions for autonomous action on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks as defined in the TEU (article 17), irrespective of actions taken by NATO. For that purpose they decided that the EU should have the necessary military forces and the appropriate capabilities in the area of intelligence, strategic transport, command and control. To decide and conduct effectively EU led military operations, the EU leaders realized that this requires a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning.

Thus during the 1999 Cologne summit the Heads of state and government already considered to hold regular formal and informal meetings of the defence ministers of the member states within the EU institutional framework, the creation of a Political and Security Committee of political and military experts as well as an EU Military Committee consisting of Military representatives that would make recommendations to the Political and Security Committee. The Union’s leaders also realized the need for an EU military staff including a situation centre and other resources such as a satellite centre and an institute for security studies.

These general guidelines for developing an autonomous capacity to take decisions and to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises were translated into more concrete decisions during the next European Council in Helsinki on 10–11 December 1999. The member states decided that in order to be able to carry out the Petersberg tasks as defined in the TEU, the Union must have at its disposal by the year 2003 a military force of 50,000 to 60,000 persons, with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities as well as logistics and other combat support services. Such a military force has to be deployed rapidly within 60 days and then to sustain for at least one year. This headline goal was supplemented by the decision to establish within the Council new political and military bodies that will enable the EU to take decisions on EU led operations and ensure the necessary political control and strategic direction of such operations.

Under the Portuguese Presidency the EU defence ministers started to implement the Helsinki decisions. An Interim Political and Security Committee as well as an Interim Military Body have been established. The temporary bodies started to operate from March 2000 in the Council Building. The Secretary General of the Council of the EU also appointed the head of the military experts seconded by the member states to the Council Secretariat. The Military experts help the Council in its work on the ESDP, and will form the nucleus of the future Military Staff. The implementation process continued under the French Presidency who organized on 20 November 2000 in Brussels a Force Generation Conference with the aim to establish a rapid reaction facility. During this meeting the EU defence and foreign ministers made a large leap forward in the EU determination to develop an autonomous military capability. Although they emphasized that such a capability does not involve the establishment of a European army, they agreed to commit the neces-

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sary military capabilities to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (EURRF) of 60,000 men, which constitutes a pool of more than 100,000 persons and 400 combat aircraft and 100 warships.\(^\text{17}\)

Regarding the implementation of the CFSP and the ESDP a major breakthrough occurred during the Council Meeting in Copenhagen on 12 December 2002, when the Council reached agreement on the "Berlin plus" arrangements and the implementation thereof. As the Union lacks military capabilities and planning facilities, these arrangements are a prerequisite for EU-led operations. Now that the arrangements are in place, the Union could start the planning to take over the peace keeping operation in FYROM and indicated its willingness to lead a military operation in Bosnia, following SFOR.

The original Berlin arrangements were signed in 1996. The arrangements committed NATO to provide the WEU assured access to NATO planning and command structures and access to NATO collectively owned assets and capabilities, including 18 AWACS planes and two not yet fully operational Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters. The arrangements also identified the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) to lead NATO planning and operational efforts in support of EU operations. The original arrangements did not solve all of the practical problems of transferring NATO’s collective assets to the WEU. Consequently, some EU member states asked Washington for a "Berlin plus" arrangements to guarantee a broader range of NATO support. The new arrangements spelled out the practicalities of "assured access". It also introduced a second category of "presumed access". In order to use the arrangements effectively, access to other, specific national assets is needed as well. For example, some member states may need access to satellite intelligence provided by others.

The arrangements mentioned will apply only to those EU member states which are also either NATO members or party to the Partnership for Peace, and which have concluded bilateral security arrangements with NATO. Not all member states participate in the CFSP and a common defence policy. Denmark made a specific provision that it will not participate, while Cyprus and Malta will not take part in the Union’s military operations with NATO assets once they have become members of the Union.

The Composition of the EURRF

Ground forces should be capable of executing the most demanding Petersberg tasks, i.e. large-scale sustained combat operations in a high-risk environment. This would include peacekeeping operations and the large-scale offensive operations for defending the Union’s interests. Regarding the Helsinki decision there were, however, many unanswered questions. Firstly, did the figure of 50,000–60,000 include support units? A rule of thumb suggests the following composition of armed forces:

- \(1/3\)rd logistics (in the pre-deployment phase logistics could be as high as 50%);
- \(1/3\)rd combat support forces;
- \(1/3\)rd manoeuvre or combat forces.

The Council decision suggested that the numbers mentioned included both logistic and combat support units. Thus, only 20,000 combat forces would be available. Such a fighting force would not be sufficient to be deployed in the most demanding Petersberg Tasks. For relatively large-scale sustained combat operations the EU would need at least 50,000 to 60,000 combat forces.

These conclusions were underpinned by the operations plans for crisis response operations in Kosovo which were developed by NATO from 1998 onwards. One of the 1998 plans covered the deployment of 23,000 troops for border control to prevent smuggling of weapons and ammunitions from Albania into Kosovo. Another plan, "B-minus", covered an intervention in Kosovo, re-

quiring some 75,000 troops. Subsequently, some 200,000 troops were needed to keep the province under control.

Secondly, what were the assumptions regarding sustainability? Member states should be able to sustain their contribution for one year. A distinction had to be made between sustained combat operations or war fighting and peace-support operations in a permissive environment with sporadic small-scale, low-intensity military actions. Regarding the former, most member states would not replace units which have suffered severe losses. As to the latter, member states are likely to replace their units after a deployment of six months. Consequently, the EU should double the figures mentioned. Given the nature of contemporary conflicts, it should be stated that a one-year sustainability period would probably be too low. In its 1993 White Paper the Dutch MOD took a three-year period as a starting point, requiring two reserve units for each unit deployed. However given the nature of contemporary crisis response operations, the 2000 White Paper no longer mentioned this limitation. The Dutch contribution would now be for an indefinite period, requiring at least three reserve units for each unit deployed. In conclusion, the real world might require at least three times the number of active forces mentioned. If not, a European-led force can only be deployed for a very limited period, requiring replacement by other (NATO) multinational formations. Consequently, a three-year sustainability period should be considered a minimum, requiring two replacement units for every single unit deployed.

The third question regarded the availability of forces. Only five of the fifteen EU member states had all-volunteer professional armed forces. The other states had mixed forces with an emphasis on conscripts. For political reasons, in most countries conscripts could only be deployed for collective defence. Other tasks, including the Petersberg tasks, require volunteers. Thus the availability of sufficient numbers of active forces for Petersberg tasks is substantially below the active strength of the EU member states.

In conclusion, a rapidly deployable armed force of 50,000–60,000, which includes logistics and combat support, cannot meet the headline goal. With such a force the EU could take over the KFOR operations from NATO in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but the full range of Petersberg tasks, including the most demanding, would require at least 50,000–60,000 combat forces, implying a pool of 150,000–200,000 troops. Depending on sustainability requirements, these numbers should be doubled or tripled. In conclusion, the present force catalogue of 100,000 indicates that sustainability is a major shortfall. As only a limited number of member states have all-volunteer armed forces, it is unlikely that EU member states will be able to implement sustainability requirements, despite the fact that 1.9 million Europeans are under arms.

The characteristics of European forces are as important as numbers. As it is impossible to predict where and in what circumstances a European force will be deployed, the crisis response task requires an expeditionary force with significant power projection capabilities. But most European allies not only rely largely on conscripts, they still invest mainly in territorial defence. As a consequence few European countries possess armed forces with power projection capabilities. For that reason it is necessary to identify European deficiencies. Only the British, the French and the Dutch seem well on track. Despite budget cuts and down-sizing, they have managed to restructure their armed forces.

In their Strategic Defence Review the British announced various measures such as the creation of a pool of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces drawn from the three services to provide a quickly deployable and militarily powerful cutting edge in crises of all kind. Other measures include new capabilities such as larger aircraft carriers.
proved strategic transport and deployable headquarters and communications. France and the Netherlands restructured along similar lines.

Germany in particular faces major challenges. It has one of the largest armed forces within Europe (333,000), but there is no sign of abolishing conscription or of an extensive restructuring of its armed forces. On the contrary, the Germans face budget cuts and a further down-sizing of the active and wartime strength of the Bundeswehr. One of the biggest obstacles for abolishing the draft is the consequences for Germany’s social system. Many young men that refuse to do military service will have to perform duties in social service. As a consequence Germany will lose cheap labour, with important consequences for society as a whole.

In addition, conceptual thinking in Germany lags behind that of other major players in the EU. The organisation and structure of the armed forces are still mainly oriented towards traditional defence tasks. Nevertheless, Germany has set up a 60,000-strong reaction force comprising volunteer conscripts, short-service and regular personnel of the three armed services. Of this total there are some 50,000 army and 12,300 air force personnel. The number of navy personnel included in reaction forces is not known. It is, however, believed that some 40% of the navy’s assets are assigned to crisis response operations. It seems that these reaction forces can only be deployed for Petersberg tasks at the lower end of the spectrum. For political reasons ordinary conscripts cannot be deployed out of the country and volunteer conscripts can only be deployed in traditional low-risk peacekeeping operations.

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An Expeditionary Force for the EU?

The EURRF will be deployed in distant places for peace support operations and to defend interests. Consequently, the more demanding Petersberg Tasks ("peace making and tasks of combat forces") require an expeditionary force with power projection capabilities. Flexibility through modularity, interoperability, sustainability, (strategic) mobility and firepower are key characteristics of such a force.

In actual fact, only a small portion of EU member’s military capabilities will be used for homeland defence, i.e. protection against international terrorism and consequence management. With the remaining forces the EU member states will contribute to coalitions of the willing and able, which are organized as Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The key question therefore is whether the EU could organize such a CJTF. The shortfalls of Europe’s forces are well known.

The EU has no integrated military command and has no disposal of an electronic command and communication system to conduct large-scale military peace keeping and combat operations. In addition, European forces have limited expeditionary capabilities as well.

In an attempt to correct these deficiencies some member states committed themselves to improve the quality of their armed forces through NATO. This was done during the NATO Washington summit in April 1999 that launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The DCI identified the following areas of improvement: deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; effective engagement; survivability of forces and infrastructure; as well as command and control and information systems. As most European members of NATO are also EU members, the DCI is of great importance for the improvement in European capabilities.

Many of the gaps and deficiencies identified in the DCI were also recognized in the Western European Union (WEU) "Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management.

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Operations”, of which the preliminary results were presented to the ministers during their meeting in Luxembourg on 23 November 1999. Although the WEU audit concluded that Europeans, in principle, have the available force levels and resources needed to prepare and implement military operations over the whole range of Petersberg tasks, a considerable effort is necessary to strengthen the European capabilities.

According to the WEU audit the collective capabilities in the areas of strategic intelligence and strategic planning need improvement. Regarding forces and operational capabilities improvement in areas such as availability, deployability, strategic mobility, sustainability, survivability, interoperability and operational effectiveness, as well as multinational, Joint Operation and Force Head Quarters (HQ), with particular reference to C3-capabilities and deployability of Force HQ.

The improvements of Europe’s armed forces were not very impressive. During the 2001 spring meeting of the NATO defence ministers, a report was tabled indicating that the NATO allies would fully implement less than 50 percent of the force goals that was agreed to in the DCl.21 A fresh attempt was made with the Union’s Capabilities Improvement Conference of November 2001, which resulted in a European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), with the aim to improve the capabilities of the EURRF. The ECAP is an agreed plan to remedy these shortcomings. The ECAP is based on the following principles:

- The defence apparatus of the various EU-countries leave room for rationalisation, therefore enhanced effectiveness and efficiency through increased cooperation can be achieved;
- The required capabilities can be acquired by combining efforts, initiating national projects or developing new projects and initiatives;
- Avoiding unnecessary duplication with NATO, by ensuring cooperation and transparency will enable efficiency;
- Sustaining political will by creating public support.

Expeditionary warfare requires the EU member states to invest in a number of areas. A major challenge is how Europeans could spend their defence budgets more efficiently. The solution is the procurement of collective European capacities and improvement of specific national capabilities. Regarding collective capabilities the following areas need improvement or could be developed:

- **Strategic intelligence and information pooling.** The present EU centre should have better access to commercial and military high-resolution satellite imagery. The United States possess some 65 military satellites, the Europeans only 5. As it is unlikely that the EU-countries develop a comparable satellite system, they should put more emphasis on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Human Intelligence (humint). Due to the characteristics of contemporary conflict, humint is of equal or even greater importance than satellite imagery. The EU-countries could exchange data gathered by UAV and humint for satellite imagery collected by the United States.

- **Deployability and mobility.** During the NATO summit it was decided to begin implementing a Multinational Joint Logistics Centre concept by the end of 1999. In addition, EU nations could pool their logistical assets, such as strategic lift capability. As it is unlikely that Europeans will procure additional lift capabilities soon, the EU could prepare the establishment of a European transport command ("Eurolift") which should review and improve arrangements for military use of commercial strategic lift assets. Europe lacks heavy air lift capabilities, such as the American C-5, C-17 and C-141 aircraft. Moreover, the Europeans have limited military sea lift capabilities, such as large roll-on-roll-off ships (US 12, Europe 2) and fast sea lift ships (US 8, Europe 0).22 As the Europeans will focus mainly on contingencies on their own

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own continent they should put more emphasis on road and rail transport capabilities and light transport aircraft such as the C-130. The recent deal on the procurement of A400M aircraft is a significant step forward.

- **Sustainability and logistics.** Logistics include enhanced interoperability through increased standardisation of material and procedures and the implementation of common standards, with special emphasis on medical interoperability. European nations should give high priority to logistic support capability requirements, including shore-based facilities, to sustain their forces effectively.

- **Command, control and communications (C3).** The 1999 NATO summit decided to develop a C3 system architecture by 2002 to form a basis for an integrated Alliance core capability allowing interoperability with national systems. The EU-countries should harmonise their efforts in this field, to ensure that this C3 system is compatible or can also be used for EU Operation – or EU Force Headquarters.

- **Combat-search and rescue.** During Operation Allied Force most of the CSAR capabilities were provided by the Americans. In Europe only the French have any CSAR capability. The EU could establish an European CSAR capability.

- **Air-to-air refuelling.** Operation Allied Force has demonstrated that Europe has very limited air-to-air refuelling capabilities. Most of the capabilities were provided by the United States. Sustainability requires enhanced European capabilities. One option is to develop a European tanker capacity of the required 350 aircraft. As a first step Europeans should pool their 52 tankers. With respect to national capabilities a de facto role specialisation has emerged between the Europeans and the Americans. Consequently, a European capability for autonomous action requires enhanced capabilities in the field of:

  - **Suppression of enemy air defences** and support jamming, including associated stand-off weapon and electronic warfare;
  - **Air defence systems,** including ground-based air defence capabilities and a more effective capability against theatre ballistic missiles and cruise-missiles;
  - All-weather precision guided munitions (PGMs) and non lethal weapons to reduce collateral damage and risks for own troops;
  - Stand-off weaponry, such as cruise-missiles;
  - Composition of forces. European forces lack sufficient engineers and deployable medical units;

- **Readiness and availability.** European NATO countries have almost 2 million men and women under arms, but are unable to sustain an operation involving more than 40,000 over a period of years.

Finally, there should be (deployable) European multinational force Headquarters. A European headquarter will command an ad hoc Combined Joint Task Force composed of Forces Answerable to the EURRF. Enhancing the deployability of (elements of ) these headquarters is a prerequisite for expeditionary operations. This requires investments both in equipment (e.g. deployable Command, Control, Communications and Computers: C4) and personnel. Additional spending on Intelligence and Strategic Reconnaissance (ISTAR) is required as well.

At present only the Regional Headquarters North and South, NATO's two land-based CJTF headquarters, are capable of commanding ground and air operations. Transforming the three headquarters mentioned into CJTF headquarters requires in particular investments in additional C3. For reasons of sustainability at least three EU headquarters should be identified. The Eurocorps, and the bi-national German-Netherlands Army Corps will be available.
The New Requirements: Towards Expeditionary Capabilities?

As long as the shortfalls mentioned are not remedied, the Union has very limited capabilities for expeditionary warfare, i.e. capabilities to conduct high tempo, large scale conventional and unconventional combat operations in distant parts of the world. Indeed, the Union cannot deploy forces rapidly. It relies too much on conventional munitions (i.e. dumb bombs), whilst precision guided munitions and stand-off weaponry will reduce both collateral damage and the risks for air crews. The Union has few additional combat ready divisions, sea based air power and marine and air expeditionary forces available to meet sustainability requirements. Consequently, the Union lacks escalation dominance, which is a prerequisite for successful combat operations.

A useful approach to force transformation is to identify essential operational capabilities (EOCs). These are:

- Timely availability;
- Validated intelligence;
- Deployability and mobility;
- Effective engagement;
- Command and control;
- Logistic support;
- Survivability and force protection.

Together, these seven EOCs form a "military capability". These EOC’s must be seen in relation to developments such as Effect Based opverations (EBO), Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and expeditionary operations, which put specific new emphasis on certain EOC’s. For instance, NCW puts an emphasis on validated intelligence and high quality command and control.

Some first general scenario analyses reveal the following shortfalls for the EURRF:

**Timely availability**
- High readiness, highly mobile, lethal forces, equipped and trained for missions in complex terrain;
- Special Operations Forces, for covert and overt search and destroy operations;

**Validated intelligence**
- Strategic reconnaissance (satellites);
- Intelligence cooperation;
- IMINT/SIGINT collection, and early warning and distant detection (ISTAR);
- Theatre surveillance and reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition and Human Intelligence (HUMINT);

**Deployability and (strategic) mobility**
- Strategic air and sea lift capabilities, with emphasis on wide-body aircraft and Roll on/Roll off ships;
- Air-to-air refuelling;

**Effective engagement**
- Precision guided munitions and stand off weaponry, including cruise missiles, and attack helicopters;

**Command and control**
- Secure and deployable C4 (Command, Control, Communications, Computers) with ISTAR (Intelligence Surveillance, Tracking, Acquisition and Reconnaissance) capabilities;

**Logistic support**
- Tactical lift capabilities, notably transport helicopters;
- Tracking and tracing systems;

**Survivability and force protection**
- Suppression of Enemy Air Defences;
- NBC protection and detection;
- Combat Search and Rescue.

The first priority is C4ISTAR and operational command and control, which form the backbone of each and every mission. The second priority is NBC protection and detection. The third priority is lift. A force can only be expeditionary if sufficient strategic air and sea lift is available. A tracking and tracing system is a prerequisite for effective logistics and reinforces the Union’s rapid deployment capacity. These elements are minimum requirements to carry out peace keeping operations and to provide the framework for more demanding operations. The latter however, requires additional improvements. Conventional and unconventional expeditionary warfare re-
quires force projection capabilities, including precision guided munitions, stand-off weaponry, air-to-air refuelling, and tactical lift. Unconventional warfare operations emphasize Special Operations Forces.

During the NATO summit in Prague, November 2002, the Prague Capabilities Commitment resulted in a capacity package aimed at improving European capabilities. This new commitment was deemed necessary because both the objectives of the DCI and some elements of the ECAP had proven to be unattainable. The following initiatives could remedy some of the European shortfalls listed above:

- All deployable NATO forces with 30 days or higher readiness-requirements will be equipped with nuclear, biological and chemical defence;
- A NATO air ground surveillance system must be completed by 2004;
- A full set of deployable and secure C4-systems for deployable HQs will be developed;
- The stock of precision guided munitions will be increased by 30 per cent by 2005;
- Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) will be increased by 50 per cent by 2005;
- Strategic air lift will be increased by 50 per cent by 2004;
- Air-to-air refuelling will be increased by 50 per cent by 2005;
- Deployable logistics and combat service support will be increased by 25 per cent by 2005.

There are new ideas to remedy shortfalls as well. Firstly, member states will lead consortiums to remedy specific shortfalls. Secondly, pooling of assets is another innovation. In it, a pool of jointly owned and operated jamming pods for electronic warfare, tankers, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) will be created. Thirdly, a short term solution will be the commercial lease of assets, such as American C-17 heavy lift aircraft. The EURFF will greatly benefit from all of these initiatives, provided that they will materialize.

Austria and the EURRF

A Conceptual Approach

During the Cold War, NATO members balanced their armed forces collectively against those of the opponent, i.e. the Warsaw Pact. Neutral nations could make an assessment of the capabilities, required to maintain their territorial integrity in case of an emerging threat. After the end of the Cold War both the need to balance against opposing forces and the need to defend one’s country against conventional attacks no longer dominated defence planning. This section provides a conceptual approach to force planning, which starts with defining the desired force posture; it includes observations on Austria’s current position and challenges decision-making concerning its future force structure in relation to Austria’s political ambitions as a player in the international security arena.

Conceptually, the characteristics, size and composition of a nation’s armed forces depend on:

- The security environment, i.e. the nature of the security challenges;
- The level of political ambitions;
- The operational context in which force elements will be brought in.

The security environment, the political ambitions and the operational context define the force posture, defined as the characteristics, size and composition of a nation’s armed forces. Together they are the elements of capabilities driven defence planning, which differs considerably from threat based planning.

The Security Environment

Since the end of the Cold War a new security environment has emerged. Moreover, since 1990 the changes in the security environment are evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The security situation presents direct and indirect challenges, requiring different responses:
- Regional instabilities and conflicts could pose an indirect threat to Austria. These crises could take place in the vicinity of Austria, i.e. the Balkans. But crises in the Maghreb, the Middle East and the Gulf area could have an important impact as well. In general, crises could affect Austria’s security interests and thus undermine the stability and well-being of the state. Security interests are mostly of an economic and socio-political nature. Economic interests could be affected if trade routes and access to vital raw materials are denied. Sociopolitical stability could be undermined if regional crises result in massive floods of refugees, seeking asylum in Austria. It is difficult to envision a scenario whereby a regional crisis poses a direct conventional security threat to Austria.

- Terrorism and criminal activities could pose a direct unconventional threat to Austria’s security. Catastrophic terrorism probably is the gravest danger for industrialized democracies, like Austria. Terrorists could use weapons of mass destruction, especially biological and radiological weapons, or other unconventional means for mass destruction or mass disruption, including commercial airliners, but also multiple, well co-ordinated detonations of conventional bombs. Actually, terrorism forms the only existing direct threat to the territorial integrity of Austria, albeit on a different scale than the classical threat of a strategic attack with land and aerial forces.

What follows from these observations is that a small, but important portion of Austria’s armed forces is needed for homeland security. In fact, given the nature of Austria’s armed forces, homeland requirements could be the starting point for a requirements review. Homeland security tasks could involve:

- Protection of critical infrastructure and vital objects with infantry;
- Special covert and overt operations to find, capture, eliminate and destroy terrorists.

In addition, the tasks of Austria’s armed force can be derived from the international security situation. Crises abroad will be dealt with by international coalitions of the willing and able for stability or combat operations. Depending on its political ambitions and financial restrictions Austria could make troops available for international stability operations. Tasks could include:

- Disaster relief;
- Peace keeping;
- Second generation peace keeping.

Finally, Austria could make available troops for more demanding combat operations. Tasks then could include:

- Peace enforcing, and
- Sustained combat operations to protect interests.

Another characteristic of the current international security environment is the fact that threats, risks and interests may require military operations at large distances from the homeland. This puts a premium on deployability and high-readiness for both stability operations and high intensity combat operations.

Of great importance for the characteristics of Austria’s armed forces is the type of conflict they will have to deal with. Conventional combat operations, involving regular units such as standing forces require combined arms operations. With regard to ground forces, the brigade has been considered the basic building block for combined arms operations. However, as will be seen, due to new operational concepts and advances in technology the battalion is likely to be the future basic building block. Moreover, combined arms operations will most likely be conducted in the framework of an international task force with several countries contributing through specific modular capabilities.

Unconventional combat operations do not require combined arms operations. Counter-insurgencies, counter-terror and counter-guerrilla operations require specific combat skills with small units. The basic building block is the battalion, but
most likely smaller units, down to platoon level, will carry out operations independently. Special Operations Forces for covert and overt operations; Specialized Forces including air manoeuvrable units are key assets. Specialized Forces could, for example seize an airfield to serve as a base of operations for Special Operations Forces. Although

Table 1: Political choices and military capabilities capable of independent operations, a trend is observed that Special Forces increasingly operate in tandem with air surveillance - and fighter aircraft.

In sum, today’s security environment requires as a minimum forces for homeland security and additionally, depending on Austria’s political ambitions, further capabilities for stability operations and combat operations. Of great importance is the distinction between conventional and unconventional operations. Except for homeland security, all tasks mentioned, including counter terror operations, are covered by the so called Petersberg-tasks of the European Union (“humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making”).

Political Ambitions

Defining political ambitions is both the most controversial and most important step to define the required force posture. Indeed, in the end the composition and size of Austria’s armed forces depend on the roles and tasks envisioned by the political leadership. The range for political choices is summarized in table 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political ambition</th>
<th>Contribution to</th>
<th>Type of force required</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Homeland defence</td>
<td>In place force</td>
<td>Back up for police force and local authorities (intelligence, search and arrest / destroy); border control; control of vital objects; consequence management; air defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Peace keeping operations</td>
<td>Peace keepers</td>
<td>Chapter VI peace support operations in a friendly environment; observation; control; interpositioning; demilitarisation; mine clearance; peace maintenance; military assistance. Disaster relief and humanitarian aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low/medium</td>
<td>2nd generation peace keeping and defensive combat operations</td>
<td>Expeditionary force with defensive capabilities</td>
<td>Tasks mentioned above plus Chapter VII peace support operations with in place forces: protection of population, separation of forces; limiting freedom of movement; embargo’s and sanctions; incidental coercive measures; escalation control; military assistance. Defensive operations: air defence (ground based and air borne)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium/high</td>
<td>Peace enforcement and offensive conventional combat operations</td>
<td>Expeditionary force with limited offensive capabilities</td>
<td>Tasks mentioned above plus Chapter VII peace support operations: (humanitarian) intervention; evacuation; Joint manoeuvre operations; ground attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>War fighting, including counter terror/insurgency</td>
<td>Full spectrum expeditionary force</td>
<td>All operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Peace keeping operations are impartial operations carried out with the consent of the parties involved. They are usually based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter; force will only be used for self defence. Operations, most likely interpositioning, take place in a friendly environment.

2) Peace keeping operations are impartial operations carried out with the consent of the parties involved. They are usually based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter; force will only be used for self defence. Operations, most likely interpositioning, take place in a friendly environment.

3) Peace support operations are all operations to keep and bring peace and stability.

### Table 2: Selected Economic Indicators (2001 figures)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Defence Expenditures*</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
<th>GDP**</th>
<th>GDP ranking</th>
<th>GDP per capita**</th>
<th>Trade Balance ***</th>
<th>Export value***</th>
<th>Import value***</th>
<th>Out-of-EU export</th>
<th>Out-of-EU import</th>
<th>NATO member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.471</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td>271.2</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td>23,300</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>20.966</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>12,97</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>18,800</td>
<td>+15.9</td>
<td>242.4</td>
<td>226.6</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>6.257</td>
<td>1.70%</td>
<td>503.9</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>23,900</td>
<td>+25.6</td>
<td>211.7</td>
<td>186.1</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1.167</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>20th</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* million USD
** in 1995 prices and exchange rates


*** billion USD
A number of steps could be taken to define political ambitions. First, Austria could decide that its political ambitions must reflect its position in the world.

From table 2 several assertions can be made. First of all, Austria is a high-income country with a significant out-of-EU export base. Although its trade volume is not as high as Italy’s or that of the Netherlands, its out-of-EU exports, as well as imports, are more than one-third of total exports and imports. This observation is in line with the earlier statement that Austria – as the 16th wealthiest country in the world – is economically benefited by a stable international environment sustaining secure markets. Secondly, Austrian GDP per capita is similar to the Dutch figure. Standard of living can therefore be expected to be equal. While Dutch trade-figures are substantially larger, the fact that the two countries are Western liberal democracies with similar living standards should result in a comparable stance concerning international security.

Being a highly developed industrialized state, Austria has considerable interest in global stability. In practice there is a clear connection between the ranking of a nation in economic terms and its political ambitions. The prosperity of a highly developed, industrialized liberal democracy greatly depends on world stability. Instability could threaten trade routes, markets and access to natural (mineral) resources. Indeed, the stability and security of modern industrialized states is highly dependent on the peaceful and stable relations among states so that its interests will not become jeopardized. Consequently, as a matter of self-interest modern industrialized states, at the minimum should contribute to peace keeping operations to maintain the stability in a given area. A variation to this is that Austria may contribute to more demanding second generation peace keeping, i.e. operations in a complex environment, involving elements of enforcement.

Nevertheless, modern industrialized states have a certain obligation to contribute to the collective defence of interests. If not, they will be seen as free riders. The choice to be made is whether to contribute to defensive or offensive combat operations, or even to full spectrum operations, including unconventional warfare operations against terrorists. Most small and medium sized industrialized powers have modest means to contribute to full spectrum operations, e.g. with niche capabilities. They are most likely to contribute with defensive means to combat operations or offensive means involving limited risks, such as fighter aircraft.

In general, political ambition is the expression of the risks the leadership is willing to take in defending the interests of the nation, to contribute to international peace and security and/or to contribute to the promotion of the international rule of law.

These considerations could be translated in defence expenditures. In terms of GDP, Austria falls roughly in between the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, however its defence expenditures are substantially disproportionate to this ratio. The Czech Republic spends 2.2% of GDP on Defence, The Netherlands 1.7%, while Austria spends 0.8%. Consequently, in absolute figures the Czech and Austrian expenditures are almost equivalent. If Austria is to raise its defence expenditure, to a more comparable figure of 2%, in line with the other European states mentioned in chart 1, this requires a budget increase to about $US 3.5 billion. Such an increase would be necessary if Austria chooses to raise its political ambitions to medium/high. If Austria decided upon an even higher level of political ambition, a further increase of the budget might be required.

Second, Austria could decide on the size of its armed forces by defining the number of building blocks it intends to contribute simultaneously to international coalitions. Where it is no longer the external threat that defines the size of the armed forces; but national political ambitions and requirements for homeland security. A capabilities-oriented defence planning approach asks for:
• The basic size of the building block. Internationally accepted as a basic building block both for peace support and combat operations is the battalion or an air force equivalent, i.e. a fighter aircraft squadron.

• The number of military operations Austria is willing to carry out, including the requirements for homeland security. The Netherlands, for example, decided in 1993 to be able to simultaneously contribute to four operations in four different theatres. This was considered "appropriate" given the Netherlands' place in the world, its economic performance and defence budget. For Austria, with roughly 60 per cent of the Dutch GNP, two or three operations similarly would seem appropriate. Yet, for such a level of ambition, broad political consensus is necessary.

• The sustainability requirements, i.e. rotation schemes and the duration of the contribution to an international coalition of the willing and able. For example, and primarily for budgetary reasons the Netherlands decided in 1993 to be able to sustain contributions for three years and to replace troops at six month-intervals, assuming that after three years another nation would take over the Dutch contribution. To sustain such contributions three units are required in all with for each deployed unit one unit recuperating and a second unit preparing for a second term. In practice however, deployments last longer than three years, and "quasi"-indefinite deployments require three or four units to back-up a deployed unit. For that reason, it was decided to enlarge the number of personnel in certain categories.

Table 3 shows the consequences of capabilities oriented planning. The basic unit for land forces is a battalion; the basic unit for air forces is the squadron.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution to a coalition with</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Duration of unit deployment</th>
<th>Requires a total strength of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 unit</td>
<td>18 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>3 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 units</td>
<td>18 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>6 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 unit</td>
<td>Indefinite</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>5 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 units</td>
<td>Indefinite</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>10 units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Highly developed states with advanced armed forces could opt for a "first in, first out" or an "early in, early out" solution. Both require an eighteen month deployment. The "first in, first out"-approach requires early entry forces capable of dealing with complex situations in a hostile environment. Only the major European powers seem capable of providing those forces and are willing to carry out risky operations. The "early in, early out"-approach requires advanced forces for deployment in a complex, but relatively stable situation. This is the preferred option for most major European states. And this could be the preferred option for Austria as well. An important reason for this is that highly trained advanced units will lose their basic skills when deployed for an indefinite period of time. Less developed countries with low tech armed forces could opt for contributions to indefinite deployments. This suggests a de facto division of labour between states with different levels of development and consequently with different military capabilities.

As a third step, Austria will have to decide on the nature of its contribution. A way to formulate this issue is to make a decision on the diversity of building blocks Austria wants to include in its armed forces. As it is impossible to develop a full spectrum force, Austria could decide on the nature of its contribution according to different levels of political ambitions. For example, Austria could contribute to a multinational full spectrum force with specific niche capabilities. Here, coalition partners could make a difference. Niche capabilities provide political visibility and consequently, provide some leverage to influence the decision making process during the course of the operation. One example of such a niche capability
is Austria’s present commitment to the Capabilities Commitment Catalogue of an NBC unit, which is also specialized in urban search and rescue. To aid the analysis on this issue, it can be helpful to use lists of current European military shortfalls and capabilities surpluses.

In sum, in the absence of a clear threat, politicians should express their ambitions which form the framework for force planning by the experts. Without such a clear expression of political ambitions, defining Austria’s future force posture is almost impossible. Consequently, force transformation will be difficult and Austria’s armed forces and their contributions may become accidental within the European Union.

The Operational Context
The characteristics of the building blocks depend on the operational context. As only major powers may carry out military operations independently, modularity is the overriding principle regarding force structuring for most nations. Modules or units will be made available for international coalitions. This implies that the higher levels (division and above) no longer have specific command functions.

If Austria contributes to peace keeping operations, it may provide a number of battalions with conscripts or volunteers. However, the participation in combat operations requires Austria to take into account the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). New technologies make new kinds of operations possible. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and parallel operations are manifestations of this RMA with Effects Based Operations (EBO) as a critical enabler. The United States already used elements of this new method of warfare during the first Gulf War in 1991. In the next decade these concepts were further expanded. Operations Enduring Freedom (2001 – ) and Iraqi Freedom (2003) demonstrated that the Americans were able to gain clear and quick victories with astonishingly low numbers of friendly casualties. This truly is a revolution in warfare: new technologies produce new operational concepts, which in turn, enhance the efficacy of military operations in such a way that quick victories with few friendly casualties can be achieved. European armies only have very modest capabilities for this revolutionary way of war. This undermines not only transatlantic interoperability, but cooperability as well. As a result, NATO embarked on a project called the NATO Response Force (NRF); a rapidly deployable force, trained and equipped for this new way of warfare. It is a European test bed for NCW and EBO, meant to spearhead force transformation in Europe.

As most EU-NATO countries will fulfil their commitments to the NRF and the Union’s Rapid Reaction Force with the same units, this development will undoubtedly have an important impact on the force transformation of non-NATO EU countries. Consequently, if Austria wants to contribute to future combat operations it has no choice than to take this development into account and make NCW and EBO a focus for force transformation. This requires substantial investment in compatible command, control and communications and intelligence (C3I) to plug into the network, precision guided munitions to achieve desired effects on the battlefield, etc. NCW can also influence the Austrian force structure in the sense that NCW-empowered ground forces rely increasingly on airborne sensors and offensive air support. This affects the required organic fire support and intelligence assets of national units. In addition it requires high levels of integrated international training in order for units to operate according to the same doctrine which is informed by NCW tenets. A separate but related trend is towards light logistics which enables small forces to operate autonomously and to be transported rapidly over large distances.

Austria’s Present Capabilities
Annex 2 provides some of the details of Austria’s present force structure used by the authors of this report. Such a force covers Austria’s homeland security requirements. With its land forces Austria...
can contribute to a multinational peace force, but – except for some niche capabilities – cannot contribute to more demanding second generation peace keeping operations. This qualifies Austria’s political ambitions as "low", and with regard to some specific capabilities as "low/medium", as the air force may contribute to offensive operations with ground attack aircraft and air-to-air missiles.

This observation is confirmed by the nature of Austria’s present deployments in Afghanistan (ISAF), Kosovo (KFOR) and Syria (UNDOF). This is also confirmed by Austria’s contribution to the European Capabilities Action Program (ECAP) (Annex 3). Besides, concerning the contribution to the improvement of infantry, Austria’s contribution to the ECAP is mainly in the field of logistics and protection. Finally, this observation is confirmed by Austria’s contribution to the Capabilities Commitment Catalogue. Although a mechanized infantry battalion for peace enforcement operations has been committed, it may be questionable whether Austria is politically willing to contribute to such a high risk operation.

The New Requirements: Homeland Security

Catastrophic terrorism is a strategic, rather than a tactical threat. A tactical threat requires a response of the police, national intelligence services and national law enforcement agencies. Due to the magnitude of the terrorism-threat, homeland defence requires a response by the police and the armed forces. It also requires international intelligence co-operation. Regarding the military means, a small number of Special Operations Forces is needed for counter terror operations. Additional general purpose forces are required to protect vital objects, such as power plants, government buildings and vital industrial facilities. In case of an air threat, member states may need to keep a small number of combat aircraft and air defence assets on alert to defend against an "11 September scenario". The threat of weapons of mass destruction, notably chemical and biological weapons, necessitates measures to manage the consequences of such attacks. In summary, homeland security requires:

- General purpose forces;
- NBC units for protection and consequence management;
- Ground based air defence assets;
- Fighter aircraft.

The New Requirements: Expeditionary Operations

Assuming that Austria has the political will to contribute to expeditionary operations the restructuring of Austria’s land forces is required, i.e. a transformation from territorially oriented armed forces to expeditionary armed forces. As a frame of reference for force transformation the essential operational capabilities (EOCs) can be used (see also Part 1). The EOC’s are:

- Timely availability;
- Validated intelligence;
- Deployability and mobility;
- Effective engagement;
- Command and control;
- Logistic support;
- Survivability and force protection.

Translating the EOC’s into military requirements for its land forces, Austria is to put more emphasis on capabilities needed to project force over great distances. This requires, as a minimum:

- Advanced logistics, with emphasis on strategic lift;
- Interoperable Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4);
- Deployable combat power, i.e. emphasis on lightly equipped forces with nevertheless, "considerable" combat power.

Austria is through its air force already able to contribute to expeditionary combat operations. From the EOC’s the following additional requirements are needed:

- Air-to-air refuelling;
- Precision guided munitions;
- Deployable C4.
Precision guided munitions will reduce the number of sorties, thus greatly reducing the logistical requirements for deployed combat aircraft. Reducing the number of sorties will also reduce the risks to the pilots.

**Conscription**

A sensitive issue in force composition is the role of conscripts. The fundamental political choice to be made is whether Austria wishes to contribute to more demanding operations. As has been argued above, Austria’s contribution to a multinational expeditionary force depends on its political ambitions which require amongst others, a major political decision concerning conscription. Most NATO and EU member states agree on the principle that expeditionary combat operations require volunteers.

Only for some low-risk peace keeping, humanitarian aid tasks and some specific homeland defence tasks reserve forces and conscripts can be used. In practice, conscripts cannot be used for expeditionary combat operations. For that reason, in many member states a debate has emerged about transforming forces based on conscription into smaller, all-volunteer armed forces.

For example, the Netherlands abolished conscription when a restructuring of the armed forces for expeditionary operations was deemed necessary. Dutch reliance on heavy material was reduced as well. For example, the number of tanks and other armour was sharply reduced. At the same time more emphasis was put on combat power that could be deployed easily in distant places and was logistically less demanding. Land forces received new Patria armoured vehicles to improve protection of employed troops and to increase mobility.

This is a choice Austria will face if it decides to contribute to more demanding, combat operations. What should be taken into account however, is that the transformation from a conscript to an all-volunteer armed force could result in a reduction of 40 per cent of the available personnel in some categories. Constraints in the budget and the labour market will preclude a 1:1 replacement of conscripts by volunteers.

**Co-operability**

Since deployments will be based upon international coalitions of the willing and able, special emphasis must be put on interoperability and co-operability with the most likely partners. This process has led to the establishment of a number of multilateral forces in Europe, including the Eurocorps and the 1st German – Dutch Corps. Multinationality is an important instrument to harmonize the defence efforts of different countries. This process is guided through the NATO Defence Planning Process and the Planning and Review Process.

Nevertheless, the issue of co-operability should be high on the agenda. The procurement of interoperable elements of C4ISTAR should be prioritized.

In sum, a decision to join international coalitions for more demanding operations requires a restructuring of Austria’s armed force, especially the transformation to an all volunteer, professional armed force, with emphasis on highly mobile, deployable infantry with considerable firepower and air forces which are interoperable with selected partners. Figure 4 summarizes critical decisions to be made concerning force structure composition in relation to the political ambition level to contribute to and participate in what types of operations.

Table 4: Force requirements and critical decisions
Towards a Balanced Force Structure

Setting priorities and making choices in defence planning, force restructuring and investments under budgetary constrained conditions is fraught with conceptual, political and bureaucratic difficulties. Nevertheless, it is possible to derive sound and relevant policy guidelines and recommendations in response to the question how the Austrian armed forces could and should be (re)structured commensurate with the developing international security political context.

In the budgetary sphere, the challenge is to find room for investments within the set budget. Here force rationalization and efficiency measures can offer some remedy. The level of manpower involved in maintaining and operating systems should be considered critically. Equally, the number of bases, depots, barracks and other facilities that require maintenance and overhead staff such as guards, should be critically reviewed so as to optimally exploit the military infrastructure.

Of a more conceptual nature is the following list of discriminators that shed light on the continued relevancy of certain military capabilities, on shortfalls, on prioritisation of operational requirements, etc. They address the political dimension, operational requirements, international ambitions and plans and national budgetary realities. Each factor can give a particular emphasis in recommendation, some overlap, some follow from higher level discriminators and some reinforce each other. The weight accorded to each discriminator is in the end however a function of political priorities. The list is not exhaustive, some elements have been mentioned before, but nevertheless offers some dominant and relevant factors that generally shape the size, structure, mix and readiness of armed forces.

- **Political ambition level**, which is an autonomous discriminator for defence planning on the one hand, for it is dependent on Austria’s foreign and security policy. On the other hand it is a function of current Austrian military capabilities and the feasibility of, and costs involved with force restructuring proposals. If the desire to participate in certain military operations, which now fall outside of the capabilities of the Austrian armed forces, proves too costly in reality, the political ambition level may require adjustment.

- **Expeditionary orientation** (or lack thereof) of units, systems, capabilities. Considering the importance of the capability to operate on short notice in remote regions puts a premium on units, capabilities, systems and restructuring initiatives that foster mobility, reach, deployability, maintainability, small logistic footprint, etc. Units, systems et al. that do not meet the criteria for expeditionary operations diminish in value in the current international environment, but may have residual value for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of force required</th>
<th>Critical decisions / assets land forces</th>
<th>Critical decisions / assets air forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-place forces for homeland defence</td>
<td>Enlargement of capabilities for consequence management and ground based air defence</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace keeping force</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expeditionary force with defensive capabilities</td>
<td>Deployable units will be all volunteer, professional; HQ element at brigade level and deployable C3; tactical lift, helicopters (platoon size)</td>
<td>Deployable C3; Eurofighter, air defence role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expeditionary force with limited offensive capabilities</td>
<td>Tactical lift, helicopters (company size), strategic lift, fixed wing (idem); plug-in C4ISTAR; weaponizing of Black Hawk; organic logistics (battalion size)</td>
<td>Eurofighter, ground attack or swing role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full spectrum expeditionary force</td>
<td>Restructuring of land forces for netted operations for conventional and unconventional warfare; further development of niche capabilities (...)</td>
<td>Precision guided / stand off munitions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
homeland defence and low intensity peace keeping operations.

• **Net-centricity.** Units and systems that participate in expeditionary operations, which will most likely be led by a large lead-nation, need a high level of interoperability, i.e., they must be able to be plugged into the information network. Units that cannot contribute to the network structure and cannot benefit from it are diminishing in value, in particular for medium to high intensity operations. This may also be applied at unit level. Certain functions, such as intelligence and fire support will most likely be provided by a combined and joint array of pooled capabilities within the international task force. National ground contingents neither will, nor need to be always supported by national organic helicopters, artillery or offensive air support.

• **Multi-functionality/multi-spectrality.** Units, systems and capabilities that can contribute to several roles, functions in a wide variety of military operations clearly are inherently military efficient as well as budget-wise sound investments. For instance, modern fighter aircraft can be employed in offensive and defensive roles, at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, and can mix various roles in one mission if the weapons suit, and pilot training are geared towards such a flexible posture. Alternatively, tanks have a very specific tactical function. Ground combat units preferably too are trained so as to be available for peace keeping as well as more intensive operations and to be able to switch rapidly between various postures.

• **Level of international contribution.** Fulfilling European ESDP ambitions requires nations to solve the military capability gap on a national and multinational basis. Thus investment priorities and opportunities for disinvestments can be derived from the lists of shortfalls. Current force structure and planned investments should be measured according to the level of contribution towards remedying the European shortfalls.

• **Depth-variety.** Medium and small armed forces must strike a political balance between maintaining an armed force composed of a very diverse set of capabilities with inherent low sustainability due to budgetary realities, or alternatively, a small set of capabilities with considerable depth. Politically, the availability of a wide variety of military capabilities offers interesting returns-on-investment due to the fact that it will be possible to contribute to a large set of military operations. However, due to low economies of scale, this will also prove relatively inefficient.

• **Endurance & size of contribution.** This is directly related to the former, but can also be regarded in its own right. The size of the armed forces, and the size of national contingent in part will be determined by the desired number of concurrent deployments and the endurance of each commitment. It will be, for instance, very hard for Austria’s current force structure to sustain a deployment of two battalions for more than two years. Alternatively, it is worthwhile to concentrate on units that do not require large efforts to sustain, or to initiate programs to diminish this dependency.

**The Route to Transformation**

The process of the transformation of Austria’s armed forces takes place in degree and time. Austria already has the capability to contribute with valuable modules to peace keeping operations, although Austria’s ability to sustain operations in remote regions is limited. In addition, Austria has capabilities very suitable for homeland defence which also have an inherent value for more demanding expeditionary operations. The challenge for the future lies in a accomplishing a phased and well-managed transformation process in the orientation of the Austrian armed forces in order to obtain improved expeditionary capabilities and create the right balance in functions and capabilities commensurate to the developments in the international, the military and the threat environments.
Table 5: Transformation path

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Desired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Defence, limited peace keeping and some defensive capabilities for defensive expeditionary operations.</td>
<td>Homeland Defence, expeditionary operations, i.e. improved defensive capabilities, limited offensive capabilities and some niche elements to contribute to full spectrum operations.</td>
<td>Homeland Defence, enhanced expeditionary operations, i.e. improved offensive capabilities and selected capabilities for full spectrum operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This transformation process of change can appear as disruptive, affecting current operational readiness. It can also appear financially infeasible. In fact, the process should be considered a gradual and phased migration, affecting not each and every single unit or system at the same time, nor in the same degree. For pragmatic, and for programmatic purposes it is useful to employ a timeline for visualizing the process. The process will involve different issues and aspects for different parts of the defence forces. The necessary steps will involve investments in new systems, but also and not least, changes in logistics, operational doctrine, training, procedures and organization.

The phased transformation process should take Austria’s armed forces from a “Homeland Defence +” capability (where + stands for limited capabilities for peace keeping and defensive capabilities for expeditionary warfare) towards a situation characterized by “Homeland Defence, expeditionary operations and/or and “full spectrum” capabilities, where units are capable for Homeland Defence but also for more demanding operations in remote regions in an international framework. A timeline may look as follows:

Details of the transformation process and the required measures are beyond the scope of this study. Some examples however are offered below as an illustration.

The Austrian Air Force will be equipped with the modern Eurofighter. The primary role and system configuration will be air defence for securing the integrity of Austria’s air space. In principle however, the Eurofighter can be a very valuable module in a EU task force. However, this will most likely require some adjustments in system design, armament, training, and logistic organization. The current Eurofighter design does not incorporate offensive capabilities, and Austria’s fighter pilots are currently operationally not qualified for offensive missions against military objects such as airfields or bridges, nor for Close Air Support, in which the use of precision weapons is often mandatory. The fact is that most combat aircraft in Western Europe are capable of conducting both offensive and defensive missions. These systems, and their pilots have a multi-role (or “swing role”) capability, provided that pilots are trained in both types of missions and both defensive and offensive armament is available. This is not only an efficient method of system employment, it also offers the task force commander inherent flexibility with his scarce air assets. If Austria aspires to potentially contribute with highly visible and valuable modern offensive air assets, Austria would thus need to consider adjusting the future roles and equipment of the fighter force.

Additionally, the Austrian Air Force would need to consider the size of the contribution for an expeditionary operation. This is often a function of the total available number of aircraft, the logistic capabilities and the requirement to conduct other (national) missions concurrent with the expeditionary operation. Austria’s Eurofighter force will always be required to offer a minimum capability for securing national air space on a 24 hour basis. This can be provided by one squadron.
This suggests that Austria’s contribution would be generated by a maximum of one squadron. Experience of several smaller European nations suggests that, due to maintenance factors, it is feasible to generate two modules of one flight of four aircraft. If such a flight is despatched, six aircraft are required in practice to guarantee four mission ready aircraft.

Two issues need to be taken into consideration however. First, with such small numbers, any participation by one flight in an international operation for any length of time will immediately have disproportionate consequences for the training program of the fighter force remaining in Austria. A second issue involves logistics. The Austrian Air Force would need to reorganize its fighter maintenance structure in order to support the deployed aircraft. The deployed flight will require a relatively high level of autonomy and self sufficiency as far as maintenance and logistics is concerned, unless it could operate as part of an international pool of Eurofighter equipped units, in which case bilateral agreements concerning support could be arranged. Still, the deployment of a sizeable contingent of a squadron’s maintenance capability will directly affect homeland maintenance capabilities, in particular in areas where highly skilled and specialized maintenance personnel is scarce.

The Austrian Army should focus on the deployment of company sized units with a maximum of a battalion level formation. Very rarely do nations contribute with brigade size formations and mostly this is the preserve of so called lead and framework nations such as France, the UK and Germany. Already Austria has the capability to deploy army units for peace keeping operations. An issue worth considering when contemplating future contributions in more demanding expeditionary operations is mobility. For operational reasons it would be preferable if one company could be air-lifted in theatre in one “hop” with transport helicopters. Austria operates with the highly capable Black Hawk transport helicopters and it should be examined whether this number satisfies the requirements for such a company-sized air lift mission.

Finally, Austria could consider deploying a helicopter contingent as a module for an international task force. In such a mission, these helicopters would most likely operate as part of an international helicopter pool which is tasked by the task force headquarters. Most likely a deployment of Black Hawk helicopters would serve the task force operational needs best, although reconnaissance and liaison helicopters also provide valuable services. In matters of training and logistics the remarks above for the Eurofighter also apply here for obvious reasons.

**Annex 1**

**Current Capabilities**

The current Austrian armed forces have a strength of 35.000 troops, including 17.000 conscripts and 16.000 volunteers. The armed forces consist of the Army (28.000 troops including 14.000 conscripts) and the Air Force (6.000 troops, including 3.000 conscripts). The total size of the armed forces after mobilisation would be around 120.000, down from 300.000 in the mid-nineties. The term for a conscript now stands at 7 months education and 30 days of training (Truppenübungen).

The Austrian (active) army consists of: 3 Jäger brigades, 2 Panzergrenadier brigades, 2 Panzer battalions, 2 more Panzergrenadier battalions, and 2 recce battalions. The central command Vienna has at its disposal 1 more Jäger regiment (4 Jäger battalions) and the Garde (battalion size). The Armed Forces are organised under a single Land Forces Command in Salzburg in April of this year, including the 1st Corps ( the 1st and 7th Jäger brigades, the 3rd Panzergrenadier brigade) and the second Corps (the 4th Panzergrenadier brigade and the 6th Jäger brigade; mountain troops). The ministry of Defence directly commands the remainder of the army. The Air Force has its own command. Further, there are commands for Special Operations Forces, for international deployments, for deployment support and for command and control support.
A brief elaboration on significant Austrian equipment follows. Relatively new are 114 Leopard 2A4 tanks and 189 M-109-A2/A5Ö heavy self-propelled artillery, taken over from Dutch, British and American reserves. The infantry and recce forces are equipped with a variety of armored and tracked vehicles, that is, 152 Kürassier "Jagdschanzer" (Tank destroyer), 112 Ulan "Schützenpanzer" (infantry fighting vehicle), 465 Saurer and 68 Pandur Armoured Personnel Carrier vehicles. There is a fairly wide variety of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery as well as 81 and 122 mm mortars, anti-tank guided weapons (378 RBS-56 BILL and 89 anti-tank guided weapons tank Jaguar 1) and anti-aircraft guided weapons (76 "Mistral"). Presently, the Air Force has 23 Saab J35OE "Draken" fighter aircraft and a relatively limited number of medium transport and lightly armed helicopters (9 S-70 Blackhawk, 11 AB-206A light transport and rescue, 25 Alouette III, and 11 OH-58B Kiowa). In the next few years the "Draken" will be replaced by 24 Eurofighters. The first of these is to enter Austrian service in 2005.

Concerning generic specialties (on the basis of readiness), the Army now includes 15,000 Reaction Forces, of which 10,000 standing troops and 5,000 on-call border militia troops, and 2,500 volunteers for peace keeping missions of which approximately 1,500 of which are deployed abroad.

Concerning possible highly relevant forces, the following units have been identified. The 6th Jäger brigade (2 infantry battalions of mountain troops); the 1st Infantry (Jäger) brigade which is being reorganised into a mechanised brigade; the 7th Jäger brigade which contains air mobile infantry units equipped with Blackhawk-helicopters. Finally, there is mention of urban search and rescue/disaster relief unit attached to the NBC-protection forces. The expected prevalence of urban combat in the near future will most probably make these highly relevant units. Operations in coordination with urban assault units would have to be trained. However, these operations would be seriously hampered by the lack of truly mobile air defence systems, mine-clearance equipment, field bridges and advanced command and control systems. The Air Force will have at its disposal one of the most modern fighter aircraft when its Eurofighters come into service. These fighters, however, are mainly geared towards guarding Austrian airspace not to close air support or interdiction and strategic strike.

Annex 2

Capability Commitment Conference (CCC)
In November 2001 the Capabilities Commitment Conference took place in Brussels in order to address the military requirements set up in the Helsinki Headline Goal in 1999. At this conference the EU member states presented their commitments in order to take the first steps in realization of the Helsinki Headline Goal. In addition the European Capabilities Action Plan was created to address the shortcomes resulting from the commitments made at the conference. The objective of the conference was to chart the operational elements of ESDP.

Austrian Commitments
The Austrian contribution to ESDP consists of several elements described as "packages meant to be mission – tailored on a case-by-case basis", but all self-sustaining.

- 1 mechanised Infantry Battalion (of 3 mech. inf. battalions in total);
- 1 light Infantry Battalion (of 9 light inf. battalions in total);
- 1 NBC-Defense Unit, including Urban Search & Rescue;
- 1 medium-heavy transport squadron;
- 1 CIMIC unit;
- 1 transport company.


Besides the Austrian commitment includes 100 observers and a "humanitarian package".

The deployability of the committed elements allows that 2000 troops can be provided in simultaneous operations. The Austrian commitment also includes insights into the political ambition of the Austrian government within the ESDP framework. The committed mechanized infantry battalion is available for peace-enforcement operations. The rest of the committed forces are especially capable for performing peace-support and peace-keeping operations (PKO-PSO). This is explicitly stated in the commitment with reference to the fact that Austria will also provide a HQ light infantry brigade for peace-support operations.

### European Capability Action Plan (ECAP)

The ECAP is a framework under which military capabilities can be improved so as to address current shortcomes in the Helsinki Headline Goal, on a voluntary basis. The objective is to rationalize the respective Member State’s defence efforts and to increase "the synergy between their national and multinational projects”.

Making note of the initiatives of the ECAP Austria is involved in will aid to provide recommendations for Austria’s future efforts with respect to ESDP.

The first column provides a list of the project Austria is involved in. Austria’s contributions has insured that the shortfalls have more or less been remedied. The second column mentions, where available, the elements that have been contributed by the Austrian government at the CIC in order for these shortfalls to be addressed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shortfalls</th>
<th>Austrian Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armoured Infantry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Infantry Brigade HQ Augmentees</td>
<td>Light Infantry Brigade HQ for PSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Observers</td>
<td>100 observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Infantry</td>
<td>1 light Infantry battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanised Infantry</td>
<td>1 mechanised Infantry battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Support Engineering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>1 NBC Defense Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>1 CIMIC Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following projects in which the Austrian government is involved still require significant efforts in order for the shortfall to be remedied.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shortfalls</th>
<th>Austrian Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Maintenance Engineering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Support Logistics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Role 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Units</td>
<td>1 Transport Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Helicopters</td>
<td>1 med/hvy transport squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarter Augmentees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From these projects it can be inferred that the Austrian emphasis lies with Peace Support Operations in general and operational support in special (CIMIC, NBC, observers, transport etc.).