

Joris van Bladel

SECURITY AS A HOLISTIC IDEA AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR CENTRAL ASIAN STATES


During the cold war security was a rather stable, even static and clear concept. Consequently, the divided but stable world gave the opportunity to defence forces to become static and divided bureaucratic organisations. The reality of the 21st century shows us that this situation is utterly obsolete. If we have learnt anything from the roaring 1990's and the post 11 September 2001 period it is that security became a holistic and dynamic concept. Not only the war in Iraq is showing us evidence of this observation, but also other parts in the world, where the media is not always undivided focused on, have to deal with this reality. In what follows I will explain what I mean by the concept of holistic security. Furthermore, I will explain what it means for security forces in general and lastly what the consequences are for the Central Asian states. But first I will say some words about the dynamics and the history of change of security organisations.

Change and the Security Forces

We can explain the question of why security organisations change or are sometimes forced to change by the triad model of organisational change which is illustrated in the following graph (Figure I). The three key elements, the 'environment', 'the organisation' and 'the actor' are represented as 'concentric' entities. Each element of the model of organisation has an active and a passive component. In the environment, the active component is political practice (political decision-making through political institutions, and possibly the process of institution building itself). The passive component comprises the structural environmental factors that influence the organisation. The organisation is a 'complex organisation' which is an 'open organisation' based on coalitions. The ideal model of the bureaucratic organisation as well as

the ‘virtual’ and the ‘matrix’ organisations represent the passive component of the organisation. Finally, the individual as a 'rational actor' is a component of the active interpretation of organisations. In contrast, the individual as represented in the ideal model of the ‘modern personality’ is a component of the passive interpretation. Hence, this ‘triad’ model is located in a central position in the 'actor-system' debate. It represents the modernization hypothesis as a heuristic model.

The complexity of this triad model as thus understood is schematized in Figure 1.



Clark Kerr's convergence theory postulates that industrial societies become increasingly alike and evolve as a whole because the character of the dominant technology enforces specific forms of social organisation, political life, cultural patterns, every day conduct and even

beliefs and attitudes.⁷⁶ This idea can be used to show that military organisations are in the long run a reflection of state and society. Furthermore, the open organisation hypothesis underscores the co-evolution between the military organisation and society. These insights lay at the basis of military sociology as an applied field of sociology. The idea of organisational evolution presented here fits the approach outlined during the 1960s by Morris Janowitz (who is regarded as the founder of this applied field of military sociology). Janowitz hypothesized that there was a resemblance between the evolution of civilian organisations and military organisations. This is the so-called ‘civilianization hypothesis’ which James Burk describes as follows⁷⁷:

“The central argument was that the boundaries separating the military from civilian society had progressively weakened since the turn of the century. It described a military organization that was forced to participate more actively in the life of the larger society and yet maintain its relative autonomy, competence, and group cohesion.”⁷⁸

In addition Jacques Van Doorn noticed a qualitative mutation in the character of military organisations. In a seminal article on 'the decline of the mass army', Van Doorn argued that military organisations evolved from a modern mass-army to a professional army.⁷⁹ Janowitz's and Van Doorn's ideas were visionary at that time. When many of their postulated ideas were realised, other military sociologists expanded and refined the idea of professional armed forces and they subsequently created the model of the post-modern army. Thus the evolving theoretical discourse on organisational change in business and government and the narrow

⁷⁶ Mentioned in Piotr Sztompka, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 133-135

⁷⁷ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait*, New York: Free Press, 1971 (second edition), pp. xii-xv

⁷⁸ James Burk, ‘Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces and Society’, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.19, No. 2, Winter 1993, p. 179

⁷⁹ Jacques Van Doorn, ‘The Decline of the Mass Army in the West: General Reflections’, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 1, No. 2, February 1975, pp. 147-157. Although Van Doorn spoke instead of an all-volunteer force (AVF) and never used the terminology of post-modernity. However, the context, referents and form of argumentation used in the article render the interpretation possible.

discussion on military change are now comparable. In fact, the similarities between business and military organisations were not accidental: they are both affected by profound changes in the external environment.

Environmental Aspects of the Post-Modern Military

The first contours of the post-modern military appeared in the 1960's, but it was during the Gulf War of 1991 and different peacekeeping and peace-making actions in the 1990's which can be seen as prototypical for this type of army.⁸⁰ The post-modern variant of the military organisation must be seen in the context of a fundamental change in the geopolitical situation in the world, rapid economic and technological changes, and changes in the world's populations' attitudes to war. This ever growing rapidity of change has made the organisational environment profoundly unstable. Instability and unpredictability are key characteristics to which the military organisations have had to find organisational answers.

⁸⁰ It is important to remark that the transition from the 'mass army' to the 'post-modern' army type took considerable time and in fact passed over a third, specific (transitory) type army. This transitory type of army is called in the literature of military sociology the 'force-in-being' and was related with the idea that armies evolved to a 'constabulary force' rather than the traditional fighting force (See: Morris Janowitz, *Op. Cit.*, 1971, p. li and pp. 417-442) Also Karl Haltiner stressed the transitory character in the evolution between the two extreme army types. Based on the quantitative variable 'Conscript Ratio', he stated that: 'the transition between the different types of force format is rather gradual, and the mass army format of the armed forces apparently rises *relatively continuously* in the transition from type 0 (all-volunteer systems) to type III (hard-core conscript systems [with a conscript ratio above 66%]' See: Karl W. Haltiner, 'The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Fall 1988, pp. 7-36. Charles Moskos made room for three periods in his famous post-modern typology, namely Early-Modern, Late-Modern and Postmodern periods. It implies also the 'force-in-being' idea. (See: Charles C. Moskos and James Burk, 'The Postmodern Military', in: James Burk (editor), *The Military in New Times, Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World*, Boulder: Westview press, 1994, p. 147 and Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (editors), *The Postmodern Military, Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1-2) In the less accurate, but more generally used notion - especially in Russia- of the 'mixed army' type, the idea of a transitory army type is also suggested. The mixed army type refers to the fact that recruitment is based on both, compulsory conscription and contract basis. Conventionally and for matters of analytical explicitness, this study limits itself to the dichotomy between the mass army and the post-modern army type. It is important to bear in mind that this is a simplification of historical and social reality, but nevertheless applicable to Russia.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union led to the break-up of the certainty and predictability of a bipolar international system. The new security era could be characterised as one of risk, complexity and uncertainty in comparison with the relative certainty of the preceding four decades. The outbreak of total war, already in doubt by the introduction of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, changed fundamentally.⁸¹

Whereas deterrence was the core of the mission of the military organisation during the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union produced a completely different scale and set of threats and missions. The missions were called 'missions other than war' or 'low intensity conflicts' and were against such threats as terrorism, organised crime, and local nationalism. Humanitarian aid, refugee support and aid in areas of natural disasters became part of military missions.

The rapid changes in the nature of the threats facing Western militaries, when deployed on a particular mission, were also a notable characteristic of the new geo-political environment. A good example is provided by British forces deployed in Macedonia during May-June 1999. During the NATO air campaign over Kosovo they prepared and trained initially for a full-scale ground war. But after Kosovar refugees flooded Macedonia and Albania they changed their mission and became a humanitarian force. Finally, after a peace agreement, they entered Kosovo with a peacekeeping mandate. Thus, in a time frame of two months, the missions of these elite troops changed fundamentally. The tempo and the nature of the changes possible in the post-modern military environment have urged the British forces to become both more flexible and better trained.

Economically in the world today there is a trend towards globalisation. Predominantly national markets have evolved into global markets. This

⁸¹ See for instance: Martin Shaw, *Post-Military Society, Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, pp. 19-23 and pp. 64-105; J. van der Meulen, 'Civiel-militaire betrekkingen in verandering: wisselwerking tussen maatschappij en krijgsmacht', in: H. Born, R. Moelker and J. Soeters, *Krijgsmacht en samenleving: klassieke en eigentijdse inzichten, [Armed Forces and Society: Classic and Modern Views]*, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999, pp. 54-66

increased competition combined with technological and information revolutions have made organisations less labour-intensive and more capital-intensive. As a result of globalisation there has been a change from extensive to intensive growth, and the famous quantity-quality innovation has taken place. Firms have become smaller but their capacity and their ability to provide services have increased in inverse proportion.

These factors have also affected military organisations. The third industrial revolution, with computer technology as a key factor, allows armies to work with technological advanced weapons. This context has led to the so-called 'revolution in military affairs' with significant consequences, such as military organisations requiring on the one hand more and more highly trained personnel with higher educational qualifications; and on the other hand the least specialised military functions have begun to disappear because they can be automated or out-sourced; and the training of these military specialists takes too long and is expensive.⁸²

The ideas of materialism and individualism have also grown to extreme levels in post-modern society.⁸³ Consequently, values and attitudes have evolved in the direction of 'self realisation', consumerism and hedonism. The 'Welfare State' mechanism supports this situation as a safety net for those who cannot compete in this type of society. Within the overall societal dynamic people are no longer prepared to give up their privileges for reasons of state security. Carroll J. Glynn and others noted this in their paraphrase of Inglehart's ideas:

⁸² D. M. Snow, *The Shape of the Future: the Post-Cold War World*, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1991; and Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *Op. Cit.*, 1993

⁸³ See for example: Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990; Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution, Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977; and Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. For an application of this idea on the military organization see Fabrizio Battistelli, 'Peacekeeping and the Postmodern Soldier', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Spring 1997, pp. 467-484

“In the United States and Western Europe, the general increase of prosperity over most of the twentieth century had profoundly altered the balance between materialist and postmaterialist values. Each new generation tended to be less concerned about materialistic values such as prosperity and security. Postmaterialist values - such as more say in government, a less impersonal society, and freedom of speech-gradually rose in importance.”⁸⁴

In its attempt to cope with highly complex social problems, the state appears to be in crisis. It finds itself in a contradictory (post-modern) state of being too small and too big at the same time. On the one hand, states seem to be too large to cope with the individual problems of the increasingly demanding citizenry. On the other hand, given the growing trend of giving more authority to international institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union, states are too small to handle classical state matters; and this perception is taking the efforts to create common defence (although political obstacles related to individual states' perceptions of their role in the world create stumbling blocks).

In this situation, the narrow relationship of citizenship and military services dominant in the modern era no longer exist. The status of the army changed dramatically. The allocated state resources for defence shrank proportionally and were re-allocated to what can be broadly called 'welfare matters'. The fall of the army's status, as an international phenomenon, can be explained by several interacting processes: the fundamental shift in state priorities in the 'post-nationalistic era'; the indifference and even hostility of the population toward military missions (except for peacekeeping and other humanitarian missions); and the cost-intensity of the technological revolution in military affairs meaning that maintaining a broad suite of capabilities is untenable for

⁸⁴ Carroll J Glynn, Susan Herbst, Garrett J. O'Keefe, and Robert Y. Shapiro, *Public Opinion*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999, p. 269

any single nation.⁸⁵ Bernard Boëne calls this last element 'structural disarmament'.⁸⁶

Security as a Holistic and Dynamic Concept

Security as a holistic and dynamic concept must be introduced in order to understand the post 11 September security situation. The idea of holism is understood in two different ways: firstly in a structural-organisational way and secondly in a geographical way.

If we want to understand what the consequences of terrorism are for the security organisation, we have to understand the nature of terrorism. I will evoke three key elements without being exhaustive. Firstly, there is **no frontline**. At the utmost, terrorist action can be catalogued as hit and run operations. The purpose of terrorism is not to fight but to install chaos. Moreover, terrorists hope that counter-terrorist action are self defeating and add to the installed chaos. In this sense a terrorist action is planting a seed of chaos which the state or the entity against which the terrorist action is focused is harvesting this chaos. Secondly, there is an extremist and violent ideology and/or religion supporting the terrorist actions. It is this ideology/religion which is a source of motivation for terrorists. Consequently, **terrorists are highly motivated** to the point that their own lives are used as a weapon against their target. Thirdly **terrorists are not real combatants** in the legal and military sense of the word. Legally, terrorists do not belong to a legal fighting force and do not wear uniforms. Therefore, they are not protected by the existing war jurisdiction that protects combatants in case of injury or imprisonment. Military terrorists are no real soldiers in the traditional sense of the

⁸⁵ See for instance: Philippe Manigart and Eric Marlier, 'New Roles and Missions, Army Image and Recruitment Prospects: the case of Belgium', in: Philippe Manigart (Editor), *Future Roles, Missions and Structure of Armed Forces In The New World Order: The Public View*, New York: The Nova Science Publishers, 1996, pp. 8-12; Lucien Mandeville, Pascale Combelles and Daniel Rich, 'French Public opinion and new missions of the armed forces', in Philippe Manigart (Editor), *Future Roles, Missions and Structure of Armed Forces In The New World Order: The Public View*, New York: The Nova Science Publishers, 1996, pp. 55-59

⁸⁶ B. Boëne, "A tribe among tribes...post-modern militaries and civil-military relations?" paper presented at the interim Meeting of the International Sociological Association's Research Committee 01 (Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution), Modena, Italy, January 20-22, 1997

word. As there is no combat, no fighting and no frontline, the military is confronted with a very difficult and dangerous enemy. Conclusively, **we can say that the terrorist threat is everywhere and at the same time nowhere**. Moreover, **the war against terrorism is a cruel war without rules**. This makes the task of the security forces utterly complex. But one thing is sure: the importance of intelligence and the predominant place of intelligence services.

When we say intelligence it may be fruitful to stand still with the problem of intelligence gathering in what is called the intelligence cycle. We understand intelligence as a process of accurate information gathering that is presented in sufficient time to enable a decision-maker to take whatever action is required. The intelligence cycle is directed by a commander or a political leader, which states his intelligence requirement, usually in form of a question. The intelligence staff converts the commander's intelligence requirement into a series of essential elements of information and commissions the intelligence agencies using a collection plan. The intelligence staff collates all the information from the various sources into a readily accessible database. It is essential that all information collected can be retrieved. Interpretation is where the collated information is analysed and turned into intelligence. Finally, dissemination can take place.

What is important here to mention is that the different intelligence agencies have to collaborate intensively. It is upon this intense collaboration that our concept of holism is based. The traditional division of military forces, border troops and troops for internal security becomes diffuse in times of crisis. At the same time there is need for leadership. In organisational theory we can see two types of organisation that can fit our need, namely the virtual organisation and the matrix organisation.

Nohria and Berkley have attributed the following basic features to **the virtual organisation**⁸⁷:

⁸⁷ Nitin Nohria and James Berkley, *Op. Cit.*, p. 115

1. The disappearance of material files and the reappearance of them in flexible and electronic form by means of information technology;
2. The replacement of face-to-face communications with computer-mediated communication, and a concomitant increase in the role of informal face-to-face communication for purposes of maintaining organisational coherence;
3. The transfer of issues of organisational structure from the realm of the organisation of human beings to the organisation of information and technology in such a way that the functioning of the organisation appears spontaneous and paradoxically structure-less, while the functioning of information systems seems at once all-pervasive and faintly magical;
4. The networking of individuals from technically separate firms to the extent that clear boundaries of the organisation become difficult to establish in practice;
5. The implosion of bureaucratic specialisation into 'global', cross-functional, computer-mediated jobs to such an extent that individual members of the organisation may be considered holographically equivalent to the organisation as a whole.

Francis Fukuyama and Abram Shulsky have given another, less technological interpretation of the virtual corporation.⁸⁸ In their view, this type of organisation seeks to push as many routine functions outside the boundaries of its own organisation as possible. Consequently, one of the by-products of this trend is a general downsizing and breaking up of large integrated corporations. Companies examine all their activities and decide which constitute 'core competencies' where they are 'best in the world'. Everything else ought to be out-sourced to some other firm that is 'best in the world' for the production of a good or service. For Stoner and others, the virtual organisation is a temporary network of companies that come together quickly to exploit fast-changing opportunities.⁸⁹ The companies involved share costs, skills and access to global markets, with each partner contributing what he is best at. The key attributes for these

⁸⁸ Francis Fukuyama and Abram Shulsky, *The "Virtual Corporation" and Army Organization*, Santa Monica: RAND, 1997, pp. 14-16

⁸⁹ James Stoner, Edward Freeman and Daniel Gilbert, *Management*, London: Prentice-Hall, 1995 (Sixth Edition), p. 336

kinds of organisations are: high technology, opportunism, excellence, trust, and temporary boundaries.

Stoner and others state that the **matrix organisation** is based on multiple authority and support systems.⁹⁰ This means that there are two lines of authority: one running vertically (by functional department) and another running horizontally. As a result every matrix contains three unique sets of relationships: the senior manager who heads up and balances dual lines of authority; project managers or team specialists who share subordinates; and subordinates who report to two different managers (their department head and the project manager). This type of organisation allows employees from different functional departments to pool their skills when solving a common problem. It aims at increasing the organisation's ability to use human resources wisely and to adapt to a changing environment. It ensures flexibility and cooperation at all levels of the organisation. Therefore, it thrives on open, direct lines of communication. Managers and subordinates need special training to learn new skills. Thus, it is an organisation which is characterised by a strongly competitive environment, an enormous flow of information, rapid (if not instant) change, and is an entity in which resources are limited as cost efficiency is paramount.

Our concept of holism concerning security matters has another aspect, namely a geographical aspect. Globalisation was mainly understood in economic terms, but it has also security aspects. Different continents and different countries are interrelated with each other when we talk about terrorism, even when these countries are not always at the centre of attention of the media. Countries like Somalia, Sudan, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Central Asian states, states in the Caucasus, and even states in Europe are named as refugee states for terrorists. Consequently, also regarding this aspect of security globalisation more intensive international collaboration is needed to overcome the threat of terrorism. It may be clear that political will is needed for collaborating in an international strategy against terrorism.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.333-334; See also: Jay R. Galbraith, 'Matrix Organization Designs: How To Combine Functional and Project Forms', *Business Horizons*, Vol. 14, No 1, January-February 1971, pp. 29-40

Consequences for the Security Forces

From an organisational point of view we have seen that the security forces have to evolve towards virtual organisations and to matrix organisations, that they have to work internationally and that political will has to exist to establish this collaboration. Now we can ask the question of what the consequence is for security organisations.

The Post-modern Military Organisation.

Parallel to the evolution from bureaucratic organisation to post-bureaucratic organisation, the military organisation in the West underwent a similar evolution. The modern organisation type (or the mass army) evolved over time to the post-modern military organisation. Dandeker has outlined the following features of the post-modern military organisation as distinct from its modern antecedent⁹¹:

1. Responsibility shifts to lower levels. Even the individual soldier at the lowest level has to take decisions autonomously, even ones with important political consequences.
2. The military job is intensive and very demanding, but also very rewarding, with increased responsibility for equipment, people and the success of the operation.
3. Flexibility means an emphasis on the multi-rolling of equipment and a consequent desire to recruit and retain personnel able to take on multiple roles, creating and necessitating a more flexible work force at all levels of the hierarchy and in all specialties.

⁹¹ C. Dandeker, "Flexible forces for a post cold war world: a view from the United Kingdom", *La revue Tocqueville/ The Tocqueville Review* Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1995, pp. 23-38 and C. Dandeker, "New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks on the Changing Role and Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1994, pp. 637-654. See also: David R. Segal, *Organizational Designs for the Future Army*, Alexandria: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Special Report No. 20, 1993 and Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (editors), *The Postmodern Military, Armed Forces after the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1-11 and 265-275

4. The 'mixing and matching' of components from different services and countries pose problems of establishing effective command and control links of lateral as well as vertical kind.

The following features can be added to this conceptual interpretation⁹²:

1. To work effectively, this system requires fundamental changes in the relationship between the military/political centre and the force commanders. Here, a new and contradictory situation is faced: the political control involves a shift away from detailed control to the acceptance of discretion within the constraints of the overall strategic objective. The omnipotence of the media leads to an overall and detailed control of the fourth force in modern society. Besides the media, non-governmental organisations control the military and even become concurrent in humanitarian operations. The autonomy of the military is fundamentally affected. The force commander thus receives on the one hand more autonomy but on the other is more controlled and constrained than ever by the media and non-governmental organisations.
2. Authority is based on manipulation.⁹³ This type of authority is based on explanation, competence of the leader and consensus in the group. Instead of negative sanctions, the leader uses positive stimuli. The military leader has to take into account the motivation and morale of the individual. The most brutal procedures for schooling and training are not tolerated anymore. Primary groups and leadership are key elements in the manipulation type of authority.

⁹² These features are borrowed from the literature and completed with some personnel insights. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, A Social and Political Portrait*, New York: Free Press, 1974. Charles C. Moskos, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organizations', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 1, November, 1977, pp. 41-50; Charles C. Moskos, 'Institutional/ Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring, 1986, pp. 377-382; Charles C. Moskos and James Burk, 'The Postmodern Military', in: James Burk (editor), *The Military in New Times: Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 141-162. Pascal Vennesson, 'Le triomphe du métier des armes: dynamique professionnelle et la société militaire en France', *La Revue Tocqueville/The Tocqueville Review*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1996, pp. 135-157

⁹³ Janowitz, *Op. Cit.*, 1971, pp. xvii-xxiv

3. There is an occupational perception of the military profession.⁹⁴ The military profession is a job like any other. The military personnel serve for economic reasons, not for patriotic reasons. The military profession is not a way of life anymore; it is a way of obtaining extrinsic rewards. Professional organisations as well as unions defend the collective interests of the members of the military organisation.
4. Diversity rather than homogeneity is the central characteristic of the AVF.⁹⁵ The introduction of women and ethnic minorities in the military is an example of this trend. In addition to tolerance, flexibility is rewarded in this kind of organisation.

Charles Moskos summarised his view on how military organisations are changing in a typology. This typology is based on the distinction between the institutional and the occupational interpretation of the military profession. The original idea was proposed in 1977 and it has been expanded and refreshed over the years.⁹⁶ Moskos's typology, represented in the following table, is a good summary of the change that is taking place in military organisations.

⁹⁴ Charles C. Moskos, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organizations', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.4 , No. 1, 1977, pp. 41-50; and Charles C. Moskos, 'Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring 1986, pp. 377-382

⁹⁵ Joseph Soeters and Jan van der Meulen (editors), *Managing Diversity in the Armed Forces, Experiences From Nine Countries*, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1999, especially pp. 211-221

⁹⁶ Charles C. Moskos, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organizations', in: *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.4 , No. 1, 1977, pp. 41-50. Charles C. Moskos, 'Institutional/Occupational Trends in armed Forces', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Spring 1986, pp. 377-382; 'Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Editors) *The Military: More than Just a Job?*, Washington D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988. Charles C. Moskos and J. Burk, 'The Postmodern Military' in: James Burk (Editor), *The Military in New Times: Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 141-162

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Institutional</i>	<i>Occupational</i>
Legitimacy	Normative values	Marketplace economy
Role Commitments	Diffuse	Specific
Basis of Compensation	Rank and seniority	Skill level and manpower
Mode of Compensation	Much in non-cash form or deferred	Salary and bonus
Level of Compensation	Decompressed; low recruit pay	Compressed; high recruit pay
Residence	Adjacency of work and residence locales	Separation of work and residence locales
Societal Regard	Esteem based on notion of service	Prestige based on level of compensation
Evaluation of Performance	Holistic and qualitative	Segmented and quantitative
Legal System	Military justice	Civilian jurisprudence
Reference Groups	“vertical”-within the organisation	“horizontal”-external to organisation

Table 1: Military Organisations: Institutional versus Occupational⁹⁷

As a final, but important remark, on the post-modern military organisation, it is necessary to stress the difference between the concept of an all-volunteer force and the idea of a post-modern All-Volunteer Force. An all-volunteer force is just a way of manning a military organisation. It basically expresses a recruitment policy. There are many examples of this recruitment system all over the world. In Africa, Asia,

⁹⁷ Source: adapted from Charles Moskos, ‘Institutional/Occupational trends in Armed Forces: An Update’, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, No 3 Spring 1986, p. 378 and Charles C. Moskos, ‘Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm’, in : Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (editors), *The Postmodern Military, armed Forces after the Cold War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 15

etc., there are many (regular or irregular, state-controlled or mercenary) military organisations which recruit their soldiers on a voluntary basis. In this case, soldiers are just paid for their military services. The post-modern All-Volunteer Force, however, is a specific type of military organisation, which is found in Western post-industrial societies. In what follows, whenever the all-volunteer-force concept is mentioned, the post-modern variant of this idea is meant.

Consequences for the Central Asian States

After we have seen the evolution of security organisations in advanced industrial states, we have to investigate what the changing roles of the national security forces in Central Asia are and what the changing role of the international community in Central Asia is. The holistic idea first underlines the importance of collaboration beyond dividing organisation boundaries of the security forces. Structurally, there is need for a security council that strategically coordinates security information and security operations. In the case of a crisis, tactical task forces must be set up bringing together all possible security forces that can help to control the crisis. After the crisis is settled, this task force can again be unbound and continue its normal procedures. This is an application of the idea of the virtual organisation and the matrix organisation. Not only have these trans-boundary organisations to exist in the state, but also between the states of Central Asia and also between Russia, the United States, Europe and all Central Asian states. It is only by such close collaboration and exchange of trustworthy intelligence that terrorism can be countered. There is a real need for dry security exercises in order to test procedures. It is only through these exercises that virtual and matrix organisations can be tested.

It is also mentioned that first and foremost the political will must be present in order to realise such a thorough collaboration. In order to obtain this political will, there is a real need for high level conferences that bring political leaders together and put Central Asia on the map of world politics. This is necessary because the threat of terrorism is also present in Central Asia and because there is a real danger that this threat

spreads beyond the boundaries of the region and will have its effect in other states such as Russia, the United States and Europe.

Another issue is to find a balance between hard-line authoritarian rule and anti-terrorism measures without limiting the rights of the citizen. This balance is necessary in order not to give in to what terrorist acts are meant to, namely limit civil rights and create chaos whenever necessary.

Conclusion

The nature of terrorism made us conclude that security became a holistic concept to which the virtual and the matrix organisation are a possible answer. This means that highly intensive crises are altered with no crisis at all. In order to fight this kind of threat the need is expressed for flexible and willing actors in the security sphere and in particular in the Central Asian area. Thorough cooperation is needed on a strategical and tactical level in order to fight terrorism, especially in the sphere of intelligence. This is a first step in order to formulate an answer to terrorism in the region and in the world.

Dr. Joris Van Bladel
Independent Expert
Basel