

## 4. From Civilian-Military to Civil-Military Relations in FRY

### I Introduction

Today there are several new important theoretical and practical reasons, which call for a reconsideration of civilian-military relations. This problem should be simultaneously approached through examples provided by individual states and, perhaps even more, from the level of the international system as a whole and of its individual segments. Previously it should be noted here that the issue of relations between high military commanders and the leading political management, if a sharp separation of the military and the political is at all purposeful, has attracted attention and been a subject of research by contemporaries from ancient times. Perhaps the main reason for this interest of contemporaries in the confrontation of the military and the political lies in the practical consequences of that relationship – consequences, which significantly determine constitutional forms, the character of the political establishment, as well as the position of the individual society. For the theory of politics and political philosophy this is also a fundamental question of relationship between two kinds of power: the *political*, which personifies the society in its entirety, and the *military*, understood as the strong arm of the only legally allowed form of violence. In its considerations of the matters of safety and security in a given society, or, to put it more narrowly and specifically, a given state, the history of military doctrines gives the military factor priority in importance. Incidentally, most examples from political history demonstrate the tendency to identify the issues of security of the state in question with the military factor, as well as the *priority* of military power over the political, and, accordingly, the tendency to concentrate the functions of supreme command of the military and management of the state in the hands of one person – the chief of state.

No matter which power enjoyed priority at a given time and place, the relationship of the political and the military always contained in its core a constant tension with high probability of conflict, the balance which was sometimes achieved being as a rule extremely delicate. The

sociological differentiation of the main factors in the political–military relationship distinguishes, widely speaking, the society as the total of all its citizens (the so-called civil society), the state, defined in relation to the society as a narrower organisation of institutionally supported coercion, and, finally, the military as a markedly non-democratic institution whose efficiency depends, among other things, on discipline, strict hierarchy, and obedience. As we can see, the three factors range from the “disperse” forms of relatively spontaneous interest- and value-motivated groupings of the civil society to the stiff, hierarchic military structure. These characteristics of the different forms of organisation are alone sufficient to cause constant tension in every individual society as a whole. But the complexity of the relationship is made more difficult by the tension within the military factor itself. Namely, the desired harmony and balance between the military's functional requirements (that is, its capability to deal with external and internal threats to national security) and the social factors influencing it (tradition, interests, culture, values, goals, dominant ideology, and institutions which support all these) has proven difficult to attain. Theory has already thoroughly explained, and practice has on many occasions confirmed, that the tipping of the scales in civilian-military relations to the advantage of either side can have disastrous consequences for the security and/or the democracy of a society.

Although individual theorists of international relations claim that the total power of a state is decisively determined by the so-called new sources and dimensions of power, the military factor is still *ultimo ratio* in the so-called Western democracies when it comes to security and realisation of national interests. However, there have been some important changes.

Due to many causes, but primarily to the almost simultaneous reduction of security threats and strengthening of the so-called civil society in most Western countries, the military has been beset by a crisis of legitimacy and the social influence of the military factor has diminished. In conditions of a reduced interest for the military profession and of relative material prosperity of the widest social circles, the civilian structures have established an effective control over the military factor. However, it seems that the balance between the two

factors has been disturbed in favour of the civilian. In fact, this is one of the most important characteristics of Western democracy, closely interdependent with the concepts of rule of law, respect of human and minority rights, and, at the same time, the most idealised and ideological value in liberal democratic societies of the West.

The need is felt to analyse the normative-institutional framework by which the *desirable* relationship between military and political power is regulated and, even more, to establish the “effective truth of the matter” - “behind” and “beyond” this framework. Moreover, this is the only way to avoid the idealisation of the relationship between the military and civilian factors – as Abrahamson rightly points out, there are also cases where military power can appropriate a significant part of economic and political power without violating the existing legal framework, that is, by acting within and through the existing institutions. In that regard, the state of affairs in the countries of South-East Europe which are in “transition” towards more stable democratic forms is different and a great deal more complex than in countries of the European Union (EU), the United States (US), and Canada.

## **II Phases of Defence and Security Development of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia**

When the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is concerned, in the past “decade of change” our country has gone through two phases in its defence and security development. The first phase lasted from 1989 to the creation of the FRY (28 April 1992), and the second from May 1992 till the present day.

(1) The first phase was marked by the consequences of the breaking up of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) as multiethnic, multi-confessional, and multicultural constructs. The state and its army shared the same fate. As it is well known, in the period prior to the beginning of secessionist wars, the “second” Yugoslavia based its defence and security policy and doctrine on the experiences and tenets of the doctrine and strategy of so-called people's war. The YPA, as a pronouncedly ideological, party army

composed of the victors and the losers of the Second World War under the slogan of so-called brotherhood and unity, was under the jurisdiction of the federal state, or, more precisely, under the control of the Yugoslav communist party political leadership. The Territorial Defence, on the other hand, was in relative terms, independently directed by the political leaderships of the individual republics and even autonomous provinces. With time, the YPA and the Territorial Defence became rivals within the total defence and security system. Their mutual animosity increased, as chauvinism and separatism in certain republics grew stronger, preparing them for secession.

(2) The second phase coincides with the creation and subsequent development of the FRY. In the defence and security field, the most striking experience of these years was the effort to mitigate the destructive consequences of the breaking up of the second Yugoslavia, as well as to carry out the necessary supplementation and improvement of the defence and security system. However, a fundamental and all-encompassing reform of the army, defence, and the entire system of integral security, including establishment of effective control of the civilian over the military, still await Serbia and Montenegro after the democratic changes of October 2000.

It must once again be emphasised that the experience of the FRY, which is only now entering the so-called period of transition, is significantly different than that of the other countries of South-East Europe.

In short, due to well-known geopolitical and strategic changes Serbia and Montenegro found themselves in completely new and highly unfavourable surroundings. FRY is surrounded from all sides with members of Partnership for Peace (PfP), members of NATO, or impatient candidates for membership in the Alliance. Until the democratic revolution of last October, no realistic offer could be made to Serbia and Montenegro to join European and Balkan political, economic, and security integration processes.

### **III Changes in the Defence System of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia**

In the period since the creation of the FRY (1992) several normative documents were promulgated, regulating the constitutional position of the defence and security system, and especially of the armed forces. These documents are the Constitution of the FRY, the Defence Act, Army of Yugoslavia Act (AY), Transformation of the AY Act, and the Production and Trading in Armaments and Military Equipment Act.

The above-mentioned normative documents essentially altered the constitutional conception and position of the army and defence in comparison with former Yugoslavia. In the earlier state, matters of defence and security were under the jurisdiction of all subjects of society and all levels of state and political organisation, from the federal state down to the republics, regions, districts, municipalities, firms, and individuals – citizens and employees. In the current constitutional settlement, defence and national security are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal state. All organs and institutions engaged in defence and military affairs – civilian, as well as military – from the top (federal minister of defence) to the bottom of the state hierarchy are directly subordinate to federal organs. The new normative documents significantly strengthened *civilian control over the military and defence system*.

*First*, the ministry of defence itself became an organ of the federal government for managing the military and defence system. On the other hand the staff and professional functions of the Supreme Command dealing with preparation and employment of the armed forces were placed under the jurisdiction of the AY General Staff. This represented a break with the earlier solutions according to which these two roles were united by the position of the federal secretary for national defence who, as the highest in rank general, was practically beyond any civilian or parliamentary control and jurisdiction. All significant issues concerning the position of the military and defence system in the social and state constitutional system, were *de facto* resolved in the immediate circle of supreme command.

With these new solutions, the FRY came closer to European standards regarding civilian control of the military. The normative regulation of these matters was such that the tasks of managing the army and providing necessary conditions for its development and functioning in peacetime were completely entrusted to the civilian and parliamentary authorities, whereas supreme command in war and carrying out of combat preparations and training in accordance with the established doctrinal and strategic role were entrusted to the Supreme Defence Council as the Supreme Command of the armed forces.

No less important in terms of strengthening civilian control over the military and defence system was the *appointment of civilians to the position of federal minister of defence*. In the previous system the senior general from the ranks of the army filled this position. In this way, the army has been placed, both formally and actually, under the control of the civilian minister and his ministry. It was a move in the direction of solutions practised in the most developed democratic states of Europe.

*Second*, the system of parliamentary control over military and defence issues was strengthened by having all development plans and programs, including, of course, the budget, debated and accepted in the Federal Parliament, in accordance with strictly defined parliamentary procedure. As opposed to the earlier system, now there is no way to manoeuvre around or avoid parliamentary control over the army and defence. In order to establish that system even more firmly, the Parliament was given the right and the obligation to pass special laws and decisions on adopting any new program concerning the equipment of the AY. Finally, the Parliament establishes basic strategic priorities and decides on the shaping and defining of defence and national security policy. This primarily applies to issues concerning changes in strategic conception of defence and attitude towards existing European and regional security and military-political arrangements and integrations.

With its changed name, the AY explicitly classifies and qualifies itself as the army of a state, and not of a people, as was the case with the previous army. This change of name was undoubtedly a sure sign that efforts to build a *new social and functional type of military organisation*, tailored to new specific circumstances and to the altered social being and

system characteristics of the new Yugoslav federation, were soon to follow.

The AY was defined as an *operational type army*, whose only task and doctrinal role is to defend the FRY's freedom, independence, territorial integrity, and constitutional order from armed aggression. It is understood that this primarily means external armed aggression, but also to the internal, if its scope, intensity, and characteristics surpass the defensive and security capabilities and capacities at the disposal of the so-called internal security forces. Although it is not explicitly stated in the formulations of the above mentioned doctrinal document, this interpretation is implicitly contained in it, as is the case with all armies in the world.

The above-mentioned document is explicit in stating that the AY is the *army of the federal state*, and not of any individual political party, including the party in power. The army stands above and beyond all political ideologies; keeping an equal distance from all political forces and movements in the country, open towards the media and the civilian institutions that are supposed to exercise social control over it.

In the operational sense, the AY is a *highly professional military organisation*, although it is not, nor can it be in the existing circumstances, composed entirely of professionals. Its forces consist partly of conscripts serving their regular term of duty, and partly of volunteers serving “by contract”, that is, individuals who choose to take up performing of military duties as their profession. The military service system, the length of the term of service, the mobilisation system, and the system of training and preparation of the wartime army has all been tailored to this definition of the army's character and functional type.

In its organisational structuring, that is, by its branches and services and by its peacetime deployment of units, commands, and combat formations, the AY follows the basic conclusions drawn from analysis and military-geographic and operational assessment of the war theatre. Since our war theatre encompasses all three traditional combat environments – land, sea, and air – the AY must have all three branches of the armed forces: army, navy, and air force. Likewise, in accordance

with the assessment that the Yugoslav war theatre consists of three lands and one maritime battle area, the AY's organisational structure has allotted corresponding operational and strategic formations to each of these. At this moment these formations are three *armies*, subdivided into corps, and the Navy, as a separate grouping on the same level as the armies. However, other solutions are possible. One, which is being considered, is based on *army corps*, each of which would have one of the land battle areas as its zone of responsibility.

Numerically, the AY can be ranked among the smaller armed forces. Its peacetime strength is approximately 0.8-0.9% of the total population, rising to about 3-4% in wartime. These figures are just very close to world and European standards.

With regard to the number and level armament with the five kinds of weapons which are classified as so-called heavy weapons (tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery weapons of calibres larger than 76 mm, combat aircraft, and armed helicopters), the AY has undertaken the obligation to fully comply with the stipulations of the Agreement of Sub-Regional Arms Control, signed in Florence in June 1996. That agreement came about as a result of the Dayton peace arrangement and its intention is to prevent new military conflicts in this region using the method of balance of forces and encouragement of mutual confidence by way of mutual control of the level of armament.

The above-mentioned limitations exert significant influence on all aspects of the AY's organisational structuring: total manpower, basic types of units and joint tactical formations, types and quantity of heavy equipment, and so on. However, the agreement places no limitation regarding quality of weapons systems. This enables the signatories to disrupt the balance of military forces in the sub-region of the former Yugoslavia by improving the quality of their heavy weapons.

The FRY has fulfilled all stipulations of this agreement, reducing its level of armament to the specified degree. In accepting the stipulations of the agreement, the FRY demonstrated that it has neither territorial, nor any other political claims against any neighbouring country. The AY as it has been structured on the basis of the limitations contained in this

agreement is absolutely ineffective for large-scale offensive operations, which would be necessary for realisation of possible territorial claims against neighbouring states. That army is useful only for conducting a *strategic defence* in protection of its own territory, and it would require extreme efforts to take the war to the territory of the aggressor. But this is not *a priori* opposed to the fundamental strategic tenet, which calls for defence of Yugoslavia's own territorial integrity, because that kind of strategic defence can in part be conducted through offensive use of military resources.

The most obvious example of the modernisation of the strategic concept of defence and of the development of a military organisation corresponding to that concept was the formation of the Special Forces Corps. Its doctrinal and strategic role consists in carrying out special operations and all kinds of so-called unconventional actions, as they are defined in the military doctrines of Western states. This is nothing unusual since it is well known that all armies in the world, especially those of European and NATO countries, as well as the armies of our neighbours, have such formations and assign to them that identical role. The Corps is a highly mobile and professional operational formation capable of quick deployment on any part of the war theatre and at any given operational or tactical route. The introduction of this formation into the organisational structure of the AY has enhanced the function of deterrence from all forms of armed threats, and primarily from terrorist-sabotage and insurgent activities on a wider scale.

It must be noted that the other corps of the AY are organised, equipped, trained, and prepared to effectively counter the full spectrum of so-called unconventional actions in their own zones of responsibility. None of the corps is dependent on the Special Forces Corps in that respect. The Pristina Corps demonstrated exemplary effectiveness in the fighting against terrorist bands of Albanian separatists and against armed insurrection during the summer of 1998. This primarily refers to protection of the border strip from infiltration by armed terrorist bands from Albania.

## **IV European Security Arrangements and the Federal Republic Yugoslavia**

Before saying anything concrete on PfP itself, we must examine other existing instruments and institutions that contribute to stability and security of the region and Europe as a whole.

WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU) – one of the oldest European organisations. It comprises ten member states, five states in the status of observers, and ten states with the status of associate partner.

The WEU has been developing its own military component for almost ten years. The initiative to form these forces was launched by France and Germany. It started with the formation of the Franco-German brigade, later to develop into forces amounting to 60,000 troops. The basic components of these forces are Eurocorps, Multinational Division – Central, which is also a part of NATO's rapid reaction corps, and Anglo-Dutch amphibious forces, which also have a role in NATO operations. There are also standing naval forces of the Mediterranean, comprising 8-10 destroyers or frigates, which had their place and role in the Adriatic in conducting the blockade of our country. Those are the forces, which the European Union (EU) would employ in peace operations, peace enforcement operations, or humanitarian operations. An agreement has been reached with NATO enabling these forces to use NATO facilities and means (means of transport, means of communication, means of command, and intelligence service) in instances when WEU forces are being engaged as European forces, acting on decision and demand of the EU, while NATO forces are not being engaged or the US, as NATO's leading member, does not want to participate. These forces are intended to replace NATO forces in Kosovo and Metohija.

THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) – 15 member states – so far without armed forces of its own, so that in case of need it would use WEU forces. However, it plans to develop its own military capacities. At the meeting in Brussels (20 November 2000) EU ministers of defence and foreign affairs decided that the member states should provide 120,000 troops for European Rapid Reaction Forces. These forces are to become

operational by 2003 in the strength of 60,000 troops, while the rest will be kept as reserve in case of need. Germany will participate with 13,500, Britain and France with 12,000-12,500 each, Italy with 12,000, Spain with 6,500, Netherlands, Belgium, and Greece with 3,000 each, Finland and Sweden with 2,000 each, Ireland and Portugal with 1,000 each, and Luxembourg with 500 troops. Denmark decided not to participate with troops because of internal problems, while Austria asked for more time to “reconsider”. These forces will be intended for rapid actions in crisis areas with the aim of enforcing or keeping peace, as well as humanitarian actions in case of large-scale disasters.

The objective of the formation of these forces is that Europe strengthens its own defensive component, that it attains its own defensive identity, something that serves not only to promote Europe's independence and responsibility in matters of its own security, but also to strengthen its position in international relations. Namely, past events have demonstrated Europe's dependence on the US in this respect, especially regarding the solution of crises in the Balkan area.

This issue has caused some quite bitter exchanges, as was the case earlier with WEU forces, in the US, but also within Europe itself, since there are different opinions regarding the objective and the purpose of the formation of strong EU forces. Some critics regard this as unnecessary, and leading only to doubling of capacities, because there already exists a sufficiently strong NATO, while others are of the opinion that this is being done with the aim to gradually “abolish” NATO and to disturb transatlantic relations, that is, to “drive out” the US from Europe.

NATO – 19 member states – politico-defensive alliance whose task is to safeguard the values attained by member states in the fields of legislature, parliamentary democracy, market economy, and common cultural heritage. It can also be defined as a political association of countries, which contribute to promotion of common values and defence of common interests. The fundamental activity of the Alliance is collective defence, stemming from Article 5 of the Washington Agreement which, among other things, states that: “...attack on one or more countries of the Alliance in Europe or America is considered an

attack on all members...”. In the meantime the list of the Alliance's potential activities has been expanded, enabling it to become engaged wherever interests of its members are threatened – preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, anti-terrorist and anti-sabotage actions, collective engagement when regional security is threatened, etc.

BALKAN COUNTRIES' PEACEKEEPING FORCES – up to 2,000 troops, to be engaged in peacekeeping operations as regional forces of the Balkans. Participating in them are all Balkan countries except the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE is a programme of military co-operation between NATO and the participating countries. The origins of this program are closely connected to the events of the 1990s and the process of NATO's reform and transformation from a defensive into a political organisation. The wave of optimism in NATO countries following the collapse of socialism was soon replaced by scepticism. A solution had to be found for the existing situation. NATO did not have an enemy any more and many prophesied its dissolution and demise. The situation in eastern European countries, created by economic and political collapse, was not good, and there was danger of mass movement of the population towards Western Europe. There was also a danger of widespread ethnic conflicts. Therefore, in October 1993 the US gave the initiative to launch the PfP project, an initiative in which was to contain basic ideas on how NATO was to consolidate its future reforms (politico-ideological redefinition of the enemy, redefinition of NATO's operational space, and organisational restructuring). All this NATO successfully realised.

The US president, William Clinton proclaimed officially the PfP programme in January 1994. The general objective of the program is to increase the member states' capability and readiness to keep the peace through joint planning, training and exercises with NATO forces. The realization of the partnership program helps partner countries to prepare their armed forces for conducting operations together with NATO forces in peace operations, peace enforcement operations and humanitarian operations. An individual or particular objective of the partnership is to

prepare those countries which wish to become members of the Alliance to realize that as painlessly as possible, whereas to countries which do not want membership or will not be given the chance to join NATO it offers establishment of co-operative relations with the Alliance and aid in planning, training and exercises. Joint planning, training and exercises are supposed to increase the capability of the member state so that it can successfully fulfil tasks in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and so on.

The procedure for entrance into the PfP programme is based on three documents: PfP Framework Document, Presentation Document, and the Individual Partnership Program. The signing of the Framework Document represents the first phase in the procedure of entry into the PfP. This is followed by the submission of the Presentation Document, which determines the scope and degree of integration into the process of co-operation with NATO with regard to common joint planning and training, joint military exercises, lists the means and infrastructure which can be allocated and which will be used to fulfil the requirements of the PfP programme and so on. The third phase, or the third document, is the individual program, which specifies the relations and obligations of the partner state to NATO. It must be emphasised that the partner state itself defines the contents and scope of co-operation, that is, how and to what extent it is to be integrated into the process of co-operation. Most countries, which have entered PfP signed the so-called General partnership program, while Russia and the Ukraine have special relations with NATO under this program. The implementation of the PfP program manifests itself through joint planning and exercises, education of officers in Western countries, participation in various seminars, giving military assistance to PfP member countries by NATO countries, joint participation in peace operations, and so on. Transparency in military planning, in the budget process, and in the establishment of democratic control over military forces is also being promoted. Finally, in the long run, the forces of the partner country develop the capabilities, which enable them to better conduct operations together with NATO countries in crisis situations. The forms of co-operation within this program (currently there are around 2,000 activities) are being expanded and deepened, and it can be safely said that the PfP has become a part of the European security architecture.

So far 29 countries have entered PfP, but since Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have become full members of NATO last year, the PfP currently comprises 26 countries. All countries of the Balkan area are members of this program, except FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina has not become a member yet because it has not yet been fully internally constituted as a state and does not have unified armed forces.

In addition to what has already been said, there is also the possibility of making bilateral military agreements and contracts of various types (military-technical co-operation, joint military exercises, assistance in arming or reorganisation of armed forces, and so on). Illustrative in this respect is the Equip and Train project, through which the armed forces of Croatia and later the Muslim forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were reorganised and armed. The US has direct bilateral military relations with Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Turkey has bilateral military co-operation contracts with Albania and Macedonia, Germany with Albania, and so on.

One form of bilateral co-operation was demonstrated by the recent joint exercise of the Croat and US air forces codenamed Secure Sky. It was held between 27 November and 1 December of this year with the participation of about 20 aircraft, the objective being to provide joint practice for American and Croat pilots.

## **V Entry of FR Yugoslavia into the PfP Program – Needs and Possibilities**

Where could the FRY and the AY join, into which kind of integration, partnership or alliance? As far as bilateral relations and agreements are concerned, the answer is undoubtedly positive. Such relations and agreements already exist. They include military-technical co-operation, exchange of military delegations, co-operation of military health services, and so on. However, there are no bilateral agreements, which could be interpreted as pointed against any other country or countries or against the general security and stability of the region. This is undoubtedly a good thing and this practice must be continued.

Membership, that is, entry into or creation of “some kind” of alliance with the WEU or the future EU forces is not possible due to the simple fact that the FRY is not a member of these institutions. Alliance with NATO is also impossible for the same reason, and it has already been mentioned that the road to entry into NATO leads through the PfP. So, there are two solutions in play: entry into PfP and into Balkan Countries Peacekeeping Forces. It must be remembered that, unlike the FRY, all Balkan countries, which contribute forces to the Balkan Countries Peacekeeping Forces have already joined PfP. This points to the conclusion that at this moment it makes sense to talk only about the PfP. So, the question is whether the FRY should seek ways to enter PfP or not and which are the dominant factors influencing such a decision.

Factors which could influence such a decision can be provisionally placed into three groups or divided into three categories:

**POLITICAL** – in the sense of what is gained and lost on the political field and in the international position of the FRY if the initiative for entry into PfP is accepted or refused;

**SECURITY** – would membership in the PfP strengthen or weaken our security system and how it would influence the security situation in general;

**GENERAL** – certain factors of psychological nature among the general population due to last year’s events in connection with NATO aggression against our country must be taken into account. Also, there are certain problems which can be provisionally termed “technical” and, of course, the question whether the other side is willing to accept our application for membership in the PfP.

1. The current state leadership, primarily the representatives of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) at the federal level, in their everyday actions and statements emphasise that they will conduct a peaceful and good-neighbourly policy, leading to establishment of good relations in the region and Europe as a whole – a policy which will include the FRY into all international organisations and institutions. They accept the presence of the forces and

representatives of the international community in Kosovo-Metohija and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. They call for its respect and the solution (peaceful, constructive, through negotiations) of the situation in Kosovo-Metohija. There have been several indications that this policy and these statements are not mere talk, but that they are being realised through concrete actions.

The initiative for entry of the FRY into PfP cannot in any way be harmful to that policy. On the contrary it can only serve as confirmation of the government actions and its intention to make the FRY a full member of the international community as quickly as possible and to share in the solidification of collective security of the Balkans and Europe. Failure to launch such an initiative or refusal to enter PfP would have negative effect on the relationship of part, or perhaps even all, of the international community towards the FRY and would cast a shadow of uncertainty as to its long-term intentions and actions, and its foreign policy course.

2. Strengthening or weakening of the security system. There should be no dilemma in this regard. Collective security is always stronger, and the immediate threats would be reduced. One very significant element of the security system, the police force, has started opening up and co-operating with international organisations and institutions. We see no reason why the AY should not do the same. "Military secrets" and protection of the measures being undertaken to prepare the country for defence must not be used as an excuse. As a signatory of the OSCE Charter our country already has certain obligations regarding limitation and control of conventional weapons (sending of reports on numerical strength and allowing control of certain units), meaning that there is already a certain openness and that information which is classified as "military secret" are to a significant extent already open and known. In addition, it must be borne in mind that the country which enters into PfP determines on its own the scope of its participation, units and infrastructure which it will include into the PfP, so there is always the possibility to deny the general public access to vital information. On the positive side, AY personnel would have the chance to test its solutions and procedures in practice, through planning and training with others. The fear among part of the AY personnel that entry into PfP would

entail the obligation to procure worn out weaponry and military equipment from Western producers is unjustified. There is a significant number of countries which have joined the PfP but have so far not procured a single piece of such weaponry, and continue to rely on their previous weapons and military equipment suppliers. Partnership could in fact prove a positive incentive for our weapons and military equipment producers to enter more freely into partnerships and give themselves better access to the markets.

3. Instant application and speedy entry into PfP could result in some negative consequences for the DOS regarding support of part of the voters and the population to measures being undertaken by the DOS government. Consequences of last year's destruction, casualties among the population, loss of jobs due to destruction of factories, and so on, are still very painful and "fresh" in the minds of our people. Measures to boost confidence, and there is a great deal of suspicion towards NATO in a significant part of the population, must be gradually undertaken. It is necessary to explain to the wider public why we should now enter into partnership with NATO, what is gained and what is lost, to prepare the population, so that there will later be no negative consequences of any form.

Under the provisional designation of "technical problems" we understand the obligations, which await the AY, as well as the possibility that the AY could quickly prepare a certain number of its personnel for direct co-operation under the stipulations of the PfP. In the AY there were no changes at the highest level, or at lower levels for that matter, but they will certainly come. The AY is facing reorganisation and reduction, based on the political decision, which will be made when DOS comes to power in Serbia and settles relations with Montenegro. Naturally, one must take into consideration the economic capabilities of the country and the degree of immediate danger. So, it is a "new army" and new people who will be entering the PfP. Knowledge of foreign languages, primarily English and French, is on a very low level in the AY, and additional time and schooling would be required to provide the necessary personnel for participation in direct co-operation. The economic factor is not to be neglected either. PfP members bear the costs of their participation themselves, and the already meagre AY

budget would have difficulty in covering these expenses. These and similar problems indicate that gradual entry allowing for at least some time for preparation would best suit the AY, especially if reorganisation, which is a complex process and cannot be accomplished overnight, starts immediately.

Also, one must not forget the other side. PfP is partnership with NATO, so it would be good to examine their readiness to immediately accept the FRY as partner, regardless of the fact that there are certain indications that a Yugoslav initiative to enter into PfP would be welcome.

In closing, it is necessary to emphasise that there are different and divided opinions regarding this issue. Some see PfP and membership in that organisation as Fry's big chance to solve almost all our problems, including the question of Kosovo-Metohija. Others are not against entering into PfP, but see no great benefit in it. A third group consists of individuals who see PfP as a NATO branch office in its expansion towards the East and are *a priori* against it, while a fourth comprises those who maintain that we should apply for entry into PfP, but then we should not rush things, but begin stalling. We consider these views and approaches to the issue as unconstructive and, to put it mildly, their advocates do not fully understand the essence of the partnership. Entry into PfP means both giving and receiving, and the benefits are certainly mutual. As in international relations, there are only interests according to which one must act.

Launching of the initiative to enter PfP would doubtless have more positive than negative effects. It would be an additional incentive and support to our foreign policy, a step towards consolidating the much-desired confidence between us and the international community, and certainly a gateway to greater co-operation, establishment of peace, and creation of a better security environment in regional and wider dimensions.

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