## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword by the Editors</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUFOR Tchad/RCA Revisited – A Synopsis</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerald Hainzl and Walter Feichtinger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>An Assessment of EUFOR Chad/CAR</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roland Marchal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUFOR Chad/CAR: A Regional Solution for a Regional Problem?</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Lanz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State-Internal Actors in the Armed Conflict in Chad</strong></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Günter Pamminger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investigation of the Economic Growth and Development in the Republic of Chad</strong></td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markus Maruszczak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUFOR CHAD/RCA Revisited – Economic Effects of the Operation</strong></td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norbert Feldhofer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Economic Effects of EUFOR/CHAD-RCA on the Local Economy of Eastern Chad</strong></td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorenz M. Strolz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>From EUFOR to MINURCAT Force – A MINURCAT Force Headquaters Perspective</strong></td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerald Aherne</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security of Humanitarian Organizations</strong></td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ute Kollies and Sophie Reck</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annex</strong></td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foreword by the Editors

In October 2009, the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management at the Austrian National Defence Academy in Vienna convened a workshop on “EUFOR Tchad/RCA revisited” in order to analyse the crisis management in the border region of Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic. Out of the results of this workshop, the concept for this book was developed. The book aims to cover the issue in question from different perspectives. The guiding questions were the mandate and how it was implementated and the impact of the mission on the region.

Therefore, researcher and experts from various fields of expertise like political development, humanitarian aid, military development and – as a top priority – from economics were invited not only to contribute to the workshop, but also to discuss their ideas in the publication on hand. In addition, some authors were invited to make a contribution in order to broaden the views presented and to provide additional expertise where necessary.

The aim of the book is to assess and discuss the significance of crisis management at a political level from different perspectives, including recent developments on the ground. Furthermore, it analyses to what extent international crisis management contributed, if it was able to contribute at all, to political, economic and social transformation processes in Chad.

Economic impacts and concerns of adverse or positive economic effects on the region at the macroeconomic level as well as effects on the local population in the area of troop deployment are given quite some space in order to highlight this topic, which is gaining more and more significance in analyzing crisis management and its long term impact on a given region.

Humanitarian issues are also touched upon, since the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission was launched under these premises. In the light of
allocating and implementing security measures for organisations which provide assistance to refugees and IDPs and were/are tasked to facilitate the return to their respective territories of origin are analysed and critical challenged.

The editors would like to express their thanks to all contributors for sharing their extraordinary experience and knowledge with us, as well as to Ernst M. Felberbauer and Christian M. Huber for their support.

Walter Feichtinger
Gerald Hainzl
EUFOR Tchad/RCA Revisited – A Synopsis

Gerald Hainzl and Walter Feichtinger

This synopsis does not only summarize the findings of the workshop, which took place in Vienna in October 2009 and but also takes other seminars and publications to this topic into account. This contribution starts with a short overview on insights found and conclusions that can be drawn. In addition, it will analyze and give a more detailed résumé of the arguments mentioned earlier.

The Conflict Region of Sudan – Chad – the Need to Act Urgently

Shortly after signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the National Congress Party (Central Government) and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (South Sudan) the conflict in Darfur reached its peak. Through mass media messages reporting the horrible number of estimated 300,000 people killed in this conflict, the international community got under pressure to stop the bloodshed and to establish peace and security. With two UN-Missions (UNMIS in South Sudan and UNAMID in Darfur) in place, there was already some progress noticeable. But one problem remained untackled: the problem of militias and rebel groups crossing to and for over the border as well as refugees fleeing their homes.

The Darfur-conflict has to be considered also a conflict between Sudan and Chad. Inside Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), rumors and repressions from the presidential side had led to hundreds of thousands of IDPs living in camps. Both, refugees and IDPs, were strongly dependent on international support for survival. Although a lot of international humanitarian organizations – governmental and non-governmental alike – were in place, it was often impossible to deliver
humanitarian aid due to the insecure situation on the ground. Militias, criminal groups or bandits created a climate of violence where humanitarian workers often were forced to withdraw or to limit their engagement dramatically.

The regional conflict dynamics led to a decision by the UN Security Council to set up another mission with police capacity: MINURCAT in Chad and CAR. MINURCAT was to be supported by a military mission of the EU called EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Planned only as a bridging element, the final idea was to handover to a bigger UN mission, MINURCAT II, after a year. It is worth to mention that EUFOR Tchad/RCA was to be the first autonomous military operation of the EU.

The big initiator of that mission was France, who had already a long term military mission in Chad on a bilateral basis. This fact caused some constraints and distrust by other EU members arguing that Paris wanted to instrumentalize the EU for its own national interests. Bearing these aspects in mind, the EU Council decided to set up the EUFOR operation, but gave it a very limited mandate.

EUFOR Tchad/RCA – a Drop in the Ocean

Considering the overall situation in the region and the broad demands for international crisis management under circumstances like these, the EUFOR-Mission was only been a drop in the ocean, although it had the potential for a more comprehensive and sustainable engagement. Above all, the lack of a clear political mission to assist in the transformation of the various conflicts within the region seems to be a lost chance for European politics to influence political processes.

From an analytical perspective, the mission of EUFOR Chad/RCA combined three intentions: First of all, the High Representative of the EU, Xavier Solana, demanded a public visibility of the EU, which was achieved by the mission. Secondly, the new guiding idea of international crisis management, using regional mechanisms for conflict transformation was supposed to be applied. And thirdly, French political
intentions supported a mission in Chad. Bernard Kouchner, the French Foreign Minister, claimed that due to the regional dimension of the humanitarian crisis, Darfur should be the actual region of European commitment and engagement. But he failed with his intention to relieve the humanitarian crisis by establishing humanitarian corridors to Darfur. So to face the crisis, the alternative of a stabilization of the Waddai Region was started.

The conflicts in the broader region of Sudan, Chad and Central Africa must be seen as a complex conflict system, which is not restricted by state frontiers, even though the root causes of each conflict do not depend on each other. Two reasons seem to be responsible for the situation: (1) Chad and RCA can be seen as so called “weak states”. As one government is threatened by home-grown rebels, the particular state allies itself with insurgent groups from neighboring countries and vice versa. (2) Membership and feelings of belonging to a certain rebel group are rather weak. Therefore, they can easily get mobilized by any other group, including the possibility of crossing state border. In the case of a peace agreement in any region, militias could move to other region to continue their destabilizing work of threats and coercion.

The issues mentioned above had great influence at the planning stage of EUFOR. EUFOR was an attempt to assist in applying a regional solution to a regional problem. First and foremost, humanitarian corridors were supposed to enable or to make the transportation of relief supplies easier. But a direct impact of EUFOR on developments in Darfur was more or less not given. Indirect effects may have taken place, but were not measured. The shift in Sudanese external policy happening during that period was not rooted in the presence of EUFOR, but in the changing political situation of a USA under a new president.

The Mandate and its Implementation

The mandate given by the EU was the result of a compromise, with limiting formulations and planned as a humanitarian intervention lacking a “political purpose” aiming at steps towards the transformation of the
Chadian system. Against the theoretical background of a comprehensive crisis- and conflict-management, the mandate was very narrow. For this reason and because of the short time span the mission was given, it was neither possible to achieve a transformation of political in Chad system, nor was it possible to address the structural root causes of the conflicts. The mandate had the character of “PAS”: provide, assist and support. Therefore, EUFOR also had little to no impact on scenarios of conflict transformation and resolution.

However, due to the presence of EUFOR, rebel attacks declined and the military threat against president Déby was reduced. Even though Débys political power increased, EUFOR contributed to a decrease of Débys internal legitimacy in Chad. Before EUFOR came to the country, the president had to make political and financial arrangements with different groups in the country, which was rendered unnecessary by the mission. Duties and responsibilities the state in principle has to deliver for its population, were and are still carried out by international organizations giving the president a de facto free hand to concentrate on staying in power and saving money to afford that.

From the humanitarian organizations’ view there were three types of threats in the region: (1) crime and impunity, (2) cross-border rebel activities, and (3) ethnic conflicts. A tackling of these issues was not covered by the mandate, although it would have been crucial for conflict transformation as well as for the return of refugees. Given a broader mandate, also the development of effective and efficient structures of governance based on a minimum of power sharing and involving civil society could have been supported. This self-restriction of EUFOR led to some confusion on the humanitarian side at the beginning of the mission.

The security situation for employees of humanitarian organizations worldwide has worsened significantly over the last decade, due to changing attitudes towards humanitarian organizations. The UN and NGOs became more often targets of aggressions. Generally, fear of or the real loss of staff and material hampers humanitarian organizations in their actions and potential impact.
In Chad, humanitarian organizations were forced to downsize their operations due to the lack of security and had to cease their help in some regions, although it was desperately needed. The government of Chad bearing the main responsibility for this situation was neither able nor willing to provide the security needed. Since EUFOR was a military and not a police operation, it was not suited to deal with these problems.

However, EUFOR forces were able to support humanitarian organizations in many ways: through the protection and support of the mission, they were able to become active in areas they had formerly not entered or had withdrawn from due to the security and safety reasons. In this respect, EUFOR accomplished the tasks stipulated in its mandate.

The civilian-military cooperation worked well due to various mechanisms. Examples are a monthly CIMIC-day as well as weekly meetings used for the exchange of security-relevant information. Similarly “awareness training” and the possibilities of “the request for presence in certain areas at certain times” were stressed as positive factors. Wishes of certain organizations to stay in distance to EUFOR officially were also respected (e.g. no visits to their compounds). In that context it became obvious to the military and humanitarian side that some lesion in action alongside had already been learnt.

The duties given to EUFOR in the mandate were clearly fulfilled. Aggression towards civilians in eastern Chad decreased, IDP-flows were secured and the work of humanitarian organizations was made possible. Even though few IDPs returned, it was at least possible for them to move freely outside the camps. Due to its limited character, the mandate was not shaped for the solution of the IDP problem, as it did not consider the structural problems. In the view of humanitarian organizations, the repatriation of refugees is generally the duty of the state. But since the government of Chad was evidently not able to fulfill this task, cooperation between military and humanitarian organizations was necessary to assist repatriation.

The problems leading to the influx of refugees into certain areas meanwhile still continue. Issues of land ownership still are sorted out
between the different ethnic groups according to their relative strength. Unsolved issues of land ownership still mean additional conflict potential in case of returning, since it is highly probable that other persons already took the land for their use. Additionally, displaced persons have to come to terms with people who took their property, but the country lacks a working legal framework able to provide mechanisms to help people to secure their title. An evaluation of repatriation with proven data is nearly impossible, since rainy seasons and harvest time always had an impact on seasonal migration of nomadic peoples. The best knowledge concerning land and property rights exists with the local population, but always needs to be carefully analyzed and verified. Moreover, many IDPs do not show any interest in leaving the camps, since the camps provide a higher quality of life and education for their children than their villages would. There are some estimations indicating that only about 50% of the IDPs do want to return to their villages of origin.

Another task of the mandate, the provision of a secure working environment for humanitarian organizations, was also met. The expectations towards EUFOR varied depending on the organization concerned. During the first months of the operation, the main challenge for the local population as well as NGOs was to understand the mandate and to figure out what to expect from EUFOR. Problems resulted due to the huge amount of humanitarian actors and their heterogeneity. Some groups asked EUFOR for support e.g. through escorts, while others were fundamentally against a military cooperation. A common position was difficult to achieve, because of the unorganized structure among the various humanitarian organizations.

At the beginning of the mission there was general skepticism, whether the French EUFOR soldiers would really act neutrally. This skepticism evolved from the fact that there had been a French Mission (Epervier) in place for years backing the Chadian president. However, the longer the mission lasted, the more positive it was perceived, since communication with EUFOR proofed to be quite good and a “feeling of comfort and security” gained room. Furthermore, the fear that EUFOR would start
operating in areas, where the core competence of humanitarian organizations lay, was not confirmed.

The security umbrella for humanitarian organizations worked well. Groups escorted by EUFOR reached their destination safely. Likewise the communication about the EUFOR escorted convoys worked well. Some organizations joined a convoy without prior arrangement, while others refused protection by EUFOR due to their strict neutrality. By contrast, escorts carried out by DIS (Détachement integer de sécurité) sometimes experienced attacks, as these Chadian police forces are said to be trained insufficient for this task.

**Economic Effects**

From a macroeconomic point of view, the period was too short to make qualified statements about the actual effects of EUFOR Chad/RCA. Food prices rose dramatically between 2003 and 2008 due to the influx of refugees and the subsequent engagement of the international humanitarian industry. A connection to the arrival of EUFOR is not supported by available data up to now. The presence of EUFOR contributed approximately five to ten percent to the overall increase in prices.

But, by contrast, changes can be proved on the local level. Due to the presence of EUFOR, market-women in the region felt safer, this made it easier for them to carry out their job on the local markets. Prices already soared in the surroundings of Abéché region prior to EUFOR. Between 2003 and 2008, there was a high influx of refugees, bringing their livestock with them. What followed was a shortage in water supply and an uncontrolled uprooting of forests. The crime rate increased by a factor of eight, prices for consumer goods by threefold, while during the same time the wages only doubled. Compared to that, the value of an average local basket of commodities only increased by five percent between 2008 and 2009.1

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1 Data provided by Lorenz Strolz.
EUFOR purchased only few goods on the local markets. Most goods were imported. The French company Economat des Armees de facto had the monopoly on the imports, but was not able to meet all demands and was quite expensive. The economic effects of EUFOR Chad/RCA were rather low. The presence of EUFOR forces in Abéché had only influence insofar as the soldiers were spending a share of their money on the local markets. Strolz shows a good example on creative economic engagement in a given region without harming the local market, when he elaborates how the Austrian contingent in Guereda interacted with local merchants and employees. Free and fair contracts without disturbing or even destroying local markets also can be seen as an important factor in force protection too.2

In the context of economics, it is worth to mention three points noticeable with EUFOR Chad/RCA:

1. There was an increasing awareness on the operational and tactical level of the high potential of economics, may it be positive or negative.
2. There were no elaborated and integrated mechanisms to use economic effects in order to achieve more with less input.
3. Although there may mostly be a monopoly provider of goods and assets in international peace operations, there should always be room for local procurement and for buying domestic goods to foster local development.

Peacekeeping missions on average spend about 20-30% of their budget in the area of operation. In the case of Chad, the percentage was lower, as a result of the fact that there was basically no local market and most of the goods had to be imported. But spending ten percent locally would already provide a great stimulus for the local economy. For contingents, it could be possible to buy goods in the region at local prices, without harming the local economy. Nevertheless, high volume purchases on the local market could lead to significant increases of prices.

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2 Compare the contribution by Lorenz Strolz in this book.
General statements concerning the transformation of the local labor market can not be made. But the well-known phenomenon that because of higher wages qualified workers leave their jobs in order to work for international organizations could also be observed in Chad. At least 50% of teachers left governmental services in search for work in Abéché. Although the minimum wage was raised by 15% in 2009, this trend could not be stopped and severe long-term consequences for the educational system might arise.

Military Aspects

At a separate workshop to the issue convened by the Directorate for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports, it was elaborated that both decision making as well as the raising of troops and procurement of equipment was a serious problem within EU. Consequently, theses issues were not touched during the workshop of the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management.

Some of the difficulties have to be blamed on the climatic conditions as well as the lack of infrastructure. Moreover, the local population needed to be informed prior to the EUFOR operation about the missions’ goals and activities in order to achieve a certain level of understanding and confidence. Humanitarian organizations welcomed these attempts and valued them as useful. EUFOR’s involvement in providing medical care to the population had also a positive impact.

The transfer of authority from EUFOR to its successor mission MINUCRAT II in 2009 was a challenge, mainly due to different organizational structures, mechanisms and procedures. It might have been easier to start with a new UN Mission from scratch rather than handing over a well-run EU-mission. Taking these conditions into account, on the one hand, the chosen system of a EU “bridging missions” as used in the given example needs to be reconsidered in the future. On the other, it is beyond doubt that the UN will never be able to deploy troops within a few weeks, a dilemma which cannot be solved easily, if it can be solved at all.
With regard to the transfer of infrastructure, the missions’ bridging character failed. For example, the EUFOR-built infrastructure was handed over to Chadian authorities, from whom MINURCAT II subsequently had to rent again. Beside bureaucratic challenges, this policy proved to be very costly and inefficient.

The UN was not sufficiently prepared for the transfer and it was only due to a small amount of highly skilled officers who had already been to Chad before the transfer eventually succeeded. One reason could be found in the fact that the UN assumed for quiet a long time that the European Union would extend the mission timeframe of EUFOR beyond its original mandate. Finally, only the “rehatting” of soldiers already deployed in the mission area assured a smooth transfer from EUFOR to MINURCAT II. One of the main problems was the vast area, which MINURCAT II was supposed to control (400km by 1000km, an area bigger than France) and the lack of staff. From an estimated 5,200 soldiers only 3,800 arrived in the early days of the mission after the transfer of authority.

One of the main advantages of EUFOR was a clearly defined mission end date right from the beginning. With MINURCAT II, there was a greater challenge, as no end date was set. Finally, the president of Chad stated in 2010 that international support was no longer necessary. By doing so, he forced the UN to end the mission although some members of the Security Council would have promoted a prolongation of the mandate.

Generally seen, EUFOR led to a broader European awareness and sensibility for Chadian/African issues. But from a critical perspective, the focus was rather on the EU and the further development of ESDP than on the problems of the Chadian population. For the EU as well as the European troop contribution countries, EUFOR Tchad/RCA was a bitter but important experience in establishing and working together in a joint operation. In order to have a real joint EU-mission it would be important and necessary to involve one of the big nations (i.e. Great Britain, Germany and France) with a substantial contribution.
Short Summary of Main Findings

a) EUFOR Tchad/RCA was successful in regard to the provisions established by the mandate.

b) The mandate did not ask for many tasks and was therefore inappropriate to implement political objectives and to contribute to political transformation within the region.

c) Without a “political” mandate and the presence as a political actor aiming at political transformation, a long term impact on conflict transformation within the region seems to be impossible. This leads to the question of input-outcome-ratio. Considering the recent serious budgetary cuts in European MoDs, these considerations will increase in importance in the future.

d) Varying concepts and definitions of what security is complicated the cooperation between different organizations and the military mission, especially in view of what is considered as security risks. The recognition of the existence and the possible coexistence of various definitions of security could do a great deal in facilitating cooperation.

e) Collaboration with other conflict management missions in the region, for example with UNAMID, in order to establish a kind of accordeed regional conflict management, was not reached. This finding is contrary to the clear evidence that complex conflicts require complex crisis management. It should therefore be assessed why it did not happen and what has to be done to achieve regional effects.

f) The economic dimension is of great importance, but unfortunately underestimated. Therefore it should already be included in the pre-deployment assessment and planning process. An “economic adviser” (who can be double hatted) could observe the impact of a given mission on local markets, and deliver options how to take use of and how to foster local markets. In advance he could suggest economic counter-measures, if the mission has an adverse impact.

g) If the absorption capacity of the local market is taken into account, goods could be purchased locally without destroying the
local economic system. For the people in the region multiple benefits would be provided (from security to economy).

h) EUFOR Tchad/RCA confirmed previous experiences that a distinct division of responsibilities between the players is crucial. In the case of EUFOR, the self-effacement of the military was emphasized and welcomed by representatives of humanitarian organizations.

i) A “bridging mission”, with a fundamentally different organizational structure and operational preconditions compared to the subsequent operation, complicates the transfer of operational responsibility. Future planning should take this factor into consideration. Otherwise, the question has to be raised, whether a bridging mission is reasonable. The interlinking between “bridging mission” and “follow-up mission” should start as soon as possible so that integrated contracts with the host nation can be shaped for both missions in order to avoid a situation where facilities and other payments or rents have to be paid twice.

j) Peacekeeping missions experienced a change in character. “Ground holding” missions have been replaced by “expeditionary” missions and have become therefore a special challenge to the international crisis management.

k) A fixed end date makes it easier to accomplish the tasks successful than a fixed end state. On the other hand “end date – missions” imply the danger of becoming “symbolic”. This kind of mission would sooner or later be delegitimized and would do serious harm to the idea of effective peace operations.

l) The success of a mission depends highly on the competence of the involved staff. Skills, character and leadership should therefore be key-prerequisites by choosing leaders and commanders for a mission.
An Assessment of EUFOR Chad/CAR

Roland Marchal (CNRS/ SciencesPo CERI)

There are many perspectives from which to assess the achievements of EUFOR Chad/CAR. Very often, divergent evaluations just reflect the different choices of parameters used. Some, for instance, may claim with good reasons that the very fact that such a European operation in Africa took place was already a very significant achievement at a time when the European Union was not at its strongest. Others may adopt a kind of constructivist approach and evaluate the operation in terms of procedures’ improvement and military cooperation among the EU member states. A few might still wonder whether this operation was worth the huge amount of money spent, since, only months after it ended, the stability of the region bordering Chad, Sudan, and CAR as well as the delivery of humanitarian aid and public services are still precarious. Some may also feel that the most important element was missing: there was no political mandate at a time when any international intervention needs to offer a roadmap to solve the problems that provoked the international reaction.

The following analysis intends to encompass the main parameters, while the personal reservations of the author are also expressed, since the two main objectives of the mandate were hardly fulfilled: the stalemate in Darfur and eastern Chad continues, and the humanitarian improvements are highly reversible, a situation not reflected in the statements made by European officials, including Bernard Kouchner, when the European operation was concluded.

The first section deals with the conditions by which the French government under two different presidents, Jacques Chirac and, after May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy, took steps to protect the Chadian regime and its President Idriss Déby Itno from what it perceived as the consequences of the Darfur crisis, which had started in 2003, and the
attempted destabilisation of N’Djamena by Chadian rebels, hugely supported by Khartoum’s security services, in April 2006 and February 2008. The second section provides candid findings that may allow some European and French officials to claim that EUFOR was indeed successful, though it could not fulfil its entire mandate, because it prepared the ground for the U.N. Operation MINURCAT II, which was to consolidate EUFOR’s achievements. Yet this section highlights a number of discrepancies that, in the view of the author, were at the core of the EUFOR concept and can only generate grim expectations regarding MINURCAT II.

This text left an important question unanswered. Although some in European capitals and Brussels may congratulate themselves on having done a great job, one may wonder whether the same extent of optimism and jubilation is found with African leaders and African civil society activists in Chad, CAR, and elsewhere. The true political assessment of the European mission eventually lies with the Africans themselves, and it is not yet clear what it will be, since the crises in Sudan, Chad, CAR, and Central Africa at large are not yet close to a settlement.

1. “Il faut sauver le soldat Déby”

Khartoum was instrumental in helping Idriss Déby to overthrow Hissène Habré in December 1990. It did so mostly because it feared that the SPLM could obtain facilities in Chad under Habré. After December 1990, the terms of the gentlemen agreement between Khartoum and N’Djamena were clear: armed opponents should not get hold of any facilities on both sides of the border. This situation allowed Idriss Déby and his kinsmen, the Zaghawa, to benefit from this alliance with Khartoum. The Sudanese regime also used this situation to promote its own interests with the French government: it was a perfect win-win situation, in diplomatic terms, that kept the U.S. (and indirectly Libya) at bay and strengthened all regimes1.

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These systemic connections were used at different times, i.e. when the crisis broke out in Zaïre in September 1996 and, even later, in August 1998. They also shed light on the coup in CAR in March 2003\(^2\). The situation changed drastically because of the conflict in Darfur. By summer 2005, Khartoum became convinced that its old friend Idriss Déby Itno was playing a double game and misusing the funds which he got from Sudan to rebuild a constituency among his ethnic group, the Zaghawa, while Khartoum expected him to use them to divide and weaken the Darfur insurgent movements, which were using Chad as a rear base. Sudan’s reaction was to allow Chadian opponents to gather and organise themselves in camps in Darfur, a drastic break in the policy that had been enforced by Khartoum for more than a decade and according to which sanctuary in Sudan had been denied to Déby’s opponents since 1991. From September 2005, many discontent officers and soldiers quit Chad to gather in new rebel organisations.

A first signal that the situation had changed were the clashes that happened in December 2005. This first alert was confirmed in March 2006, when elements of the Presidential Guard left the capital city after an alleged coup attempt. A few weeks later, the Chadian armed opposition was able to launch a surprise offensive on N’Djamena. Although this attack failed, it showed the fragility of the Chadian regime.

Paris had its share of responsibility in the deteriorating relations between the two governments. It pushed Chad to play the role of mediator in the Darfur conflict, while it knew that N’Djamena was handling different agendas at the same time: the consolidation of Idriss Déby’s grip on power, through a constitutional change that authorised an unlimited number of presidential mandates, the continuing normalisation of relations with Tripoli, while the Libyans were heavily involved in supplying the Darfur insurgents with weapons and ammunition, an internal Zaghawa reconciliation, which pushed a reluctant Idriss Déby to turn a blind eye to the support channelled to the Darfur insurgents from

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Chadian territory, often by his own relatives. To the author of this paper it still is unclear why France kept denying those facts, while the crisis between Khartoum and N'Djamena unfolded.

French interests in Chad are not so clearly strategic that they could explain the support the Chadian President enjoyed in Paris. One may list a number of reasons, but none of them is convincing by itself. It could also be the willingness to continue a traditional stance. From a French point of view, only two countries are entitled to make decisions on Chad: Libya and France. Consequently, Sudan has never been and will never be allowed to be part of that club. More convincing is the fact that French decision makers reframed the deterioration of the Chadian-Sudanese alliance into a new geopolitical project, in which Sudan wanted to “arabise” its western neighbours and change the demographic pattern of the whole region beyond Darfur.

This sounds very dubious for an expert of the region. Arabs do not form one community, neither in Darfur nor in Chad; politically they are deeply divided; they are not even socially organised under one umbrella. Moreover, why would Khartoum’s regime undertake such a “civilisational” project, at a time when it had to focus on the south, and Darfur, and reassure the international community? But French politicians and military experts are used to those kinds of geopolitical grand visions: they developed one to justify their support for the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda and for another to make sense of the wars in DRC. Sometimes facts seem too boring.

Paris pushed the United Nations to plan an intervention to freeze the border between the two countries to prevent the Darfur crisis from spilling over into Chad. So the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) sent a delegation to the region twice (November/ December 2006 and February 2007), but Chad was dissatisfied with its recommendations. In March 2007, N'Djamena made it clear that a U.N. peacekeeping operation was not welcome in Chad, especially because it would mean a political mandate and be an acknowledgment that the Chadian opponents in Darfur were not mere mercenaries but also a party
in an internal conflict. Furthermore, Libya was hostile to the growing presence of foreign troops at its southern borders.

This was not good news for Paris, which kept pressuring the U.N. to envision a less ambitious operation with a minimal political mandate. In May 2007, a new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, was elected and a new foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, appointed. Both, for reasons too long to explain here, had promised to act decisively on Darfur. Kouchner, who had become a good friend of the Sudan Liberation Movement’s leader, Abdel Wahid Mohamed al-Nur, wanted to focus on Darfur. On his first day in office, he organised a meeting with various NGOs interested in Darfur. The outcome was his proposal to organise “humanitarian corridors” to provide food and assistance to the Darfuri population. The NGOs working in Darfur, the experts, and eventually the U.N. strongly disagreed: Darfur was not Bosnia, and this proposal was not solving any current difficulties faced by humanitarian workers. While visiting Khartoum a few weeks later, Bernard Kouchner organised a meeting in Darfur with the NGOs present. He left the room in anger when their representatives told him that what they needed first was a political solution in Darfur, not corridors. Kouchner could have reflected on the discrepancies between what he understood about Darfur and what humanitarian actors on the ground were telling him. Again, he needed to take the initiative by proposing a new idea. This is how the concept of EUFOR/MINURCAT came into being.

Besides that, a political agreement was reached between the Chadian regime and its opposition in order to improve the quality (an understatement) of the legislative elections that were postponed in May 2006. The Agreement of 13 August (2007) was certainly not an ill-conceived document but did not tackle two main problems: the issue of the armed opposition and the centralisation of power at the Presidency (and its many consequences in terms of governance, impunity and lack of accountability). To be fair, the French policy proceeded with a double approach: keeping the armed opposition at bay and mending the relationship between the regime and its legal opposition.
The EUFOR/MINURCAT French initiative is at the convergence of three different logics. First, while Khartoum had endorsed the idea of a new international force in Darfur in June 2007, it had made it clear that no Western countries would be allowed to contribute troops. There was no way French politicians could claim any role in that acceptance and in its implementation. The second logic was the urgency to show that the newly elected government in France could deliver. French politicians were looking for an alternative way to show their commitment to Darfur supporters in France. The third trend was the policy pursued by Paris concerning the deployment of U.N. troops at the border of Chad and Sudan. The DPKO was not enthusiastic about that concept. It had already too many operations ongoing, with too few troops, and such an operation had a taste of France using the U.N. to achieve its own political agenda.

As described above, Bernard Kouchner was reacting against a previous failure within a context that prohibited Western humanitarian military presence in Darfur. Chad was not the best option but not meaningless either, since more than 250,000 Darfur refugees were settled there and about 150,000 Chadian people displaced. There was little understanding why refugees and displaced persons were there: everything was linked to the conflict in Darfur, in Kouchner’s eyes. The project was endorsed by Idriss Déby, since he was reassured that there were no political “strings” attached to the operation. Moreover, since the operation – or its military component – was European, France would have a leading role and the U.N. would give up any ambition to infringe on the Chadian political realm. Idriss Déby was right.

Paris wanted to promote the idea because it integrated different goals into one policy. Moreover, it allowed Paris, which was going to chair the European Union, to show its leadership at the European level and also to

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3 The French government, quite unhappy not to have been at the forefront, organised an international summit on Darfur in late June 2007, which brought about no new decision, but, at least, Bernard Kouchner and Nicolas Sarkozy were in the news on Darfur.
4 See the report to the Security Council that presented the different options. The lack of enthusiasm is clear: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/242/07/PDF/N0724207.pdf?OpenElement>
get the EU to share the financial burden of such an operation in Chad for the whole year of 2008. Among French diplomats and the military there was also a minority group that pushed the project as the best way to close the Epervier (Sparrowhawk) Operation, to save some money and get these French troops out of a country with such a debatable record.

2. An Assessment

Any assessment is a function of the parameters used to perform it. As stated in the introduction, there are different ways to look at the same reality. People may, for instance, rightly say that France was providing more than 50% of the troops, and therefore the operation was French and hardly European. This is true but not unusual for European military operations in Africa. Should we, therefore, on the basis of this sole argument decide that EUFOR was a failure? If this is the case, then all European operations were a failure, a view that cannot be accepted by many European officials and even critics of the French policy in Africa. Let me try to make a few points that show the complexity of any evaluation.

First, this operation was truly difficult to sell to the European partners. There are a number of reasons that could explain the reluctance of many European countries to commit troops to this project. Some countries were already spending a significant amount of money for the military intervention in Afghanistan and did not want to spend more. Others were very suspicious of a possible hidden French agenda under the cover of a European intervention. German MPs, for instance, claimed that they also had problems strengthening a regime that showed so little inclination towards good governance and respect for human rights. The killing of the civilian Chadian political opposition leader Ibni Mahamat Saleh in February 2008 was considered the ultimate proof of the disregard of

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5 In April 2009, the Epervier Operation included 1,142 French soldiers (including 392 for the air force) based in N’Djamena, Faya Largeau and Abéché. They could use 6 mirage F 1, 3 freighters Transall, an air tanker C 135 and 3 Puma helicopters.
key European values\textsuperscript{7}. A few might have felt that this was a short-sighted intervention, since the mandate given to MINURCAT did not include any room for a national political reconciliation. Maybe the armed opposition was playing into the hands of Khartoum, but it was the expression of a genuine problem that needed to be addressed.

Most of the European partners understood that such an operation would have very little consequences for Sudan, at a time when its public was more interested in Darfur than in anything happening in Chad. N'Djamena (and even more Bangui) was not a concern for most European countries that had no (or very little) knowledge of this country and relied heavily on French official expertise\textsuperscript{8}. For this reason, the discussion among EU member states in Brussels was not as frank as might have been expected. While a number of countries, such as the UK and Germany, had doubts about a possible French hidden agenda and became minimally involved, others, such as Ireland, wanted to prove their European commitment after the very depressing national debate on the Lisbon Treaty. The fact that 26 countries were contributing less than 3,500 soldiers is a good illustration of this mixed support or opposition, France got in that period, taking also into account that Paris provided more than 50\% of the troops. Nobody wanted to appear as not doing much to help Darfur; yet nobody was convinced that EUFOR would achieve this aim. But, no harm was done.

As a consequence, it took until 15 March 2008 to reach the initial operational capacity. Five EU meetings were necessary to generate forces. France – as in other European operations – supplied more than 50\% of the troops. 13 of the 26 countries that were involved contributed less than 10 troops. The hard lesson for Paris was that without a specific commitment from Germany and/or the U.K. a European operation might

\textsuperscript{7} See for instance the World Bank indices on Chad that show little progress despite French claims of the contrary. 
\textsuperscript{8} At least, the European operation helped change this situation, since diplomats had to travel regularly from Cameroon to follow the political developments in Chad.
get stuck due to these problems\textsuperscript{9}. The setting of the operation also sheds light on a French ambiguous agenda. While the Operation Headquarters was based near Paris, the real day-to-day key places were in N’Djamena and Abéché. This, purposefully or not, provided a sense of French control and overview that was criticised by some European countries. To be fair, one should add that the French General Jean-Philippe \textit{GANASCIA}, EUFOR Deputy Commander, took a very balanced stance and did his best to keep to the letter and the spirit of EUFOR’s mandate. This was not without risk, since he was increasingly facing problems from the French embassy in N’Djamena that wanted him to endorse more enthusiastically the French agenda\textsuperscript{10}. In summer 2008, some experts in Paris thought that he might be called back.

Financially, the reluctance of several member states appears justified. The overall cost of the operation for the European states is subject to discussion, but pundits agree that it should be €900-1.000 million, including about €138 million paid by the European Union. The ATHENA mechanism, set up by Brussels to fund European missions, worked well. Yet it paid only for a little part of the expenses. In 2008, for instance, the European contribution for EUFOR was €119 million (of which France paid €18.5 million), while Paris spent €130 million for its own costs. Not all countries act in the same way. Paris wanted to extend the European participation to claim a diplomatic success but had to pay for it. Paris had to provide the Polish contingent with equipment worth more than €2.6 million, feed the 63 Albanian soldiers free of charge, supply fuel to the Ukrainians (more than 350m³), build accommodation for the Russians\textsuperscript{11} and the like. This led to excessive costs for the French military\textsuperscript{12}. The logistical difficulties were daunting. For example,

\textsuperscript{9} That explains why, when the crisis in eastern DRC broke out, Kouchner and Miliband travelled together to Kigali and Kinshasa in October/November 2008: the proposal of a European intervention made by Kouchner (and eventually rebuffed by the Élysée Palace) needed at least the informal endorsement of his British colleague.

\textsuperscript{10} Interviews with French military and diplomats, Paris.

\textsuperscript{11} The Russian contingent was composed of 120 staff and 4 helicopters MI 8.

drinkable water had to be brought from N’Djamena by plane. The hemming in was a recurrent problem that was only eased by the expertise and additional means provided by the French Opération Epervier. It took containers two weeks to travel from Europe to Cameroon, then two more weeks to reach N’Djamena and, finally, one week to get to Abéché. This geographical situation explains, to a certain extent, the high costs of such an operation. For France EUFOR cost as much in 2008 as its military presence in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{13}.

The minor involvement of many countries resulted in a high change-over rate at the Operation HQs at Mont Valérien, near Paris. Only 25\% of the staff stayed for the whole duration of the operation. Most of the other officers were present only for four or five months. Purposefully or not, this again gave the French the upper hand concerning many aspects of the operation. Yet this situation had some advantages. It allowed more than 475 officers to work and train in a European operation and could be considered an investment with regard to future interventions. The quality of the troops was such that the mandate could be fulfilled without many problems, except those generated by any international intervention.

Eastern Chad had had little infrastructure, and the European military had to build or renovate a number of facilities for the operation. Six new bases were built in the east, while the airports of Abéché and N’Djamena were enlarged and secured. The European Union spent €70 million on that. A point of contention is that all those facilities were handed over to the Chadian State at the end of the EUFOR Mission and had to be rented by MINURCAT II at a high price. European taxpayers may wonder why they have to fund the Chadian military budget and why no conditions were expressed by the French negotiators at the beginning, since they knew that EUFOR would likely need to hand over these facilities to a U.N. operation, eventually. MINURCAT II officials are very bitter because of these terms of agreement.

This was, by far, the most important military operation undertaken by the EU: 23 member states and three non-member states (Albania, 

\textsuperscript{13} Cf. ibid. p. 58.
Croatia and Russia) were officially involved. To a large extent, the mandate was fulfilled by the European troops. Nevertheless, questions were raised increasingly concerning the long-term impact of the Operation. The answer and the hope lay with the United Nations that took over the whole operation as MINURCAT II on 15 March, 2009. At a technical level and from a European perspective, the bridging operation could be seen as a success, although the U.N. troop generation was late and hardly sufficient. This was not because of the U.N.’s usual difficulties to raise troops. Several European countries and Norway kept a good share of their contingents in Chad to give the DPKO more time. Yet, one should be clear on the fact that the U.N. is hardly equipped to deal with such a difficult task that requires a highly mobile force and the capacity to react quickly. Both are only possible, if the best troops and equipment are available. One should not forget that the area under scrutiny stretches 760 km from north to south and 450 km from east to west. The DPKO had to refuse troops from some contributors because they were absolutely not fit for the mandate, and still could reach the amount of troops authorised by the U.N. Security Council.

As we see, these various points do not allow a black-and-white picture of the Operation. Carrying out such a task, of course, allowed the Europeans to improve several procedures and coordination rules. Let us now consider, more specifically, the impact on the ground – an assessment that may be more controversial.

The relationship with Chadian authorities was not bad, though not as good as expected at the beginning of the Operation. EUFOR thought that it could enjoy the same trust and freedom as troops under the French flag. This was not the case, since the Chadian President rejected very quickly the claims made by leading officers that the European mission was not there to confront Chadian rebels, unless the latter targeted IDPs, refugee camps or humanitarian groups. This became particularly visible in June 2008, when the rebels carried out a short offensive in southeastern Chad. But several incidents before or after that specific attack made it clear that Brussels was not Paris, even though the Europeans were legitimist. For instance, when French special operations forces were killed inside Sudan in early March 2008, the EUFOR
leadership was extremely concerned because it had not been aware of this platoon’s mission. The only diplomatic solution was to make apologies to Khartoum at the cost of obliging the French authorities to go along with it. The question of neutrality was again raised in May 2008, when one Darfur insurgent organisation, the Justice and Equality Movement, organised an offensive against the Sudanese capital Khartoum from Chad (and Kordofan, Sudan) and managed to control parts of Omdurman for a few hours\textsuperscript{14}. This operation had green light from the Chadian Presidency, but EUFOR could not take sides regarding this controversial action, which hardly corresponded to the public discourse of the Chadian regime, which was attacked by the evil Islamist regime in Sudan. Incidents at the border were numerous and provoked either by Sudanese or Chadian elements, sometimes at the cost of European troops, which did not want to create a diplomatic incident. Viewed from this angle, EUFOR underwent a tough reality check. European troops became unwillingly part of international skirmishes when Sudanese aircraft bombed Chadian areas and Chadian soldiers crossed the border to support Darfur insurgents. They also witnessed the impunity of some Chadian militias in Chad, even though those groups were burning down villages.

The very concept of operation kept changing. At first, in early summer of 2007, the discussions focused on communal violence, militias, banditry and, eventually, the impact of Darfur. The questions of governance, impunity and behaviour of the “corps habillés” were also tackled. Yet the French military intelligence very quickly redirected the Operation towards a more conventional approach concerning the insecurity in eastern Chad: the problems were created by the Chadian rebels based in Darfur and the infamous Janjaweed. It took months to correct this too biased approach and to acknowledge what experts and NGOs had been saying for years, namely that the insecurity mainly came

\textsuperscript{14} One column came from Chad, another one from Central Sudan (Kordofan). The vehicles were from Libya. The whole operation appeared as a response to what had happened in early February. JEM was an actor but also a tool in this confrontation between would-be regional powers.
from within Chad and that EUFOR should act more as a police than as a military force.

While, at first, the ambition was to rebuild the judicial system in the east and eventually expand it all over the country, the U.N. and the European Union quickly became more modest and realistic. The backbone of this ambition was the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS), made up of police personnel who would secure the IDPs and refugee camps. It took months to train the first 450 members and some further months to get a list of new trainees provided by the Chadian State. Without entering into intricacies, one can say that the DIS may not be a success story, as claimed by the U.N., the Europeans and, from time to time, the Chadian Presidency. They seem to be contributing to the unstable situation more than reducing it. They created jealousy from other law enforcement agencies and were not the most efficient to address the insecurity in the camps. Eventually, they served as an escort for U.N. staff, if anything. NGOs, to say the least, have not been impressed, since the authority of the State did not reassert itself in a credible manner, and, anyway, should express itself by supplying public goods. In eastern Chad, the State gave up this component to the foreigners, a point that should have raised more concerns in the humanitarian community.

The U.N. resolutions – especially Resolution 1861 of January 2009 – emphasised the importance of the return of refugees and IDPs as a key factor to assess the success of the Operation. Bernard Kouchner himself congratulated EUFOR in March 2009 on having created the conditions for IDPs to return home. Even the humanitarian agencies of the U.N. mentioned a high number of returned persons at one point in 2008, namely no fewer than 40,000. However, this figure was not correct, and it quickly disappeared from the U.N. books. IDPs never rush back to their home villages; it is always a slow process because checks have to be repeated, and the local economy re-launched before a family can leave the camp for good. When EUFOR tried to please Mr. Kouchner, they just created useless tensions with humanitarian workers and the IDPs. This shows how totally different agendas can clash: the French government needed a humanitarian success, while the humanitarian organisations thought that more attention should be paid to the root
causes of the insecurity and repeated, mantra-like, that for a solution it would take a fresh political process, the end of impunity, and a strict control of the “corps habillés”, which had often been the cause of many tensions.

Nevertheless, the French government could claim some success: first, EUFOR fulfilled its military role, in the sense that the Chadian rebels were unable or unwilling to confront the European Forces. In fact, EUFOR, which had no mandate on the border, helped freeze the situation. The Chadian armed opposition was also unable to capitalise on the European interest in Chad, due to the presence of European troops. There is no point to explain this situation, but French diplomacy was able to focus European and international attention on the Agreement of 13 August 2007, which offers a framework for parliamentarian elections in 2010. Benefiting from a very weak civilian opposition in the country and factional disputes of the armed opposition in exile, Idriss Déby has free hands and European money to carry out his own reforms of the State apparatus.

3. Conclusion: Towards the Failure of MINURCAT II

Months after the end of the EUFOR Mission, the situation in eastern Chad is still grim. MINURCAT II does not have the same efficiency and insecurity has increased. EUFOR contained the problem but could not solve it. Banditry has become a main threat in this part of the country (as in Darfur). Darfur refugees are still waiting for a political solution to return back home and, despite a new round of negotiations monitored by the U.S., an agreement still appears distant.

Yet the indictment of President Bashir by the ICC was celebrated at the Chadian Presidency. This pushed the Sudanese President to search for new (very tactical and fragile) common ground with Chad and show some flexibility regarding Darfur talks. The Dakar Agreement has been resuscitated, though experts tend to believe that nothing really tangible has been agreed yet. Problems may remain “frozen” until the outbreak of the next crisis, which may be after this year’s rainy season. But then the
U.N. will be blamed, and not the capable, democratic, and generous Europeans led by Paris.
EUFOR Chad/CAR:
A Regional Solution for a Regional Problem?

David Lanz*

Introduction

On 28 January 2008, the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU) decided to launch a peacekeeping force to be stationed for one year in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). One day later at a press conference in Brussels, the Operation Commander of the newly founded EU Force (EUFOR) Chad/CAR Lieutenant General Patrick Nash from Ireland highlighted his mission’s “difficult operational environment”, including a “regional situation [that] is volatile and sensitive, with ongoing tensions between Sudan and Chad.”\(^1\) Nash’s assessment proved to be exactly right, more so than he had ever hoped for. Four days later, on 2 February, a group of approximately 4,000 rebels from eastern Chad descended on N’Djamena, after having travelled 1,000 kilometers across the entire country. The aim of the rebels was to topple Chadian President Idriss Déby, and they nearly succeeded. After several days of fighting, Déby narrowly managed to repel the insurgents, owing to the military support provided by France

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and Libya as well as quarrels among the rebel leaders about who would succeed Déby as president.

The February 2008 attack not only revealed the fragility of Déby’s regime, it also brought to light the regional dynamics of the armed conflict in Chad, CAR and Darfur. As such, the Chadian rebels were sponsored by the Sudanese government, and they prepared for their attack in western Darfur and northeastern CAR, where they also recruited combatants. Déby, in turn, crucially relied on the military support from the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), one of the main rebel movements in Darfur. These links date back to 2005 and 2006 when violence broke out in Chad and CAR. The media and activists were quick to describe these conflicts as a simple spill-over from the war in Darfur, applying the same categories that they had used to frame the violence in Darfur: Arab militias known as “Janjaweed” were attacking innocent civilians from “African” tribes. The “Darfurization” thesis has since been discredited by a number of studies that have highlighted the intrinsic roots of the conflicts in CAR and Chad. Nonetheless, it remains that the crises in western Sudan (Darfur), eastern Chad and northeastern CAR have become so interconnected that they form, in the words of Roland Marchal, one “system of conflict.”

Even before the February 2008 attack, it was clear to the EU that its peacekeepers were to be inserted into a highly complicated regional context. The guiding question of this article, therefore, is whether EUFOR represented an adequate response to the kind of regionalized

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conflict that has taken shape in north-central Africa. In other words: Was EUFOR Chad/CAR a regional solution to a regional problem? At first glance, the answer appears to be affirmative: the mission’s theatre of operations spanned two countries, Chad and CAR, making EUFOR one of the first trans-border peacekeeping operations ever to be deployed. Moreover, as the mission was concentrated in eastern Chad, across the border from Darfur, the third trouble spot in the region, it is not surprising that EUFOR Chad/CAR aimed to influence the situation in Darfur. According to General Nash, EUFOR “is an important addition to the overall international efforts to facilitate a solution to the Darfur crisis in the regional context.” Likewise, French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, the principal architect of EUFOR, stated during a U.N. Security Council session in September 2008 that EUFOR “aims to provide a response to the regional dimension of the Darfur crisis.” This article offers a critical appraisal of such claims by outlining, at first, the context of the regionalized conflict in which EUFOR Chad/CAR was deployed. It then considers the regional implications of EUFOR’s creation before attempting to sketch out EUFOR’s impact in the region. The article concludes by proposing a number of general reflections regarding conflict management in contemporary international affairs.

PART I: Conflict Regionalization in North-Central Africa in Context

The post-colonial history of the three states in north-central Africa – Sudan, Chad and CAR – has been marked by armed conflicts that frequently involved external actors. Thus since 2003, the escalation of the war in Darfur has reinforced cross-border entanglement in this

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4 Summary of Remarks by Lt General Patrick Nash, p. 9.
6 This section is based on Giroux, Jennifer/Lanz, David/Sguaitamatti, Damiano. The Tormented Triangle: The Regionalization of Conflict in Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic. London 2009.
region. Two rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and JEM, emerged after 2001, recruiting from non-Arab tribes of Darfur, primarily the Fur, the Massalit and the Zaghawa. In 2003, when the Sudanese government and the main insurgent group from the south, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), were engaged in peace negotiations, from which Darfur was excluded, the rebels decided to step up their attacks against government installations in Darfur. In response to the early military successes of the rebellion and with the aim of destroying the civilian support base of the rebels, the Sudanese government unleashed the infamous “Janjaweed” militia, a vicious counter-insurgency force, primarily recruited from Arab tribes in northern Darfur. Violence peaked in late 2003 and 2004, leading to the emergence of a transnational advocacy movement, which described the Darfur conflict as genocide. Violence in Darfur has since diminished, but continues to flare up periodically, as the conflict remains unresolved.

Chadian President Déby, himself a member of the very Zaghawa tribe that forms the backbone of the Darfur insurgency, initially maintained his longstanding alliance with Khartoum. This was demonstrated by his attempt to arrest Khalil Ibrahim, the leader of JEM, and by his role as mediator between Khartoum and the Darfur rebels in 2004. However, Khartoum expected Déby to put more pressure on the Zaghawa Darfur rebels, while Déby, who was losing popularity, increasingly needed the

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support of the Zaghawa elite in order to keep his government together. By 2005, Déby had caved to political pressure and dissolved the alliance with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, opting instead to support the Darfur rebels. Déby’s volte-face proved to be a critical juncture, as the shift of alliances set in motion a process of conflict regionalization. Consequently, the Sudanese government stepped up its support for Chadian rebel groups, such as Mahamat Nour’s ‘Front uni pour le changement’ (FUC), encouraging them to overthrow Déby. A first attack on the border town of Adré took place in December 2005, followed by a raid on N’Djamena in April 2006. The Chadian rebels came closest to achieving their objective in February 2008, as described in the introduction of this article. In May 2009, another attack was launched, but it was successfully fended off by the Chadian army, which had learned from previous attacks and was better equipped than before. JEM, in turn, became an important ally for Déby, who rewarded the movement with weapons and cash. This enabled JEM to take the rebellion to the centre by attacking Omdurman in May 2008. Although the attack did not succeed in toppling the Sudanese government, it shook al-Bashir’s regime to its core and solidified JEM’s status as the most powerful among Darfur’s rebel groups.

CAR is another player in the regional conflict system in north-central Africa, although its role has been less scrutinized. President François Bozizé came to power in a 2003 coup, for which he essentially relied on Chadian fighters partly provided by Bozizé’s patron Déby. Until recently, the inner circle of Bozizé’s personal security consisted primarily of Chadian fighters, and Déby remains a crucial ally. However, many of the Chadian combatants who had brought Bozizé to power were upset by his broken promises of compensation for their efforts in the coup. Consequently, they turned against the government in

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Bangui. Some of them joined the ‘Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement’ (UFDR), which served as the umbrella for a number of armed groups in the Vakaga region in the northeast. The UFDR launched an insurgency in 2005, and it appears that it received some support from the Sudanese government. By arming the rebels in the northeast, Khartoum sought to persuade Bozizé to limit Chadian influence in CAR, thus depriving Sudan’s enemy Déby of an ally in the region. Moreover, it appears that the Chadian rebels have used the northeast of CAR as a staging area for their attacks on N’Djamena in 2006 and 2008.

In sum, the conflict dynamics in north-central Africa reveal a web of state and non-state actors that strategically utilize regional alliances and fluid borders to shape and project power. This process of conflict regionalization was not a random occurrence. Rather, it was facilitated by five interconnected factors pertaining to the geopolitical, economic, military, ethnopolitical, and historic structure of the region: the nature of state power; the geopolitical position of hinterlands; the role of trans-border ethnic communities; the implications of trans-border migration and arms trade; and the presence of combatants with blurred loyalties. These factors, which will be further considered in the following paragraphs, do not themselves explain conflict regionalization in north-central Africa. However, they form a structural environment that enabled the cross-border conflict dynamics that were set in motion by events related to the escalation of the war in Darfur in 2003.

First, the functioning of the state in Sudan, Chad and CAR is relevant to understanding conflict regionalization. Chad and CAR qualify as “weak” states, in the sense that governments are little institutionalized and the allocation of public goods, such as security, education, health care or

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critical infrastructure to the population is limited. Sudan is different from Chad and CAR insofar as the central government is more capable and relatively effective in the area around Khartoum. However, political power and resources are concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite from the Nile Valley around Khartoum. Consequently, peripheral areas such as Darfur have been systematically marginalized, and they have often remained outside the effective control of the government in Khartoum. What Sudan, Chad and CAR have in common is the inability of the elites in the capital to project legitimacy and state power to their hinterlands. As a result, those holding power in the center are constantly threatened by rebellions that may break out in peripheral areas. To counter this threat, the ruling elites enter into clientelistic relationships with provincial elites, insurgent groups, and governments of the region. Such relationships entail the arming and mobilizing of rebel groups across the border and their unleashing against insurgents and the civilian populations who support them. They also include appealing to regional powers, such as Libya, in order to secure their patronage, which allows them, for example, to use peripheries as strategic rear areas.

The second factor of conflict regionalization pertains to the geopolitical position of hinterlands. Eastern Chad, northeastern CAR, and Darfur are characteristic examples of hinterlands that are historically, economically, politically, and culturally dissociated from their capitals and oriented towards neighboring areas across the border. For example, eastern Chad is almost 1,000 kilometres from N’Djamena, and during the rainy season

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overland travel is difficult. Eastern Chad is also the site of the historic Wadai Sultanate, which was an independent political entity for centuries. Likewise, Darfur was independent until 1916 when the British incorporated the Darfur Sultanate into larger Sudan. Furthermore, Darfur is several 100 kilometres from Khartoum and geographically distinct from the Nile Valley and northern Sudan. CAR presents the most extreme example of a hinterland: the district of Vakaga in the northeast is almost 1,000 kilometres from Bangui, and during half of the year it is completely inaccessible by land. In terms of culture and trade, northeastern CAR is oriented towards Abéché in eastern Chad and Nyala in south Darfur, as opposed to Bangui or any other part of CAR. The isolation of hinterlands, coupled with state weakness, has facilitated conflict regionalization by providing strategic rear areas for rebels from neighboring countries. Moreover, the distant geopolitical position of hinterlands has forced governments in the centre to build clientelistic networks on one or the other side of the border in order to gain a military advantage and to tap the lucrative cross-border trade.

A third factor leading to conflict regionalization concerns the presence of ethnic communities inhabiting the border areas, whose loyalties lie primarily with their kin, rather than with the central elites. The role of the Zaghawa is particularly significant in this respect. The Zaghawa have traditionally lived in eastern Chad and northern Darfur, although recent decades have seen their spread throughout the region. According to Jérôme Tubiana, for the Zaghawa, like other nomadic tribes of the region, “the border has never existed: a person can be born in one of these countries and live in the other, and feel that they belong to both in the same way.” The Zaghawa have traditionally been important

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stakeholders in the region, given their position in the cross-border trade between Chad and Sudan. Their role has been enhanced since Déby took power in Chad in 1990. As a result, many Zaghawa have been placed in influential positions of the Chadian government, security apparatus and economy. The access to power and resources of the Zaghawa in Chad has fostered an increasing awareness among the Zaghawa in Darfur of their disenfranchisement within the Sudanese state. It is thus not surprising that Zaghawa leaders are playing a key role in the Darfur rebellion that broke out in 2003. As described above, the pressure from the Zaghawa elite in N’Djamena led Déby to break his alliance with Khartoum, setting in motion a regional proxy war between Sudan and Chad.

Fourth, cross-border migration and small arms trade between eastern Chad, northeastern CAR and Darfur have contributed to the spreading of armed conflict in the region. Migration from Chad to Darfur has occurred for many decades, although it was accelerated in the 1980s, when eastern Chad was afflicted by severe drought and civil war. These Chadian migrants, many of them from Arab tribes, aggravated the competition for land in Darfur, caused by ecological deterioration, population growth and mismanagement of resources. Many of these local conflicts were militarized when Darfur became the stage for a proxy war between Libya and the West over the control of Chad. Chadian migration also played a role in the most recent conflict in Darfur, as disenfranchised young men from Arab tribes in Chad were recruited into the ranks of the Janjaweed militia. Moreover, there has been little restriction of the cross-border movement of goods as a result of the absence of border controls. This has, in turn, facilitated the

proliferation of military goods, in particular small arms, fuelling armed conflict across the region.  

A fifth factor in conflict regionalization relates to the activities of armed groups that have proliferated since the escalation of the war in Darfur. Indeed, there appears to be a pool of armed men in the region, whose livelihood and social identity depend on their status as combatants. Many of these fighters have, at some point, been integrated into regular security forces, only to return to being insurgents when it proved the more lucrative option or when their leaders were expelled from the government. According to Marielle Debos, these combatants have “fluid loyalties,” meaning that they can be mobilized for any project, be it defending the government or fighting insurgencies in their own or in foreign countries. The presence of such combatants has made it relatively cheap to instigate rebellions or to fight counter-insurgencies in neighboring countries. If governments had to send their armies to invade other countries, they would face much higher costs and be less inclined to do so. However, the presence of combatants that are cheap and easy to mobilize makes the option of regional proxy warfare comparatively more attractive.

PART II: The Regional Implications of the Creation of EUFOR Chad/CAR

The creation of EUFOR Chad/CAR was a politically contentious exercise, although the mandate of the mission does not reveal this fact: EUFOR aimed to protect civilians; to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid in the area of deployment; and to protect its own installations and those of the accompanying U.N. Mission MINURCAT.

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33 Cf. ibid.
I. Despite this noble mandate as well as the framing of EUFOR by its promoters as a neutral humanitarian intervention, the operation was politically charged from the outset. Its creation became possible as a result of the convergence of French home politics, efforts to establish a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and the survival strategies of the regimes in Chad and CAR. The following section will consider these dimensions highlighting the regional implications of EUFOR Chad/CAR.

First, the French dimension: a number of observers have suggested that EUFOR Chad/CAR is a product of ‘Françafrique’ – the idea that France’s policy towards Africa is essentially neocolonial, based on clientelistic relationships with brutal dictators. In this logic, EUFOR is a Trojan horse for French interests in Chad and CAR and basically constitutes an attempt to ‘multilateralize’ or ‘Europeanize’ France’s involvement in the region. Indeed, EUFOR Chad/CAR was primarily a French initiative, and although endowed with an EU mandate, France paid the lion’s share of the mission and provided more than half of its troops, i.e. 2,100 out of 3,700. Such claims were corroborated by France’s reaction to the February 2008 attack on N’Djamena. France’s diplomatic coverage and military support proved instrumental for Déby in eventually driving back the rebels. Subsequently, France was strangely passive when Déby declared a state of emergency and arrested leaders of the civilian opposition, which led Jean-François Bayart to denounce a “French-Chadian obscenity.” Moreover, as Roland Marchal revealed, there are tight connections between the ruling elite in Chad and the French government.

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35 Such a position is articulated in Tull, Denis M. *The Chad Crisis and Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR*. Berlin 2008. 4.

Chad and the French government. France’s policy in CAR is less known. It is clear, however, that France was concerned with the fragility of its CAR ally Bozizé, whose regime was threatened by rebellions in the northwest as well as the northeast. To counter the UFDR insurgency, French forces intervened massively in March 2007, taking control of Birao, the capital of the Vakaga district in the northeast. Thus, EUFOR was seen by France as an opportunity to stabilize the situation in the northeast and to prop up the Bozizé’s regime. France also hoped that the extension of EUFOR to northeastern CAR would deter the Chadian rebels from using the area as a staging ground for their assaults against Déby, as they had done in 2006.

Although Paris’ geopolitical interests in the region have certainly played a role, they were not as instrumental in EUFOR’s creation as another less tangible dimension of French politics. In May 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy won the French elections and ascended to the presidency of the Republic. In an attempt to co-opt his political opposition, Sarkozy appointed Bernard Kouchner, a well-known protagonist from the French political left, as foreign minister. As the co-founder of ‘Médecins sans frontières’, Kouchner has a long past in humanitarianism. He sparked controversy within the humanitarian community and beyond by championing the “droit d’ingérence” – the right to intervene to stop mass atrocities by using military force. After NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo, the concept was augmented to include prevention and reconstruction aspects, and it was re-labeled the ‘responsibility to protect’ – or R2P, in short. The core idea remains as ambitious as it was


before: when mass atrocities occur, human rights outdo sovereignty and international solidarity overrules national self-interest.\textsuperscript{41} When reports about atrocities in Darfur started filtering through into Western media in early 2004, Darfur became a test case for normative entrepreneurs promoting R2P. Within a few months, an advocacy movement emerged, at first in the U.S., and later in Western Europe, framing the Darfur conflict as genocide and calling for humanitarian intervention to stop it.\textsuperscript{42} Led by the Save Darfur Coalition, the movement gained momentum in the context of the 2004 U.S. presidential elections. In response, the U.S. government made significant policy adjustments, including a number of sanction bills targeting the Sudanese government.\textsuperscript{43}

In France, the Darfur advocacy movement, spearheaded by the NGO coalition ‘Urgence Darfour’, gained momentum in the context of the 2007 presidential elections. Led by the former director of ‘Médecins du monde’, Jacky Mamou, ‘Urgence Darfour’ successfully made Darfur a prominent issue in the French presidential campaign.\textsuperscript{44} As a result, all candidates made statements that emphasized their resolve to act on behalf of the victims in Darfur. Not surprisingly, Bernard Kouchner was active in this campaign, demanding a humanitarian intervention to save people in Darfur.\textsuperscript{45} When he was later appointed foreign minister, he immediately took up Darfur for three compelling reasons. First, Darfur presented him with an opportunity to put into practice his normative agenda pertaining to humanitarian intervention, of which he had been a long-standing advocate. Second, Kouchner wanted to send a signal to his


activist friends and his constituencies that he had stayed true to their cause. Third, Darfur allowed Kouchner to fend off accusations that he had been co-opted by Sarkozy’s right-wing agenda by taking the initiative on an issue that resonated with the left. Thus, on his first day in office, on 18 May 2007, Kouchner convened a meeting with NGOs and diplomats and launched the idea to establish ‘humanitarian corridors’ to facilitate aid delivery in Darfur. However, when Kouchner travelled to Khartoum a few weeks later, he discovered to his dismay that humanitarian NGOs in Darfur and the U.N. were opposed to the idea on the grounds that humanitarian access in Darfur was already relatively good.46

Kouchner was thus forced to abandon his plan, but he was determined to not drop the ball on Darfur by finding alternative forms of humanitarian intervention. This is how the idea of EUFOR Chad/CAR was born. Since 2006, when the international community became cognizant of the regional dimension of the Darfur conflict, there were plans to deploy U.N. peacekeepers in eastern Chad. By having a military presence on both sides of the border – the U.N./African Union (AU) Mission on the Sudanese side, and the U.N. Mission on the Chadian side – it was hoped that the effects of the war on the civilian population could be contained.47 Déby initially rejected the idea of peacekeepers in the east. However, when Kouchner, shortly after his unsuccessful NGO meeting in Khartoum, proposed an EU operation under French leadership, Déby accepted the offer.48 As a general consideration, it is important to note that Kouchner never regarded EUFOR Chad/CAR as a solution to the political crisis in Chad, but as a means to address the effects of the Darfur conflict. Deployed outside of Darfur, EUFOR Chad/CAR is therefore tantamount to ‘conflict intervention by approximation.’

The second dimension of EUFOR’s creation relates to European politics: in order to confer legitimacy on the mission and to share the cost burden,

46 Cf. ibid, pp. 63-64.
France sought an EU mandate for its peacekeeping endeavors in Chad and CAR. From the outset, EUFOR Chad/CAR was controversial, as a number of EU member states, most importantly Germany, “suspect[ed] it of being a vehicle for advancing French interests.”\(^{49}\) France’s close relationship with Déby was regarded as particularly problematic, as it would compromise the neutrality of the mission. It was feared that this would threaten the security of EU troops on the ground and potentially tarnish Europe’s image in Africa.\(^{50}\) In fact, debates about EUFOR Chad/CAR revealed general disagreements about the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy in Africa: France, on the one hand, was eager to further the EU’s role in crisis management, including military peacekeeping. Germany and Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, viewed the core of the EU’s engagement in Africa as civilian, not military, and were concerned about the ESDP’s instrumentalization by former colonial powers, especially France.\(^{51}\) Despite such disaccords, the EU foreign ministers finally approved the establishment of EUFOR Chad/CAR in September 2007. At least four factors rendered this decision possible: first, the EU was keen on doing something in the region in response to civil society mobilization around the issue of Darfur. Second, EUFOR Chad/CAR was seen as a useful experiment for the ESDP.\(^{52}\) Third, in the end, Germany, France’s strongest opponent, was not prepared to take a principled stand and upset its traditionally strong friendship with France. Fourth, a deal was struck, whereby troop contributing countries, especially France, would cover most of the costs related to the mission, lessening the burden on the EU budget.\(^{53}\) Despite these compromises, the deployment of EUFOR Chad/CAR was delayed, owing to the immense logistical challenges of deployment as well as a

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\(^{49}\) “Colonial baggage: The lessons of Europe’s muddle over its military mission to Chad.” *The Economist* 7.2. 2008.


\(^{52}\) Cf. ibid. 113.

general reticence to commit troops on the part of most EU member states.54

The third dimension of relevance for EUFOR’s creation related to the calculations of host governments, i.e. Chad and CAR. Although framed as a humanitarian intervention, EUFOR, in fact, remained a peacekeeping mission that required the consent of host governments. On the insistence of France, the U.N. had assessed the possibility of deploying peacekeepers in Chad in 2006. Although the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations was not enthusiastic, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed different options for a peace mission in eastern Chad, including one with a strong political component.55 Although Annan’s successor Ban Ki-Moon subsequently presented a less ambitious plan,56 Déby still rejected it. Déby absolutely did not want a mission with a political mandate, and he may also have feared that peacekeepers in the east would obstruct his war-making efforts. However, as the pressure on Déby increased, and after obtaining four specific concessions, he accepted the mission: the EU took over the military component of the mission; EUFOR had a non-political mandate; EU soldiers were not deployed in areas immediately bordering Sudan; and U.N. and EU peacekeepers would not carry out patrols inside displaced camps, but they would instead train Chadian police forces to do so.57 Consequently, Déby’s attitude shifted and he came to regard EUFOR as potentially useful, as it provided him with breathing space, in addition to a deterrent against rebel attacks in the east.58

58 This is corroborated by a statement in an interview Déby gave on the French radio station Europe 1: “[EUFOR will] free us of the weight of being responsible for the
Against this background, it is not surprising that Sudan was fundamentally opposed to the deployment of European forces across the border of Darfur. The Sudanese government, just like the Chadian rebels that it supported, regarded France as a belligerent in the war it was fighting against Déby. Given France’s preeminent role in EUFOR, the mission was therefore seen as partial and biased against Sudanese interests. Moreover, Khartoum was at the time campaigning against a U.N. peacekeeping operation in Darfur. In this context, the Sudanese government portrayed itself as the victim of a Western neocolonial conspiracy to take control of Sudan, and EUFOR Chad/CAR was included in this narrative.59 Little is known about CAR President Bozizé’s motivation for accepting EUFOR on his territory, although his acquiescence is not surprising. It can be surmised that, since Bozizé was under pressure from insurgents, he hoped that by stabilizing the situation in the northeast, EUFOR would provide him with some leverage. In sum, it can be noted that, even before its deployment, EUFOR became a factor in the regional power struggle, influencing the strategic calculations of governments and insurgents in Sudan, Chad and CAR.

PART III: The Regional Impact of EUFOR Chad/CAR

EUFOR Chad/CAR had been operational for one year, from March 2008 to March 2009, when it was officially handed over to the U.N. Follow-on Mission MINURCAT II. The end of the mission provides an opportunity to take stock of its impact on the ground. Of particular interest in the context of this article is the impact of EUFOR Chad/CAR on the regional dynamics of conflict in north-central Africa, as described in Part I. For this purpose, the following section will first consider the impact of EUFOR in eastern Chad, northeastern CAR, and Darfur, looking briefly at the security and humanitarian situation. It will then

security of 300,000 Sudanese refugees and 170,000 Chadian IDPs. It is a significant burden that mobilizes many of our forces.” (Tubiana 2008:17).

59 According to Alex de Waal (Public talk at Harvard University, 1.4.2008), EUFOR had been portrayed by the Sudanese government as the “camel’s nose in the tent”, as a metaphor to highlight the imminent invasion of Sudan by Western armies.
look at political developments in the respective areas during the twelve months of EUFOR’s presence in the region.

The bulk of EUFOR soldiers were deployed in eastern Chad, and it appears that the stability of the region has somewhat improved as a result of EUFOR’s presence. The many patrols that EUFOR soldiers carried out around camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) led to a perception of enhanced safety among camp residents.\(^{60}\) Also, the activities of armed groups in eastern Chad have decreased, and it appears that there were fewer attacks on civilians. According to the Crisis Group, “the presence of European forces has … obliged players in the Chad conflict to act with greater prudence, because they now feel themselves to be under scrutiny.”\(^{61}\) It is noteworthy, in this regard, that no large-scale rebel offensive, such as in April 2006 and February 2008, took place during EUFOR’s deployment. To what extent this was due to EUFOR’s presence is uncertain: some observers attribute a deterrence effect to EUFOR, while others, such as Jérôme Tubiana, hold that EUFOR was simply “lucky” that the rebels refrained from launching an attack.\(^{62}\) In any case, the relative calm was only temporary. In May 2009, a coalition of Chadian rebels supported by the Sudanese government launched another major attack, although it was pushed back by the Chadian army before reaching the capital.

While EUFOR’s record with regard to protecting civilians is relatively positive, the same cannot be said for the “safe and secure environment” that EUFOR was supposed to create according to its mandate. In fact, the U.N. Secretary-General’s midterm review of EUFOR-MINURCAT of September 2008 noted that the security situation in eastern Chad was worsening.\(^{63}\) Similarly, humanitarian organizations complained about a


significant increase in criminality and banditry during EUFOR’s deployment, including attacks against humanitarian workers. For example, in May 2008, the country director of Save the Children U.K. and his driver were shot, as was a staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross two months later. 64 Given the deteriorating security situation, it is not surprising that almost no displaced people returned home during EUFOR’s presence, despite Bernard Kouchner’s declarations to the contrary. 65 It is manifestly difficult for 3,700 soldiers to control an area as vast as eastern Chad and northeastern CAR. However, EUFOR as a military mission was particularly ill-equipped to provide security in a context of rising criminality that calls for a robust police presence. In this respect, the Chadian police force that was supposed to be deployed alongside EUFOR proved ineffective because their training, which MINURCAT was mandated to provide, was delayed by almost an entire year. 66

The most serious flaw of EUFOR was its inability to effect any kind of meaningful changes in terms of a functioning state in Chad. Although EUFOR did not have a political mandate, the presence of EU soldiers in eastern Chad could have provided the EU with leverage to oblige Idriss Déby to engage in a serious political process. Such a process could have contributed to creating a widely-based, more representative government in Chad, addressing some of the root causes of the insurgency in the east. However, such opportunities were squandered. The EU did broker a peace agreement in Chad in 2007, i.e. the August 13th Agreement. This agreement laid out a number of measures pertaining to electoral reform and was signed by a large number of political parties. However, it excluded members of civil society and the armed opposition. Moreover, the EU, although referring to the August 13th Agreement like a

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65 Kouchner said in an interview on Radio 1 in December 2008 that a quarter of the displaced people in eastern Chad have gone home, and that, in March, half of them will have returned. Cf. Tubiana (2009:35).
“mantra,” did not put sufficient pressure on Déby to actually implement it. The deferment of the elections promised for 2009 is a case in point in this respect. In effect, “the accord gave Déby the chance to portray himself to the international community as a willing partner in Chad’s democratization process”, without really committing to such a process. Thus, despite its humanitarian mandate, EUFOR has actually benefited the regime in N’Djamena. The presence of European soldiers has temporarily filled the security vacuum in the east, allowing Déby to concentrate on strengthening his army, e.g. by procuring weapons and by recruiting mercenary fighters from the Ukraine, Mexico, Brazil and Algeria. Several observers have thus noted that Déby is now better prepared to fight the war against the armed opposition in the east than he was before EUFOR’s deployment.

The presence of EUFOR in CAR was reduced to one contingent of approximately 300 French soldiers stationed in Birao. Such a small number of peacekeepers obviously did not have a sweeping impact on the territory of northeastern CAR, which is roughly equivalent to the size of Denmark. However, it appears that EUFOR’s presence contributed to relative stability in and around Birao. Indeed, in 2008, the security situation in the northeast improved. This was mainly due to the reduction of rebel attacks against the government. In fact, the UFDR, the main

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rebel group in the northeast, signed a peace agreement with Bozizé in 2007, a few months after the French intervened in Birao. In exchange for their allegiance, the UFDR obtained the government’s recognition of its influence in the northeast, including the control of the cross-border trade to Sudan and the exploitation of local resources. In 2008, the agreement held and the UFDR’s troops were kept under control by its leader Zacharia Damane. To what extent EUFOR has contributed to the improving security in northeastern CAR is uncertain, although it seems plausible that the presence of European soldiers had a deterrence effect.73

In any case, such gains proved to be short-lived. In early 2009, violence erupted in Vakaga, as ethnic tensions between the Kara and the Goula escalated. Also, there were reports of UFDR soldiers preying on civilians, and criminality increased considerably.74 EUFOR and its successor MINURCAT II proved inept at responding to these developments. When attacks occurred around Birao, the peacekeepers would generally withdraw to their base at Birao airport, offering the staff of humanitarian organizations the opportunity to join them. Also, it was unclear if EUFOR MINURCAT had a mandate to intervene outside of Vakaga, e.g. in Sam Ouandja, where a few thousand Darfuri refugees live. This has now been clarified, and MINURCAT II is indeed competent to operate in this area. However, the absence of airlift capacities, i.e. helicopters, makes it impossible for the peacekeepers to project force and react to attacks quickly. Unlike in Chad, a serious political process did take place in CAR during EUFOR’s presence, with the EU and France throwing their weight behind it. Mediated by Gabon’s President Omar Bongo, an Inclusive Political Dialogue took place in December 2008, bringing together the government and the main exponents of the opposition. However, the process was impeded by the participants’ personal agendas, and it suffered from the exclusion of crucial issues, such as the disarmament of rebel combatants.75 In the end,

73 Cf. ibid.
74 Confidential interview with a U.N. official, September 2009.
the Inclusive Political Dialogue did not really change the way government is run in CAR, and it is thus not surprising that insurgencies broke out again shortly afterwards.76

As mentioned in Part II of this article, the main rationale of EUFOR Chad/CAR was to do something to improve the situation in Darfur. Ironically, however, the impact of EUFOR in Darfur was extremely limited. Despite decreasing levels of violence,77 the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur remains extremely fragile. Banditry is commonplace, including attacks against humanitarian organizations. Outside urban areas, a growing number of rebel groups roam, and they are entangled in an ever more complicated web of alliances and counter-alliances. Interethnic violence, in particular between Arab tribes, has become more frequent as a result of increased competition for land.78 Around 40% of Darfuris are internally displaced and live in camps that are increasingly politicized and beyond the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces.79 None of these dynamics were seriously affected by EUFOR’s presence across the border.80 One may speculate about indirect impacts of EUFOR Chad/CAR in Darfur. For example, by strengthening the Chadian government, EUFOR may indirectly have benefitted the Darfur rebel groups that N’Djamena is supporting, especially JEM. Nonetheless, it would not be plausible to argue that EUFOR had a significant impact on the security situation in Darfur. The same can be said for developments on the political level. The Darfur peace process continues to be led by the U.N./AU mediator Djibril Bassolé, although he was obliged to bring his efforts in alignment with a proactive Qatar, settling for Doha as the official venue for the peace

80 This is confirmed by a humanitarian worker in West Darfur, who, in a confidential e-mail correspondence with the author (October 2009), stated: “There are a ton of other dynamics at play here that I’d attribute changes [in West Darfur] to and … EUFOR is not one of them.”
talks. These actions appear to be independent of EUFOR, and it can thus be said that the mission did not have any tangible effects on the peace process in Darfur.

Conclusion

EUFOR Chad/CAR was conceived as a regional mission. It was deployed in the “tormented triangle” between eastern Chad and northeastern Chad, complementing the AU/U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Darfur. Moreover, the aim of EUFOR was to create a safe environment in eastern Chad so refugees from Darfur could return to their homes. Taking into account the impact of EUFOR as described above, its implications on regional conflict dynamics are negligible. European peacekeepers did manage to improve security to some extent where they were present. However, these gains were limited and they are certainly not sustainable. Unfortunately, EUFOR did not affect the structural causes underpinning conflict regionalization in north-central Africa. It did not engage armed groups in the region. Indeed, the peacekeepers stayed away from them in order to minimize their own casualties. Moreover, EU countries, especially France, did not use the opportunities that EUFOR provided to foster political processes that could have contributed to changing state governance in the region. Also, EUFOR did not undertake efforts to curb the proliferation of small arms, an important factor in the spread of armed conflict across the region.

Thus, in conclusion, EUFOR Chad/CAR did not constitute a regional solution to a regional problem. Whether it was worthwhile, nonetheless, to spend €800 million on the mission, is for others to decide. In any case, EUFOR shows that interventions in armed conflicts are neither altruistic nor do they necessarily respond to the most pressing needs of the people who are directly affected by armed conflict. In that sense, EUFOR was less about ‘them’ – the suffering victims of the conflict in Darfur – but more about ‘us’: EUFOR allowed Bernard Kouchner to

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promote his normative agenda; it helped France to secure its influence in the region; and it may have contributed to establishing the EU as a global player with a common defense and security policy. That external interventions in conflicts are politically motivated is an inevitable reality of world politics and does not make these interventions objectionable as such. In the interest of accountability, however, next time politicians invoke noble humanitarian arguments to justify their actions we should be prepared to unearth the political motivations that such rhetoric tends to conceal.
State-Internal Actors in the Armed Conflict in Chad

Günter Pamminger

A broad spectrum of state-internal conflict actors has formed in Chad. This is due, on the one hand, to the fragile system of the country’s armed and security forces and, on the other hand, to transnational factors, which have their origins in the Darfur conflict.

1. Chad’s Armed and Security Forces

Chad’s armed and security forces (Forces Armées et de Sécurité – FAS), whose strength varies from 19,000 to 60,000 personnel, depending on the respective source, are marked by signs of decay and convey the impression of a “loose” entity. Principally, their structure corresponds roughly to that of the French Armed Forces, while merely

1 The following sources were used to elaborate on the issue of the armed and security forces:
US Department of State. 2008 Human Rights Report: Chad. (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/118993.htm);
Zoom sur le Tchad website. Deby et L’Armee. 04 October 2008. (http://www.zoomtchad.com/Templates/archivesoct08.html);
additional information was collected within the framework of interviews with Austrian EUFOR troops. Their names as well as the dates and locations related to the interviewed troops are not mentioned for reasons of privacy.
the filling of this structure with a mix of existing elements and the integration of rebel groups unveil deviations. The ethnic composition of the FAS varies, as it still depends on the respective head of state. The armed forces were dominated by ethnic groups from the south of the country when Chad gained independence in 1960, while now President Déby’s Zaghawa group prevails. The share of Chadian officers and troops in the current rebellion makes the permanent switch of military personnel between the fronts visible.

As far as quantity and quality are concerned, the FAS have enough weapons and military equipment, respectively, in their inventory. Chad imported more than five times more military equipment between 2004 and 2008 than it had done between 1999 and 2003. States such as France, Libya, Belgium, China, the USA, Israel, Switzerland, Serbia, Portugal and especially Ukraine acted as suppliers.6

The Zaghawa-dominated DGSSIE elite unit (Direction Générale de Sécurité des Services et des Institutions de l’Etat), which also involves

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3 The former President Hissène Habré, for instance, merged his “Forces Armées du Nord (FAN), with the existing Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes (FANT) after his coup.

4 The Zaghawa (also known as Beri) live both in Chad and in Sudan (especially in Darfur) and only make up between 1 % and 3 % of Chad’s total population. Even though they may be subsumed under the term of settled “Africans” (Fur, Masalit, Tama), they actually belong to the class of nomadic/semi-nomadic tribes. The Zaghawa are divided into three sub-groups, the Kobe, the Wogi (or Wegi) and the Bideyat. Chad’s President Idriss Déby is a member of the Bideyat/Bilia group. Cf. Tubiana, Jérôme. Chad, Land, Making Sense of Darfur, Politics: Land and Power: the Case of the Zaghawa. (http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2008/05/28/land-and-power-the-case-of-the-zaghawa/); Cf. Olson, James Stuart. The Peoples of Africa, An Ethno-historical Dictionary. Westport/New York, 1996; cf. Joshua Project – Chad (http://www.joshuaproject.net/countries.php).

5 Ukraine, for example, delivered two Mi-35 helicopters (the export version of the Mi-24 helicopter) in 2007, two Mi-35 helicopters, three Su-25 combat aircraft, 80 BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles and eight BTR-3E armoured personnel carriers in 2008 as well as 12,000 rifles between 2006 and 2007.

the Presidential Guard and the ANS (Agence Nationale de Sécurité) intelligence agency, presently constitutes the loyal core of the Chadian armed and security forces. The remaining military apparatus is made up of the GNNT (Garde Nationale et Nomade du Tchad), the Police Nationale and the actual military force, i.e. the ANT (Armée Nationale Tchadienne). The ANT, the Gendarmerie Nationale and the GNNT are subordinate to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), while the Police Nationale is under the control of the Ministry of Public Security and Immigration. The DGSSIE and the ANS receive their orders directly by President Déby.

Chad’s ANT elements operate in cooperation with self-defence militias, which they recruit especially in the east of Chad, due to the weak presence of the armed forces there. These militia formations, which most often are of a voluntary nature, also have child members and thus are

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7 The Gendarmerie Nationale and the Air Force FAT (Forces Aériennes Tchadienne) are part of the ANT, too.
8 Cf. Human Rights Watch. They Came Here to Kill Us, Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad. Volume 19 No. 1(A) January 2007:37.
responsible for the increase of the number of underage fighters among the ANT.9

The relation of the size of Chad and the strength of its armed and security forces only allows the deployment of these forces in centres of gravity, such as the border to Sudan. Despite its classification as a key region, the surveillance of the Sudanese-Chadian border cannot be guaranteed, due to its vast extension (1,360 km). Even if Chad had functioning and disciplined armed forces, the accomplishment of basic military tasks, such as the surveillance of a border of 5,968 km length to ensure security inside the country, would be an enormous challenge in Chad.10 In any case, France’s military elements stationed in the country provide crucial support. France has been the dominating force in Chad since the country’s colonisation. Agreements, such as the Agreement on Technical Military Cooperation, signed in 1976, which fixes support in the fields of logistics and reconnaissance11, tie Chad to France. It is the DAMI Assistance and Training Corps (Détachement d’Assistance Militaire et d’Instructions) that is in charge of the implementation of the Agreement. DAMI’s advisors make up a “second command structure” next to the military leadership level of the Chadian armed forces. Moreover, there are rumours about a “secret agreement on guaranteeing order”, which assures the Chadian president ad personam of France’s direct support.12

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11 France made results of reconnaissance activities available to Chad, in the course of the rebel attack in April 2006. It also provided air support by way of a combat aircraft, which fired at the rebel column advancing on Chad’s capital N’Djamena. Cf. Human Rights Watch. They Came Here to Kill Us, Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad. Volume 19 No. 1(A). January 2007:19.
and the Épervier intervention (from 1986 up to now), which were installed to contain or push back, respectively, Libya’s invasion, are examples of the practical implementation of these agreements.\textsuperscript{13} France’s role in Chad equals a tightrope act between an “interested third party” and a “colonial power”, whose military presence ensures at least superficial stability in Chad. In June 2010 roughly 950 French troops were stationed in Chad in the framework of the Épervier Mission\textsuperscript{14}, but officially they did not actively participate in combat actions. Actually, France has been providing the Chadian government with indirect support under the cloak of self-defence. French troops, for instance, defended the airport of N’Djamena (strategic installation) during the rebel attack on Chad’s capital city in 2008. Back then not only French, but also Chadian aircraft were stationed at the airport.\textsuperscript{15}

2. Mercenaries in the Service of President Idriss Déby

Air Force
Déby has to fall back on “mercenaries” in the sphere of Chad’s Air Force, which has been upgraded since the start of the rebellion in 2005. The Chadian helicopters (Mi-17.1s, Mi-35s) and combat aircraft (Sukhoi Su-25s) of Russian origin are flown and maintained by Ukrainian,


\textsuperscript{14} The three Mirage F1 combat aircraft, stationed in N’Djamena, form the core element of these forces. They are mainly used for air reconnaissance activities. Other Épervier components are stationed in Camp Croci, close to the airfield in Abéché, and a small element is deployed to Faya-Largeau (northern Chad). Cf. Website of the French armed forces (http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/tchad/dossier/22-06-10-les-elements-francais-au-tchad-eff).

formerly also Mexican, Chinese and Algerian pilots or technicians, respectively, who receive their wages from Déby’s regime directly. Apart from the DGSSIE, the air component, which still is very small, constitutes one of the most important elements in the fight against the rebels.

Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Private Military Companies (PMCs) are a phenomenon that may be neglected in Chad. Only the CopGuard enterprise, whose staff is unarmed, badly trained and mostly underage, is worth mentioning, as it is hired by oil companies in the south and by relief organisations (UNHCR, etc.) in the east, in order to protect infrastructure.

The Sudanese Rebel Group - Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
In the course of the Darfur conflict the JEM rebel militia, too, was founded in 2003. By its foundation the transnational element of the Zaghawa tribe manifested itself, as the group’s area of operations stretches from Sudan (mostly Darfur) to Chad. The JEM’s withdrawal

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bases are located in the traditional Zaghawa territories in the north-east of Chad (Iriba, Tine\textsuperscript{20}, etc.) and the northwest of Darfur (Tine, Kornoi, Umm Buru, etc.).\textsuperscript{21} Déby’s cousin Khalil Ibrahim (Zaghawa/Kobe), who is a medical doctor with longstanding political experience in Sudan and the founder of the JEM, is the leader of the group\textsuperscript{22}. Concerning its political goals, the JEM aims at taking over power in Khartoum\textsuperscript{23}. At present, the JEM has almost exclusively Zaghawa\textsuperscript{24} members and – not least because of the fact that the Chadian government is dominated by the Zaghawa – was able to boost its political and especially military capacities.\textsuperscript{25} Déby’s support of the JEM has not always been certain. At the beginning of the Darfur conflict in 2003, President Déby, whom President Bashir had patronised on the occasion of his seizure of power in Chad in 1990, acted as Sudan’s ally and denied Sudan’s resistance groups (the SLM/A\textsuperscript{26} and the JEM) any form of support. The rebels’ permanent demands for Chadian support in Darfur increased the pressure on Déby and eventually prompted him to make the commitment

\textsuperscript{20} Tine is located exactly on the Chadian-Sudanese border and is divided by a wadi. Cf. Darfur Hilfe website (http://www.darfur-hilfe.org/index.php?id=44).


\textsuperscript{22} Khalil held contact to the Sudanese Islamist hard-liner Hassan Al Turabi, and essential JEM leadership elements come from among Turabi’s circle. These elements formed an Islamist cell with the aim of forging ahead with the change in the Sudanese NIF government party (National Islamic Front) from the inside. The Islamists wrote a book together with Khalil in 2000, which is also known under the title “Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan” and criticizes the government in Khartoum. By the secret dissemination of the Black Book the protagonists wanted to point out the political and economic shortcomings of the Khartoum-based elite and its three tribes (Dangala, Shaygiyya, Ja’aliyiin, also known as “River Arabs”). When Sudanese security authorities eliminated the authors, the main actor, i.e. Khalil Ibrahim, left the country (heading for London) and subsequently founded the JEM.

\textsuperscript{23} Cf. De Waal, Alex. War in Darfur, And the Search for Peace. Cambridge 2007:21.

\textsuperscript{24} Other parts have already broken away, such as Idriss Ibrahim Azrag, a former JEM representative in the Netherlands and a member of the Meidob group.


\textsuperscript{26} The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) was founded in 2003, even before the JEM. Its members came from among the “Africans” ethnic groups of the Fur (who make up the majority of Darfur’s population), the Zaghawa and the Masalit.
to bring the critics of the regime under control and to stabilise the crisis spot in Darfur together with Sudan. Continuous backing of regime-critical, rebelling Sudanese Zaghawa (especially among the JEM) on the part of Déby’s closest entourage contributed to the gradual loss of the Chadian President’s credibility among the Sudanese leadership elite. Consequently, the Sudanese government began to strengthen Chadian opposition forces from 2004 on, thus dynamising the support spiral until late 2009.

Its persistence in pursuing its political goals and self-legitimisation distinguish the JEM from a rebel movement with pure bandit character. Attempts launched by the Sudanese government to discredit the JEM as an organisation of criminals are rooted in the intention that it does not wish to have to recognise the JEM as a conflict partner. The JEM’s leadership elite is made up of well-educated people, who partly work as medical doctors or university professors in Europe and have strong exile communities around them. The tight military and political structure of the JEM, with a leader who is responsible for the attitude and conduct of his “comrade-in-arms”, the use of recognisable badges, and the open

28 Déby’s older half-brothers Doussa and Timane Déby were involved in the affair.
carrying of arms, implies the classification of JEM members as combatants, according to the Hague Conventions. A political motive cannot be denied, but JEM fighters keep switching between their civil and military status like chameleons. Moreover, isolated fighters slide into the criminal scene, for example, by taking whatever they want from refugee camps or relief organisations. The JEM’s financing has many facets and is a mix of support funds and own resources\(^\text{30}\). Furthermore, JEM representatives run the NGO “Darfur-Hilfe” (www.darfur-hilfe.org/) to officially transfer funds for humanitarian purposes to the region.\(^\text{31}\)

The JEM has had its own website (www.sudanjem.com) since 2002. It is run from the Netherlands and its contents are available in English, Arabic and German. Modern means of communication (satellite telephones, mobile phones, etc.) are integral parts of the JEM’s standard equipment\(^\text{32}\), while its armament and military gear are similar to the armament and gear of the Chadian rebels\(^\text{33}\).

Until Chad’s real approximation\(^\text{34}\) to Sudan, in late 2009, and the supply of its armed and security forces with effective equipment, President Déby, used, among other things, the JEM’s military capacities to fend off the Chadian rebels. The JEM provided this military support because of its ethnic closeness to the Zaghawa regime in N’Djamena and Chad’s patronage. However, the tide has changed: since 2009 the JEM has not

\(^{30}\) Chad and Eritrea are among the JEM’s regional supporters. The group’s own resources are generated by the diaspora, the connection to Al Turabi, who gained funds after the rift with President Bashir, and by the looting of international relief organisations. Cf. Prunier, Gerard. Armed Movements in Sudan, Chad, CAR, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Zentrum für internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF). February 2008:3 et seq. (http://www.cmi.no/sudan/doc/?id=948).


\(^{33}\) See chapter Chadian rebels.

\(^{34}\) There already had been several attempts to reduce bilateral tensions in the past, but they were not crowned by success.
been welcome in Chad anymore. This change of heart is based on several bilateral agreements signed since December 2009, which provide for a common border surveillance mission, the withdrawal of the Chadian rebels from the border, and their shift into the depth of Darfur as well as the JEM’s expulsion from Chadian territory. Yet, the focusing on domestic challenges both in Sudan (elections, referendum on South Sudan etc.) and in Chad (elections) is considered to be a much more decisive trigger of this development.

3. Chadian Rebels – Sudanese Proxy Militia?

The Chadian rebel formations, which resemble paramilitary groups, are made up of fragile alliances of all essential ethnic groups (Zaghawa, Toubou, Arabs, etc.) and recruit their members, *inter alia*, from among Chad’s dissolving armed and security forces. Even though the term warlord is not used in the context of Chad, the rebel leaders, who mostly come from among the eroded government sphere, have to be subsumed under the class of autocratic leaders, absolutely willing to resort to violence. The individual rebel leaders aim at taking over power in N’Djamena, since that would guarantee the access to revenues gained from resources. Due to the fact that Chad is, first and foremost, rich in crude oil, whose exploitation and transport – contrary to that of mineral resources, like diamonds, coltan etc., – require technical know-how, the state generates its revenues by legally returning investments. Moreover,

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35 National elections were held within the framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in April 2010. The referendum on the independence of South Sudan is scheduled for January 2011.
36 The parliamentary election is planned to be held in November 2010, and the presidential election in May 2011.
38 The Toubou make up about 4% of Chad’s total population and are divided into the Toubou/Teda and Toubou/Daza (also called Goran) sub-groups. They live in the north of Chad and south of Libya. Furthermore, this ethnic group can also be found in Niger and in Sudan. Cf. Olson, James Stuart (1996). The Peoples of Africa, An Ethnohistorical Dictionary. Westport/New York; Joshua Project – Chad. See URL: http://www.joshuaproject.net/countries.php.
lucrative oil projects are awarded by the government. Hence, economic needs are satisfied via political detour, exclusively. The make-up of the temporary alliances is closely related to the respective leader and the primary interests of his ethnic group. Thus, analysis should not be carried out with regard to the rebels’ coalitions but to the individual leaders and their support by Sudan as the “interested third party”. The reconciliation of Sudan and Chad, since late 2009, also resulted in the temporary suspension of support to Chadian militias in Darfur and the expulsion of the Chadian rebel leaders from Sudan.41

Up to the present, the following persons have become established as the major rebel leaders, among other things, due to Sudanese patronage: 42

- **Tom and Timan Erdimi**, President Déby’s cousins, belong to the Zaghawa/Bideyat ethnic group. The twin brothers joined the armed resistance even before presidential elections were held on 03 May 2006. They took over the fighters of the SCUD and

40 The Chadian rebel leaders Timan Erdimi, Adouma Hassaballah, and Mahamat Nouri were “kindly asked” to leave Sudan and go to Qatar prior to Bashir’s visit to Chad in July 2010.
43 The SCUD (Scole pour le Changement, l'Unité et la Démocratie), which was founded on 18 October 2005, had been led by the former politician Yahya Dillo Djerou (Zaghawa/Bideyat) – one of the nephews of the Erdimi brothers and thus a relative of President Déby. A large number of its members came from among Chad’s Presidential Guard, which Déby subsequently disbanded in October 2005. Djerou returned to N'Djamena in 2008 and, *inter alia*, occupied the post of Energy Minister. Cf. Report of
founded the RaFD (RFC)\textsuperscript{44} in December 2005. Tom is said to have found “exile” in the oil business in the U.S. (Houston/Texas) and thus can be seen as part of the diaspora.\textsuperscript{45} Following the pressure from Sudan, Timan Erdimi has been leading the Union des Forces de la Résistance (UFR) rebel coalition since 23 January 2009. The UFR was founded by the UDC, FSR, RFC, UFDD, UFCD, UFDD-F, CDR and the FPRN\textsuperscript{46} on 15 December 2008, succeeding the \textit{Alliance Nationale} (AN), but has shown signs of decay since November 2009.\textsuperscript{47} After his “deportation” Timan is said to have bee staying in Qatar since July 2010.

- **Mahamat Nouri** is a member of the Toubou/Daza (Goran) ethnic group and was a close confidant of Chad’s former President Habré, but joined Déby’s camp after his coup in 1990. Nouri has held various political and military key positions and was appointed ambassador to Saudi Arabia in December 2005. He took over the Chadian rebellion on invitation by Khartoum in July 2006 and formed the UFPD (\textit{Union des Forces pour le Progrès et la Démocratie}) rebel group after his return from Saudi Arabia. Later, in October 2006, the UFDD (\textit{Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement}) emerged from the UFPD. The UFDD ran the www.ufdd.org website and is the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad S/2009/199 dated 14 April 2009. p. 2; cf. Human Rights Watch. They Came Here to Kill Us, Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad. Volume 19 No. 1(A) January 2007:20.

\textsuperscript{44} The \textit{Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques} was renamed RFC (\textit{Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement}) in February 2007.

\textsuperscript{45} Cf. Chad: Déby – Caught between Paris and Khartoum. Africa Confidential Volume 49 No. 4 February 2008:15.

\textsuperscript{46} Additional information as to these rebel groups is presented below.

supposed to use www.tchadvision.com for its purposes now. Nouri has been the most prominent member or leader, respectively, of the last CMU\(^{48}\) and AN\(^{49}\) rebel alliances. He was part of the UFR rebel coalition, but broke away in May 2010 and formed the ANCD (Alliance Nationale pour le Changement Démocratique).\(^{50}\) Nouri is believed to have been in Qatar since July 2010, too.

- **Adouma Hassaballah** is an Arab and member of the Wadaian tribe (who lives in the area of Abéché, East Chad). He has been the leader of the UFDD splinter group UFCD (*Union des Forces pour le Changement et la Démocratie*) since March 2008. Hassaballah is part of the UFR rebel coalition and is said to be in Qatar, just like Erdimi and Nouri.

- **Abdelwahid Aboud Makaye** is an Arab/Salamat and has been leading the UFDD splinter group UFDD-F (UFDD-Fondamental) since May 2007. He worked for Déby’s government and is part of the UFR rebel coalition.

- **Acyl Ahmat Achabach** is an Arab/Awlad Rashid and is the head of the CDR group (*Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire*), which was already founded in 1978. He is mainly committed to working on the political level. **Acheikh Ibn Omer** belongs to the

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\(^{48}\) The *Coordination Militaire Unifié* (CMU) was founded by the UFDD, UFDD-F and the RFC on 12 December 2007 and replaced by the *Alliance Nationale* (AN) in February 2008.


Arab ethnic group and was already active in the FROLINAT. He held the post of foreign minister from 1989 to 1990, headed the CDR, founded the UFDD together with Mahamat Nouri and has taken a back seat since 2007. He presently lives in exile in Paris.52

- **Abderamane Koulamallah** is a member of the Zaghawa/Kobe group and was minister under Déby. He leads the UDC (*Union Démocratique pour le Changement*) and is part of the UFR rebel coalition, for which he also acts as a spokesman. Koulamallah runs the [http://koulamallah.abdelaziz.over-blog.com/](http://koulamallah.abdelaziz.over-blog.com/) Internet blog.

- **Adoum Yacoub** is a member of the Wadaian people and is at the top of the FPRN (*Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale*) founded in 2001. Yacoub is part of the UFR rebel coalition.

- **Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane** is an Arab/Mahamid and leads the FSR (*Front pour le Salut de la République*), founded in 2007. He was minister under Déby and ambassador to the U.S. from 1998 to 1999. The FSR or some of its former members, respectively, are thought to use the [makaila.over-blog.com/](http://makaila.over-blog.com/) Internet blog. Soubiane was part of the UFR rebel coalition and founded the new MN (*Mouvement National*) rebel group together with the UFDD-R53 and the MNR54 on 24 June 2009. He,

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51 The *Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad* (FROLINAT) was founded in Nyala (Darfur) in 1966 as one of Chad’s first resistance groups.
54 The *Mouvement National pour le Redressement* was part of the *Alliance Nationale* rebel coalition. Cf. Communiqué de presse du Mouvement National pour le Redressement. tcomtchad website 09 November 2008 ([http://tcomtchad.info/?p=2360](http://tcomtchad.info/?p=2360)).
however, signed a peace agreement with the Chadian Government on 25 July 2009. In August and September 2009, roughly 1,500 of his group’s fighters were integrated into Chad’s armed forces.55

- **Hassan Al Jineidi** is an Arab/Hemat and led the CNT (*Concorde Nationale Tchadienne*), which was founded in 2004, until he signed a peace agreement with Déby in December 2007. Jineidi’s forces were integrated into the Chadian Armed Forces and Jineidi himself shortly held the function of chief of general staff in 2009. He had close connections to the Janjaweed56 and was part of the FUC respectively the RaFD.

- **Mahamat Abdelkarim Nour** is a member of the Tama57 ethnic group and originally was among Déby’s followers, but later differences made him head for Sudan, and he became one of the Janjaweed commanders. Following pressure from Sudan, Nour founded the RDL (*Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et la Liberté*) and merged his group with other ones58 in the course of

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58 One of these groups is the Zaghawa/Bideyat SCUD group. It is a scurrilous detail that the Zaghawa and the Tama tribes are enemies.
time. Later the FUCD or the FUC\textsuperscript{59}, respectively, which used the http://fuc.blogspirit.com Internet blog for presentation purposes, emerged in December 2005.\textsuperscript{60} After he had signed a peace agreement with Déby in December 2006, Nour was appointed minister of defence. Due to the disloyalty of his 5,000 to 7,000 fighters, Nour, however, was replaced as minister of defence in December 2007 and fled to the Libyan embassy in N’Djamena.\textsuperscript{61} By 2005, Nour had de facto initiated the Chadian rebellion on the military level, but has not taken an active role, neither for the government nor for the rebel side, since he was replaced as minister of defence. He is said to have been arrested in Khartoum\textsuperscript{62} – something that might be connected to the reconciliation of Sudan and Chad.

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\textsuperscript{59} The Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique au Tchad was later renamed FUC (Front Uni pour le Changement). The FUCD/FUC also had fighters originating from Sudan and the Central African Republic. Cf. Tubiana, Jérôme. The Chad–Sudan Proxy War and the “Darfurization” of Chad: Myths and Reality. Small Arms Survey April 2008:34 et. seq.


The strength of the Chadian rebel formations varies greatly, due to the number of defectors. Defection strongly depends, *inter alia*, on the rainy season (no attacks are possible because of the limited freedom of movement) and on internal disputes. Theoretically, a maximum number of 10,000 fighters would be possible but, practically, a number of fighters ranging between 3,000 and 5,000 has to be assumed. The opposition forces are equipped with cheap, easily available Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and use all-terrain “technology”, under the form of Toyota Land Cruisers to move around. Their SALW inventory includes AKM assault rifles, also known as AK-47 “Kalashnikov” rifles, RPG-7s, i.e. Russian anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades, MANPADS.

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63 Cf. Prunier, Gérard. Chad: Between Sudan’s Blitzkrieg and Darfur’s War. Opendemocracy 19 February 2009; cf. interviews with Austrian EUFOR troops. Their names as well as the dates and locations related to the interviewed troops are withheld for reasons of privacy.
under the form of SA-7 (Strela 2) ground-to-air missiles and French (MILAN) anti-tank guided missiles. The opposition forces are provided with weapons and equipment by Sudan, above all, or satisfy their respective needs at the illegal arms markets of the region, but also by stealing from among international relief organisations and the local population. Parts of the rebels’ extensive inventory have been seized, due to the swift change of violent actors and desertion. MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defence Systems) are of special significance, since they pose a considerable threat to air components. Seen from the military point of view, Chad’s rebel alliances operate in a strategically organised and very mobile way, which was proven by the attacks on N'Djamena starting in Darfur (a distance of about 1,000 km of rough terrain). The rebels have satellite telephones and internet access, i.e. modern means of communication which allow them to exchange information fast, both inside and outside the group (website, national and

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international newspapers, etc.). Child soldiers (under 18 years of age) are found both in Chad’s armed forces and the rebel groups. There may also be females among them and their primary spectrum of tasks involves support activities in the field of “logistics” (making fire, tending goats, preparing and treating water, etc.), but temporary combat actions are not excluded, either.

The rebels prefer “hit and run” tactics as their modus operandi of choice. This guerrilla tactics allows an inferior enemy to wear down his superior enemy by pinpoint attacks and to occupy a territory at least temporarily. Because of the partial support by the population both in Chad and in Darfur, the fighters succeed in disappearing unseen by Déby’s loyal forces, in order to consolidate and collect strength to gain new territorial control over target areas. A sketch of the course of the rebellion is given in tabular and graphic forms, in order to provide an impression of the interplay of attack and withdrawal as well as of the variety of coalitions among the rebels.

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69 For details on the course of the rebellion cf. Tubiana, Jérôme. The Chad–Sudan Proxy War and the “Darfurization” of Chad: Myths and Reality. Small Arms Survey April 2008:28 et seq.
### Table 3: Composition of essential rebel coalitions and their attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Rebel coalitions and attacks (grey fields)</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>RDL</td>
<td>Abdelkarim Nour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>SCUD</td>
<td>Dillo Djerou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>Attack as far as Guereda by the SCUD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>Attack as far as Adré by the RDL</td>
<td>Abdelkarim Nour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>FUCD or FUC (RDL, SCUD, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>RaFD (SCUD, etc.)</td>
<td>Timan Erdimi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>Attack as far as Guereda by the FUCD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>Attack as far as N’Djamena by the FUCD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2006</td>
<td>UFPD</td>
<td>Mahamat Nouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2006</td>
<td>UFDD (former UFPD)</td>
<td>Mahamat Nouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2006</td>
<td>Attack as far as Goz Beida and Am Timan by the UFDD</td>
<td>Mahamat Nouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2006</td>
<td>Attack as far as Am Zoer and Biltine by the RaFD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2006</td>
<td>Attack as far as Abéché by the UFDD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2006</td>
<td>Attack as far as Guereda by the RaFD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2006</td>
<td>Attack as far as Biltine by the UFDD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2007</td>
<td>RFC</td>
<td>Timan Erdimi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2007</td>
<td>Attack as far as the Hadjer Hadid area (Abou Goulem) by the UFDD and RFC</td>
<td>Mahamat Nouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2007</td>
<td>CMU (UFDD, UFDD-F, RFC)</td>
<td>Mahamat Nouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January/February 2008</td>
<td>Attack as far as N’Djamena by the CMU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late February 2008</td>
<td>AN (UFDD, UFDD-F, UFCD, FSR, MDJT)</td>
<td>Mahamat Nouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>Attack as far as Goz Beida by the AN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2008</td>
<td>UFR (UDC, FSR, RFC, UFDD, UFCD, UFDD-F, CDR, FPRN)</td>
<td>Timan Erdimi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>Attack as far as Am Dam by the UFR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, 2010

70 The rebel coalitions and their make-up, respectively, are shown in a very simplified form by reason of their complexity.
Attacks/withdrawals of the Chadian rebels (rebel coalitions);
Source: Author, 2010

The lack of an offer regarding suitable demobilisation measures by the Chadian government encourages permanent switching between the armed forces and rebel and bandit formations\textsuperscript{71} and makes differentiation between combatants and non-combatants difficult. The law concerning warfare, already laid down in the Hague Conventions (to be found, inter alia, in the section on the laws and customs of war on land), provides the legal foundation to qualify different actors in a war as

\textsuperscript{71} Cf. Gerdesmeier, Volker. Gewaltsame Konflikte im Tschad, Ursachen, Akteure und Handlungsoptionen. Misereor Ihr Hilfswerk, Gruppe Friedensentwicklung (FriEnt), Dezember 2007: S.3.
combatants, if they meet certain preconditions,\textsuperscript{72} and binds them to the laws of war. The Chadian rebel coalitions are close to meeting the criteria stipulated by International Law. They also have the demanded third country’s acceptance of occupations, but are incapable of controlling and “reigning” temporarily occupied territory and do not abide by the laws of war,\textsuperscript{73} since, amongst other things, they illegally recruit fighters in refugee camps.

Résumé

Due to the fragile situation in Chad and Darfur, respectively, no essential change of the inner-state constellation of actors in the conflict may be expected. The armed and security forces remain a vulnerable mosaic of different protagonists (former rebels, “mercenaries” etc.). Armed opposition groups will get active in the course of Chad’s presidential election campaign in 2011 again, at the latest, while transnational forces, such as the Zaghawa rebels, will still be the playthings of the governments both in Khartoum and N’Djamena. The relations between Sudan and Chad, for whose long-term continuity the parameters are not given, constitute a major factor of uncertainty in Chad’s aspirations to stability. Seen from a historical point of view, only the leaders at the top of the state and the rebel movements, respectively, vary. However, what they have in common is that none of them shows recognisable ambitions to initiate a lasting state-building process.

\textsuperscript{72} 1) Clear leadership structure with a person responsible for his subordinates. 2) A badge that is recognizable at a distance. 3) Open carrying of arms. 4) Compliance with the laws and customs of war.

\textsuperscript{73} For example, by looting in the sphere of international relief organisations and the local population and by showing an unstable presence as actors of war.
Bibliography

Books


Internet


**Resolutions/Papers**

### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Alliance Nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANS</td>
<td>Agence Nationale de Sécurité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANT</td>
<td>Armée Nationale Tchadienne (Chadian National Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANR</td>
<td>Alliance Nationale de la Résistance (Chadian rebel group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMU</td>
<td>Coordination Militaire Unifié (Chadian rebel alliance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNT</td>
<td>Concorde Nationale Tchadienne (Chadian rebel group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAMI</td>
<td>Détachement d’Assistance Militaire et d’Instructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGSSIE</td>
<td>Direction Générale de Sécurité des Services et des Institutions de l’Etat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAN</td>
<td>Forces Armées du Nord</td>
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Investigation of the Economic Growth and Development in the Republic of Chad

Markus Maruszczak

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to give an overview of what happened in Chad in the past and how specific characteristics of the country have led to the current economic situation. The main points of focus are factors that have slowed down sustainable economic development and growth. Examples are the geographic location, the population, the country’s history as well as more recent developments, such as the discovery of oil. The aim of this paper is to discuss the evolution of these influential factors. A main measure for the economic progress is the Human Development Index (HDI). This indicator was used to analyze the situation and how it has influenced growth and development in Chad.

This paper is the result of literature research, discussion, and the analysis of data from the World Development Indicators 2008 as well as the lecture given by Prof. Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente at the University of Salamanca (Spain). The data and figures were obtained from the World Development Report of 2008, created by the World Bank. Furthermore, the works by A. Thirlwall, Growth and Development with Special Reference to Developing Economies, and J. E. Rauch/ G. M. Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Development, were extensively used for the data interpretation process.

Special thanks go to Eva Nicola Rinner for the insightful discussions and close cooperation during the production of this paper.
Introduction

The Republic of Chad spans three distinct geographical regions: the heart of the Saharan Desert in the north, broad savanna in the center and the fertile lowlands in the south. Chad is rich in natural resources, and the recent discovery of large oil deposits has created great enthusiasm regarding the country’s future economic development. Yet today, the economy is still far away from prosperity. This results, in part, from the historical development of the region as well as from other factors that affect economic growth and development. The most notable being the geographic situation and the climate conditions that come with it. Nevertheless, let us not forget the influence of politics, which will not be discussed in depth in this paper.

Chad is a landlocked country, covering a vast area of 1,284,000 km². It is characterized by steppe vegetation, climatic instability, and a situation of insecurity as a result of several armed rebellions since the 1960s. The key factors in the current political situation are the desire to pursue the process of democratization and to establish peace within the country and with neighboring Sudan.

Chad’s main sources of growth have come to include oil, which has been exploited in the country since 2003, and agriculture, in particular cotton, Arabic gum, food crops, as well as livestock breeding. The oil resources provide the country with new prospects but also lead to new problems, due to the expectations of the population and the risk of conflict that these resources might create.

Socially, Chad’s development indicators show that it is one of the poorest countries in the world, with an HDI (Human Development Index) ranking of 170 out of 177 countries in 2007. 1 After a moderate performance of 0.2% in 2006, Chad’s real GDP (Gross Domestic Product) contracted by 0.3% in 2007. Under these conditions, the GDP was estimated to grow by 1.7% in real terms by the end of 2008.

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Because of the pressure from security spending, the country’s budget surplus shrank from 2% of total GDP in 2006 to 0.8% in 2007. The non-oil sector posted deficits of 14.8% and 21% of GDP in 2006 and 2007, respectively.²

These numbers show already that Chad may be at the verge of moving to new economic conditions. Although the figures provide a rather bleak outlook, the overall circumstances give reason to hope. How so? For one, the discovery of oil may become a blessing for the crisis-ridden Chadian economy, however in the past, it has rather become a problem for countries that were in similar situations. On the other hand, the current deployment of a U.N. operation may spur Chad to move in a different direction, with regard to the exploitation of its natural resources. Especially so, if development agencies act according to the lessons learned from similar missions in the past.

This paper aims to discuss the development of the economy in Chad from various perspectives: (1) geography and history: how the geographical location and the history of Chad have influenced its development to the present state. (2) How GDP and HDI were influenced by the factors in (1) and by various other aspects of economic growth and development, such as the world food prices or peaks in oil prices. (3) The level of Chad’s integration in the world economy and how this may affect its growth and development perspectives. This leads to part (4): other factors limiting future growth and development of Chad from a global as well as regional perspective.

² Cf. ibid.
Geography, History and other Characteristics

Geographical Characteristics and their Influence

Geographic location of Chad and the resulting climate
Chad is located in the center of Africa. It is surrounded by Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan. Chad is a landlocked country and has the inhospitable climate of deserts; the Sahel, which is part of the Sahara, but also some tropical areas in the south. Although the climate is so versatile and the country rich in natural resources, as for example petroleum, uranium, natron, kaolin, fish (Lake Chad), gold, limestone, sand and gravel and salt, Chad has problems in feeding its people and has stayed underdeveloped despite its natural resources. Since only 2.8% of the country is arable land and the permanent crops only make up 0.02% (as of 2005), there is a cause for malnutrition. The rest of the country has unspecified other uses, but it should be kept in mind that vast patches of this area are desert. Of 1.284 million sq km, only 300 sq km were irrigated in 2003, and 24,800 sq km were covered by water. Some water related issues are due to the inadequate supplies of potable water as well as improper waste disposal in rural areas, which contribute to soil and water pollution. The most obvious problem is the ever ongoing desertification, decreasing the potentially arable land even more. Further problems occur because of natural risks. Due to its continental and desert landscape, hot, dry, and dusty harmattan winds occur in the north. Periodic droughts and locust plagues are also the norm. Summed up, all these factors lead to environmental and geographical issues, which are not helpful in creating growth or supporting the development of Chad.

Why is geographic location important for development?
The importance of geographic location was already a topic in Adam Smith’s *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. He paid much attention to how geography correlates with growth. With this in mind, it can be said that the geographic endowment of Chad is reason enough to explain development and growth problems. For one, it is known that landlocked economies may be particularly disadvantaged, due to their lack of access to the sea, and thus, to international trade.
Smith saw geography as the central criterion of economic institutions for determining the division of labor. Smith’s logic starts with the concept that productivity depends on specialization, and that specialization depends on the size of the market. The size of the market, in turn, depends both on the freedom of markets as well as the costs of transport. This brings Chad’s geography into focus, as transport costs are a crucial cost factor:

“As by means of water-carriage a more extensive market is opened to every sort of industry than what land-carriage alone can afford, so it is upon sea-coast, and along the banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every kind naturally begins to subdivide and improve itself, and it is frequently not till a long time after that those improvements extend themselves to the inland part of the country.”

When considering transport costs, Henderson, Shalizi, & Venables (2001) considered a standard shipping container to be transported from the eastern United States (Baltimore) to various African countries. The costs were 3,000 US$ to Cote d’Ivoire, 7,000 US$ to Burkina Faso, and at least 13,000 US$ to the Central African Republic. The Central African Republic is a neighbor as well as a landlocked country south of Chad. They further noted that, when comparing a median coastal country with a median landlocked country, the transport costs rise by some 50%. What does this tell us about Chad’s possibilities of growth and development? Regarding transport costs, they seem very grim, as it appears very unlikely that Chad will be able to manufacture goods and provide services at such low cost that the transport costs will be compensated for, at least not in the foreseeable future.

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3 Smith (1776[1976]:25).
Geographical influence on the agricultural sector

A further barrier to development and growth are the agricultural problems that Chad has. As Thirlwall (2003:190) writes, the quality of land can have a notable affect on the productivity in agriculture. This is simply because, usually, developments in agriculture lead to economic development. The way it works is that by increasing agricultural productivity, the input factor labor can be decreased. This leads to labor being available to other sectors of the economy. Since the agricultural sector is a predominant one in Chad, like in many other developing countries, the physical attributes of this sector (fertility etc.), the system of land tenure, and the land-to-labor ratios are, among others, likely to influence the speed of development.

The agricultural sector does influence the speed of development; it determines the pace of agricultural advance, followed by the pace of the
industrial sector. Both are based on a healthy agricultural setting or the exploitation of other natural resources. In the case of Chad, the agricultural outlook is bleak, yet there are several natural resources that could be exploited. This is because only 0.02% of the land are (or can be) used for permanent crops. This is a small proportion of the 2.8% that are available as arable land. Over the last 40 years, approximately, there has not been a significant increase in the amount of value added per worker in the agricultural sector. Adding around 193 constant US$ in 1967, it took until 1994 to reach this level of added value again and to keep it. Also the amount of value added as a percentage of the GDP in the agricultural sector is relatively meager. An average of 37.03% in almost 40 years shows that not a lot changed in the economic structure of Chad, especially since the amount of value added per worker is relatively small compared to the averages of the sub-Saharan area (average 293.55) and similar countries, such as the Central African Republic (303.6), or Niger (203.11), and Sudan (493.66), all in constant 2,000 US$ (see the World Development Report 2008 and appropriate calculations).

What can be concluded?
Based on these facts, it can be deduced that to some extent the problems of Chad have arisen because of its geographical location and the resulting climate. The climate induces problems so that agricultural development is hampered, which further slows down the industrialization process. But not only the various climatic regions contribute their part: the fact that Chad is landlocked additionally discourages development and growth, as transport costs rise significantly with every land kilometer distance from a seaport, not to mention “security” premiums added to the actual costs of transport, since the area is far from secure. Furthermore, being landlocked makes Chad vulnerable to political instability in neighboring countries, which as in

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4 Definition: Arable land includes land defined by the FAO as land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are counted once), temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow. Land abandoned as a result of shifting cultivation is excluded. (Food and Agriculture Organization, Production Yearbook and data files).
the case of the Darfur crisis leads, among other things, to inequality and problems of distribution.

The discovery of oil – low-quality crude oil was discovered in Chad in the late 1960s – seemed like a way out, yet mismanagement in the merciless construction of a prestigious pipeline have done their part to destroy this silver lining. Furthermore, the political situation, which I will shortly address, has contributed to discourage foreign direct investment (FDI) – another key factor to development and growth, as the Asian “tiger economies” have shown in the past.

**Historical Aspects**

*A short history of Chad*

The recent history of Chad, which is of interest due to its influence on economic growth and development, is mostly a story of war and a fragile peace. Chad was part of France’s colonies until 1960 and, as an area with seemingly no natural resources, was somewhat neglected by France. After the proclamation of independence, Chad endured three decades of civil war as well as invasions by Libya, before something like peace was finally restored in 1990. The government finally drafted a democratic constitution and held presidential elections in 1996 and 2001, which, by no means, can be described as unproblematic with regard to fairness. In 1998, a rebellion broke out in northern Chad, which has sporadically flared up despite several peace agreements between the government and rebels. Since 2005, new rebel groups emerged in western Sudan and made probing attacks into eastern Chad. Despite several peace agreements in December 2006 and October 2007, power has remained in the hands of an ethnic minority, which does not necessarily help the peace process. In June 2005, President Idriss Déby held a referendum for removing constitutional term limits, which succeeded. This was followed by Mr. Déby winning yet another controversial election in 2006. Sporadic rebel campaigns continued throughout 2006 and 2007, and the capital experienced a significant rebel threat in early 2008, with a direct attack on the capital. This was
also the beginning of the implementation of EUFOR RCA/CHAD\(^5\) as a reaction to the ongoing Darfur crisis, which led to further economic problems, such as inequality and displaced persons distributed among refugee camps and the local population.\(^6\)

*Influences of the historical development on growth and economic progress*

Chad is a country without internal coherence that exists only as a legacy of the period of European imperialism. There is a north-south divide that has dominated the politics of the country since its independence. The north is inhabited by Islamic nomads, the south by Christian farmers. Chad is a political unit of dubious validity, situated in an environment of precarious viability, yet, against all odds, it has survived.

With the political turmoil that has characterized Chad from 1960 onwards, it is surprising that Chad has any sort of economy. This very limited form of economy resulted in more than 80 percent of the population working in agriculture, in either herding or farming. Of this economic activity the biggest part has been subsistence-oriented agriculture. The primary non-subsistence agriculture has been the growing of cotton, which is only feasible in the south.

Chad consists of three climatic zones, each covering one third of the country. From north to south these are as follows: \(^7\)

The Saharan zone, which gets less than 0.35 meters of rain per year, on average. There is some camel herding and some crop production in a few oases. \(^8\)

The Sahelian zone, which gets between 0.35 and 0.8 meters of rain, on average. This region is marked by cattle breeding and the growing of a few hardier types of grain, such as millet and sorghum. Land can be

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\(^5\) The European Union led a peace enforcement operation to protect displaced persons (DPs) from the Darfur region in neighboring Sudan.


\(^8\) Cf. ibid.
farmed for only a few years and then must be allowed to lie fallow for a much longer period to regain its fertility.  

The Soudanian zone, which gets a minimum of 0.8 meters of rain on average. This is the region where cotton can be grown, virtually the only export product of Chad. This region is sometimes called “le Tchad utile”, the useful Chad. 

The area around Lake Chad is a special region, in agricultural terms. Farmers have been able to build polders around the periphery of the lake and farm there. This land is highly fertile and the lake provides moisture. This leads to permanent agricultural activity. 

During the colonial era, the French promoted and encouraged cotton production in the south, in part, by imposing a poll tax on the farmers. About the only way the farmers could get money to pay that tax was growing and selling cotton. This monoculture has affected the economic progress of Chad up until today, making it prone to the volatile prices of international markets. This lack of diversification has also led to a reliance on imports. In response to this, a FAO Pilot Project aimed at improving the food security situation by diversifying the Chadian livestock.

This project has been successful in terms of improving household food security and increasing poor farmers’ income. The success of this example not only means that there is sufficient food intake at the individual level, but also that food availability at the national level increases. This latter goal can be achieved if poor and vulnerable people have physical and economic access to food and if households have a sustainable livelihood basis.

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9 Cf. ibid.
10 Cf. ibid.
This project in Chad helped the households involved improve their living conditions through access to poultry (chickens, ducks and guinea fowl), loans, animal health care, staff and farmer training, and improved practices in animal husbandry. As a result, household food security in the N’Djamena area has greatly improved, due to the contribution of poultry. The move from a monoculture to a more diversified agriculture is a crucial step towards less reliance on imports and self-sustainability. The success of this and similar projects usually has a long-term impact on the livelihood of the locals.

**Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Human Development Index (HDI)**

*Gross domestic product*

The GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy to consumer prices, converted to current U.S. dollars at market exchange rates, plus any product taxes (minus subsidies) not included in the valuation of output. It is calculated without accounting for the depreciation of fabricated capital assets or the depletion and degradation of natural resources. GDP is equal to GNI, minus net receipts of primary income. The added value is the net output of an industry after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. The World Bank does not use this measure for the classification of countries according to income groups or poverty levels, as it is subject to distortions caused by short-term exchange rate fluctuations, policies and interventions. However, GDP measured in constant, local currency units provides the basis for estimates of overall economic growth.\(^{14}\)

The Chadian economy is traditionally based on agriculture (21 percent of GDP), mainly livestock and cotton, and, since 2003, oil. An output of about 160,000 barrels a day made it possible to double real GDP between 2000 and 2005. However, since it has no refinery, Chad has had no choice but to export crude and import refined products at currently exorbitant prices, further inflated by the country’s landlocked situation. This includes service activities, mainly trade and government services,

which accounted for about 27 percent of Chad’s GDP in 2005. Manufacturing and crafts activities remain confined to a few enterprises that serve the local market and contribute less than 5 percent to the GDP.\footnote{Cf. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank (2008) and World Resources Institute (2009).}

The ratio of merchandise trade to GDP rose from 58 percent in 2000-2001 to 102 percent in 2005-2006. The sharp rise of the ratio was the result of a tenfold increase in annual exports, which reached €2.7 billion in 2005-2006. Exports of cattle came second after crude oil, but the trade is largely informal. Cotton is the third biggest export. The main export destinations (including for most oil exports) are the United States, China and the United Kingdom. Imports consist of machinery and transport equipment, medicines, food products and other consumer goods. The European Union (chiefly France) is Chad’s main supplier. The share of the African countries in Chad’s total trade remains small, although, in fact, this share is probably much bigger than statistics suggest, since trans-border trade is to a large extent informal. Imports of services relate to transport and insurance. Exports are confined to income from travel and the services provided to foreign or international administrations established in Chad.\footnote{Cf. Scuero (2008).}

Agriculture, mainly livestock breeding and cotton growing, is an activity of vital importance for Chad. For its development, there are 39 million hectares of arable land available as well as extensive water resources, but only 2 million hectares are being cultivated and 30,000 hectares irrigated. In general, Chad’s agriculture suffers from very low productivity, and the levels of mechanization and input utilization are also very low. In particular, the heavy taxation of agricultural imports is interfering with the proper functioning of the food product market. Transport infrastructure problems are impeding the movement of produce and, combined with the heavy taxation, amplifying the price
fluctuations between the harvest and bridging periods. A modest rise of productivity levels could already lead to a better situation.

![Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita, current prices in MillionUS$](image)

Figure 2 GDP per capita at current prices Chad and the world

Cotton contributes most to the value of agricultural exports but, since 1997, the sector has been in deep crisis, and after having been the largest cotton producer in the franc zone at the beginning of the 1970s, Chad is now one of the smallest. The country produces cotton seed, as well as cotton fiber in the factories run by COTONTCHAD, the country’s cotton company, in which the State has a 75-per cent stake. COTONTCHAD has monopolies on the purchase of cotton seed from the producers, on spinning and marketing, including exports; every year, it absorbs more than 40 percent of the budget appropriations that go to the Ministry of Agriculture. With the economic crisis, payments to the planters have fallen behind. An example of the importance of cotton in Chad is that, within the World Trade Organization, Chad reserved its

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18 Data: Both from World Bank Group Quick Query, selected form: World Development Indicators (5. Oct. 2009) and own calculations.
third party rights in connection with the Brazilian complaint concerning United States cotton subsidies.

Chad is probably the largest exporter of live cattle in Central Africa. The turnover on cattle exports, which for the most part take place outside formal channels, is estimated at more than €200 million a year, placing them on top of Chadian exports, oil excluded. The groups concerned are economically vulnerable, which makes an appropriate trade policy all the more important. The numerous levies, including those imposed on exportation, do nothing to encourage the development of the sector. The equipment and sanitary inspection procedures in Chad’s slaughterhouses reportedly conform to international standards; the main problems with exporting the meat appear to be those connected with the high cost of air transport.19

The chief goods are a few agri-food products, in particular meat, sugar, beer and bakery products, together with corrugated iron, soap, paper, and bicycle assemblies. The irregular supply of expensive power and water, the poor quality and high cost of transport and communications services, and the difficulties in obtaining access to other inputs (chiefly because of the high duties levied at the border) explain why the manufacturing industries, which produce mainly for the local market, are so few and relatively unprofitable. Despite the almost complete absence of local production and the country’s almost total dependence on imports, most manufactured goods are subject to the maximum rate (30 percent) of the value added tax, which further reduces the already limited purchasing power of Chad’s population.20

*Human Development Index indicators*

One of the best available indicators for economic development appears to be the Human Development Index (HDI). This is a socio-economic index, reflecting not only changes in the economy but also other associated changes within local societies. It is focused on three dimensions of human welfare:

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• Longevity – Life expectancy
• Knowledge – Access to education, literacy rates
• Standard of living – GDP per capita measured with Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) per US$21

The HDI is an index for human development, applicable to all countries in the world, which was first published in 1990 and is part of the Annual Human Development Report published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The HDI was mainly elaborated by the Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq, who worked closely together with the Indian economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen and the British economist and politician Meghnad Desai.22

Unlike the country comparison by the World Bank, it not only takes into account the GDP per capita of a country in PPP US$, but also life expectancy and the extent of access to education, on the basis of literacy and school enrolment rates. The life expectancy factor is considered to be an indicator for health, nutrition, and hygiene, while the educational factor relates to the acquirable knowledge and participation in public and political life to make for a reasonable standard of living.23

Life expectancy at birth reflects the overall mortality level of a population. It summarizes the mortality pattern that prevails across all age groups – children and adolescents, adults and the elderly. It is defined as the average number of years that a newborn is expected to live.

21 ‘Purchasing Power Parity’ is a theory which states that exchange rates between currencies are in equilibrium when their purchasing power is the same in each of the two countries. This means that the exchange rate between two countries should equal the ratio of the two countries’ price level of a fixed basket of goods and services. When a country’s price level increases (i.e., a country experiences inflation), that country’s exchange rate must depreciate in order to return to PPP. The basis for PPP is the ‘law of one price’. Cf. Blanchard, Illing and Forster (2006); Krugman and Obstfeld (2009).
live if current mortality rates continue to apply. The current data for Chad is as follows:24

Life expectancy at birth all 2009 estimates: 25
total population: 47.7 years
male: 46.67 years
female: 48.77 years

Life expectancy at birth is an indicator of mortality conditions and, by proxy, of health conditions. It is also one of the most favored indicators of economic development, used as one of the components of the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index.26

Sustainable or unsustainable development:

Mortality, with fertility and migration, determines the size of human populations, their composition regarding age, sex, ethnicity, and their potential for future growth. Life expectancy, a basic indicator, is closely connected with health conditions, which are, in turn, an integral part of development. Increase in human longevity reflects gains in public health and in access to primary health-care services. This indicator reflects many social, economic and environmental influences. It is closely related to other demographic variables, particularly the population growth rate. Examples of closely linked indicators would include infant mortality linked to water and air quality. 27

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24 Cf. CIA (2009).
Population and Demographics
An adverse age structure, such as the one that Chad has, is more challenging to governments, particularly when national resources are insufficient to improve economic and social welfare. Countries with a favorable age structure are those with a large proportion of adults at working-age and relatively few dependent persons. These countries, as studies have shown, are generally more peaceful and democratic, allowing governments to better meet the needs of their people. Countries that progress with the demographic transition – changing from high death rates and birth rates to smaller families and longer lives – generally demonstrate more favorable age structures. 29

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Like in many developing countries, Chad has a young population because of recent decades of high fertility along with improvements in child survival. A drop in the fertility rate can change a country’s age structure and profoundly affect the economy. As youthful populations become older and have fewer children than previous generations, a bulge in the working-age population can result. When there are more working-age adults (defined as ages 15 to 64), compared to children under age 15 and the elderly, working age people have a lower dependency burden, resulting in fewer people to support with the same income and assets. The hard facts for Chad provided by the CIA Factbook are:

Population: 10,329,208 (July 2009 est.)
0-14 years: 46.7% (male 2,445,841/female 2,381,319)
15-64 years: 50.4% (male 2,386,428/female 2,816,050)
65 years and over: 2.9% (male 126,351/female 173,219) (2009 est.)
Median age: total: 16.5 years

Figure 4 shows the proportions of the population in the respective age group. An indicator that there has hardly been any development in the past 46 year is visible, since 46% of the population is still below 14 years of age (data compiled from the World Development Report 2008).

Demographic age structure and its effects

Most countries in Africa, including Chad, are projected to have more working-age adults per child in 2030 than they did in 2006, but at the moment, they are far from this, as Figure 4 indicates. Yet this increase in the working-age population will become useful: if Chad utilizes its natural resources, its population can gain human capital, which in turn can increase productivity. This has a direct impact on growth and development.

A large workforce that has fewer dependent persons (children/elderly) to support, creates a window of opportunity to reallocate money from health care to other social services, to improve the quality of education, to increase economic output because of more people working, to invest more in technology and skills, to strengthen the economy, and to create the wealth needed to cope with the future aging of the population. Some economists call this window of opportunity the “demographic dividend”. The window eventually closes when the workforce ages and relatively fewer workers have to support increasing numbers of older people. But the period of the potential bonus can last for several decades. This was seen, for example, in Europe and the U.S. after World War II when the “baby boomer” generation grew up.\footnote{Cf. Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente (2009/2010); Rauch und Meier (2005).}

East Asia’s “economic miracle” provides the best evidence of the potential impact of the demographic dividend. As early as in the 1950s, countries in this region developed strong public health systems that ensured child survival, promoted smaller families, and made contraception acceptable and easy to obtain. In the 1950s, the typical East Asian woman had six children but, by the mid-1990s, she had only two. A strong educational system and sound economic management made it possible to absorb the large generation of young adults into the workforce. From 1965 to 1990, the growth of the gross domestic product per capita averaged more than 6 percent per year – a spectacular growth compared to countries in other regions.
Population age structures yield insights into many of the political, economic and security challenges that countries face, now and in the future. For example, when a large proportion of a country’s population is passing through one of life’s dependent stages, such as childhood or old age, society’s resources are likely to be stretched and put under greater stress.

The experience of East Asia and other developing regions where economic gains were not as dramatic shows that reaping the demographic dividend appears to depend on several factors: strong public health systems that improve child survival and health in general; widespread availability and social acceptability of family planning; a rapid and steady decline of the birth rate; increasing participation in educational programs and improvement of the quality of education; stable economic conditions conducive to growth and job creation.32

Africa’s unique population profile33
With 44 percent of its population under age 15 in 2006, sub-Saharan Africa is the youngest region of the world. In Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, about 30 percent of the population is under age 15, and in Europe only 16 percent. While countries in other regions have experienced a decline in fertility earlier and thus have seen their populations age faster, sub-Saharan Africa has yet to see its youth population peak. Although the AIDS epidemic has ravaged families and communities in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa, it has not had a major effect on the overall population size or age structure in more than a few countries, such as Botswana and Lesotho. Women in sub-Saharan Africa give birth to 5.5 children, on average, in their lifetimes – the highest rate of any region. These fertility levels have had greater impact than mortality rates on population size and growth and they have been the driving force behind Africa’s youthful population.

33 Cf. Beninguissse and Kone.
Literacy

An educated country is a developed country. Literacy levels play a major role in the economic development of a nation. If people are literate, there will be only a minimum of violence in the country. Literacy leads to good employment opportunities. If the literacy level is high in a nation, there will be a higher number of entrepreneurs and the flow of money will be huge. If new enterprises are set up, the economy of the country grows with the amount of tax collected. New enterprises generate more employment opportunities and, in turn, reduce the unemployment rate. A nation with a low unemployment rate will develop very rapidly. Let me now elaborate on the abovementioned topic. According to the hard facts in Chad, as provided by the CIA World Factbook, of the total population aged 15 and over 25.7% can read and write French or Arabic. 40.8% of these are male, 12.8% female. This is, however, only an estimate from 2000.

The literacy level is directly related to economic development. The cycle could look like this: literacy leads to a rise in the number of entrepreneurs and new enterprises, which in turn provide employment. The demand for employment will lead to a rise in the number of schools and colleges. When there are more schools, the public can get easy access to schools and colleges at affordable costs. In this manner, everybody will get education, and the literacy level will go up. Hence, the demand in the industry directly correlates with the demand in the education sector and is, in turn, directly related to literacy levels and vice versa. The gains in human capital are vital for both the development and growth process. The best example is the economic growth of India and China, which is mainly due to the rapidly growing literacy level in these countries.

The theory is that the relative contribution of individuals to growth depends on their human capital – knowledge, skills, competencies and other attributes that are relevant to economic activity. As a consequence,
developing the skills and knowledge of the labor force is regarded as a key strategy for promoting national economic growth. Related to this is the assumption that individuals who contribute more by way of their human capital should earn more. Distributional issues are a consideration as well, since increasing access to education and training can help to address inequality regarding the employment and earnings of more and less skilled individuals.  

**Contribution of literacy to economic growth and individuals’ earnings**

In today’s technology-based global economy, considerable emphasis is placed on the contribution made by people, or what economists refer to as human capital, to economic growth. The theory is that the relative contribution of individuals to growth depends on their human capital—the knowledge, skills, competencies and other attributes that are relevant to economic activity. As a consequence, developing the skills and knowledge of the labor force is regarded as a key strategy for promoting national economic growth. Related to this is the assumption that individuals who contribute more by way of their human capital should earn more. Distributional issues are a consideration as well, since increasing access to education and training can help to address inequality in employment and earnings between more and less skilled individuals.

Because of the difficulty to measure ‘skills’, educational achievements have typically been used as indicators, measured either as years of schooling or as highest level of education completed, ranging from below high school to the completion of one or more university degrees. However, these indirect indicators cannot distinguish between the acquisition of specific knowledge and general literacy skills.

Link between literacy skills and economic growth\textsuperscript{39}

A recent study\textsuperscript{40} investigated the relationship between educational attainment, literacy skills and economic growth. This study found that investment in human capital, that is, in education and skills training, is three times more important to economic growth over the long run than investment in physical capital, such as machinery and equipment. The results also show that direct measures of human capital based on literacy scores perform better than years-of-schooling indicators when explaining growth in output per capita and per worker.

One of the study’s key conclusions was that human capital accumulation matters a great deal for the long-term wellbeing of nations. In fact, the study suggests that differences in average skill levels among members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) explain 55\% of the differences in economic growth over the period from 1960 to 1994. This implies that investments in raising the average level of skills could yield large economic returns.

The study also found that the average literacy score of a given population is a better indicator of growth than one based solely on the percentage of the population with very high literacy scores. In other words, a country that focuses on promoting strong literacy skills widely throughout its population will be more successful in fostering growth and wellbeing than one in which the gap between high-skill and low-skill groups is large.

What conclusions can be drawn?

While the link between the education, knowledge, and skill that an individual contributes to the labor market and society more generally is a strong one, more recent studies have endeavored to refine our understanding of how education contributes to economic growth. Analyses using direct measures of economic growth find that, indeed, a major contributor to growth are the literacy skills of a country’s population, broadly defined as including prose, document, and

\textsuperscript{39} Cf. Coulombe, Tremblay and March.

\textsuperscript{40} Cf. Coulombe, Tremblay and March.
quantitative literacy. It should be a key policy issue to increase the literacy rates in sub-Saharan Africa and, especially, Chad. Yet to control and monitor this process, it is crucial to have reliable indicators, however, even the World Development Report currently lacks essential data sets for longer periods of time.\textsuperscript{41}

As a result, wage returns to literacy tend to be highest in countries where the demand for literacy skills is high and where literacy levels are highly variable. In other words, when literacy skills are in high demand, individuals who possess good literacy skills are more successful at the labor market than individuals whose literacy skills are weaker. In addition, further increases in earnings are associated with other skills and knowledge acquired through education.

\textbf{Economic Integration into the World Economy}

\textit{Recent structural progress}
Chad is a poor country with few economic connections to the rich countries. One of the first hopes in this century has been the Chad Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (CCPP), aiming to build a pipeline and oil producing structures in Chad. Sadly, the promises and expectations, as in many other developing countries with many other development projects, did not come true.

The country has experienced both a trade surplus as well as a balance of payment surplus in recent years. Major exportable commodities of the country are cotton, cattle and textiles. Export partners of Chad are Portugal, China and the United States.

Transportation machines, petroleum products, foodstuffs and textiles are the main importable products in the country. Chad imports these goods from countries such as Germany, France, Belgium, the U.S., and Cameroon.

\textsuperscript{41} Cf. Barder (2009) and Muñoz de Bustillo Llorente (2009)
The paradox of the plenty

Today oil exports only contribute little to the welfare of developing states. It is called “the paradox of the plenty” or “resource curse” – the phenomenon that countries rich in natural resources tend to suffer from lower living standards and a higher incidence of conflicts than their resource-poor counterparts.

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have both confirmed that the greater a country’s dependence on oil and mineral resources, the worse its growth performance.42

For many years it was believed that a country with more resources has better possibilities for development than a resource-poor country. At the end of the 1980s, it turned out that is was more a curse than a blessing. Countries rich in petrol all around the world had poorer growth performances and bigger problems.

An important part of theoretical fundamentals comes from Jeffrey Sachs, who has several arguments. He argues that resource-abundant economies, economies that are able to live off exports, tend to follow state-led and often protectionist policies that don’t foster free trade and, therefore, are less competitive. Furthermore, he says that governments that control natural resource incomes tend to waste the rents through “inappropriate consumption”.

Another problem, according to Sachs, is the more volatile world price of oil compared to other commodities. It is known that greater uncertainty can reduce factor accumulation through greater risk or because it raises the option value of waiting for a better moment to sell. The next problem is the reliance of these economies on the resource-abundant sectors that are under the control of special groups within society. High rents distract governments from investing in the ability to produce growth by fostering public goods, such as infrastructure or legal codes. These are just a few

42 Cf. Keenan.
approaches that might be able to explain the paradox, all of them reasonably supported by numbers and calculations.\textsuperscript{41}

\textit{CCPP-Project}

The main actors in the CCPP are, of course, the World Bank (WB), the two countries Cameroon and Chad, and the petroleum companies (Exxon-Mobil (40%), Petronas Malaysia (35%) and ChevronTexaco (25%), whereby Exxon-Mobil is the lead agent of the project. The failures of former projects and the lack of a profound development discourse had led to the loss of faith in the IMF and the WB; hence this project was advertised as counter evidence and as final proof that development with petroleum could be a good concept and a success. Experts predicted that the pipeline would yield $2 billion in revenue for Chad over the next 20 years.

\textsuperscript{41} Cf. Sachs and Warner (1997).
The length of the pipeline, finished in 2003, is 1,070 km, whereby 890 km run through Cameroon, and just 180 km through Chad. The pipeline starts at an oil field in Kome and delivers the oil to the Atlantic Coast in Kribi, where the oil can be shipped.

What problems come with this project?
One of the biggest threats to an equal distribution of the oil export revenues is corruption. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) lists Chad as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Therefore, the Revenue Management Plan (RMP) was developed, sadly without big success. The concept was a kind of structural adjustment program, which assigned the revenues to special objectives. Firstly, the money should be used for debt payments, another part was devoted to capital investments in “priority sectors”, and lastly, a “future-generations fund” was to save for the post oil era. Unfortunately, as mentioned before, many things went wrong, and the money never found its way to the majority of the people. President Déby changed the rules, and suddenly military expenditures became legitimate “priority sector” investments.

The “unprecedented framework,” the “model program” that represented “an unparalleled opportunity for creating a much brighter future for Chad” failed. It failed due to intransparent governmental structures as well as some secret contract clauses on the side of the WB and because of capitalistic greed for money on the side of the petrol industry. Additionally, the West supported corrupt and unequal structures in Chad (by refraining from action).

Communications
Quality and density of Chad’s telecommunications services have increased since the introduction of mobile telephones in 2000. However, the availability, quality and costs of basic fixed telecommunications services (including access to the Internet and international calls) are still less than satisfactory. The privatization of the traditional operator Sotel Chad, which has a monopoly on basic services, has been envisaged since 2001. A 2005 decree specifies three operators for mobile networks, including a subsidiary of the traditional operator, and five for the provision of internet services, including the traditional operator. Postal services are a state monopoly with the possibility of outsourcing.

Another project in planning is a program financed by the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank Group, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the African Development Bank. It is about supplying fast internet and communications channels for 11 countries in Africa, among them Chad. So far Chad has had to use expensive and poor quality satellite connections, due to its geography. The Central Africa Backbone Program (CAB) will use an already existing fiber optic cable of 1,000 km length, following the oil pipeline from Chad to Cameroon. The expectations regarding this project are to become internationally more competitive:

“The CAB Program is very important for the countries involved and lies at the heart of their development strategies. It will assist countries to strengthen their enabling environment, create competition and, ultimately, increase access and lower the costs for end users,” said Mary Barton-Dock, World Bank Country Director for Cameroon, Chad and Central African Republic.

These are the promises given by the patrons of this project. They also cite a World Bank report in which it is stated that “for [...] every ten-percentage-point increase in high speed internet connections, there is an increase in economic growth of 1.3 percentage points. The report also identifies the mobile platform as the single most powerful way to reach and deliver public and private services to hundreds of millions of people in remote and rural areas across the developing world.” 44

Also the program “[...] will seek to strengthen the capacity of public institutions, such as the ministries and regulatory authorities, and will promote a competition-friendly environment by liberalizing the sector and restructuring and privatizing telecommunications operators.”

The total financial volume of this project during the next 10 years is about 313 million US$. The World Bank and the other project partners will try to minimize the share of the public sector investment and maximize the amount of money that comes from the private sector. It is the African Development Bank’s responsibility to assure this.

All together it can be said that the sum of 313 million US$ is an almost ridiculously small part and that its use, except for the World Bank’s promotional benefits, is questionable. If this project – fast and cheap communications with access for everyone – were realized, this would surely help the whole economy.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Other Factors Limiting Growth and Development}

As Jeffrey Sachs suggests, there is no single formula to solve the problems of all developing countries at a time. It is not free trade and it is not an anti-capitalistic economy. Every country has to be considered on its own, and with this analysis a development concept can be created. In Chad several other things, apart from those that have been mentioned, like climate, geography, corruption etc., limit growth and development. These are the lack of education, a poor health system, almost no social security, and the conflict between religions.

\textit{Language and ethnicity}\textsuperscript{46}

Chad is a francophone country, as it was conquered by France in 1920 and only got its independence back in 1960. The people in Chad divide themselves into ethnic groups and speak more than 100 different languages. When the Europeans arrived, they drew boundaries where they imagined differences in ethnicity and selected tribal chiefs. Things that did not fit in with Chadian society but just corresponded to the European stereotype of African people. The contact was really insensitive and created problems that still hinder a “normal” development. It forced groups into a scheme that was in no regard suitable – chiefs did not have any legal authority over the groups they were to lead, and a normal exchange between the groups was not possible any more. These circumstances intensified the feelings of ethnic separation, which still continues as an element in the internecine conflict that leads to constant fighting.

Sharing a common language normally means sharing a common history, but people also switch languages. Chadians, especially, have a tradition

\textsuperscript{45} Cf. Country Studies Program (2009).

\textsuperscript{46} Cf. Country Studies Program (2009).
of great linguistic and physical mobility because of the hostile environment. People were often forced to leave their homes because of a lack of rain and famine.

The following is a summary of the various ethnicities, religions and languages important in Chad. All of them have their own influence on their respective people.

Ethnic groups: Sara 27.7%, Arab 12.3%, Mayo-Kebbi 11.5%, Kanem-Bornou 9%, Ouaddai 8.7%, Hadjarai 6.7%, Tandjile 6.5%, Gorane 6.3%, Fitri-Batha 4.7%, other 6.4%, unknown 0.3% (1993 census)

Languages: French (official), Arabic (official), Sara (in the south), more than 120 different languages and dialects

Slave trade and other displacements of captives also resulted in language changes. Ethnicity, like language, is not immutable. It involves more things than just speaking the language. Belonging to an ethnicity means not just sharing the genetics but also an understanding of how things have to be handled, the organization of relations among groups, and it might also mean sharing a common worldview. These common things, including the gene pool, change over time and alter a group’s perception of its own identity.

A problem that arises in Chad is the ignorance of the government. It refuses to officially recognize ethnicity, therefore hardly any official data on this subject exists. Nonetheless, ethnic identity has always been a significant component of life in Chad.

Religion

Today, or rather some 25 years ago (the most recent available data are from the 1993 census), the shares of the religions in Chad were: Muslim 53.1%, Catholic 20.1%, Protestant 14.2%, animist 7.3%, other 0.5%,

47 Cf. CIA (2009).
48 Cf. CIA (2009).
49 Cf. CIA (2009).
50 Cf. World Bank Country Sites.
unknown 1.7%, atheist 3.1%. This brings about some problems because, as in several other countries, there is a north-south divide between religions.

The history of religions in Chad is similar to that of other African countries: The biggest part of the population used to be followers of classical African animist religions (about one third) – until the arrival of the Europeans.

Christianity arrived, after some issues with the French officials, in the twentieth century. At first, the French colonial staff did not want the Christians to advert their religion in Chad, and prohibited missions. However, after the First World War, the opposition to Christian missions in Chad softened, and the government granted the first missionaries entry. Since then, Protestant and Catholic missions have been educating children as well as grown-ups and conducting basic social work.

The dispersion of Islam took a more gradual or natural path. When the first Arabic migrants arrived in the 14th century, Islamic thoughts had already been introduced to Chadian society. Although most of the people do not speak Arabic, they perform the Arabic prayers like a kind of spiritual ritual, without understanding the words. Islamic fundamentalism in Chad is almost non-existent.

As mentioned earlier, most Muslim people live in the north of the country, while the Christians live in the south. In economic terms this means that Christian people are wealthier and use the more fertile land, compared to the nomadic Islamic people, who live in the northern desert. On average, Christians in Chad also have more children; therefore the profile of religion has changed in favor of Christianity.

The role of religion does have an economic impact in Chad. It not only influences the way in which trade happens or entrepreneurs work, but also the will to economically integrate with other religious groups and regions. Especially when natural resources come into play, a trans-religious conflict often arises, as was seen in southern Sudan and Darfur.
Summary and Conclusions

Chad is in a difficult situation, geographically as well as politically: landlocked with a very hot and dry climate, on the one hand – rich in natural resources, on the other hand; outside the Darfur conflict – inside a disparity between north and south.

So what chances does Chad have to develop economically? The important increase in productivity in the agrarian sector is hard to achieve and does not look promising. There is hardly any more land that can realistically be put to use. After all, even if Chad managed to produce large excess quantities of an exportable agrarian good, it still could not produce it at a rentable price. The costs for land transport are too high, therefore the goods would not be competitive.

There has to be another possibility to bring capital into the country. The newest project, the CCPP for a pipeline to transport oil from three Chadian fields through Cameroon to the coast was also a disappointment. The expected “trickle-down” effect did not take place, and a lot of money was sunk in the secret channels of deadlocked structures.

Life expectancy is below 50, and only just about a quarter of the total population is able to read. Corruption and the lack of a big democratic middle class close the vicious circle.

It seems as if there is no way out for Chad. The future is not very bright; the only chance for Chad to survive in the capitalistic system is the hope for mercy.

The situation of Chad shows that the rules established by the current world system are more than unfair and offer very little chance for less developed countries to catch up, not to mention the difficulty to keep up once they are there. There is a huge divergence between the living standards, GDPs, HDIs and many other indices of the northern developed countries and the countries that are less fortunate.
It is a question of humanity and solidarity to develop mechanisms to redistribute wealth in this world. Mechanisms that give an equal chance to everyone. Developing strategies and new mechanisms to overcome old problems is the challenge of our generation. It is our mission to find a solution that leaves everyone better off, even if it means using unconventional methods that might destroy the system that carries our wealth. We need more fairness; this is our mission and our chance: we can create a world that allows a humane life with possibilities and perspectives for all people around the world.
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Macroeconomic Development

Poor countries with abundant natural resources can end up in a “natural resource trap,” argues Paul Collier (2007), with “governments spending money on massively wasteful projects saturated with corruption” and with a malfunctioning democracy. Combined with conflicts, bad governance and a landlocked situation, that may end up as a recipe for disaster. The situation in Chad comes close to such a parlous description.

Despite its oil wealth, the indicators displaying development put Chad at the bottom of global rankings. Chad holds rank 175 out of 182 in the U.N. Human Development Indicator 2009. Although the country has a relatively high GDP per capita of US$1,477 (Power Purchasing Parity - PPP), life expectancy at birth amounts to only 48.6 years, adult literacy rate is only 31.8%, and the enrollment ratio in education 36.5%. More than 60% of the population live below the poverty line of 1.25 US$ a day.

A similarly sad picture is provided by its ranking in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index: it holds rank 173 out of 180. High corruption goes hand in hand with a poor business environment – the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicator indicates slight improvements – however Chad still ranks 178th among 182 ranked countries. Chad performs worst in the sub-category of Starting a Business – this is not an indication for a prosperous private sector contributing to an improvement of the situation very soon.

All in all, GDP growth mirrors oil price and oil production performance. The start of oil production and oil exports in 2003/2004 (via the Chad-
Cameroon oil pipeline) pushed the economy to a higher level. However, the reduction of oil sector activity, due to technical problems in key oil fields, resulted in a slight contraction in 2008. The growth of the non-oil sector increased, only temporarily, to approximately 10% in 2005 and returned to a level of 3% after several rebel attacks.

Chad’s chronically unstable security situation constrains economic growth. Any attempt to improve its security situation would result in a more supportive environment for investment and economic activity. Anecdotal evidence indicates, for example, that the EUFOR CHAD/RCA Mission improved the security situation in eastern Chad, leading to first signs of economic activity (the cultivating of arable land, the founding of service businesses etc.).

Source: IMF (2009)
However, Chad is increasingly likely to miss the opportunity provided by oil production to increase the growth potential of the non-oil sector. Only with a simultaneous growth in the non-oil sector can the aim of reducing poverty be envisaged. The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009) clearly states the preconditions for seizing this opportunity: “(...) prudent fiscal policy, anchored in a medium-term framework, and strong public financial management. (...) oil revenue is volatile, as the drastic fall of oil prices since the summer of 2008 illustrates, and temporary, as production from the Doba basin is expected to diminish gradually until it becomes negligible in 2030.”

The start of oil production has radically improved government revenue...

The high oil revenues in the years before led to a doubling of public expenditure, reaching 43% of non-oil GDP in 2008. Public expenditure was increased in Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) priority areas as well as for military spending. Increased public infrastructure investment, in particular in road construction, had positive effects, for instance, on trade between the agricultural areas in the south and the area around the capital.
However, the fall of oil prices and the changes in oil tax payments in 2008 (higher pre-payments by the oil consortium) resulted in a collapse of oil revenues in 2009 (to only one tenth of their 2008 level, according to the IMF). The government was forced to draw the savings it had with the regional Central Bank of Central African States (BEAC) and to turn to the IMF for support with a Staff Monitored Program (SMP) in mid-2009. A track record of policy performance under the SMP would pave the way for further support from the IMF and possibly for debt relief from international financial institutions and bilateral creditors.

A precondition of the SMP is the development of a viable poverty reduction strategy. The second version of the Chadian National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS II) was completed in April 2008, and the government bases its policies (at least theoretically) on this strategy. Developments in the rural sector, good governance, and investments in human capital and in infrastructure are the main priorities of the NPRS II. A new priority, the Action Plan for 2008-11, was adopted by the government, which strives for an improvement of the business climate, the development of infrastructure and the strengthening of rural development.

This brief outline of the macroeconomic situation confirms the fragility of the current situation in Chad. A window of opportunity (oil revenues, NRPS II) is available, though any improvement in economic policy and governance might be endangered by a change in the security situation. In a nutshell, Robert Zoellick describes such situations as “securing development – bringing security and development together, first, to smooth the transition from conflict to peace, and then, to embed stability so that development can take hold over a decade and beyond.” (Gutmann 2009)

The mandate of EUFOR CHAD/RCA was narrowly defined and did not focus exactly on “securing development”. Nevertheless, first results on the ground indicate support for the conclusion that the mere presence of foreign troops has gradually improved the security situation in eastern Chad in recent years. A thorough analysis would be required to verify
this conclusion and to describe explicitly the impact on economic activities in this region.

The direct economic impact of the EUFOR Mission appears clearer – the local supply of the Mission’s staff, their expenditure on the local market and to service businesses as well as the local staffing have high multiplier effects on poor areas. Though, the impact on local economic real growth can be thwarted by increasing prices. A careful analysis of the product and labour market situation is necessary, prior to starting local procurement and local staffing, to avoid unintended supply problems. According to assessments by the Austrian EUFOR troops, the local procurement of certain products (e.g. vegetables) benefitted local businesses by increasing their production capacities and thus the supply of the required quantities and quality, without increasing the price level on local markets. Consequently, local procurement, though certainly limited in size, has stimulated the local economy.

Local staffing is one of the most difficult tasks for international missions. The competitive behavior of international organizations on local labour markets can result in a divided labor market. Drivers with international organizations end up with higher salaries on the domestic labor market than academics (e.g. Bosnia in the post-war period). Highly educated people are implicitly forced to accept “driver’s jobs” with international organizations. Again, a careful and thoughtful approach is needed when starting local staffing procedures. However, the involvement of local employees in a mission has the most durable impact for a country’s development, especially when training and education are core components of working contracts. A successful mission should be measured by whether it effects a “knowledge boost” in a county.

The potential developmental impacts of military missions depend on their adjustment to national development priorities. However, a relatively short-term mission like EUFOR has limited possibilities to adapt to NPRS II goals or to the activities of other development partners. Nevertheless, a thorough examination of national development plans can
help identify areas of cooperation to increase the effectiveness of missions.

The macroeconomic situation of Chad is characterized by a high volatility and by many security-related risk factors. The NPRS II (National Poverty Reduction Strategy) constitutes a first outline of how to improve development in Chad. The NPRS II relies on the available opportunities provided by oil revenues and on the improvements in governance. In this environment, the EUFOR Chad/RCA Mission has positively contributed to economic development in Chad by mainly two factors: by improving the security situation and thus ensuring economic activity, and by increasing demand, due to the mission’s expenses. Estimates of the exact impact are currently not available, and additional in-depth analyses in the region would be required to provide more accurate data.

**Literature:**


The Economic Effects of EUFOR/CHAD-RCA on the Local Economy of Eastern Chad

Lorenz M. Strolz

Introduction

The advent of EUFOR/TCD-RCA in January 2008 was not met without controversy. Many opinions were formulated by a wide variety of scholars, journalists and politicians until the official end of the mission on 15 March 2009 and the day the last EUFOR troops left on 30 June 2009. No matter whether in writing or in speech, the commentaries span the wide range from facts to fiction, and most of them have in common that their authors never set a foot to Chad (TCD) or the Central African Republic (RCA). Whatever opinion these experts might have, one fact remains: the deployment of several thousand Europeans to the heart of Africa could not take place without effects on the local population and their lives. The following section will try to find out about the possible economic effects of EUFOR/TCD-RCA on its theatre of operations, the eastern part of Chad, where most of the EUFOR troops were deployed to.

Eastern Chad/ Northern RCA – Area of Operations

EUFOR – Basics

The gross domestic product (GDP) of Chad in 2008 was 1,800 USD (1,390 EUR)\(^1\), terribly low in comparison to the U.S. GDP of 46,400 USD (36,050 EUR)\(^2\) in the same year. Not too bad in comparison with the GDP of the Central African Republic of 700 USD (545 EUR), the 7\(^{th}\) poorest country in the world, one might be tempted to say. However,

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when it comes to African countries, carefulness is highly recommended when it comes to dealing with figures. Chad is no exception, either. Most people in Chad never even come close to earning 1,800 USD (1,390 EUR) per year, it is the country’s oil revenues which brought the country from the top ten of the poorest countries in the world to number 33 on the same list within ten years.\(^3\)

The EUFOR area of operations (AOO) in eastern Chad and northern RCA is an even poorer region in one of the poorest regions of the world, with a population of approximately 2,000,000 people. The population is young, at an average age of 16; life expectancy is 40-45. Most people never see a doctor in their life, a person of 30 is considered old. Of course, there is trade but it is barter trade mostly, and only people living closer to larger settlements have access to markets and can sell whatever they grow. After talks with approx. 100 heads of families in the border region of Chad and Sudan, it can be estimated that, in a good year, a head of family earns approximately 200 USD (160 EUR). With an average of 20 people in a family, this means an actual per capita income of 10 USD (8 EUR) in the EUFOR AOO in 2009.

**Eastern Chad – Economic Situation from 2000-2003**

In Ouaddai, the most important economic region in Eastern Chad and centre of all EUFOR activities, the majority of the population (90 per cent) were sedentary farmers and nomadic cattle farmers at the start of the first decade of the 21\(^{st}\) century, and only 10 per cent of the population worked in what can be called trade and service sector. Interestingly, there is a strict division in the world of trade, as most imported goods are traded and sold by men, while fresh agrarian products, like fruits and vegetables, are sold by women. The reason for this can be found in the local social structures, as working on the field is mostly seen as work unbefitting a man and therefore the domain of women and children. The region was relatively stable, there was no labour market close by, and most people either stayed to work for their

parents or relatives. People, mostly men who had completed some higher education, had no choice but to leave the region due to a lack of job opportunities. It can be said that there was no real unemployment because there was no real employment market. The general level of education was relatively low; crime in the region was relatively low, too. The capital of Chad N’Djamena was the economic capital of the country as well; only Moundou, the centre of oil production was a significant competition.

All this changed rapidly, when in 2003 the conflict in Darfur started and the first massive wave of refugees arrived in the Ouaddai region, bringing with them large numbers of cattle. The need to feed and water livestock in combination with blank despair and hunger led to violent clashes between refugees and the local population, and many Chadians eluded this menace through migration into parts of the country considered to be safer. The wave of internally displaced people (IDP) resulted in a doubling of the number of inhabitants of Abéché, the capital of Ouaddai, within a year from 30,000 in 2003 to approximately 62,000 in 2004. Water shortage, usually the result of a series of extremely dry years, became a problem. Due to the traditional ways of life, with wood being used for all cooking, uncontrolled wood clearing became another huge problem and resulted in additional desertification around all settlements. With so many people on the move and rebel activities going on, the crime rate went up, and violent crimes like robberies became an every-day occurrence.

In late 2003/early 2004, U.N. agencies and NGOs started large scale activities, and Darfur and its refugees became the number one charity case for opinion makers all over the world. The centre of all relief work was Abéché, the only city on the Chadian side of the border with a hard surface airfield and a minimum of infrastructure. Trying to save money, most of these organisations started to purchase goods needed for their relief work locally and started to hire people. As the wages paid often reached U.S. or European levels, Abéché became an interesting employment market for the whole of Chad. The huge turnover rates resulting from the sale of goods, with most relief organisations ready to pay whatever prices asked, led to an economic reorientation, the city
became the “boomtown” of the country. By 2008, the population had risen to approximately 95,000.

**Living Costs in Chad – A Chadian Basket of Consumer Goods**

When the Austrian Contingent deployed to Chad, it was clear that entering an existing local market would have an impact. To keep this impact as positive as possible and to get fair prices for any goods and services needed, it was clear that an assessment of the situation had to be made to understand how the local economy worked, how much people earned and what they (had to) spend their money on. As there was no data available, a survey was made, which resulted in a Chadian “shopping basket” as described below. All prices are indicated in the local currency Francs CFA.

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4 Strolz, Lorenz M. Chadian basket of consumer goods, data collected in Chad/RCA 2008/09.
5 Franc de la Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale (FCFA), currency issued by the Banque des États de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC) for Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo: The FCFA (XAF) has a fixed exchange rate to the Euro, 1 EURO = 655.957 FCFA, 1USD = 520 FCFA.
Out of interest, the survey was subsequently extended to find out what happened to the economy in the years before the deployment of EUFOR. As certain staple foods had fixed prices over a long period of time, this proved to be relatively easy. For other goods than those mentioned in the basket of consumer goods, old price lists in shops could be found and were used to calculate the mean values.

The results were astonishing, if not alarming: the increase of the prices of the basic consumer good basket between 2003 and 2008 was 300-500 per cent.

Unfortunately, the wages stayed far behind this increase rate. When assessing the consumer goods basket, the wages had to be assessed too. The government of Chad had set the minimum monthly wage at 30,000 FCFA (57.69 USD or 45.734 EUR) in 2004. In 2003, a skilled worker, employed on a daily basis was paid an average 500-1000 FCFA per day, and received two meals per day. This resulted in a monthly wage of 12,000 to 24,000 FCFA per month, quite a bit lower than the rate officially set. In rural areas, especially in family clans, no wages were and are paid at all, people receive food and accommodation and two sets of new clothes per year – that was all.
Governmental wages, even for the armed forces and police were paid irregularly: the fact that some of the troops had not received their pay in more than a year by autumn 2007 can be regarded as one of the reasons for the defection of a high number of units to the rebels. Even worse than usually in most African countries was the situation for teachers and civil servants. As they had not received payment in more than two years by 2007, it was clear that many of them had to look for alternative ways to earn money. Given that in most families the man was the sole breadwinner, people were in fact getting poorer and poorer.

As a consequence of the rebel attacks in 2008, soldiers and policemen and even the teachers and civil servants received their unpaid wages, but this proved to be a temporary relief only.

The advent of the crises in Darfur, followed by a large number of relief organisations setting up shop in eastern Chad, changed the situation completely. Great numbers of people were hired at all levels. The international organisations, in particular, needed highly educated workers as interpreters and staff members. With wages punctually paid, the latter often corresponding to either U.S. or European standards, most educated people suddenly, and understandably, had one single goal: to get such a job. The demand of workforce for jobs, ranging from construction to storage management and truck driving, resulted in a doubling of wages in the period from 2003 to 2008. It became much more attractive to work as a day labourer for an international organisation than to stay in another uncertain field of work. Within a year, more than half of the teachers in the region had left governmental service; many more people from the whole of Chad went to Abéché to look for work. The increase of the minimum wage in Chad by 15 per cent in 2009 has not changed the situation.

To sum up, the wages in Chad doubled and the prices quadrupled in the period from 2003 to 2008. The resulting general insecurity and discontent can be seen as very important reasons for the uprisings in 2008 and 2009.
The same methods were used to assess the price increase during the deployment of EUFOR/TCD-RCA the results looked better, since between 2008 and 2009 the prices went up only 5 to 10 per cent compared to a 300 to 500 per cent rise in 2003-2008. The wages stayed relatively unchanged, which still meant that the general wages-price ratio had been stabilised, but not improved.

Local Procurement – (Un)wanted (economic) Side Effects of EUFOR

When EUFOR/TCD-RCA arrived, it was clear that the Force would not be an autarkic system and that local procurement would be necessary. EUFOR lead nation France outsourced all the activities in that field to its subsidiary company Economat des Armées (EdA). This made EdA a revenue oriented entity, the de facto monopolist for all 3,700 EUFOR troops. The French have a long history in Chad: since 1986, Operation Epervier has been deployed in support of the Chadian government, within its ranks, as in every other military operations of France, EdA. Therefore, it was clear that all procurement activities would be based on existing French networks and contracts. EUFOR itself had limited to no influence at all on how local procurement would be undertaken, who would be the partners and what would be bought. The very strict EU regulations concerning food resulted in only a very limited range of products being bought locally. This had the positive side effect that the local market, already under pressure due to the demand created by relief organisations, did not come under additional pressure regarding most food items. Still, lots of things were bought, and with EUFOR having no right to influence the purchasing policy, the money spent could not be used to purposefully stimulate the markets in a direction chosen by the Force or to support exploitable groups and/or minorities. In fact, the big EdA contracts made a number of rich local (male) wholesale merchants even richer, while small family-based merchants had even fewer chances to sell their goods to anybody else than these wholesalers, who

consequently dictated prices thereby achieving large profit margins. The hiring policy of paying relatively high wages (100,000 FCFA and more) even to unskilled workers resulted in even more turmoil on the local labour markets and resulted in even more inflationary effects on the local economy.

The fact that during the early days of the mission EdA was not able to fulfil basic demands, like supply of drinking water for the tip of the spear Special Operations Forces (SOF) Contingents, led to a detailed study of the rules and regulations of the ATHENA process. The result was that enough loop holes were found that allowed the troop contributing nations (TCN) and their contingents a certain independence of EdA. Many TCN made no use of this possible liberty; in the Austrian case, it was used to create an alternative approach to local procurement, based on the goals to keep the negative impacts on the market as low as possible and to better suit the special needs of the SOF Contingent. The Austrian idea was that local procurement could be used to further and strengthen direct bonds with the local population. The conclusion was clear: the more the Austrian Contingent was a known partner for local merchants, the less locals would see Austrian EUFOR soldiers as enemies and, consequently, targets for possible hostile actions. Additionally, the local social structures in eastern Chad made the market for fruits and vegetables a female domain. Therefore, the money spent for these goods directly went to the weakest and most vulnerable parts of an otherwise male dominated society, since it could be assumed that women earning money would use it primarily for their children and only then deliver it to their husbands.

Of course, buying smaller quantities of goods at several smaller (female) shops meant more work for the responsible persons, but was accepted given the circumstances and expected results. The outcome was very positive: a foundation of trust could be laid and, over the following months and years, the female merchants became an extremely valuable source of information for what went on in the region and an unfailing barometer for the general sentiments in the population. The fact that questions as to what the income was used for were mostly answered by mentioning child care products, school fees and other family-related
expenses, was an additional reason for sustaining the chosen policy. Due to the nature of their tasks, life and work of SOF-Contingents is much closer to the local population. Any additional insight into what is going on around them is of high value. Local procurement can therefore be seen as an instrument of passive force protection and should be taken into consideration for all military operations.

Consequently, this Austrian way was presented to other EUFOR contingents and has certainly influenced the way some of the partners interpreted their interaction with the population in the AOR.

**How to Responsibly Enter a relatively closed Economic System: The Guereda Example**

In June 2008, the Austrian Contingent (AUCON) received the task to set up a forward operations base (FOB) near Guereda, a village with approximately 500-700 inhabitants, 150 kilometres northeast of Abéché. When preparing for this operation, the goal besides all military planning was to not disturb the local price structure, which, far away from all large scale relief and military action, had so far remained untouched by the often negative effects observed in Abéché. As a first step, two local employees, independent from one another and not informed about the future deployment to the region, were sent to Guereda and even smaller villages in the region to collect information on current wages and prices paid for goods as found in the basket of consumer goods established earlier. The results showed that the small local economy had even less to offer, that not all goods were available and that the wages and prices were much lower than in Abéché. When the first troops had deployed in July 2008 to set up the FOB Camp ISA, they had been issued detailed price lists and therefore arrived with clear ideas on what to expect and how much to pay when making purchases or hiring assistants on the local market. The strategy worked: people who were seeking employment were offered average local wages, which they accepted, and merchants who tried to make quick profits by demanding inflated prices from “the whites” had to find out that the newly arrived were well-informed and could not be duped. Consequently, they did not try to hold
goods back to sell them for higher prices to AUCON only, which would have resulted in less supply to fulfil local demands and thus higher prices for everybody. During the whole period of Austrian activities in Guereda, the prices and wages were reassessed on a monthly basis, with seasonal changes taken into account, and the abovementioned Austrian principle of passive force protection was again successfully applied. When AUCON left the region in September, it could be reported that nothing had changed and that the wage-price ratio had remained untouched. No harm had been done to the local economy.

Guereda can be seen as an example of how to approach existing markets and how to interact with them in a responsible way. A success like this would have been impossible without commanders interested in economic interrelations and aware of what impact an affluent new group of consumers can have on existing communities.

**Conclusions**

Every market functions according the law of supply and demand and is influenced by new groups of affluent consumers. Therefore it is impossible to deny that the presence of several thousands of soldiers and their procurement mechanisms had an impact on the economy in Chad and the Central African Republic, whether or not you like the idea of it.

The (economic) lessons learned during the EUFOR/TCD-RCA Operation are numerous. On-site experiences have shown that economic influence, if planned and systematically applied, can be used as a very good lever to further the military goals of a mandate. Unfortunately, this leverage was only used by apt and interested commanders, however, not as part of a general EUFOR concept. The same applies to local procurement used to establish a deeper connection with local societies, thus creating an element of passive force protection and a way to support underprivileged members of the local population, without having to hand out gifts and pittances that might generate jealousy and discontent.
The Guereda example has shown that the entry of a new affluent group of consumers into an existing system of demand and supply is possible without causing severe and lasting damage to wages and prices, provided it is carefully-planned and responsibly performed. Some may argue that the market with only 500 to 700 inhabitants was too small and not representative, due to its isolated position. Still the results show the success of guided economic interaction. Not all future EUFOR missions will be deployed to regions, where the economic equilibrium is as disturbed as it was in Chad. Thus it can be assumed that, given carefully prepared concepts and sustained implementation, a similar success is possible on an even larger scale.

Over the last two decades, multidimensional requirements have resulted in the development of new military concepts, like civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC), to interact with the civilians living in AOOs, and psychological operations (PsyOps), to inform them and build up communication. Given the record of the EUFOR/TCD-RCA Operation, the next logical step might be a tool to create economic awareness with military leaders, something like economic operations (EconOps).

In comparison with neighbouring countries using the same currency (FCFA) and their inflation rates, the 5 to 10 per cent increase in living costs in the theatre of operation 2008/09 are to be seen as not uncommon for the Central African region. The tight military budgets and close supervision of the actual expenses can be seen as an additional factor for not too much money spent and therefore limited inflationary effects during the deployment of EUFOR/TCD-RCA. Therefore, it can be argued that the European military presence has obviously had a stabilising effect, not just on the security situation, but also on price stability, to a certain degree.

Accusations concerning alleged negative effects of EUFOR/TCD-RCA on the local economy in the theatre of operations were numerous and had in common that most of the people who made them had never or only for very brief periods set foot on Chadian soil. The data collected in the field over a period of two years and all resulting figures provide a clear and indisputable picture: between 2003 and 2008, consumer good
prices went up by 300-500 per cent, while wages doubled. Of course, the results must not be seen as representative for the whole of Chad and Central African Republic; they were collected in the EUFOR AOO and therefore apply to this region only. However, the bottom line is and remains: the huge damage done to the economy and therefore to the population’s everyday life in eastern Chad happened long before EUFOR arrived, and the Force obviously had a stabilising effect on the region in the field of security as well as economy.
From EUFOR to MINURCAT Force –
A MINURCAT Force Headquarters Perspective

Gerald Aherne

Introduction

The transfer of authority (TOA) from EUFOR to MINURCAT Force on 15 March 2009 was a possible accident waiting to happen. That this accident did not happen for the United Nations (UN) was due to a combination of factors: The re-hatting of sufficient soldiers from EUFOR troop-contributing nations (TCNs) to MINURCAT Force during TOA, which provided situational awareness and continuity in the Operational Sectors; the professionalism of a small group of dedicated and capable staff officers at the new Force Headquarters, who managed command and control (C2) of the Force against all odds; a relatively benign security situation at that time in the area of operations (AoO), and, above all, luck. The qualified success of the TOA process is not attributable to detailed prior planning by the UN. The benevolent mentoring of the new force by EUFOR Force Headquarters helped. MINURCAT Force worked tirelessly to make its operations viable during TOA and continues to do so.

Many early Indicators of a Demand for MINURCAT Force

The demand for a UN follow-on-force (FoF) as a successor to the bridging force (BF) operation of EUFOR was flagged, and sufficiently so, from high above. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1778 (2007)\(^1\) stated in Paragraph 6 (a)\(^2\), *inter alia*, that the UN


\(^2\) Ibid, Paragraph 6 (a).
“authorizes the European Union to deploy, for a period of one year, from the date that its initial operating capability is declared by the European Union....”. UNSCR 1778 further states in Paragraph 6(b)\(^3\) that it “authorizes the European Union operation, at the close of the period referred to in subparagraph a, to take all appropriate measures to achieve an orderly disengagement.” In essence, this was an unambiguous indicator that, from the moment that initial operating capability (IOC) had been declared, the EUFOR Operation would be finite. IOC was declared on 15 March 2008\(^4\), a full year before TOA to MINURCAT Force.

UNSCR 1778 did not definitely declare the necessity of a FoF. However, the Resolution stated in Paragraph 10\(^5\) that it “requests the Secretary-General to report to it, after due consultations with the governments of Chad and the Central African Republic, six months from the date indicated in paragraph 6, subparagraph a (declaration of IOC), on the arrangements for following up the intended European Union Operation, which has been authorized for a one-year period, including a possible United Nations operation, and notes to this end, “the United Nations and the European Union shall perform an evaluation of needs before the date in question.” While the UN remained uncommitted as to the demand for a FoF, the EU saw things differently. It saw the EUFOR Operation solely as a bridging operation with the defined one-year timeline, and unambiguously stated this in its Concept of Operations (CONOPS)\(^6\). The exit strategy of EUFOR was predicated exclusively on there being a FoF. Thus, even from the pre-EUFOR deployment phase onwards, there had been an evident disparity of ambition between the EU and the UN.

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\(^3\) Ibid, Paragraph 6 (b).
\(^4\) IOC was acknowledged by the UN in its UNSCR 1834 (2008), S/RES/1834 (2008), dated 24 September 2008.
The “evaluation of needs” process, known as the Joint Technical Assessment Mission (JTAM)\(^7\), advised that a FoF would be required and reported this to their respective headquarters. This recommendation was confirmed in the Report of the Secretary-General (RSG) to the Security Council (SC) on 12 September 2008\(^8\) and enshrined in UNSCR 1834\(^9\). Thus, warning lights for the probability of a FoF were clearly flashing from September 2007, identified at the conclusion of the JTAM in June 2008 and recommended by the Secretary-General (SG) to the Council in September 2008. It is not unreasonable to assume that such warning lights should have been heeded by the UN from September 2007, despite the absence of an enabling UNSCR\(^10\), to advance to detailed planning and Force Generation (FG). The absence of detailed planning was, in retrospect, more acute than the said FG and procurement processes of both the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS), which require a minimum of six months pre-planning for force generation and procurement lead time, and even longer to ensure guaranteed positive outcomes.

Despite the intention of UNSCR 1834 (2008), it was an unworkable instrument to advance to a final planning mechanism, as it could not get

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\(^7\) Operation EUFOR Chad/RCA, Mid Mandate Review, Report of the Operation Commander, dated 07 July 2008, Reference #1028 EU – OHQ (This Report covered the military/security aspects. Director General External (DGE – 8); the EU Secretariat provided the political aspects, the EU Commission (COIN) the humanitarian aspects. The Joint Technical Assessment Mission (JTAM), comprising military and civilian actors across a multi-disciplinary range of expertise from the UN and EU, spent two weeks in CHAD and CAR in June 2008.).


\(^9\) UNSCR 1834 (2008), S/RES/1834 (2008), dated 24 September 2008, Paragraph 4 states *inter alia*

"... its intention to authorize the deployment of a United Nations military component to follow up EUFOR Chad/CAR in both Chad and the Central African Republic...". It was adopted by the Security Council at its 5981\(^\text{st}\) meeting on 24 September 2008.

\(^10\) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, (S/2008/760, dated 4 December 2008), Paragraph 1, states *inter alia*, "...the Council...stated its intention to authorize the deployment of a United Nations military force to follow up the European Union-led military force (EUFOR) in Chad and the Central African Republic, subject to a decision of the Security Council.”
the UN’s FG and contracting processes to move beyond planning to implementation. The enabling UNSCR 1861 (2009)\(^{11}\) was finally endorsed by the SC on 14 January 2009, approximately two months from the designated TOA. A nearly impossible deadline.

**Brinkmanship Thwarted**

The Report of the SG to the SC of 12 September 2008\(^{12}\) is revealing. In his report to the Council, in Paragraph 95, the SG recommended two notable ways forward: firstly, “in accordance with the (so-called) Brahimi Report\(^{13}\), that the SC consider leaving in draft form the resolution authorizing the deployment of the force until the time when the Secretariat has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements from Member States”; secondly, that “in the meantime, the United Nations would explore with the European Union the possibility of a limited extension of the EUFOR presence to cover any potential gap between the end of the EUFOR mandate and the arrival of the United Nations Force in theatre, should the United Nations Force face generation difficulties”. These proposals are noteworthy in that they would seem to indicate, among other possibilities, a lack of full commitment to the timelines envisaged in earlier reports and to resolutions for the deployment of the UN FoF, a mechanism for the UN to buy time should that tactic fail, and a form of brinksmanship in the UN’s dealing with the EU on the issue.

This new proposal by the SG was in stark contrast with the stated intent of the EU to terminate its mission on 15 March 2009 and to recover its Force by the onset of the rainy season. To consolidate this decision, an

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\(^{11}\) UNSCR 1861 (2009), S/RES/1861(2009), adopted by the Security Council at its 6064th meeting on 14 January 2009.


amendment to EUFOR CONOPS\textsuperscript{14} was inserted to revise the date of final recovery to 31 May 2009. This was to thwart any ambition of the UN to have an extended recovery phase for EUFOR. There was little appetite among EU member states to extend the deployment of EUFOR. The required unanimous agreement for such a change would have proven impossible to achieve against the background of the initial reluctance of some member states to deploy EUFOR in the first place. The clock was now ticking for the UN, and it now had only six months in which to execute an untested transfer of authority with an EU-led force.

**The MINURCAT Force Military Planning Process**

The command group of MINURCAT Force, namely the Force Commander (FC) and the Deputy Force Commander (DFC), were appointed very late. As a result, neither could influence the formulation of CONOPS\textsuperscript{15} of the Force or the required pre-planning for the critical C2 process by Force Headquarters (FHQ). In the complex and harsh environment of eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic this was a critical enabler not allowed to the Command Group (CG), neither prior to nor during TOA. The FC arrived in the AoO on the day of TOA, while the DFC arrived on 2 March 2009. The reason for the delay in the appointment and deployment of these two critical appointees is unknown. However, the constraints of and delays in UN personnel selection and appointment procedures, coupled, perhaps, with the influence of Member States Permanent Mission at the UN in regional/continental appointments, can impede timely planning.

A Core Planning Team (CPT) to consist of the chiefs of the major staff cells in the new Force Headquarters was to deploy to DPKO on 6 January 2009, to oversee the detailed planning of the military aspects of

\textsuperscript{14} Op EUFOR TCHAD/RCA – Concept of Operations and the Provisional Statement of Requirements, dated 07 Nov 2007 Reference #19749/07.

\textsuperscript{15} Military Strategic Concept of Operations for the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), Number 0269, dated 5 February 2009.
the transfer from EUFOR. This concentration occurred too late. Not all staff cells were represented, and some proposed members of the CPT, despite the best efforts of the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) at DPKO to have TCCs deploy their CPT member officers, either arrived late or not at all. The officers who did present themselves at DPKO were representative of the diversity of the UN, with no common understanding of, or indeed, training in common Operational Planning Design (OPD). The UN does not have a generic OPD for force planning which is rolled out in preparation for emerging deployments, and thus lacks a process that is known to and capable of being shared with troop contributing countries (TCCs) for pre-deployment or core strategic training purposes.

In absence of an alternative and out of necessity the CPT initially chose the NATO Guide to Operational Planning (GOP) as a template. This process was unknown to the non-European members of CPT, which lessened their impact on the functioning of the CPT process. Critically, the European members of the CPT were trained in the NATO Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) procedures, which significantly aided planning. In reality, the initial strategic military documents of MINURCAT Force were EUFOR documents with relevant name changes, which were later amended to reflect UN terminology and concepts. The need for a dedicated and approved UN OPD mechanism is evident.

Peacekeeping is a generic term. For some years, all “peacekeeping” mandates have been Chapter Seven “peace enforcing missions”¹⁶, being capable of “robust peacekeeping”, in terms of operational posture and delivery. To be leading edge, robust peacekeeping requires new thinking and the creation of new support mechanisms on the part of the UN. The matching of required assets to the respective tasks, as envisaged in the CONOPS of MINURCAT Force, has to date not been fully realized. This can only lead to a restricted delivery of the operational outputs

¹⁶ Charter of the United Nations, Chapter Seven. (Chapter Six or “traditional” peacekeeping missions were classical peacekeeping mandates, where there was a peace agreement, a separation of forces, and the keeping of the peace between the adversaries. Chapter Seven mandates are “peace enforcing” missions, where the maintenance of international peace and security is, where necessary, imposed).
envisaged in CONOPS. In the absence of these key enablers, the issue of revisiting or amending CONOPS or even the relevant UNSCR needs to be considered.

**The Mission Planning Process**

MINURCAT Mission issued its Mission Support Concept for Deployment of MINURCAT II on 4 February 2009, one day before the issuing of CONOPS. This was much too late. The transfer of EUFOR critical infrastructure assets, such as camps and airfields, to MINURCAT was impeded by the Chadian government’s insistence on their non-transfer between the EU and the UN, except via separate agreements with the government. This significantly delayed the planning and transfer process of fixed assets between the EU and the UN.

The EU and the UN have financial and accounting models that are incompatible and diametrically opposite to one another. This led to delays in and impediments of the handover of transferable assets between EUFOR and MINURCAT, prior to and after TOA, resulting in unwelcome tensions. Reimbursement of TCCs by the UN for their human resources and equipment is one of the bulwarks of its financial, deployment and accounting models. The “Athena Process” or “Costs Lie Where They Fall/ Common Costs” underpins the EU system.

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18 Reimbursement, on agreed scales of charges, for contingents, for their Contingent Owned Equipment (COE), for maintenance of that equipment, either on a “Wet Lease” or “Dry Lease” arrangement, forms the core of the financial compensation of nations for the temporary transfer of their assets for UN service.
19 The so-called “Athena Process”, because the agreement was negotiated in Athens, requires all EU nations to bear the full costs of the deployment of forces, equipment and sustainment costs by that nation while participating in a mission sponsored by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Common costs for budget items such as a FHQ are borne, in proportion to agreed scales, by all EU nations, whether or not that nation has forces deployed to the mission, and regardless of the number of forces deployed.
The management of expectations of re-hatted EUFOR troops was problematic. Contingents used to the security provided by the dedicated military combat service support (CSS) logistic system of EUFOR were, at least initially, confronted with the uncertainties of the UN’s Integrated Support System (ISS) in MINURCAT. The latter is a UN civilian-led logistics system, with military officers embedded in it. Initially, a lack of signed contracts for essential fuel and water supplies, critical life support and physical infrastructure deficiencies at the FHQ, and the inability to advance the construction of expanded and new camps, due to foreseen contractual deficiencies, led to daily “fire fighting” crises.

However, mission support slowly developed into effective action, and the challenges now faced by the mission to support its force are more manageable. A major impediment has been the remoteness and inaccessibility of the AoO. No local economy or market exists in Chad to get resources from. All supplies require air transportation or overland delivery, the latter over long distances fraught with danger. The mission has struggled to recruit international civilians willing to serve under such hard conditions.

A new Genre of DPKO Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

UN peacekeeping operations are changing conceptually, and changing beyond recognition. This is best reflected in the new family of CONOPS, generated to support the UNSCRs that mandate them. MINURCAT Force CONOPS is no exception.\textsuperscript{20} Troops, equipment, and the attitude of all concerned with advancing these new concepts of operations are critical to their success. The more traditional task of “holding the ground” in earlier peacekeeping missions did not require that individual soldiers have sufficient personal equipment to sustain themselves in the field for days on end. Their former role was frequently static and required little more than a garrison support mechanism “in the field”.

\footnote{20 See footnote 16.}
Modern peacekeeping is predicated on troops operating from forward operating bases (FOBs) with troops being deployed from these FOBs, either in armored personnel carriers (APCs), armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), or airborne vehicles. The intention of the CONOPS of the MINURCAT Force followed that of EURFOR. Training in, familiarity with, and competence in the use of things as meals ready to eat (MREs), the possession of individual bivouac equipment, and the use of “harbour areas” for both force projection and expeditionary capability are the cornerstones of this new CONOPS. The absence of these capabilities, training, and assets critically restricts deployability.

Casualty evacuation/medical evacuation (CASEVAC/MEDEVAC) resources, especially helicopter resources, to support such operations are essential. Without those, full compliance with CONOPS is not achievable. These helicopters need to have enhanced night flying and night vision capability. To date, the UN has no history of sourcing these assets commercially if, as frequently occurs, they are not made available by TCCs from their military assets. TCCs are not the only source of such assets.

Currently, many troops from TCCs are challenged by these new concepts, because of deficiencies in their personal equipment, more specifically, in their personal load carrying equipment (PLCE), and because of the training and the essential attitude required to deploy at short notice and to remain deployed under harsh conditions for days on end. This is an urgent matter that requires policy and coordination within the DPKO, with the necessary force requirements (FRs) to be formulated by the Force Generation Service (FGS) within the Department of Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET). The validation of pre-deployment training (PDT) and the verification of essential/minimum personal equipment items for deployment need to be confirmed during pre-deployment visits (PDVs) to TCCs. To date, the necessity to coordination the disparate strands of DPKO/DFS/DPET and to bring all of these functions together is a work in progress.
The recently published joint DPKO/DFS “non-paper” titled *New Horizon*\(^{21}\) is a step in the right direction. It embraces, for the first time, the concept of “capability development” for peacekeeping, with an emphasis on the quality of output rather than on the numbers of personnel deployed. It shows the way forward, but it will undoubtedly be delayed by many entrenched roadblocks of traditional thinking. However, this is the future. The challenge within peacekeeping is almost “generational”. All key leaders, both civilian and military, need to concern themselves with the new challenges and requirements of these CONOPS. There is a way to go in and convince them. A minimum acceptable standard can be achieved with clear thinking, inclusive/honest dialogue, and enlightened leadership. The seed planted in September 2008 by the SG\(^{22}\) for the exploration of the “over-the-horizon model”, in support of peacekeeping operations, is worthy of further exploration. Its value is tried and trusted, for instance in NATO operations and standby arrangements. It is possible to go forward in such a manner that the interests of the UN and TCCs can be guaranteed. A “do-nothing posture” cannot be sustained.

**Process or Regress**

At the time of writing, it is nine months past TOA. Many of the impediments that the Force faced in the delivery of CONOPS still exist. Chief among those are the slow build-up of the Force, the absence of key enabling units and assets, and deficiencies in critical life-supporting infrastructure. UNSCR 1861, passed as an alibi two months before TOA and frequently referred to by the UN regarding the challenges pre and post TOA, does not stand the test of retrospective scrutiny. Some issues are no further advanced today.

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While of late there has been some deterioration of the security situation in the AoO, this may have its genesis in the annual upsurge of violence after the rainy season. The increase of humanitarian personnel, coupled with their high value assets, is an additional contributing factor. MINURCAT Force continues to provide output to the humanitarian community within its means and capabilities and also to the targeted refugees and IDPs. The graph indicating the successful military output of the Force continues to rise. Some TCCs are challenged by the new methods in force projection and expeditionary operations as required in CONOPS. This is negatively commented on by humanitarian workers, with some justification. Enabling assets essential to EUFOR continue to be lacking in MINURCAT Force. This restricts but does not impede the full implementation of CONOPS. MINURCAT Mission Administration has come to terms with the certainty of required supply of essential items such as fuel and water in order to sustain military operations in the difficult environment of the AoO.

Without addressing the concept of “capability development” in UN peacekeeping and properly generating forces by enabling units and assets, UN forces will struggle to reach the level of capability that EUFOR possessed. This gap can be bridged, albeit not completely, by more numerous UN forces in the theatre, and by a more creative and inventive use of these forces. MINURCAT Force continues to do so with increasing effectiveness. The deployment of the enabling assets is the final essential force multiplier.

The Future

Since TOA, a kind of “pioneering” culture has been ingrained within MINURCAT Force. It could have easily floundered under the difficulties it faced. The fact that it did not is a testimony of the dedication and professionalism of identifiable individuals who refused to bow to such a possibility. It was especially contingent and unit commanders who excelled. The Force has a “can-do culture”, of which it is proud. The outputs of the Force are now consistent with acceptable norms, against a background of deficiencies in manpower, equipment
and critical enablers. It continuously strives for a better delivery of service to humanitarian actors as well as to refugees and internally displaced persons, in accordance with its mandate and CONOPS.

Two recent significant events are characteristic of the potential progress of peacekeeping and of MINURCAT Force. The first Workshop on Military Capability Development\(^{23}\) took place in ENTEBBE, UGANDA, from 8-10 November 2009. This is encouraging, as it seeks to focus on the quality of operational outputs rather than on troop strength. The lack of quality control regarding operational outputs in peacekeeping urgently needs to be addressed. Secondly, the publication of the joint study by DPKO and the Office of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on the protection of civilians (POC)\(^{24}\) is an exciting, farsighted and comprehensive document. It charts a way forward in a manner that raises confidence. Challenges and deficiencies are truthfully named and ways forward identified.

MINURCAT Force will reach the first anniversary of TOA in two months. In retrospect, it would perhaps have been less complicated for it to serve as a start-up mission rather than as a FoF to EUFOR. The actual incompatibility of both systems in mission preparation, planning, accounting, procurement, force generation as well as availability and deployment of essential enablers, make the model less than ideal, at present. However, it can be remedied. Both the EU and the UN are undergoing lessons-learned processes after TOA. Hopefully, the favorable and less favorable ones will be critically identified and rectified. This bridging concept of regional organizations prior to UN

\(^{23}\) The Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET) conducted this workshop with senior military leaders in the field, on current challenges and possible solutions to improving preparation and performance of military peacekeeping capabilities on the ground. This workshop focused on garnering field perspectives, on devising a comprehensive strategy for addressing central challenges to effective performance, and on how to advance the development of critical operational training guidance for contributing and supporting countries.

deployments is a strategic aim of DPKO. The EUFOR/UN models in
CHAD and the CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC have left room for
improvement. As far as MINURCAT Force is concerned, I remain
cautiously optimistic for the future.
Security of Humanitarian Organizations

Ute Kollies and Sophie Reck

Introduction

In 2005 some humanitarian actors in eastern Chad called for an international operation to provide security for humanitarian activities, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). At the end of 2007, a European Union Force arrived with 3,322 troops at its full strength, in conjunction with a UN Mission composed of civilian sections and an UNPol contingent, the latter with the task to provide guidance to a Chadian gendarmerie and police component, the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS).

EUFOR Chad/RCA deployed to Chad with the unique mandate to 1/ contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons; 2/ facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations; 3/ contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations associated personnel.1 The EUFOR Concept of Operations clearly designated EUFOR as a bridging operation, “under the condition that the UN are prepared to subsequently deploy a multinational force within the agreed timeframe”, to prepare the terrain for a United Nations Force2.

For humanitarian organizations on the ground, the presence of EUFOR instilled a feeling of comfort and security, and soon became an example

of best practices in terms of civil-military coordination. Yet, it was unclear in how far EUFOR’s mandate, as it had been conceived by the Security Council, was appropriate to address the actual challenges and threats on the ground, and the extent to which the Force was able to implement its mandate was difficult to assess. It is debatable whether it is possible to measure the success of EUFOR in providing humanitarian organizations with security with tangible indicators, and if so, what would those be? We must also have a look at the effects of the operation and determine whether they were in line with the actual mandate.

In order to do so, it is imperative to look at the security situation for humanitarian workers, in particular in eastern Chad; to examine the threats in the light of Security Council Resolution 1778; to look at one of the indicators for success which had been considered tangible for a long time – the return of IDPs; to examine EUFOR’s effects on humanitarian access; and to outline the structures of civil-military coordination supporting EUFOR’s interaction with the humanitarian community. In conclusion, these factors should lead to an appreciation as to whether the mandate was implemented.

Humanitarian Workers and Security: a downward Spiral?

Over the years, the safety and security of humanitarian personnel seems to have continued to deteriorate. 60 years ago, the United Nations (UN) flag and logo had a more protective effect than today. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) suffer a similar trend, since more and more of their humanitarian workers are becoming targets of deliberate attacks that range from killings, abductions and hostage taking to rape, harassment, banditry and criminality. The comprehensive and updated report of the Secretary-General6, upon request of the General Assembly, on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of

6 Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, 63rd Session, item 68, on the provisional agenda Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance, on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and the protection of UN personnel, A/63/305, 18 August 2008.
UN personnel, dated 18 August 2008, highlights the recent threats and challenges in ensuring safety and security for humanitarian and UN personnel. It calls for an international collective responsibility according to international law and its principles, and for a closer collaboration between the United Nations and host governments pertaining to the security of its personnel. The report highlights: “(…) in 2008, 63 casualties among international and national staff of NGOs were reported. Other incidents included 236 attacks, 70 cases of detention by State authorities and 103 incidents of unlawful detention by non-state actors, 41 incidents of assault, 132 incidents of harassment, 138 cases of forced entry or occupation of premises, 113 armed robberies, 50 incidents of vehicle hijackings, 70 residential break-ins and 124 cases of theft. In the same period, the UN suffered 490 attacks, over 500 robberies, some 263 physical assaults and 119 hijackings”

The impact of these threats is not only disastrous at the individual and organizational level, but has an adverse effect when it comes to accessing populations in need: they tend to shrink the space for humanitarian action and hamper the delivery of assistance as well as the protection of thousands of vulnerable IDPs, refugees and poverty-stricken host communities that are left in highly stressful situations without coping mechanisms, in and outside of camps.

In eastern Chad, humanitarian organizations, refugees, IDPs, and the host population have not been exempted from the abovementioned deterioration of the security situation. A short chronology of the main security incidents from the end of 2007 to March 2009 provides us with a snapshot of the situation faced by humanitarian actors as well as the military throughout the mandate of EUFOR:

- October to November 2007: regular clashes between the Chadian Army (ANT) and the Chadian Armed Opposition Groups (CAOGs) in several villages in eastern Chad impose restrictions on the movements of humanitarian actors on IDP sites located along the border with Sudan;

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4 Ibid.
End of January to early February 2008: a rebel attack on N'Djamena causes the evacuation of non-critical humanitarian personnel and a temporary continuation of humanitarian operations with 'skeleton teams';

April 2008: killing of a Save The Children driver on his way from Bredgine refugee camp to Farchana;

April 2008: killing of two CNAR security officers during an armed attack in Iriba;

1 May 2008: killing of the head of mission of Save The Children: Pascal Marlinge is shot dead on his way from Farchana to Adre by bandits, who intercept the convoy. From now on, armed escorts are the norm in United Nations operations in eastern Chad;

14 June 2008: confrontation between the ANT and rebels in Goz Beida. This causes 235 humanitarian workers to leave their bases for the EUFOR camp in Goz Beida for two to three days;

8 July 2008: ethnic clashes between the Dadjo and the Muro communities in Kerfi interfere with NGO community work in the area and cause humanitarian organizations to leave the zone for several weeks, cutting off aid for some 11,000 people;

July 2008: shooting of ICRC staff in Abéché;

July/August 2008: several NGO staff based in Iriba and Bahai receive death threats, resulting in the suspension of humanitarian programs in the refugee camp (in particular a food distribution planned to take place in Oure Cassoni refugee camp), close to Bahai and the town of Iriba. NGO support to the local health center is suspended;

September/October 2008: several violent acts of banditry and break-ins into NGO compounds based in Dogdore, close to the Sudanese border, cause the totality of them to leave and suspend their programs benefitting 28,000 IDPs and host populations in
the following areas of support: water, sanitation, hygiene as well as health. These acts of banditry are prompted by a security vacuum, due to the fact that the ANT and the GNNT (Garde Nationale Nomade du Tchad) have left the area and no security forces are present;

- 8 October 2008: during a registration exercise by UNHCR and partner organizations, humanitarian staff in Am Nabak camp are attacked by a group of refugees who want to be registered but are not considered legitimate. All humanitarian staff is evacuated safely from the refugee camp and the neighbouring town. All humanitarian programs, except the provision of water through one NGO, are suspended for several months;

- 7 to 9 November 2008: inter-ethnic clashes in the area of Birak between the Zaghawa and the Tama tribes cause around 40 casualties and several thousand displaced persons in the cantons of Birak and Bali as well as movements to Sudan. The attacks are aimed at the Tama community. Humanitarian access is impeded due to insecurity and proximity to the border. EUFOR is solicited to provide patrols and contribute to security in the area;

- February/March 2009: as in September 2008, acts of banditry and break-ins into compounds of NGOs based in Dogdore cause the majority of them to leave once again and suspend their programs for around 28,000 IDPs;

- March 2009: regular crime and acts of banditry cause NGOs to leave Adre and Ade.  

In sum, compounds were looted, vehicles carjacked, staff beaten, shot at, killed, or they received death threats. This kind of war economy, which saw much of the livestock in Dar Sila looted between 2005 and 2007, was then perpetuated through the looting of easily transferable humanitarian assets, such as four-wheel-drive vehicles, at the

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5 Inputs to OCHA NY, Key Trends in Humanitarian Access over the past 18 Months, 23 March 2009.
considerable expense of IDPs in need of assistance. In the course of 2008, altogether more than 160 attacks on humanitarian workers were reported in eastern Chad, including four fatalities. Impunity continued to reign in eastern Chad.\(^6\)

Humanitarian organizations became targets, irrespective of their adherence to humanitarian principles, irrespective to their logos displayed on cars, t-shirts, and compounds. Serious discussions took place inside the country about the shrinking of humanitarian space, at the individual and the organizational level, since perpetrators of violence showed little or no respect for the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, humanity and independence, or for international humanitarian law.\(^7\) EUFOR increased its patrols, and its presence provided comfort. However, security through the respect for the humanitarian principles that humanitarian organizations rely on was not guaranteed any more.

The expectations when EUFOR arrived in the country were mixed. They ranged from fears that EUFOR would try and conduct humanitarian projects to the uncertainty of how to deal and cooperate with or whether even to stay clear of the incoming military force to the hope that the security situation would become more stable and that humanitarian access would improve. These expectations had soon to be adjusted, and even the Force itself, within the limitations of its mandate, had to adapt and find ways of how to deal with the actual threats prevailing on the ground.

\(^6\) The murder of Pascal Marlinge, Head of SAVE the Children, was not followed up in due course.

\(^7\) Impartiality = the provision of aid according to need based on non-discrimination, neutrality = not taking sides in armed conflict; humanity = alleviating human suffering wherever it is found; independence = not being utilized as an instrument of any political, military or economic agenda.
Threats versus Mandate

The situation in Chad had led to a mandate for the multidimensional peacekeeping operation, enshrined in Security Council Resolution 1778 of September 2007, which reflected the concerns regarding limited access, the threats to humanitarian workers, and the protection of civilians by means of a three-pronged approach, as mentioned earlier.\(^8\) The threats which the mandate was supposed to tackle were generally divided into three categories by the humanitarian and international community: 1/ banditry, crime, impunity, a lacking rule of law; 2/ CAOG and cross-border movements; 3/ intercommunity and ethnic clashes.

OXFAM presented EUFOR’s impact on the security of humanitarian workers as follows: “The mission’s military component EUFOR, which is present on the ground, has made many civilians feel safer through its activities, such as patrolling, destroying unexploded ordnance, and even positioning themselves around camps and sites during rebel and government fighting. However, EUFOR is a military force, and not a police force, which means it is ill-suited to deal with banditry and criminality, and not mandated to act within the camps and sites. Nevertheless, OXFAM believes it is important that EUFOR continue with its patrols and other deterrent activities, focusing its efforts on protecting all the key refugee and IDP zones in order to ensure the ‘wide-area security’ necessary for both MINURCAT and DIS deployment as well as for a smooth handover to a future UN force”.\(^9\)

The mantra that EUFOR was a military force sent to deal with a police problem often came up in debates. EUFOR had been put in a delicate situation, since the problems that humanitarian personnel faced were car-jacking and break-ins into compounds, more than actual rebel attacks or conflict situations. EUFOR representatives often repeated that the Force would not go after a stolen Landcruiser. Yet EUFOR went out of its way

to adapt to the situation within its mandate and, through creative ways of patrolling and the provision of area security, helped the humanitarian community to operate in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR.

The debate continued, though, as to whether the mandate could really tackle the threats on the ground. In June 2008, the Joint Technical Assessment Mission composed of UN and EU representatives from New York, Paris, and Brussels visited eastern Chad. One part of their task consisted in reviewing the mandate of SC Resolution 1778, in order to assess the needs for a resolution concerning the follow-on Force, mandated by the UN. The delegation left with more questions than answers – the threats on the ground simply did not match the mandate which had been outlined in the resolution. The military could do its part in providing area security and in serving as a deterrent to rebel groups when they moved through the area of operation (AoO). However, to address the problem of impunity, banditry and the lack of an appropriate justice system, a police contingent supported by a strong civilian component was necessary. The DIS, together with UNPol and MINURCAT’s civilian sections, was to fulfill this role. Yet, during the EUFOR mandate, this was impeded by problems concerning a rapid deployment of the mission, as well as delayed training of the DIS elements.

Thus, EUFOR had no choice but to adapt as well as it could in order to fulfill the three main parts of its mandate. The Force went to great lengths to achieve this, *inter alia* by offering to patrol in Abéché. This type of ‘policing’ action was rejected, however, by the Governor of Abéché.

International and national attention was focused on how the Force would deal with the challenges it faced on the ground, and the desperate search for tangible indicators to measure the success or the failure of the Operation began. It seemed as though one of the options was to look at the number of IDPs and refugees that would return during the time of EUFOR’s deployment.
EUFOR and the Return of IDPs and Refugees

The return of IDPs caused many debates and lively exchanges between the humanitarian community and EUFOR, from the tactical to the strategic and political level. For EUFOR and, in particular, the European Union at headquarters in Brussels, it was politically imperative to see people return to their home villages during EUFOR deployment in eastern Chad. For the European Union, the number of returned persons was an indicator of a successful operation. The return of IDPs was indeed named as one of the tasks in EUFOR’s Concept of Operations. For humanitarian organizations, this was a reason for serious concern. Humanitarian organizations consider the return of IDPs as voluntary and their assistance as an action to accompany those who wish to return, and thus feared that EUFOR, being under pressure to produce numbers of returned people, would push people to return.

Even if IDPs want to return, it is extremely difficult to track their movements and to deliver concrete figures. In its strategy for sustainable returns of 25 April 2008, OCHA categorizes IDPs into three groups: 1/ those who would return to their village of origin at some point, 2/ those who would stay at the IDP site, settle there, and not move again, and 3/ those who would do neither the first nor the second but move to a third location.


At the same time, several factors caused the movements of IDPs to fluctuate. Some would go back to their lands of origin during the harvest season and then return to the IDP site because that was where they would receive assistance in terms of food distribution, access to health facilities and education. The standard of living was simply higher at a site than outside.

The rainy season brought further movements. The rains made it virtually impossible for humanitarian organizations to deliver food at the sites themselves. Thus IDPs from Kerfi, for instance, would have to move to Goz Beida in order to receive their rations.

Lastly, even if some IDPs did decide to return, they often returned to a volatile situation, with no local authorities present in their area, thus a vacuum of rule of law and governance.

The abovementioned factors accounted for the fact that, even in case of an improvement of the security situation, IDPs would not necessarily return.

EUFOR on the ground realized this quickly and understood, due, amongst others, to the fervent criticism from humanitarian actors, that it was not possible to use returns as a tangible indicator for success. EUFOR Force Headquarters defended this view successfully, perhaps to the detriment of political and strategic authorities in Brussels and Paris, yet to the effect of positive relations and effective cooperation with the humanitarian community on the ground.

If it was difficult to appreciate EUFOR’s impact based on the number of decreasing or increasing security incidents or on the number of returned IDPs, concrete and tangible examples exist where EUFOR’s presence had a strong added value in creating or helping to maintain the access of humanitarian organizations to their beneficiaries.
EUFOR and Humanitarian Access

EUFOR provided area security, as opposed to point security or escorts. Upon the request of humanitarian organizations, the Force would open a passage across main axes two days in advance of humanitarian movements; equally upon request, EUFOR would conduct air patrols, and humanitarian workers could communicate their movements to the Force so that the military would be in the surroundings on the day the humanitarian actors moved. Some organizations, for reasons of impartiality, neutrality, and independence, communicated their movements to EUFOR so that the military would not be in the area at that same time.

A small selection of multiple examples illustrates the success EUFOR had in providing humanitarian access:

- **Goz Beida, June 2008**: rebels enter the town of Goz Beida, and fighting erupts. 235 humanitarian personnel find refuge at the EUFOR base of Sector South. Without this possibility, humanitarian operations would have to be suspended, since humanitarian actors would have to relocate to Abéché or even N’Djamena. Thanks to the presence of the battalion, they can stay in a safe haven and, once the situation has calmed down, move back to their base and resume their work.

- **Am Nabak, October 2008**: humanitarian organizations have been attacked inside the refugee camp of Am Nabak during a registration exercise. The Multinational Battalion North provides armed escort and evacuates humanitarian organizations from the camp back to their bases.

- **Birak, November 2008**: fighting is ongoing between two ethnic groups in the area of Birak. During the first two days, no humanitarian actors are present. EUFOR distribute water, food rations and provide some medical care. EUFOR’s presence allows humanitarian organizations to move in and take over the delivery of humanitarian assistance, while EUFOR returns to its task to provide security.
➢ Daha, January 2009: 20,000 refugees from Central Africa come across the border in southern Salamat. EUFOR provides air escort and conducts reconnaissance missions to the airfields in Daha, so that humanitarian organizations can move in and deliver humanitarian assistance.

➢ Border areas, September 2008 and March 2009: both times, some 28,000 IDPs have been left without humanitarian assistance in the area of Adre, since NGOs had to leave due to insecurity and banditry. EUFOR provides patrols, which allows humanitarian organizations to resume their work.

➢ Rainy season: EUFOR pulls humanitarian personnel out of the mud.

For EUFOR to be able to provide the rapid assistance to humanitarian organizations outlined in the examples above, effective information exchange and coordination structures were essential. Successfully established coordination mechanisms in the domain of civil-military cooperation and coordination from both the military and the civilian sides provided the necessary basis.

**Civil-military Coordination Mechanisms and Projects**

Humanitarian civil-military coordination played a central role during the deployment of EUFOR as well as during and after the handover to the United Nations Force. A functioning structure for civil-military coordination was key to the success and the implementation of the unique mandate of EUFOR and the U.N. Force to support humanitarian organizations. Through the advocacy of humanitarian organizations in Chad on the ground and of headquarters, the necessary posts were established and filled from day one of the deployment of the European Union Operation: OCHA deployed its Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Officer (UN-CMCoord Officer) in November 2007, at the same time when the first EUFOR officers arrived; the NGO Coordination Committee (CCO) advertised the post of a Policy Advisor on Civil-Military relationships, who arrived in June 2008. This allowed
for the immediate setup of structures for coordination and information exchange, which showed several facets:\footnote{Reference Document – Humanitarian Civil-Military Liaison Arrangements and Coordination Mechanisms during the Mandate of EUFOR Chad/RCA, 12 March 2009.}

1/ A CIMIC Day was initiated, on which the EUFOR Force Commander summoned his CIMIC teams from the sectors, together with his CIMIC branch, once a month per sector, on a rotation basis, in order for teams to exchange experiences, and in order to streamline the vision of CIMIC for the mission. Humanitarian representatives, such as the UN-CMCoord Officer or representatives of UNHCR or NGOs were often invited to give an update on the situation of IDPs or refugees.

2/ CIMIC bulletins and security bulletins were made available to humanitarian organizations regularly, on a monthly and weekly basis, respectively.

3/ The schedules of logistics convoys were communicated every week to humanitarian organizations, so that they could join the convoys by following or preceding them, in order to move within an environment of security, without having to take a proper armed escort.

4/ Escorts were provided by EUFOR, if necessary, and upon request of humanitarian actors. This was the case, for instance, during food distribution in one of the refugee camps, and in situations involving high security risks. Short and long distance patrols, were regularly conducted in all sectors, and movement schedules were communicated to the humanitarian community.

5/ EUFOR offered to transport large sums of money for humanitarian organizations, for instance, on salary pay day, in order to avoid carjacks on the road.

6/ EUFOR provided emergency numbers to the humanitarian community, and humanitarian organizations could call in 24 hours a day.
7/ Weekly coordination platforms in the shape of meetings on security were created and attended by EUFOR CIMIC teams and the Force Commander himself, where information was exchanged in the order of geographical location, from north to south.

8/ EUFOR contributed to the elaboration of security plans, in support of the humanitarian community, and conducted relocation exercises.

Projects were a contentious topic, but they can be taken as an example for best practices in the context of eastern Chad. EUFOR conducted eight micro-projects. Those included the reconstruction of schools, the building of sports fields, and infrastructure support to the local hospital. Meetings for information sharing between the humanitarian community and EUFOR were convened by OCHA, for EUFOR to explain the content and the objective of their projects. After some heavy debates on the ground, the humanitarian community and EUFOR came to the common understanding that projects should be complementary to and well coordinated with humanitarian operations. EUFOR’s projects, within the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Complex Emergencies\(^\text{13}\), and within the Quick Impact Project Directives\(^\text{14}\), helped to reach those who did not receive humanitarian assistance, such as population groups who lived outside the refugee camps and IDP sites or too far for humanitarian organizations to provide them with any basic assistance.

Although under great pressure from troop contributing nations as well as headquarters in Brussels and Paris, EUFOR succeeded in limiting their projects to a minimum. This effort strongly contributed to the good relations between EUFOR and the humanitarian community.


Conclusion

It is not possible to measure the success of EUFOR with tangible indicators and figures. Security incidents continued on the same level, with their number even increasing at times. Certainly, this must be seen in correlation with the arrival of an increasing number of international staff, thus more goods and more money, which means more high-value targets in the area. The return of IDPs continued gradually, based on voluntariness.

The initial anxiety of humanitarian organizations regarding a military operation was calmed, and reassurance was provided that, in case of security problems, the military Force would be there and ready to intervene, if necessary. Cooperation between humanitarian actors and the military was a case of best practices in eastern Chad.

Based on the three main points of Resolution 1778, namely that EUFOR should 1/ contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons, 2/ facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations, and 3/ contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment, and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations associated personnel, EUFOR creatively adapted to the situation by flexibly finding solutions within the limits of its mandate, assets, and capabilities, and by addressing problems which, perhaps, it was neither trained nor equipped for. EUFOR did what it could; the question remains whether the mandate was appropriate for resolving the threats on the ground and realistic in view of the circumstances prevailing there.
Annex

Resolution 1778 (2007)

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions and the statements of its president concerning Chad, the Central African Republic and the subregion, including resolution 1769, Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and political independence of Chad and the Central African Republic, and to the cause of peace in the region, Deeply concerned at the activities of armed groups and other attacks in eastern Chad, the north-eastern Central African Republic and western Sudan which threaten the security of the civilian population, the conduct of humanitarian operations in those areas and the stability of those countries, and which result in serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, Reaffirming that any attempt at destabilization through violent means or seizing power by force is unacceptable, Recalling that the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic bear primary responsibility for ensuring the security of civilians in their territories, Reiterating its concern that the ongoing
violence in Darfur, eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic might further negatively affect the region, Recalling the Tripoli Agreement of 8 February 2006 and the other bilateral and multilateral agreements between the Governments of the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic, stressing that a proper settlement of the Darfur issue and an improvement of relations between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic will contribute to long-term peace and stability in the region, and welcoming the communiqué of the 70th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, concerning the relations between Chad and the Sudan, which was held on 12 and 13 February 2007, Reiterating its full support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and of the African Union to revive the peace process begun by the Darfur Peace Agreement, consolidate the ceasefire and reinforce the peacekeeping presence in Darfur, Reaffirming its resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, and 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, Reaffirming its resolution 1612 (2005) on children in armed conflict, taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Chad (S/2007/400) and the recommendations therein, and recalling the conclusions regarding Chad subsequently adopted by its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (S/AC.51/2007/16), Bearing in mind the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 and its additional protocol of 16 December 1966, Emphasizing the need to preserve the civilian nature of the refugee camps and internally displaced persons sites and to prevent any recruitment of individuals, including children, which might be carried out in or around the camps by armed groups, Welcoming the signing on 13 August 2007 in N'Djamena of the Political Agreement for the reinforcement of the democratic process in Chad, Having examined the report of the Secretary-General (S/2007/488) of 10 August 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the report of the Secretary-General”) and its recommendations for the deployment of an international presence in the regions of eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic indicated in paragraph 37 thereof (hereinafter referred to as “eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic”), Welcoming the readiness of the European Union, expressed at the meeting of the Council of the European Union held on
23 and 24 July 2007, to consider the establishment, for a 12-month duration, of an operation to support the United Nations presence in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, and taking note of the letter dated 17 September 2007 from the Secretary-General/High Representative of the Council of the European Union (S/2007/560, annex), Welcoming the letter from the authorities of Chad dated 11 September 2007 (S/2007/540) and the letter from the authorities of the Central African Republic dated 17 September 2007 (S/2007/551) approving the deployment of an international presence provided by the United Nations and the European Union, Determining that the situation in the region of the border between the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. Approves the establishment in Chad and the Central African Republic, in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 6 below and in consultation with the authorities of Chad and the Central African Republic, of a multidimensional presence intended to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by contributing to the protection of refugees, displaced persons and civilians in danger, by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic and by creating favourable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas;

2. Decides that the multidimensional presence shall include, for a period of one year, a United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (the acronym MINURCAT is to be used in all languages), with the following mandate in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, in liaison with the United Nations country team:

Security and protection of civilians
(a) To select, train, advise and facilitate support to elements of the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire referred to in paragraph 5;
(b) To liaise with the national army, the gendarmerie and police forces, the nomad national guard, the judicial authorities and prison officials in
Chad and the Central African Republic to contribute to the creation of a more secure environment;
(c) To liaise with the Chadian Government and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in support of their efforts to relocate refugee camps which are in close proximity to the border, and to provide to UNHCR, on availability and cost-reimbursable basis, logistical assistance for that purpose;
(d) To liaise closely with the Sudanese Government, the African Union, the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) which will succeed it, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), the Multinational Force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (FOMUC) and the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) to exchange information on emerging threats to humanitarian activities in the region;

Human rights and the rule of law
(e) To contribute to the monitoring and to the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to sexual and gender-based violence, and to recommend action to the competent authorities, with a view to fighting impunity;
(f) To support, within its capabilities, efforts aimed at strengthening the capacity of the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic and civil society through training in international human rights standards, and efforts to put an end to recruitment and use of children by armed groups;
(g) To assist the Governments of Chad and, notwithstanding the mandate of BONUCA, the Central African Republic in the promotion of the rule of law, including through support for an independent judiciary and a strengthened legal system, in close coordination with United Nations agencies;

3. Decides that MINURCAT shall include a maximum of 300 police and 50 military liaison officers and an appropriate number of civilian personnel;
4. Requests the Secretary-General and the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic to conclude status-of-forces agreements for MINURCAT as soon as possible, taking into account General Assembly resolution 59/47 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, General Assembly resolution 60/42 on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and General Assembly resolution 61/133 on the Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and the Protection of United Nations Personnel, and notes that the model status-of-forces agreement of 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally pending the conclusion of such an agreement with one or other of the countries;

5. Endorses the police concept referred to in the report of the Secretary-General, including the provisions regarding the establishment of the Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire (PTPH), which would be dedicated exclusively to maintaining law and order in refugee camps, sites with concentrations of internally displaced persons and key towns in neighbouring areas and to assisting in securing humanitarian activities in eastern Chad, and, in this regard, encourages the Government of Chad to establish the PTPH, emphasizes the urgent need to provide logistical and financial support to the PTPH and requests the Secretary-General to mobilize member States and institutional donors for this purpose;

6. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, (a) Authorizes the European Union to deploy, for a period of one year from the date that its initial operating capability is declared by the European Union in consultation with the Secretary-General, an operation (hereinafter referred to as “the European Union operation”) aimed at supporting the elements referred to in paragraphs 2 to 4, and decides that this operation shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operation in eastern Chad and the northeastern Central African Republic, to fulfil the following functions, in accordance with the arrangement to be concluded between the European Union and the United Nations, in liaison with the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic:
(i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;
(ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations;
(iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel;
(b) Authorizes the European Union operation, at the close of the period referred to in subparagraph a, to take all appropriate measures to achieve an orderly disengagement, by means including fulfilment of the functions indicated in subparagraph a, and within the limits of its residual capacity;

7. Invites the European Union, as may be required for the proper execution of the mandate of its operation, to take part in the liaison and support activities referred to in paragraphs 2 (b) to 2 (d);

8. Invites the European Union operation to immediately take all appropriate measures to prepare its full operational capability and requests the Secretary-General to coordinate closely with the European Union particularly with regard to those arrangements required to ensure appropriate protection for United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and ensure freedom of movement of United Nations staff;

9. Requests the European Union, the Secretary-General and the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic to cooperate closely throughout the period of deployment of the European Union operation, until its complete disengagement;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to it, after due consultations with the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic, six months from the date indicated in paragraph 6, subparagraph a, on the arrangements for following up the intended European Union operation which has been authorized for a one-year period, including a possible United Nations operation, depending on the developments in the
situation, and notes that, to that end, the United Nations and the European Union shall perform an evaluation of needs before the date in question;

11. *Invites* the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic and the European Union to conclude status-of-forces agreements as soon as possible for the operation referred to in paragraph 6;

12. *Requests* the European Union to report to the Security Council, in the middle and at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6, subparagraph a, above, on how its operation will fulfil its mandate;

13. *Calls upon* all the parties to cooperate fully in the deployment and operations of MINURCAT and the European Union operation, including by guaranteeing the security and freedom of movement of their personnel and associated personnel;

14. *Urges* all the Member States, particularly the States bordering Chad and the Central African Republic, to facilitate the delivery to Chad and the Central African Republic freely, without obstacles or delay of all personnel, equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, intended for MINURCAT and the European Union operation;

15. *Encourages* the respective Governments of the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic to ensure that their territories are not used to undermine the sovereignty of others and to cooperate actively with a view to implementing the Tripoli Agreement and other agreements aimed at ensuring security along their common borders;

16. *Encourages* the authorities and political stakeholders in Chad and the Central African Republic to pursue their efforts of national dialogue, with respect for the constitutional frameworks;

17. *Reaffirms* the obligation of all parties to implement fully the rules and principles of international humanitarian law, particularly those regarding the protection of humanitarian personnel, and furthermore
requests all the parties involved to provide humanitarian personnel with immediate, free and unimpeded access to all persons in need of assistance, in accordance with applicable international law;

18. Takes note of the measures already undertaken by the authorities of Chad to put an end to the recruitment and use of children by armed groups, encourages them to pursue their cooperation with United Nations bodies, particularly UNICEF, and calls on all the parties involved to ensure that children are protected;

19. Exhorts the donor community to redouble its efforts to address the humanitarian, reconstruction and development needs of Chad and the Central African Republic;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to keep it informed of the liaison arrangements set out in OP2-b to 2-d above, and to report regularly on the security and humanitarian situation, including movements of refugees and internally displaced persons, in eastern Chad, the northeastern Central African Republic and the region, of progress towards the objective of helping to create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons and of the implementation of the mandate of MINURCAT, and to submit to it a report on that matter every three months;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Map of the Region
# National Participation in EUFOR Tchad/RCA at Full Operational Capability (FOC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>OHQ</th>
<th>FHQ</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Forces Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>173</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>418</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>141</strong></td>
<td><strong>173</strong></td>
<td><strong>3314</strong></td>
<td><strong>3628</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Sweden participated with 120 troops in the early phase of the operation, but had largely withdrawn at FOC.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFV</td>
<td>Armored fighting vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Alliance Nationale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| ANR          | Alliance Nationale de la Résistance  
(Chadian rebel group) |
| ANS          | Agence Nationale de Sécurité |
| ANT          | Armée Nationale Tchadienne  
(Chadian National Army) |
| AoO          | Area of Operation |
| APC          | Armored personnel carrier |
| AU           | African Union |
| AUCON        | Austrian Contingent |
| BEAC         | Banque des États de l’Afrique Centrale  
(Central Bank of Central African States) |
| BF           | bridging force |
| C2           | Command and Control |
| CAB          | Central Africa Backbone Program |
| CAOG         | Chadian Armed Opposition Group |
| CAR          | Central African Republic |
| CASEVAC/MEDEVAC | Casualty evacuation/medical evacuation |
| CCPP         | Chad Cameroon Petroleum Development and  
Pipeline Project |
| CDR          | Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire |
| CG           | Command Group |
| CIMIC        | Civilian-Military Cooperation |
| CJTF         | Combined Joint Task Force |
| CMU          | Coordination Militaire Unifié  
(Chadian rebel alliance) |
| CNT          | Concorde Nationale Tchadienne  
(Chadian rebel group) |
| COE          | Contingent Owned Equipment |
| CONOPS       | Concept of Operations |
| CPA          | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| CPI          | Corruption Perceptions Index |
| CPT          | Core Planning Team |
| CSS          | Combat service support |
| DAMI         | Détachement d’Assistance Militaire et  
d’Instructions |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>Deputy Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGSSIE</td>
<td>Direction Générale de Sécurité des Services et des Institutions de l’État</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIS</td>
<td>Département Intégré de Sécurité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPET</td>
<td>Department of Policy, Evaluation and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EconOps</td>
<td>Economic Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EdA</td>
<td>Economat des Armées</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAN</td>
<td>Forces Armées du Nord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FANT</td>
<td>Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAS</td>
<td>Forces Armées et de Sécurité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAT</td>
<td>Forces Aériennes Tchadienne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCFA</td>
<td>Franc de la Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Force Generation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Force Generation Service</td>
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<td>FHG</td>
<td>Force Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operations Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FoF</td>
<td>Follow-on-Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPRN</td>
<td>Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Force requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROLINAT</td>
<td>Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSR</td>
<td>Front pour le Salut de la République</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUC</td>
<td>Front Uni pour le Changement, Chadian rebel group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUCD</td>
<td>Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique au Tchad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNNT</td>
<td>Garde Nationale et Nomade du Tchad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP</td>
<td>Guide to Operational Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operating Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Integrated Support System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTAM</td>
<td>Joint Technical Assessment Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANPADS</td>
<td>Man-Portable Air Defence System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDJT</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MN</td>
<td>Mouvement National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>Mouvement National pour le Redressement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNRD</td>
<td>Mouvement National pour la Réforme et le Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>meals ready to eat</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front</td>
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<td>NPRS</td>
<td>Chadian National Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>Office of Military Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPD</td>
<td>Operational Planning Design</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>Pre-deployment training</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDV</td>
<td>Pre-deployment visit</td>
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<td>PLCE</td>
<td>Personal load carrying equipment</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>PsyOps</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<td>RaFD</td>
<td>Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques</td>
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<td>RCA</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>RDL</td>
<td>Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et la Liberté</td>
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<td>RFC</td>
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<td>RMP</td>
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<td>RSG</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary General</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
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<td>SCUD</td>
<td>Socle pour le Changement, l'Unité et la Démocratie</td>
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<td>SLA/M</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Army/Movement</td>
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<td>Sudan Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>SMP</td>
<td>Staff Monitored Program</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>Troop contributing nations</td>
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<td>Troop-contributing nation</td>
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<td>TOA</td>
<td>Transfer of authority</td>
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<td>UDC</td>
<td>Union Démocratique pour le Changement</td>
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<td>Union des Forces pour le Changement et la Démocratie</td>
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The Authors

Gerald Aherne, BG, L.L.M, was Deputy Force Commander (DFC) for MINURCAT Force in Chad/CAR in 2009/10, and is Member of the EU/UN After Action Review (AAR) Group EUFOR/MINURCAT. He is currently studying for a Doctorate (Ph.D.) at National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUIM). Doctoral Thesis: “Costs Lie Where They Fall/Common Costs or Reimbursement. NATO/EU or the UN. Policy Influences on Irish Troop Deployments”. He joined the Irish Defence Forces in 1971. His oversea experiences include inter alia duties for the NATO as Brigade Staff Officer (Civil/Military Affairs) at the Multinational Brigade Centre (MNBC) KFOR in Kosovo 2003/04, as also his duty for the United Nations as Chief Operations Officer (COO) in Liberia – UNMIL Force 2007/08.


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