International Crisis Management: Squaring the Circle

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Preface

Ernst M. Felberbauer, Walter E. Feichtinger and Erwin A. Schmidl

‘Squaring the Circle’: this title encapsulates the various subjects covered in this book. As we all know, peace and stability operations have come a long way over the past two decades since the end of the ‘Cold War’. Expectations that this might be the ‘end of history’ and the beginning of a new, peaceful era were quickly thwarted. Instead, a multitude of new crises and new wars have led to an ever larger variety of peace support and crisis response operations, humanitarian interventions and stability operations. The increasing number of names for these missions, as well as their unclear definitions (one power’s ‘peace enforcement’ is another power’s ‘peace making’) are clear indications of the difficulties faced by the international community in post-Cold War crisis management.

A common element of these missions, however, is that dividing lines between military and civilian aspects are increasingly becoming blurred. There are two reasons for this. One is that security is increasingly being seen as an ‘encompassing’ feature, including civilian, police and military aspects. In recent years, ‘comprehensive approach’ has become a new catchphrase. This is a positive sign, because it means that more and more people on decision-making levels realize that the days of clear divisions between military and civilian tasks are over. When Western coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003, some senior officers were reported to have argued that ‘the military is doing war-fighting, not nation-building’ (or peace-keeping, for that matter). Since then, reality in Afghanistan and Iraq has shown that war-fighting and nation-building are intimately linked, and that long-term stability cannot be established in a short campaign. Indeed, many of the lessons derived from recent campaigns have taken us back to earlier (counter-) guerrilla and insurgency campaigns and have once again shown the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the people – as well as, one might add, of providing them with credible security in their daily lives and economic endeavours.
But there is a second reason why the dividing line between military and civilian tasks has become more and more blurred. Unlike the military, civilian and police structures lack the capacities and reserve structures necessary to provide suitable and experienced personnel for foreign operations on a significant scale. For a mid-career bureaucrat, it is usually a setback rather than an enhancement of a career to go overseas for one or two years. Few police organisations are able to send more than a handful of people abroad for any length of time. By contrast, the military organisations in most countries have either always been used to doing that, or have increasingly adopted military operations abroad as their new *raison d’être* after the end of the East-West conflict. Therefore, in many missions military personnel (often reserve officers with suitable and relevant civilian work experience) are tasked with what basically are non-military assignments.

The papers included in this volume deal with these very issues, examining them from various angles. They go back to a conference organised at the Austrian National Defence Academy in Vienna in October 2010 jointly by the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management and the Contemporary History Unit of the Institute for Strategy and Security Policy, in conjunction with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. The papers were revised by their authors, and two papers have been added which were not presented at the conference. Together, they provide an overview of current issues and ways adopted in different countries to deal with them. They are presented here in the hope of furthering our understanding and helping to improve our efficiency, but also our awareness, when dealing with contemporary conflict.

Unfortunately, one of the more impressive participants, Dr. Donna Winslow, died a few weeks after the conference. Therefore, we have decided to dedicate this book to her memory, and to include an older, but still very significant article she wrote a decade ago, as she was not able to finish her own paper from the October conference for print. We are very grateful to Professor Ho-Won Jeong of George Mason University for granting us the permission to do so.
Dedication

This volume is dedicated to the memory of

**Donna Jean Winslow**

(23 August 1954 – 6 November 2010)

This volume contains papers which were based on presentations during the symposium organized at the Austrian National Defence Academy in October 2010. Sadly, one of the most remarkable participants in this meeting is no longer with us: Dr. Donna Winslow, professor at the University of Ottawa and the *Vrije Universiteit* at Amsterdam before taking up her final appointment at the U.S. Army Logistics University in 2009, died a few weeks after the conference.

Donna Winslow was an award-winning anthropologist and sociologist. From her earlier research in Canada as well as in South-East Asia, the South Pacific and Central America, she moved on in 1995 to study a very peculiar ‘tribe’: the military. Following the incident in Somalia in 1993, where Canadian soldiers had tortured and killed a young Somali, she was invited to work as a technical advisor to the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, bringing her knowledge of cultures and social structures into the investigation. This resulted in an important study: *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-Cultural Inquiry* (Ottawa: Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 1997).

In the following years, she became one of the leading specialists in studying military-civilian relations and the problems resulting from a lack of cultural awareness on the part of the military. At the University of Ottawa, she directed the Programme for Research on Peace, Security and Society at the Centre on Governance in addition to co-ordinating the Military Officer Degree Programme.
She went on to conduct research in collaboration with the Department of National Defence on the role of military culture in the breakdown of discipline among Canadian Forces deployed to the former Yugoslavia. She conducted field research in-theatre with Canadian units in the former Yugoslavia and on the Golan Heights. She also united the military and academia in her private life, when she spent some years in the Netherlands, comparing Dutch and Canadian experience in peace operations. Later research on army culture was funded by the US Army Research Institute in Alexandria, Virginia, and she was involved in a major research project of the George C. Marshall Centre in Germany on the cultural complexities of peace operations. Her last endeavours concentrated on the development of a culture and foreign language strategy for the US Army and the latter’s 2010 Culture and Foreign Language Strategy. An important article, ‘Anthropology and Cultural Awareness for the Military’, was published in a volume edited by C. Leuprecht, J. Troy and D. Last (ed.), *Mission Critical: Smaller Democracies’ Role in Global Stability Operations* (Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010).

As her premature death prevented her from finishing her written contribution for this volume, we have decided to re-publish an earlier – but still highly pertinent – study: ‘Strange Bedfellows’, about the difficult relationship between the military and the civilian cultures, in particular the non-governmental organizations which have become such an important element in recent peace operations. We appreciate the cooperation of Professor Howon Jeong, who kindly allowed us to re-publish this article from the *International Journal of Peace Studies*.

May this volume serve as small tribute to her memory!
Introduction

Erwin A. Schmidl

Peace and stability operations have come a long way since the end of the ‘Cold War’. Hopes of eternal peace (and claims that the changes of 1989-90 represented the ‘end of history’) soon proved premature, as new conflicts broke out in the Middle East and in South East Europe in 1990 and 1991, whilst old conflicts continued to fester. Since 1989, the world has witnessed numerous wars in South East Europe, in Africa and in the Middle East, in addition to smaller conflicts in the Americas and various parts of Asia and Oceania. Some observers (usually blessed with scant memory or historical knowledge) have claimed that these represented ‘new wars’, forgetting that there was little new about these conflicts at all. One could even argue that international crisis management, freed from the specific circumstances and limitations of the East-West conflict, had now returned to cover the whole spectrum of conflict and interventions, as it had already done prior to 1914.

But the contributions assembled in this volume do not discuss these theoretical issues, interesting though they might be in their own right. Rather, the authors concentrate on very practical and relevant aspects of contemporary peace and stability operations. In October 2010, two elements of the Austrian National Defence Academy, the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management and the Contemporary History Unit of the Institute for Strategy and Security Policy, joined forces with the Geneva-based Centre for Security Policy, organizing a three-day symposium on current trends and challenges in international peace operations. Although the occasion was to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Austrian participation in these operations (which started by deploying a medical unit to the UN operation in the Congo in 1960), the organizers

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1 This operation is dealt with in detail in the study by Erwin A. Schmidl, Blaue Helme, Rotes Kreuz: Das österreichische UN-Sanitätskontingent im Kongo, 1960
decided not only to look back into history, but to look ahead, and discuss present and future challenges. Six of the papers presented at that conference, two additional papers as well as an earlier essay by Dr. Donna Winslow and a summary and ‘outlook’ by Ambassador Fred Tenner are now collected in this volume. A general disclaimer has to be made on behalf of all the authors as well as the editors. Hailing from eight different countries, they contributed to the conference and to this volume in their capacity as scholars, not as representatives of their respective governments or organizations. Nor does this volume aspire to represent the official viewpoint of the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports.

A major feature of both contemporary wars and peace operations is that soldiers are required to muster a number of ‘non-military’ competences (such as cultural awareness, listening and negotiating) in addition to their basic military and combat skills.Traditionally, the British are credited with long experience of fighting small-scale wars and (counter-) insurgencies, dating back to their days of ‘imperial policing’ in the colonies as well as more recent operations in Malaysia, Oman or Northern Ireland, and numerous peace operations, ranging from Cyprus to Sierra Leone. Therefore, the first paper, by Deborah Goodwin, deals with a ‘British Perspective’ towards ‘new approaches in modern conflict’. Drawing on her experience gained while preparing British soldiers for deployments to various peace and stabilization operations as well as on interviews made during and after these missions, she describes the importance (but also the practical possibility!) of teaching non-traditional skills to soldiers. In conflicts based on clashes of ideologies and cultures rather than traditional inter-state rivalries, ‘it is highly unlikely that resolution [of a conflict] can take place through armed reaction alone’. Therefore, ‘a determined effort to create links and dialogue throughout the life cycle of a conflict and its de-escalation’ is needed, however ‘irk-some and dangerous’ that might be, in order to achieve lasting solutions instead of short-term fixes (which in the long run might prove far more
costly anyway). To prepare soldiers for this, ‘as much vigour should be spent on these initiatives as on aggressive response’ in training, including negotiating, liaison and listening skills. An important issue is the communication between soldiers and non-military actors, including (foreign as well as local) non-governmental organizations or elements of the local administration of the host country. Not without reason, the present has been termed ‘the age of what might be called the soldier-diplomat’.

In his paper, David Hogan-Hern describes the relevant experience of a special organization created in the United Kingdom to deal with these issues: The ‘Stabilization Unit’, originally named ‘Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit’, which was set up in 2004 in response to lessons identified after the early days of the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. This unit is jointly owned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Department for International Development, and aims at providing civilian experience to British forces acting in post-conflict stabilization scenarios. One element is to prevent frictions between civilians and soldiers by involving both from the outset, and using civilian experts as a component of a joint military-civilian effort, rather than bringing them in as ‘outsiders’ who might be perceived as ‘intruders’ by the military.

An important element is also to institutionalize ‘the need to identify lessons and then share them widely and embed them in institutional memory’. A particular challenge is identifying and recruiting ‘the right civilians, with the necessary skills’, deploying them properly (and getting them back home safely) as well as training, debriefing and re-training them. In 2008, the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown proposed that ‘in the same way as we have military forces ready to respond to conflict, we must have civilian experts and professionals ready […] to help rebuild countries emerging from conflict’.

The third paper, symbolically entitled ‘strange bedfellows’, was authored by Donna Jean Winslow and is re-published here with the consent of Professor Ho-Won Jeong. We are very grateful for this, because the paper, although originally written a decade ago, is still highly relevant today. If anything, the sometimes difficult relations between mili-

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tary forces and non-governmental organizations in peace and stability operations are even more important now than they were ten years ago. In this study, Donna continued the work started by Judith Hicks Stiehm (Florida International University) in the mid-nineties, when she was working for the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington D.C. and at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, trying to overcome the traditional antagonisms and stereotypes held both by the military and civilian aid workers about one another. While many NGO members viewed soldiers as ‘boys with toys’, impatient, arrogant and excessively security conscious, many soldiers translated NGO as ‘non-guided organizations’, whose members were ‘children of the sixties’ or ‘flaky do-gooders’, unpunctual, obstructionist and anarchic. In the meantime, both soldiers and aid workers have realized to a larger extent how important good communications between them are for achieving the common goal. And many soldiers understand that the sooner they establish a secure environment both for foreign NGOs and for the local people, the sooner an exit date might come for them.

In 1998, Michael Williams noted that not only had soldiers to work alongside civilian aid workers, but they also increasingly had to take on ‘new and significant political roles’, being asked to broker deals, to shelter displaced persons, to protect human rights, to organize and monitor elections, and to support civilian reconstruction work. Donna Winslow, herself a trained anthropologist, continued to study current operations and the problems faced by both the military and by civilian personnel. Lately, she concentrated on cultural awareness and the importance of better preparing the military for operating in a foreign (and often alien) environment. After 2009, she worked for the U.S. Army’s Logistic University and was enthusiastic about being able to share her wide knowledge and experience. That was what she talked about in Vienna in October 2010, but her premature death prevented her from finalizing her article for this book.

Like Donna, but coming from a younger generation, Audrey Roberts is a cultural anthropologist who has worked for the U.S. military. In her paper, ‘Embedding with the Military in Eastern Afghanistan: The Role of Anthropologists in Peace & Stability Operations’, she describes the
development of the ‘Human Terrain System’. This project aims at uniting civilian and military capacities, conducting relevant socio-cultural research and analysis which is developed and maintained as a ‘socio-cultural knowledge base’ to provide better knowledge and understanding of local conditions to military commanders. In order to support Human Terrain Teams in theatre, a comprehensive structure has been developed, including ‘research reachback centres’ at home to allow direct communication between anthropologists in the field and the academic environment in the States. Audrey Roberts herself combines theoretical knowledge with field experience, having served with American forces in Afghanistan.

Needless to say, the very concept of ‘embedding’ anthropologists and other academics in the forces in the field has been severely criticized in some quarters, and it is beyond doubt that academics in the field are faced with special challenges regarding their professional ethos. Yet there appear to be few alternatives, in order to provide the military with a sound understanding of local conditions, which in turn is the best safeguard to avoid overreactions and prevent ‘collateral damage’, which often nullifies any tactical successes the military forces might have achieved.

One feature of modern wars appears obvious: Civil wars and internal conflicts last far longer, and require longer involvement by the international community than ‘traditional’ inter-state wars. In just a few years’ time, in 2014, the world will not only commemorate the centenary of the outbreak of World War One in 1914, and the 75th anniversary of the start of World War Two in 1939, but also half a century of UN forces’ presence in Cyprus (since 1964), and 15 years of international involvement in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, to cite just a few examples. Even now, conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have lasted far longer than either of the two world wars in the 20th century.

In past years, policy and military planners have often struggled with planning the stabilization measures needed once a conflict has ended. In their article, Katarina Ammitzbøll and Harry Blair deal with the necessary ‘first steps in post-conflict state-building’ and the challenge of
setting priorities when it comes to ‘state-building’. How should foreign powers and donors best act in order to enable a new (or re-established) state to become viable over time? In their article, they attempt to lay out the essential core functions a state must provide – including security as well as political, economic, administrative and judicial governance. To include economic issues among the most important ones is perhaps an (often ignored) key to stability. In their paper, Ammitzbøll and Blair suggest a ‘flexible template’ for prioritizing international support for these core functions over the first two or three years after the establishment of a United Nations mandate, i.e. at the very start of international involvement.

For a long time, discussions about peace and stability operations concentrated on possible lessons – ‘lessons identified’ and ‘lessons learned’ or, only too often, ‘lessons forgotten’ or ‘lessons ignored’. In due course, this led to the question of how best to record and preserve documents and experience, and how to adapt practices long established for conventional operations to the challenges of peace missions or counter-insurgency operations. There are four articles in this book dealing with various aspects of ensuring that lessons can indeed be ‘identified’, ‘learned’ in due course and put to use in the field.

In his paper ‘Preserving the Present as Past’, Professor Thomas R. Mockaitis writes about the role of military history in general and about historians in unconventional operations in particular. Military historians face the same challenges as their colleagues studying other areas of the past, but Tom Mockaitis also lists some of the problems unique to their discipline. His own experience from studying the international involvement in Kosovo well illustrates the points raised by other authors regarding the difficulties faced by different organizations working together in the field. In the course of his field research, he spoke to representatives from the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and several NGOs: ‘What emerged […] was a picture not of a unified mission, but of at least five missions, one from each brigade area with several submissions and little unity of effort.’
To quote Professor Mockaitis once more: ‘Historical research is the art of the possible. The most interesting historical questions have little value if there are no sources to answer them. Historians must make the best use of the available evidence to reconstruct and interpret the past. Often fragmentary and incomplete, the historical record requires the historian to exercise imagination while clearly distinguishing between undisputed fact and speculation “held tightly in check by the voices of the past”, to use a phrase coined by Natalie Zemon Davis. Historians’ works then become part of a body of literature, reviewed, disputed, and expanded upon by other historians.’

When Bianka J. Adams wrote about ‘The Role of U.S. Historians in Peace & Stability Operations’, she was able to draw not only upon her own experience in the U.S. Center for Military History and as a historian of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, but also from having been deployed to Iraq as command historian of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division when it was serving as the command and control element of the ‘Multi-National Division – Baghdad’ in 2009. Her article gives an excellent overview of the development of institutionalized military history in the U.S. Army in addition to describing current activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Her own experience made it easier for her to describe the strengths and weaknesses of the current system.

Using slightly different methods, the British have developed the collection of records in the field from the traditional ‘war diaries’ to the ‘operational records’ system. This is described by Bob Evans, the head of the ‘Collective Memory’ Branch (Army Historical Branch) in the UK Ministry of Defence. His paper deals with British Army operational records since 2003. In the wake of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, new systems had to be devised to deal with the mass of electronically stored data which forms the bulk of operational records these days. As Evans writes, ‘the digitization of headquarters has revolutionized the way that command and control is exercised and […] has significantly altered the nature and size of the army’s historical records. Almost all records are now electronic files, and a conservative estimate suggests that if they were printed on paper, then there would be at least one hundred times as much of it as what was generated in Iraq in 1991’. The ‘operational re-
cords’ system established in 2003-04 and overseen by the Historical Branch has so far generated and archived more than 5,000 monthly unit operational records. In addition, two civilian specialists from the Army Historical Branch accompany British headquarters at divisional and corps levels into the field, collecting data directly on hard disks. The original intention was to have two historians on duty in the headquarters staff: One historian was to collate key documents and compose a daily narrative from them, whilst the second historian attended all key meetings and briefings. In the evening, both historians would combine their information into the ‘narrative’ for that day, with key source documents archived as attachments. However, ‘the intensity of the operation and the scale of information that flowed around the headquarters were both far greater than had been foreseen’ and this process proved difficult to sustain.

Although at first viewed with some suspicion by certain military officers, historians have since established themselves well. In fact, command staff soon came to rely upon the historians when they required access to accurate information about events which had occurred a few days or weeks before. The historians’ ability to make documents available quickly from their operational records files undoubtedly assisted their assimilation into the headquarters and acceptance by its staff officers.

The experience of the British military historians in Afghanistan and Iraq was mirrored by their Dutch colleagues, as Richard J.A. van Gils describes in his paper: ‘Historians in Peace & Stability Operations: The Dutch Experience’. Although the Netherlands Army had a war diary system developed along similar lines to the American or British models, it, too, had eroded over the years of the ‘Cold War’, as the Dutch found out to their dismay when the question of reliable data keeping became important amidst the public discussions following the Srebrenica tragedy in 1995. In 1997, an officer was deployed as ‘record-keeper’ to Bosnia for the first time, and in 2002, when Dutch troops were first deployed to Afghanistan, they were accompanied by historians from the Netherlands Institute of Military History to keep a proper war diary, based on the
German system. Consequently, this system has been improved and has since proven its worth.

Like in Britain, the operational diarist was first regarded with some suspicion, ‘as a potential spy from the higher deck’, but soon commanders in the field recognized their true value. In 2007-10, diarists were deployed with the Dutch Task Force in the southern Afghan province of Uruzgan and the Regional Command South headquarters. Diarists are usually reserve officers who hold a degree in history. Their job is not an easy one, with working days usually starting at 7 a.m. and not ending before 9 or 10 p.m. When on leave (about mid-term during their tour of six months), they are replaced by historians from the Institute of Military History (who themselves usually hold reserve commissions), which ensures constant communication between war diarists in the field and their parent organization.

The final short article in this volume, ‘Where We Stand in 2011: Perspectives for the Future’, was written by Ambassador Fred Tanner. He gives a brief overview of the development of peace operations over the last fifty years, and analyzes ongoing challenges in international crisis management. Providing security might have priority over the democratization process and holding elections for the local population. ‘Peacekeeping’, ‘peace-building’ and ‘state-building’ have to go hand in hand, and have to be governed by a better conflict transition management. Coordination between the various agencies involved is crucial for success – a point also noted in the United Nations’ ‘New Partnership Agenda’ (Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping) of July 2009: ‘The success of future peace operations lies in a coherent approach by the international community, which recognizes the primacy of local actors and host states.’ Tanner also mentions current debates about the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ concept (R2P), going back to 2005, and outlines possible perspectives which crisis management will have to focus on in order to master the current problems.
New Approaches in Modern Conflict: A British Perspective

Deborah Goodwin

As a cultural anthropologist, Dr Donna Winslow entered a completely different world when she investigated conflict response, but soon found more than one parallel between the inner workings of the military and the tribal societies she had studied before. With this ethos in mind, this chapter has been shaped to reflect the complexity existing in modern conflict and the ways in which conflict practitioners seek to understand, influence and support the push for peace.

In a global environment that is obviously violently unpredictable, there has to be an imperative ruthlessly to conciliate and actively to intervene. We no longer live in a world dominated by interstate warfare, although the capacity still exists, of course, but rather where a clash of ideology and culture can be the root cause of many conflicts. In such situations, it is highly unlikely that resolution can take place through armed reaction alone, but that there must also be a determined effort to create links and dialogue throughout the life cycle of a conflict and its de-escalation, however irksome and dangerous these might be. As much vigour should be spent on these initiatives, as on aggressive response. However, traditional responses are limited in scope and viability and so, following Kofi Annan’s comment, ‘[they have] made us review our responsibilities and question our most basic assumptions about the very nature of war and the very high price of peace in the post-cold war era’.

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1 The views expressed here are those of the author alone, and do not represent the views of the Ministry of Defence or any other agency, organisation or individual. This chapter is an amalgamation of recent proposals and presentations made by the author, discussed and revealed in multiple environments.

2 Comment made by Dr Erwin A. Schmidl to author in 2010.

3 Address at University of California, Berkeley, 20 April 1988.
The Pool of Post-conflict Operatives

The reconstruction phase of a conflict naturally necessitates the involvement of many players in theatre as crisis response workers. Experience has also shown that it can be difficult to organise and focus such a diverse group, especially when there is no clear common strategic aim, or if that aim is not appropriate or viable for all operatives in theatre. Sometimes, for example, the polarity of views between military and non-governmental organisational actors can be marked and raises questions about the exact roles and objectives of these parties in theatre and the best ways to interact.

Evolving military doctrine encompasses an objective to play an active part in the post-conflict stage and not just to ‘defeat the enemy’ in a traditional sense. This has led to friction between the military, the police, and humanitarian workers in certain theatres of operations, since traditional areas of responsibility are becoming blurred and indistinct at times. At the very least, these frictions can result in misunderstandings or wounded pride, but at worst they can cause problems and issues for those who need to be helped. Save the Children cites a case in 2004 where the delivery of aid by the US-led coalition in Afghanistan’s Zabul province was accompanied by leaflets calling upon civilians to provide intelligence information or face losing the relief in future. Following protests from humanitarian agencies, the leaflets were withdrawn.

How might it be possible for post-conflict support workers, ranging from the military through to one man and a truck of donated supplies, to work together in a mutually cohesive manner? An initial, and rather simplistic, response is a change in mindset. Human nature is such that organisations can become extremely insular in both outlook and objective terms, and can lose the ability to see the ‘bigger picture’, preferring to focus on their own needs and concerns. Whilst this is understandable, and even effective, in non-conflict deployments, group cohesion and a concept of

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4 See the ‘Save the Children’ report ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan’ in 2004.
5 Ibid, 40.
‘common partnership’ will prove beneficial in the complicated environment of post-conflict reconstruction. Being tough on the problem, but not on the people, focuses attention on the essence of the dilemma to be ameliorated, even if it costs a degree of self-pride or forces interagency rivalry to take a back seat. Of course, every operative has an individual mission and motivation, but unless there is early recognition of the part that every player has to play in the greater ‘good’, then implicit frictions rapidly become explicit and necessarily destructive. Respect and trust that every organisation has its own area of expertise and understanding, which can be ‘pooled’ to inform and provide best practice in the field, is another essential insight. Any drive to act in theatre, rather than appraise judiciously (albeit briefly in crisis situations), can lead to poor communication, poor understanding, and poor responses lacking in coordination and effectiveness. This is regrettable when all parties are driven by the core motivation to help, rebuild and sustain.

A way to form a healthy post-conflict working environment is to use modern communications, as well as traditional meetings and negotiation, to discover who is in theatre (not always obvious or overt), who needs what, who will be the provider, and who will monitor, assess and make secure. Regular communications both at the ground level and at a wider operational level can help to maintain focus, provide mutually useful information about every agency and for every agency, and help to control the flood of requests and responses required. They also limit the ‘us and them’ factor, by enhancing understanding and recognising discreet areas of responsibility. The hosting and logistical requirements of arranging such communications in theatre can be decided upon in every specific deployment, with the main agencies perhaps alternating in taking the lead and initiative in information-sharing and communicating. To state what seems an obvious and constructive working environment initiative might appear simplistic, but in current circumstances parties jostling for position at the post-conflict stage might supersede any integrated response and reduce effectiveness for all agencies. Even better would be the formation of a ‘code of conduct and responsibility’ to aid all agencies in delineating response prior to active involvement in any post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. This ought to be formed at the strategic level, akin to the concept of writing a broad-based mandate for
agencies, would be non-context specific, but provide general guidelines for all parties once deployed. In essence, this would be an inter-agency charter that all would construct and devise and that would provide instructions on main responsibilities and roles. Once in theatre, then the fundamentals would already be established, but then allow for a flexibility of response and the delivery of context-specific initiatives. The elaboration of such a charter would take time and a high degree of effort to produce in the international arena, but could prove to be an effective tool on active operations.

Security

The deaths of five Medicins sans Frontières (MSF) workers in Afghanistan in June 2004 and the spate of hostage-taking of civilian construction workers and humanitarian workers elsewhere to date pose a significant threat to the ability to provide aid to the civil community. Unlike the military or police, these workers are not armed and do not have any real way to defend themselves and their missions, and the impact of such acts has resulted in the withdrawal of active involvement in on-going operations by organisations such as MSF, ‘Save the Children’ and the UN. The post-conflict reconstruction community faces a serious dilemma; if the tactic of targeting such ‘soft’ targets persists, then how might support to the home nation be best achieved, without the presence of vital agencies? One argument might be that, despite the dislike of the humanitarian agencies of military involvement in humanitarian work, in volatile circumstances the military might be the only agency able to provide effective short-term response. This is due to the fact that the military would have the capability to defend themselves as they are armed, and they can act in a more aggressive manner. Whilst a post-conflict dynamic remains inherently violent, but an imperative for human assistance exists, then military delivery of such appears the only option. NGOs stress that they do not want to arm themselves, and that they wish to remain distinct from the military on operations in order to carry out their own work in an effective manner. They tend to dislike the military becoming involved in any kind of humanitarian assistance. This is quite understandable, but in the dangerous working circumstances described, the elective departure of such organisations from theatre leaves a vacuum that has to be
filled by someone else, if people are to be helped. Often the only ‘someone else’ left is the military. Therefore, complaining that the military should not get involved in humanitarian work is not seeing ‘the bigger picture’ in this instance, i.e. getting help to the people who continue to suffer during episodes of violent response. If humanitarian agencies are forced to leave theatre due to a deplorable security threat to their operatives, then their remote guidance to the military in the continued provision of aid would be beneficial and supportive to those in need. In quieter post-conflict environments, such work should remain the main responsibility of humanitarian aid organisations; however, in volatile countries, where workers are placed at unnecessary extreme risk, the military has a capability to fulfil some of the aid responsibilities still required. Humanitarian workers have not been targeted just because they are believed to be allied to the military (it has already been stated that they seek to remain remote from the military on many occasions), but due to more fundamental antagonisms or monetary interests. In such circumstances, it is important for humanitarian organisations to ask themselves a question. Given that it is very sensible not to risk civilian aid workers in such situations, does it remain reasonable to dislike aid distribution and support being undertaken by another agency in a period of volatility and during the necessary absence of established aid agencies, in order for a degree of aid relief to be continued? This is a logistical and ethical dilemma for all parties involved, and one that still requires an adequate solution.

As Barbara Smith has commented:

*Peacekeeping forces will not protect aid workers, local authorities will not protect aid workers and, in some respects, the behavior [sic] of aid workers compromises their own protection. There is no security for them.*

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Dealing with Crises

When people, or nations, are in a state of crisis, there is an increase in general tension, and if the situation cannot be resolved, then tension rises still further. People can be overwhelmed by feelings of panic, anger or confusion. Caplan emphasises that it feels like ‘an obstacle to important life goals that is, for a time, insurmountable through the utilization of customary methods of problem-solving’. As difficult as it might be, this is the time to try to build links with those not only of like mind, but also with those with whom it is problematic to talk. A crisis necessitates the use of unusual problem-solving techniques, if it is prolonged.

Whether we are negotiating with an individual extremist, a nation-state, or at inter-agency meetings, the underlying motivations and drives remain the same. Each has interests, goals and aspirations, and mutual negotiation is an effective way of discovering these factors. The persistent use of force or armed aggression is not always effective, or revealing, concerning the discovery of the central dilemma.

If we were able, at this very moment, to witness the human interaction in many of the world’s current trouble spots, we would be struck by the drive to communicate, build links and foster relationships. First-hand experience of desperate human circumstances and the power of looking into another pair of eyes stir a core impulse to interact, to do one’s best, and to help if one can. The daily persistence of field workers from innumerable humanitarian agencies stems not only from altruistic goals, but also from the mechanics of endeavouring to foster effective working relations in theatre, with local dignitaries, decision-makers, and with those suffering. In a country where the infrastructure has been destroyed, an effective field operative seeks to re-discover social structures by talking to those who might be able to influence and assist. These people might be religious leaders, town mayors, or leaders of refugee groups. Remedies to problems can only be viable if communication is established with all those affected, and all take an active part in solving the

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common problem. One of the key ways of achieving this is through effective negotiations, planned and unplanned, which build confidence, knowledge and mutual co-operation.

But what about situations where there is an on-going conflict? Recent history has shown us that conventional warfare is relatively short-lived and that a key phase is the time following the cessation of formal hostilities. As in any human dilemma, the basic survival instincts of human-kind are the first to come to the fore (security, shelter, food), yet the formerly belligerent forces are often those remaining in charge. The last two decades have seen the growth of military peacekeeping forces providing both physical security and humanitarian support in theatre, often under UN mandates and international agreements. How do our soldiers respond to the demands we make upon them?

The troubled history of the Balkans has witnessed a number of approaches, ranging from the weak and uncertain mandate of UNPROFOR in the early 1990s to a new European initiative employed in December 2004. Out of very troubled times, seemingly culminating in the turmoil of Srebrenica, a modern expectation arose about the military. We had entered the age of what might be called the ‘soldier-diplomat’. In other words, we still expect our military to act as traditional warriors, should the case arise, but, almost simultaneously, actively to conciliate, liaise and co-operate with both the home nation and other in-theatre organisations. Many have been effective in this role. Recent events that have besmirched the role of the peacekeeper are unfair and unrepresentative of the thousands of peacekeepers around the world who have acted, and continue to act and behave, in a positive and humanitarian manner. Many nations have trained their military in negotiating and liaison skills for over a decade; of particular note in this respect are Canada, Norway, Sweden and Great Britain. It is important that the military continue to liaise with vital community leaders, to meet, to talk, to work out problems and to respect all viewpoints. Where this happens, significant confidence-building occurs, and the needs of distressed and displaced people can be addressed and remedied. Such work rarely makes international news headlines, however.
The Military and Training for Modern Operations

In light of the dilemmas discussed above, any pre-deployment training should be scenario-specific wherever possible and specific regarding the relevant rules of engagement (ROE), so that military actors appreciate the context and relevance of communication techniques and inter-agency co-operation in a particular operational area.

As Sun Tzu stated:

*Those who are skilled in executing a strategy,
Bend the strategy of others without conflict;
Uproot the fortifications of others without attacking;
Absorb the organisations of others without prolonged operations.*

As the following commentator states, a difficulty lies in the perceived transfer of theoretical training knowledge into practical real-world application:

*The difficult area in training was always going to be the less easily definable skills such as using interpreters, negotiation, dealing with the media…the armed drunk, the difficult soldier at a check point or trying to stop a firefight, skills which you could discuss and practise ad infinitum, but not really test until you were on the ground.*

The UN ‘Protection Force’ (UNPROFOR) in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-95 demonstrated the new operating procedures required by the serving soldier in such a difficult situation, many of which ran contrary to established military behaviour in a traditional war zone.

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9 Non-attributable comment by an Operation Grapple soldier.
These practices can be summarised as follows:

- **Protection** of NGO personnel and their supplies
- **Direct engagement**: the delivery of humanitarian supplies, rebuilding of infrastructure, *hearts and minds* work \(^{10}\)
- **Acting as mediators between warring factions**
- ** Establishment of safe areas**
- **Liaison and negotiation**: bodies, accommodation, movement

The watching world generally hopes that such peacekeeping missions will not merely freeze conflicts, but help to restore a stable peace as well. In a military sense, this requires the integration of the tactical and operational command levels to support the strategic aim of de-escalating violence and reconciling communities.\(^{11}\) Experience in operational areas such as Cyprus shows that appropriate techniques exist at the tactical level, where peacekeepers have used negotiation, go-between mediation, and conciliation to achieve objectives. Principled negotiation, consultation and problem-solving meetings are thus more progressive forms of conflict resolution, if the aim is to do more than just keep the belligerents apart physically. Dr Ken Eyre stressed this viewpoint in 1993:

*Given that the peacekeeping model is changing, it is fair to ask if the tasks that soldiers are now being required to do are still covered in training or general war, or if the changing face of peacekeeping now raises the imperative to train soldiers at all levels in skills that are beyond those needed to successfully prosecute combat operations. Based on experiences from the unstable environment during the Cyprus War in 1974, media reports from events in the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and Somalia and an informal survey conducted with several hundred*

\(^{10}\) A term coined by Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templar (1898-1979).

\(^{11}\) Compare the proceedings under UNPROFOR with specific guidelines given in Operation Restore Hope [Rwanda]: ‘In humanitarian operations ... [all] must be intimately involved in what the other is doing, and must make an extra effort to ensure that the other is appraised of every activity, meeting, encounter, and operation conducted by the other.’ [non-attributable, author’s summary].
troops who served in Sarajevo with the Canadian Contingent in UNPROFOR, the answer is tentatively ‘yes’.12

It is obvious that the word ‘tentatively’ now requires removal and should be replaced by ‘definitely’, so as to reflect the new world order and the multifunctional demands on the military.

In the early 1990s, the UN was forced to realise that the diversity of roles played by the troops in UNPROFOR was leading to a concomitant diversification in liaison and ‘on the ground’ duties and requirements. As a Canadian contingent stated:

_Negotiation techniques are critical for LOs, F Echelon leaders from patrol/section level and up, and key CSS personnel._13

Military units deployed to facilitate humanitarian aid had to negotiate on a case by case basis for freedom of movement to escort convoys and this often led to ‘linkage’ negotiations on other humanitarian issues and political problems that would be used as bargaining tools by, and with, local warlords. The following comment exemplifies this:

_Peacekeeping operations can contain elements of both small and large-scale confrontations which have to be dealt with during the de-escalating effort._14

In an attempt to remedy some of these dilemmas, the UN devised and distributed techniques and hints on negotiation to soldiers on the ground, reflecting the experiences and techniques arising from the ambiguous nature of UNPROFOR itself.15 The UN stressed that the soldier’s first

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13 12eRBC Mid-Tour Report, CANBAT 2, Roto 2, cited on website http://www.allc.com/website/english/products/dispatch/3-1/dis313ae.html LO is an abbreviation for Liaison Officer.
15 Reference: various non-attributable reports and comments.
responsibility remained the execution of the Mandate and, at every opportunity, to demonstrate an unwavering resolve in the face of belligerent forces.\footnote{UN Ref 77/4 B-77/4, Annex B, SOP 2/5/1, 23 May 1996.}

Working within such an environment, and using a skill that was unfamiliar at times, meant that there was a further perceived problem for the soldiers. Many of them felt inadequately trained in negotiating skills. Whilst the British had experience of working in Cyprus, many younger personnel did not, and most international units had no formal pre-deployment training package or doctrine at all. Many soldiers have stated that their experiences in Bosnia/Croatia indicated that individuals were either good negotiators or were not, and had little time to alter that fact for the better.\footnote{Verbal comments to the author.}

They were conscious that poorly handled negotiations could have serious ramifications beyond the immediate issue, and when cultural factors and pervading hostility were added, then issues and tempers could rapidly increase in intensity. A great deal of harm could be caused with very few words. Thus, a perception emerged that new skills were required of the soldiers, in addition to the traditional armed capability, and these so-called ‘soft-skills’ were assumed to be in their arsenal already. Shortly after the deployment of UNPROFOR, the UN staff attempted to review and illustrate the new skills that had been observed on the mission:
Where we are now

Awareness and resultant training initiatives have moved on since the days of UNPROFOR, albeit haphazardly on a global scale. This author, who has been involved in training peacekeepers and developing doctrine and training material since 1994, has noticed the welcome growth of international workshops, conferences, training courses and general awareness-raising of the issues inherent in the modern theatre of operations. However, context-specific training remains rather limited and needs to become more widespread, both geographically and organisationally. The demands on the military and other agencies are continuing to grow exponentially, and so must the support that they need to do the job effectively and cohesively.

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The British Army and Influence Ops\textsuperscript{19}

Working with field practitioners for many years induced me to consider how best to construct a succinct representation of some of the main factors at play in negotiation. This experience has also led me to conclude that the tenets of interest-based negotiation are valid for most practical applications, and are those upon which I base the majority of my instruction for field negotiators. However, for both instructional and for information retention, the concept of encouraging practitioners easily to visualise movement within dialogue, to explore the idea of building up one’s understanding through some proven strategies, and to help guide novice practitioners especially, was a powerful one. It is important to note, though, that many negotiation practitioners do not want complex argument or detailed theory to support their overarching work, but crave a series of easily memorized mental hooks that might aid analysis and option creation in the heat of battle, so to speak.

The notion of creating an Action Cycle of behaviour and response, at least in terms of illustrating the essentials of what might be going on in negotiation dialogue, is a device that appeals to practitioners especially. Practitioners rightly ask an academic or theorist ‘so what do I do?’, and want to know how to break down useful analysis and apply it in terms of behaviour, response and understanding in real-world terms.

So, the visual representation of an Action Cycle was devised. For the last few years it has been used and tested within multiple negotiation training environments and the feedback from field practitioners has been positive. What does it delineate?

The first stage linked to the expressed want (position) declaration is to prompt the practitioner that this position is informed by interests. If these are not explored (as the cycle goes on to show), then the dialogue might stay positional and necessarily antagonistic. However, it can be the case

\textsuperscript{19} Parts of this section are also discussed in publications by the USAF and the IMA (2011).
that it is up to the practitioner, rather than the other party, to start this movement in the dialogue, so that understanding can be achieved.

A delineation and explanation of what interests are can be delivered in any training and post–training. The practitioner has quick reference to these.

If you and I are negotiating, for example, then I will have ways in mind in which I can listen to your arguments and wants, understand what you value and care about, but then I will seek to alter the position you take by using influencers that will be attractive to you.

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20Copyright Goodwin 2009.
Each party has interests, goals and aspirations, and mutual negotiation can be an effective way of discovering these factors, when it has been chosen as the necessary response. The persistent use of force or competitive thinking is not always effective or revealing concerning the discovery of the central dilemma and drive.

**Interests** are what we care about, value or need. They can be explicit or implicit (such as feelings), overt or covert; but they define what makes us think, and how we behave and make decisions. They underlie the **expressed want, or position**, we take in a negotiation. If you can suss interests (and this includes your own), then you can shape ideas and options that will play to those interests and will be more effective than just bashing the other party.

If a guard at a checkpoint says, for example, ‘You can’t go through’, then that is his position, his expressed want. The Action Cycle reminds a practitioner to ask himself why he says this next. It might be because he has orders, or he is unsure what to do with you, is on his own, is aware of other soldiers around him and that they are watching what he is doing, is trying to carry out the wishes of a third party who is not there, wants to mess around with you, wants to delay you for some reason, is frightened of you, and so on. Through Active Listening (the next stage indicated on the Action Cycle) you should be able to start to identify what actually makes this man tick. Why has he taken this position? By delving into his interests (what he cares about, what he values, what he needs), it might be that we start to hear a powerful interest of, say, fear about the consequences of letting you through. In this case, you would need to provide suitable reassurance about his personal safety, save his face (as he is very unlikely openly to state that he is scared), build liking, trust, empathy and authority, and start to change his expressed position not to let you through.

Negotiation is essentially a conversation with a purpose. I maintain that it revolves around the strategies of listening, watching (the expressed want stage), thinking (identifying interests) and responding (Active Listening Skills and influencers), in turn. Deceptively simple as these responses seem, working from an informed position concerning one’s own
approach and that of others is more effective than pure intuitive reaction or pure advocacy. Competitive antagonism in negotiation is far less effective than enquiring and influencing.

Even expert negotiators apply tried and tested strategies to the way in which they influence and negotiate, supplemented with their experience of previous prototypical situations. Importantly, these strategies revolve around obtaining movement in the process without an overt sense of imposing a loss on the other and thus a sense of failure or belittlement. As Kahneman and Tversky (1979) stated: ‘Losses loom larger than gains.’

The third step in the Action Cycle centres on actively listening. A practitioner can be informed that becoming an effective negotiator does not imply that he has to be able to speak at length and verbally dominate any encounter, as a competitive party seeks to do. Far from it; expert negotiators aim to speak for only 10-20% of the time, if possible. It is difficult to achieve, but a proportion of 30-40% is realistic.

If we are speaking, then we are not listening; and listening provides us with masses of information about the other persons, their problems, their motivations, their needs and wants, their framing, their tactical response if the negotiation goes badly, and possible resolutions. It is very tempting to leap in to defend, counter-argue or challenge the other party in a negotiation. But if you are in a situation where your main aim is also to de-escalate tension as well as attempt to find a mutually agreeable solution, then active listening is your ally.

Active listening is based around a set of techniques which work in two ways. Firstly, they encourage the other party to keep talking to you (and it has already been said how much you can learn if they keep talking). But they also help to make you sound more engaged in what is going on, empathetic and in control, and they give you time to think. A competitive negotiator tends not to benefit from any of these useful products.
Active listening factors:

**Emotion Labelling**: a verbal statement of the emotions you hear

**Paraphrasing**: their meaning in your words

**Mirroring/Reflecting**: echoing single words or short phrases to make them explain more

**Summary**: a re-statement of the main points from time to time

**Open-Ended Questions**: What, Why, How, When…?

**Minimal Encouragers**, short follow-ons: ‘Ummm’ ‘I see.’ ‘Tell me more…’

**Effective Pauses**: use of silence to promote a response

**‘I’ Messages**: taking the blame on yourself and saving face: ‘I’ve misunderstood.’ ‘I am a bit slow on the uptake today, please would you explain further…?’

Emotion labelling taps into the human need to have others understand how we feel. Unexpressed feelings can fester and cause deeper problems to all concerned, so a quick response such as ‘I can hear that this is really worrying you, so what would you like to happen?’ is a useful mix of an emotional label and an open-ended question. This is likely to make the other party feel that you have listened and understood their personal emotion (i.e. worry) and are also keen to hear what they suggest without immediately imposing a solution.

A powerful example of how a potential zero-sum encounter was rescued by an active listener is an event that occurred between U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin during the Camp David talks of September 1978. After 13 hard days, it looked as if the talks were breaking down. Instead of threatening, Carter remembered
an earlier request made by Begin for signed photographs of the three leaders that he could give to his grandchildren. Carter personalised each picture with the name of a Begin grandchild and, during a stalemate, he handed the photos to Begin. Begin saw the names of the children on each photo and spoke each name out aloud, with mounting emotion. He and Carter then talked quietly about grandchildren and the prospect of war. This was a turning point in the negotiation, as the leaders (Begin, Carter and Egyptian President Anwar as-Sadat) signed the Camp David Accord later that day.

Helping the other party to know that you have understood their point and meaning is essential and, even if you have got it wrong, they will correct you and then you will be better informed. If you are trying to sustain a 30-40% verbal input in the negotiation, then using mirroring and reflecting, minimal encouragers and pauses just to nudge the person into saying more is a valid tactic. If you want to save their ‘face’, then the use of an ‘I’ message, where you take any blame, thus avoiding their embarrassment, is powerful. If they have spoken in an unclear way, for example, then saying something like ‘I’m sorry, but I didn’t catch that; could you explain it to me again?’ rather than ‘You aren’t speaking clearly and you are very hard to follow’ is more diplomatic and lessens the desire of the other party to self-justify. Staw (1976) argues that self-justification is the foundation for escalation in negotiation.

Watching

Within the third stage of the Action Cycle other useful elements to watch out for are the motivations of the other party and what seems to be influencing them in personal terms.

It can be argued that core human motivators can be described essentially as ABC: a sense of Achievement, Belonging and Control. Each of these factors underlies many of the behaviours and responses that people make in life, and are no different in a negotiation. If someone is preoccupied with a sense of achievement in a negotiation, then it is likely that they will seek to set overt goals and deadlines so that they can go away with a result; the pure zero-sum. We might also observe them acting in more of
a self-interested way because they want to be effective personally, rather than for a third party, and so they may well use ‘I’ a lot in the exchanges and want to publicise any agreement reached as quickly as possible. Strategies to employ with a party pre-occupied with achievement are open questions, paraphrasing, summary and using any deadlines set positively, i.e. shaping the time available to act co-operatively to agree on a mutually viable solution.

Belonging can affect negotiators immensely. They might not be negotiating for their own ends, but for those they represent. They want to personify their group needs and succeed for their group and so are unlikely to make any individualistic maverick decisions and to be quite cautious in their style. If they are not the ultimate decision–makers, they will be very reticent to make any agreements without talking to others outside the negotiation, and you will need to allow for frequent breaks in order for this to happen. A sense of belonging can also have a negative impact on the way in which a negotiator is perceived; you may be an outsider or alien to the group culture and ethos that they represent. In this case, you will need to build rapport and empathy through Active Listening Skills (ALS).

The negotiator who is swayed by a strong sense of control may seek to dominate the exchange. Control could be represented in two ways: personal power and fear of the unknown. Personal power issues are expressed in competitive behaviour in the negotiation; defensive and offensive statements are directed at you and what you represent, and you will hear plenty of phrases that start with ‘I want…’, ‘I need…’. ‘I’ messages could come in useful here, if you do not want to antagonise, as would an implicit recognition that there might be some conflicting emotions at play here. Are they behaving like this because they are fearful of the future, although they will never express this to you openly? Control issues are closely linked to perceptions of risk and biases that favour the status quo rather than change. The competitive negotiator necessarily rides rough-shod over core dilemmas such as these, and so misses opportunities.
Let us at this point recall the notion of the Rational Problem-Solving Space: this concept revolves around the ideas of: the comprehension space, the problem space, option generation and the decision-making space. This process can also be applied to work out the steps needed in an effective negotiation. For example: 1. What is the key issue in the negotiation? 2. What else is going on and affecting what is happening? 3. What are the likely options here? 4. Which options are the most viable and likely to succeed? These elements are akin to the stages depicted in the negotiation Action Cycle as well.

Influencing and responding are the fourth stage of the Action Cycle graphic. One might think that responding should now be the simplest part of the entire negotiation process, as we have been identifying and planning all the time and generating options internally. The competitive negotiator would tend to leap to this stage of the Action Cycle immediately and so fail rigorously to interrogate the information to hand, thus being more open to failure, or unsustainable outcomes.

Let us now focus on the nature of influence for a moment and how it can be both informative and proactive in responding and encouraging movement and why this is an important part of the Action Cycle.

The field of Social Sciences has engaged in the study of influence for the best part of fifty years and argues that there are many forms of influence per se. Social influence research evaluates the factors that cause attitudinal and behavioural change.\(^{21}\) Deutsch and Gerard (1958) claim that there are two types of influence: informational influence (where one seeks to change what the other believes) and normative influence (to affect the other and their relationship with you). Kipnis et al. (1980) identify seven tactics of influence: exchange and sanctions (for example, the other party could be offered something in return for compliance or threatened for non-compliance), reason and assertiveness (here, the

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other party could be given further detailed information about our argument, or forced to comply with our argument without clarification). The other three tactics are coalition (the alternative to coming to an agreement is damaging to the other), ingratiation (the other starts to like us), and higher authority (the power of status or an external decision-maker). I like to describe the last tactic as ‘the bigger boss syndrome’; where parties are affected and influenced by actors external to the dialogue.

People are often influenced by elements that transcend personal motivations, culture and overt recognition. Cialdini (1993) proposed that we are all subject to essential factors that influence the way we think and behave in general, and it is useful to be aware of these when we are negotiating.

Reciprocity is the notion of give and take. There is an implicit urge in us to respond to someone positively if they have given us something; we want to reciprocate. If you are invited to a colleague’s home for a meal, for example, you feel you should take a gift with you by way of thanks. If someone turns up empty–handed, we tend to think that person is mean or churlish. If you are able to give something that is fairly inconsequential to you early in a negotiation, then it is likely that the other party will want to reciprocate. You can also use reciprocity in negotiation if you want to slow things down; get a brew on, get cigarettes out (it is amazing
how many non-smoking operational field workers carry cigarettes) or share food.

Scarcity refers to the feeling of loss we experience if we sense that we might miss out on something. We hate it if others might profit from an opportunity that might pass us by. You can use scarcity in a variety of ways. You might, for example, refer to your actual presence in scarcity terms: ‘Look, I am only going to be here for the next couple of hours and I don’t know if the next guy will be willing to talk to you in the same way as me, so how about we sort this out?’ It is a take it or leave it approach.

We all tend to expect authority figures to know more, be trustworthy and worth listening to. Advertisers use this tactic all the time when they attempt to persuade us by showing us people in white coats endorsing their products, for example. So either your own authority or that of a bigger boss could be used in a negotiation. Moreover, the zero-sum negotiator might find a degree of comfort here. There is a psychological influence tactic known as the ‘Door in the Face’. Research on this phenomenon suggests that if an extreme offer is made early on and rejected, but without putting an end to the negotiation, that it is likely that a slightly amended offer or demand will be received more positively later on. What you must not do is persist with your extreme demand to make them lose, because you will lose, too, if a negotiation breaks down.

Liking influences us at a deep level, as Kipnis also argued. It revolves around both the ability to find the other party appealing in the sense of ‘being like me’ and thus part of my group, and also a more emotional response to each other. Witness Carter and Begin. We will all engage more with people we like and who we feel understand us. This is where Active Listening Skills once more come in useful as you try to build rapport and empathy. Moreover, it can be effective to humanise yourself in an exchange with another party; talking man to man, woman to woman, parent to parent and so on, as it can build empathy even more.

We are essentially herd animals, dislike being solitary, and seek to be members of our respective groups. Therefore, we are prey to the Social Proof effect. This is when we see how everyone else is behaving and
then are convinced that we must behave the same way: ‘If everyone else is doing it then I ought to be too’. Very few people in this world act in a totally individualistic way and seek to think and behave in ways that deviate completely from all human norms and values. You could use this impetus when you negotiate by saying, ‘...well, everyone else has signed up to this agreement and you are the only one who hasn’t. Is this the way you want it to be?’

Finally, there is the issue of commitment and consistency. If we put something in writing, if we give a public promise, if it is on the record, then we are unlikely to break that commitment. It is because you have given a public promise, and publicly set expectations. If you do not honour this, then you will feel failure, and then you will be back into face and status issues again. So, in negotiations, getting parties to write down an agreement and sign it, or publicly go on the record with their agreed actions is a strong influencer. It is harder for them to renege. All of this ties in with consistency issues also, because if you make promises and are seen to carry them out, then that will build trust and respect, and help you in long-term encounters.

Now the practitioner must evaluate how the process is moving on and whether the Cycle should be travelled again. It is always stressed that the Cycle might need to be explored several times, as some interests might have been missed, active listening has not been fully applied, or ineffective influencers attempted. It never guarantees success after one ‘rotation’; the arrows indicate continual movement as necessary.

Although some purists might baulk at the idea of simplifying what is necessarily a complex process into a four-stage graphic, the Action Cycle was devised as a suggested quick-reference tool for those whose primary focus in negotiation is not the study of fine nuances and formal theories, but who have to contrive personal and accessible strategies to practise this skill. If you are not convinced by interest-based negotiation, then the Action Cycle might appear unappealing, and that is understandable. However, whatever your own formal approach to negotiation, problem-solving and decision-making, the Action Cycle concept is proving to be a valuable tool for the field practitioner, whether she/he is in a
boardroom or on a battlefield. There are more complex versions of the Cycle that can be shared with practitioners as their experience and perceptions grow, and these subtler nuances can be explored and mapped. However, we would all agree that anything that assists those who are creating and sustaining dialogue in order to effect positive change in this complex, dangerous and uncertain world, has utility and purpose for those who need it.

‘Only time resolves conflicts, but time needs help.’
I.W. Zartman (1989, 273)

Further Reading:

Relevant Experience from the UK Stabilization Unit

David Hogan-Hern

This article is devoted to a specific, little known element of peace and stabilisation operations: the deployment of civilians into hostile environments in fragile and conflict-affected states. The United Kingdom's Stabilisation Unit, initially named the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, was set up in 2004 in response to lessons identified after the early days of the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Unit is jointly owned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Department for International Development.

Life would be a lot easier, although far less interesting, if all deployments were the same. At least then you would be in with a chance of predicting how a posting might develop, what might happen on the ground, and how the deployee might respond. But that will never be the case. The very nature of our work – focused on people with their human responses and fragile environments always in flux – makes any attempt at prediction futile.

For someone involved in managing and deploying civilians, there are two possible responses to this unpredictability. You could constantly fire-fight, responding to events as they occur. Or you could develop systems and processes that – even though never tailored to a specific scenario – should reduce the likelihood of something going wrong, or lessen the impact when it does.

The sub-title of this article is carefully chosen. This is just one organisation’s experience of deploying civilians into hostile environments in fragile and conflict-affected states. But it is worth highlighting that the detail comes from our experience, accrued in particular over the last couple of years, of establishing, managing, and deploying a civilian ca-
pability. It is practical, based on our real-world experience, the many lessons we have learnt, and the many lessons we are still learning.

The Stabilisation Unit, initially named the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, is jointly owned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Department for International Development. It was set up in response to lessons identified after the early days of our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Two key areas of focus for the Unit were the ability to plan more effectively across Government, involving both civilians and the military from the outset, and the need to identify lessons and then share them widely and embed them in institutional memory. A third element was the need to be able to get the right civilians, with the necessary skills, out the door, quickly and alongside the military, beyond the confines of embassies and protected compounds, to engage with the local population in the immediate aftermath of conflict or instability.

In 2008, the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown proposed that ‘in the same way as we have military forces ready to respond to conflict, we must have civilian experts and professionals ready […] to help rebuild countries emerging from conflict’. In response to this call, the Stabilisation Unit established the Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG), a pool of more than 1,000 people who are skilled, trained and willing to assist the British Government in addressing instability in fragile and conflict-affected states.

Members of the CSG, whether Stabilisation Advisers or Governance experts, specialists in Policing or the Rule of Law, Political Officers or Programme Managers, usually focus their work on building others’ capacity for self-governance, often by mentoring, liaising with, and training representatives of the host government. This approach supports local ownership; it develops local capacity; and it provides the basis for a more sustainable, longer-term solution.

By the time the CSG was formally launched in February 2010, it was already seen as ‘an essential part of our national security apparatus’. By November 2010, the Stabilisation Unit had 168 people – members of the CSG, staff from the Unit, and serving police officers – deployed around the world, from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, from supporting British embassies in eastern Africa to working in EU missions in Kosovo and Georgia.

A litany of the countries where our people are deployed, though, masks the complexity of both the environments and the tasks. Being based in Afghanistan, for instance, could mean working on development projects from the embassy in Kabul. But it could also mean working in Lashkar Gah, Helmand’s provincial capital, perhaps running a programme to distribute wheat seed as a viable alternative to poppy. Or it could mean being deployed to frontline Forward Operating Bases in remote districts with resonant names like Sangin, Nad-Ali or Musa Qala to work in the most austere conditions, supporting Afghan district governors in building schools, setting up health clinics, and revitalising markets.

As partners around the world, in both developed and developing countries, as well as in multilateral organisations, look to develop their own civilian capabilities, so more and more people come to us to ask about our experience of establishing the CSG and making our deployments work. Not least due to the dynamism and flux of operations, we are still learning ourselves; our approach is evolving all the time. But as a snapshot, I have tried to capture a dozen pointers on what we have learnt about how to establish, manage, and deploy a civilian capability.

**Establishing the Capability**

1. **Take your time to identify the roles and skill-sets required**

Think critically upfront about the kinds of skills that might be required, where and into what contexts and roles your people might be deployed, how many might be needed, and where they might be found. Once the

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2 Gordon Brown speaking at the launch of the CSG, 9 February 2010.
capability is established, it can be challenging to amend its focus, structure, and processes, so this work should, ideally, be carried out at the outset (although reality probably means you will end up trying to run at the same time as learning to walk). Remember, though, that establishing a capability is not a science, and whatever you create should remain organic: it will need to be refined iteratively to keep it flexible and responsive to evolving demand.

In practice this means (a) consulting widely with likely future clients across Government and, more broadly, for instance, with international organisations, to understand their current and likely future requirements, and (b) developing and agreeing role profiles and skills matrices that define the types of people to be recruited, preferably in line with the profiles and terminology used by those likely future clients. Where there is an overarching national security strategy, this should serve as the cornerstone.

2. **Introduce rigorous quality assurance from the outset to recruit the right people**

The complexity of the work your people will be doing means you cannot skimp on quality. The best people with the requisite skills and abilities need to be recruited from the outset. This means putting in place a robust recruitment process so that only people meeting a pre-determined standard qualify as members of the capability. Such a process enables confidence in the overall quality and credibility of the capability, including amongst potential clients. In practice, this means requiring all candidates to complete an application form (and not just submit CVs), sifting all the applications against pre-determined role profiles, and then interviewing the best candidates, normally in person.

This all happens for an applicant just to join the capability. There is still no guarantee of a deployment at this stage – something that must be made very clear to keep applicants’ expectations realistic: all members of the CSG are required to apply for specific posts and will be sifted and interviewed against each post’s terms of reference.
3. **Prioritise behavioural competences and inter-personal skills within the capability**

Experience has taught us that this is crucial. We have learnt that a deployment is more likely to fail on behavioural than on technical grounds. Whilst technical skills matter, work in the field has shown that the personal attributes of people deployed to complex and hostile environments and the way in which they approach their work are at least equally important. Travelling to work in a vehicle convoy or a helicopter might be the bread and butter of a soldier’s day, but for a civilian they can be alarming experiences. Living conditions can be uncomfortable, particularly in the most remote locations: four people to a room, or a shared tent; washing from a bag perforated with holes in the absence of a shower; living under the constant threat of enemy fire. And the pace can be relentless, driven by the tempo of military operations and events on the ground, beyond the control of any individual. These environments in particular call for people who excel at communicating with, and influencing, varied audiences. These environments require people who can work well in a team in the most stressful situations, but who are also self-sufficient. Flexibility and adaptability, innovation and resilience, are key attributes of successfully deployed personnel. In practice, this means ensuring that the recruitment process – in particular the interview – assesses people’s behavioural competences and interpersonal, as well as technical, skills.

4. **Keep a breadth of skills and experience within the capability**

One of the strengths of a capability is its diversity. Stabilisation environments are complex and constantly evolving, so the capability needs a sufficient breadth of skills and experience – and viewpoints – to keep it relevant. To achieve this broad range in the CSG, we use a combination of (1) civil servants, who come from over thirty different government departments and agencies and who understand the machinery of government and the political dimension, and (2) consultants from outside government. The latter, our Deployable Civilian Experts, are mostly from the private and voluntary sectors, and are lifelong experts in their specialist fields – from Security Sector Reform to Disarmament, Demo-
bilisation and Reintegration – and have significant experience on the ground. We also have access to (3) a pool of serving police officers who can deploy as policing advisers and trainers.

5. **Ensure your people are able to work with and alongside the military**

It remains likely that a significant proportion of the fragile, hostile, and conflict-affected environments into which we deploy our people will require close working with the military, whether our own, or that of the host nation, or that of the international community. It is therefore essential that the capability includes people who understand the military, their language and culture, their ways of working, and how to operate at the military pace. In practice, this means strengthening civil-military interoperability through joint training and exercising, whether in the classroom, on exercise or in pre-deployment preparation.

6. **Set up a ‘standby’ over ‘standing’ capability; and invest in preparation**

It is preferable to maintain a ‘standby’ capability, where people are paid when deployed, and not a ‘standing’ capability, where people are paid regardless of whether they are deployed or not. The standby approach has two main advantages: first, the ‘pay per use’ principle offers best value for money; second, it enables a larger number of people to be included in the capability than would be possible if you had to pay them full-time. Having a larger number of people to select from allows the capability to have breadth as well as depth, the diversity that is so essential.

The risks of the standby approach include the unavailability of people for deployment, particularly at short notice, as well as not being able to meet people’s expectations of deployment. We mitigate these risks by developing ‘talent pools’ of the most deployable people, putting them on exercises and pre-training and pre-clearing them, in short ‘warming them up’ for deployment.
Managing the Capability

7. Actively manage the capability to keep your people interested and engaged

A capability is more than just a database or telephone directory. It is a network or community of civilian experts with skills and experience relevant to stabilisation. To be effective, the capability – which is, after all, human – should be kept enthused and engaged, to prevent its members losing interest. This has been a challenge for us, not least with a pool of over 1,000 people and in a resource-constrained environment.

In practice, it has meant: providing every member of the capability with a point of contact within the Stabilisation Unit whom they can approach with questions or for advice; identifying high-quality but low-cost training opportunities to keep CSG members committed, including holding seminars in which returning CSG deployees showcase their experiences; and creating a private, password-protected web portal where members of the capability can access job opportunities, blogs, photographs and other relevant material electronically.

8. Keep educating, training and preparing your people in order constantly to develop the quality of the capability

In addition to improving civil-military interoperability through training courses and exercises, it is essential to keep educating, training and preparing the capability more broadly so that members will be able to respond effectively to complex and evolving stabilisation challenges. Inevitably, not everyone receiving our training will go on deployment, but efforts should be made to correlate those being trained with those likely to be deployed: we do this by, for instance, prioritising core training for those members with skills in high demand. For us, in practice this means putting CSG members on classroom-based courses that give them an overview of the UK’s understanding and practice of stabilisation, as well as scenario-based training courses that prepare them for potential deployment and enhance their ability to cope in the event they are confronted with similar situations in reality. And in any case, strong rosters
like the CSG also contribute to a stronger global civilian capability for use by the UN, NATO, and the EU, amongst others. We advertise posts in these multilateral organisations around the CSG, and work with them on joint training, to further our rosters’ interoperability.

9. **Advertise posts widely and transparently. Follow the recruitment process**

Resist the temptation to pick someone for a deployment just because they have worked for you before. We have found that advertising all posts across the entire capability is the most successful approach for three main reasons: first, experience has shown that open competition is the most efficient and effective way of identifying the most suitably qualified (and willing and available) candidate for the job. Second, it promotes transparency and commitment to a merit-based recruitment process. Third, it provides capability members with an indication of the current demand of skill-sets, thereby helping to shape their expectations of possible deployment.

In practice, this means: helping the client design clear, realistic terms of reference with a reasonable balance of ‘essential’ and ‘desirable’ criteria, aligned to the sorts of skills the capability holds; maintaining an open and fair application and recruitment process so that CSG members can themselves decide to apply according to their willingness, availability, suitability and whether they meet the selection criteria; and adhering to the application and recruitment process - even in ‘urgent’ situations. Our experience tells us that a short deadline, a truncated application form, and a speedy sift and interview can mean that identification of a requirement and deployment of an individual can happen within days of each other.
Deploying the Capability

10. **Recognise the impact of operating in hostile and insecure environments: actively manage people’s performance on deployment**

It is not the risks and dangers inherent in operating in hostile environments that most affect an individual’s performance. Rather, it is the issues commonplace to a normal working environment - whether poor communications within the team, unclear objectives, or uncertainty over line management chains. It is critical to recognise and understand that a hostile and insecure environment magnifies the impact of these – usually manageable – issues. Extreme circumstances can bring out extreme behaviours; and so active performance management is all the more important.

In practice, this means taking the time in-country to set up and manage a performance framework, including making the effort to set objectives, monitor staff achievements or shortcomings, and hold regular performance discussions. There will be significant push-back from line managers in theatre, who are ‘too busy’ for performance management. But having to deal with underperformance because someone does not understand their role, or having to manage someone suffering from stress, or having to re-run a recruitment campaign or bear a gapped post because someone leaves early, will be much more painful.

We also insist on full performance appraisals at the end of a deployment. This serves a number of purposes. For the individual, it helps to identify their strengths and areas for development. For the home department or employer, it recognises the individual’s achievements and the areas requiring development that can be taken into account across the individual’s career. Finally, for those managing the capability, it helps them take account of past performance for future deployments, as a useful indicator of likely future success.
11. **Provide ongoing support to those deployed**

Deploying personnel to hostile and insecure environments – sometimes alone to a remote location – requires extensive support. Experience has taught us that civilians have not always been thoroughly briefed, prepared and equipped for deployment, so we have created a clear and common structure for the deployment of all our civilians.

In practice, this covers a gamut of activities: organising theatre-, culture- and language-specific briefings, training and preparation before the individual deployments; facilitating medical check-ups, vaccinations and psychological assessments before, during and after deployments; providing the right kit to do the job – from body armour to laptop to satellite telephone; agreeing appropriate Duty of Care, security, welfare and allowance arrangements to protect and support those deployed; and providing a reach-back facility into the Unit: a 24/7 duty officer on call in case of emergency; access to specialist expertise on the delivery of stabilisation on the ground; and a full post-deployment debriefing so that we can draw lessons and continually improve our processes.

12. **Understand and respond to clients’ current demands. Try to predict future demands**

Clients’ demands are never static. Given the evolving nature of the challenges faced in stabilisation environments and the lead time required to develop new areas of capability, we always try to keep one eye focused on future demand in order to be able to respond to it if – and when – it arises. While it is impossible to foresee every requirement (for instance, the request to provide French-speaking prison experts in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake), the breadth, depth and quality of the capability should ensure that the majority of demands are met.

In practice, this means monitoring how the capability is being used now, and how requirements of current and potential clients are developing, and keeping the capability flexible and adaptable so that it can be refined incrementally to meet emerging demand. In response to a growing num-
ber of requests in one area, for example, we have recently created a new role profile for community engagement advisers.

The question of how to predict demand seems a good point at which to look ahead to what the future holds for civilian capabilities. In the UK, the recently-published Strategic Defence and Security Review undertook to ‘expand the remit of the joint Stabilisation Unit so that it can draw on our 1,000-strong pool of civilian experts from across the public, private and voluntary sectors to help prevent conflict and instability as well as support the UK’s response to crises when they occur’.  

The new Government’s support for what we do, and indeed this expansion of our remit, could be traced back to 2008, when David Cameron, then Leader of the Opposition and now Prime Minister, stated clearly: ‘We welcome the idea, which we have long supported, of a stand-by civilian capacity so that we can act quickly in fragile or failing states.’

So there is a consensus across UK political parties for what we are doing. But that does not mean we can stagnate: the scenarios in which present and future governments, whether in the UK or around the world, may call for a civilian response are far from static.

The following are just some examples of what the future might hold in store, and some of the questions they entail:

- ‘Upstream’ conflict prevention as well as ‘downstream’ crisis response: we all recognise the value of the former, cheaper than the latter both in terms of blood and treasure. But what new skills do we need to develop to meet this need? How do we identify and respond to early warning signals? How do we maintain a focus on ‘downstream’ Afghanistan, while getting involved ‘upstream’ elsewhere?
- An evolution from the ‘comprehensive approach’ to the ‘integrated approach’: how do we integrate the various strands of activity – de-

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fence, diplomacy, development, and wider – from the very outset? How do we facilitate the creation of a common objective and a single plan with which all players across the international community can agree? How can we deliver truly bespoke responses to a problem when everyone wants to get involved?

- Interoperability with partners on the ground: how do we promote transparency about who is doing what and where? How can we get people working and training together who come from different geographical locations? How do we overcome the obstacles of differing communications, logistical and security requirements? And how do we bring together differing national comparative advantages, national interests and niche capabilities?

- Building a global civilian capability: how do we help others develop their own civilian capabilities? Should we be focusing on national, regional or sub-regional levels? How can we enhance the international political will to deploy as well as train, to share the burden of civilian engagement?

- Multilateralism: how do we dock into the UN’s work on accessing civilians for deployment and support them in taking it forward? How will the EU and NATO civilian rosters be used, and where? And how can the AU develop the civilian dimension of its African Standby Force?

I started this article talking about the unpredictability of deployments and events; and, as I have tried to outline what the future might look like, it seems still littered with unanswered questions. Life will not be getting any easier.
Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian

Donna Winslow

1. Introduction

This article intends to examine some of the tensions that can arise between civilian relief workers and military personnel in peace operations. The context is the qualitative change that has taken place in the post-Cold War period concerning the types of peace operations that military personnel and humanitarian workers are asked to participate in. Armies no longer merely protect national sovereignty and that of allies. They intervene more and more in intrastate conflicts. Military mandates are broader and more ambiguous, and assignments more multi-dimensional and multi-functional. In addition, the military is often tasked with facilitating humanitarian relief, social reconstruction and protecting civilians in areas where there is no peace. According to Williams (1998:14), ‘the military have taken on new and significant political roles’. They are now asked to broker deals, shelter the displaced, protect human rights, supervise the return of refugees, organize and monitor elections, and support civilian reconstruction. This takes them into the domain of civilian relief organizations.

There are also larger numbers of civilian relief workers in peace operations also performing a wide variety of tasks such as food delivery,

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1 This article was first published in the International Journal of Peace Studies, volume 6, no. 2 (2001) and is reproduced here with the kind consent of Professor Dr. Howon Jeong, the editor, to whom we extend our thanks. With the exception of harmonizing the quotations, some additional explanations of acronyms and the occasional change from the present to the past tense, this article is published here as it was, as a tribute to the work undertaken so enthusiastically by Donna Winslow to improve the understanding between civilians and the military in peace and other operations.
monitoring elections and human rights, managing refugee camps, distributing medical supplies and services, etc. They can belong to any number of organizations with varying budgets, tasks, goals, competence, types of personnel, etc., which can make liaisons between them and the military difficult at times (Last, 1998: 162). In peace operations, one can now find the large International Organizations (IOs) such as the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) as well as the well-known international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as CARE, OXFAM, Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) and the ICRC (International Committee for the Red Cross). There are also larger numbers of smaller NGOs in areas of conflict in the post-Cold War period. In 1989, for example, 48 international NGOs were registered with the United Nations (UN).

By 1998, there were 1,500 (Simmons, 1998: 75-76). These NGOs may be religious or secular, may include personnel from one nation or several, may be truly non-governmental or may in fact receive large sums from government grants. Finally, a peace operation may also have small groups with humanitarian interests running around doing any variety of things from distributing old prescription glasses to trying to set up dental clinics. According to one Canadian sergeant, ‘a problem that confronts peacekeepers who must deal with NGOs is the wide range of competence they demonstrate. Fortunately, some are highly effective, while others are simply useless. Many small agencies may be very well-connected to the local situation, yet lack the administrative capacity to manage the money donated to them. Other groups simply lack the ability to co-ordinate their actions with outside organizations. The impressions formed by peacekeepers who have seen some of the less competent agencies, unfortunately, may colour their perception of the whole spectrum of humanitarian aid organizations’ (Pollick, 2000: 59).

Traditionally, interactions between the military and humanitarian workers were characterized by avoidance or antagonism. Each group held (and sometimes continues to hold) stereotypes about the other. According to some US analysts, American military personnel are described by some NGOs as ‘boys with toys’: rigid; authoritarian; conservative; impa-
tient; arrogant; civilian phobic, homophobic; excessively security conscious; etc. (Stiehm, 1998: 30; Dearfield, 1998: 4; Bruno, 1999: 10). By contrast, one of the battalion commanders I interviewed referred to NGOs as ‘non-guided organizations’, and other authors note the following comments: ‘Children of the sixties’; flaky do-gooders; permissive; unpunctual; obstructionist; anarchic; undisciplined; self-righteous; anti-military; etc. (Stiehm, 1998: 30; Dworken, 1993: 38). According to Williams (1998: 39), humanitarian organizations form the nucleus of an international civil society whose esprit de corps distrusts national military structures.

Laura Miller (1999: 181-198) tells us that aid workers’ antimilitary attitude stems from the origins of their organizations. Many were established to alleviate suffering caused by war (e.g. the ICRC) or to provide an alternative to military service (e.g. The American Friends Service Committee). In peace operations, soldiers may find it morally acceptable to participate in humanitarian actions, however, it is highly unlikely that humanitarian workers would ever find it acceptable to take part in military actions. Pamela Aall has made the following comment on the NGO-military relationship: ‘Traditionally, NGOs and the military have perceived their roles to be distinctly different and separate. NGOs have felt uneasy with military forces, either from their own countries or from the country receiving assistance, particularly when the latter are employed in the service of dictators with unsavoury human rights records. Military leaders, on the other hand, tend to regard NGOs as undisciplined and their operations as unco-ordinated and disjointed.’ (Aall, 1996: 440)

In the 1990s, the nature of international conflict meant that relief workers increasingly found their lives and their work at risk. Relief workers in Rwanda and Chechnya were deliberately targeted and killed in 1997. In Burundi and the Sudan, NGOs were expelled and workers killed because they had become witnesses to local atrocities. In other countries, workers have been victims of land mines, armed hijackings of vehicles, banditry, kidnapping, bombings, etc. A Canadian Defence Ministry official noted that some NGO workers had more battlefield experience than most Canadian Forces personnel (cited in Williams, 1998: 41).
Due to these tragic events and the deterioration of field situations, aid workers began to conclude that they needed weapons on their side in order to fulfill their mandates. In Somalia, for example, the ICRC suspended its normally irrevocable principle of avoiding co-operation with military forces in its relief operation in order to protect its relief convoys. The chaos in Somalia became so bad and the negotiating position of humanitarian agencies so tenuous that military force became the only viable alternative (Natsios, 1997: 354).

But even security arrangements can prove to be a contentious issue. David Owen (1995: 208) found the military in Bosnia ‘bitter in their denunciation of some of the NGOs who to them were a pestilent nuisance, resisting all attempts at co-ordination and then complaining that they were not properly protected’. A Canadian officer I interviewed in Bosnia was equally cynical concerning NGOs, saying that the NGOs wanted nothing to do with the military until there was a perceived security threat, and then they started showing up to make sure that they could be evacuated or protected by the military. However, working with the military can be problematic for some NGOs. The Independent Commission on Kosovo has described the NGO dilemma as follows: ‘The central humanitarian mission of protecting civilian life and safety is precisely what is under siege in military engagement. How can humanitarian organizations develop closer and more continuous working relationships with military organizations without compromising their mission?’ (International Commission on Kosovo, 2000: 208).

Until recently, when civilian relief workers and military personnel have both been involved in ‘traditional’ peace operations, they performed their tasks separately. There was thus little functional need for co-operation between these groups. As the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, General Maurice Baril (1997: 119) has remarked: ‘Humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations seemed to be in every area of conflict but remained independent and reluctant to modify their approach and agree to co-ordinate their efforts with the military force’. Moreover, some of the tasks assigned to the military (for example delivering relief supplies) are no longer distinct from humanitarian work. Thus, the military is expected to work not only alongside, but also in co-
operation with NGOs and other relief organizations. In these circum-
stances, an effective interface for civil-military co-operation becomes vital.

In order to promote civil-military co-operation, it is important to under-
stand some of the difficulties that can arise in peace operations between
the members of these communities. In this article, I will explore some of
the tensions that can emerge between the military and relief agencies. I
have identified five possible points of tension to be found in peace op-
erations, which I have termed a ‘cultural interoperability model’. These
points of tension are related to organizational differences in terms of:

1. organizational structure and culture,
2. tasks and ways of accomplishing them,
3. definitions of success and time frames,
4. abilities to exert influence and control information,
5. control of resources.

In addition to documentary sources, particularly the work of US sociolo-
gists Laura Miller and Charles Moskos, research for this paper was car-
rried out in the archives of the Canadian Department of National Defence
Headquarters. During the crisis in the Great Lakes region of Central Af-
rica, Canada attempted to lead the formation of a multinational coalition.
The crisis resolved itself before the coalition could actually be deployed,
but a number of important lessons were learned from this effort (Ap-
pathurai and Lysyshyn, 1997). Information also came from unstructured
interviews and focus groups carried out with Canadian soldiers in Bosnia
(October 1998) and on the Golan Heights (February 1999). In addition to
interviews with Canadian military personnel, I have also conducted a
few interviews at NATO headquarters and with European battalion
commanders who were deployed to the former Yugoslavia. I have also
consulted with members of large international relief agencies such as the
UNHCR and the ICRC, but have little interview data from the smaller
NGOs which do not have contact with the military in an area of opera-
tions. This is an area for future research.
2. Organizational Structure and Culture

At a speech on civil-military partnerships in humanitarian intervention held in Toronto, Canada in the autumn of 1999, Lieutenant-Colonel D. D. McAlea described obstacles to fostering CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation): ‘Number one: NGOs just don’t trust the military; they’re suspicious of military. Number two: they jealously guard their independence. NGOs have to be careful not to compromise their objectivity because they could lose their funding. […] There are suspicions on both sides because they have different cultures’ (cited in Ross, 2000: 2).

In this paper, tension in organizational structure and culture refers to differences in organizational goals (including values and basic assumptions), organizational composition (gender, age, ethnicity), and actual organizational structure. Dandeker and Gow (2000: 59) have said that ‘culture comprises a set of ideas, beliefs and symbols that provide a definition of the world for a group or organization and guides its action’. NGOs and the military are often seen as being at odds with each other concerning the basic goals that guide their action (alleviating human suffering vs. preparing for war) approaches to violence (non-violence vs. controlled use of force), their approach to nationalism (internationalist vs. strongly nationalistic) and decision-making styles (decentralized vs. hierarchical).

The military’s primary mission is still fighting and winning wars and in a theatre of operations they continue to work on these skills. When I was in Bosnia, for example, I was able to observe a Canadian live fire exercise. For some NGO members, it is hard to work with the military because it is hard to forget their fundamental purpose. As one NGO member who had worked with the Canadian military on a peacekeeping training exercise remarked, ‘they seem like nice people, both the civilian and military people mixed, but I think of military people training in acts of war […]’ (cited in Miller, 1999: 191). Some soldiers feel that participating in peace operations dulls their warrior’s edge. These soldiers and officers do not believe in their role as ‘global street workers’. Peace operations are considered inappropriate for combat soldiers. As a Canadian soldier said to me in Bosnia, ‘this is not what we trained for, which was
green’ – as opposed to the blue symbols of peacekeeping. Similarly, Canadian politicians have been criticized for trying to make the military into NGOs in uniform. On the other hand, many soldiers and officers acknowledge that their presence in a peace operation makes a difference. As one non-commissioned officer (NCO) in Bosnia remarked, referring to the different international peace forces there, 2 ‘in UNPROFOR – they were shooting at us and children were throwing rocks at us. In IFOR – we were taking the guns away from the big guys. In SFOR – we see people coming back, children are waving at us’.

Miller’s work shows that, in spite of the perceived benefits and a shift towards support of armed intervention in the regions where they work, relief workers remain essentially anti-military. An anti-military and anti-weapons bias persists in relief organizations because militarization and violence are still the primary causes of much of the suffering that these agencies attempt to relieve. The crises in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia were all caused by clan or ethnic warfare. The human rights abuses in Haiti were the result of a military coup and a brutal dictatorship. NGOs accepted weapons as a necessary evil for reaching their goals when other methods could no longer provide a safe environment (Miller, 1999: 191).

Some differences between the two groups concern motivation. Soldiers and officers participate in a peace operation because it is their job. They stay for their tour of duty and do what they are ordered to do. In one Canadian study on ethics (National Defence Headquarters, 1999), the extra money earned was also a strong incentive for participating in peace operations. ‘I have been on many tours, I do it for the money. I don’t believe in peace, in helping people who don’t want to help themselves.’ The Ethics Report goes on to say that: ‘The often articulated motivator of extra dollars as the prime consideration for volunteering complicates the decision-making process in high-intensity ethical situations. The comment dollars are the number one motivation, rather than duty was not uncommon’ (National Defence Headquarters, 1999: 2-13). By con-

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2 These were the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR, 1992-95), the NATO-led ‘robust’ Peace Implementation Force (IFOR, 1995-96), and the subsequent smaller NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR, 1996-2004). In 2004, SFOR was replaced by the EU-led EUFOR ‘Althea’. 

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trast, relief workers volunteer for hardship, often making many personal sacrifices in order to pursue altruistic goals.

NGO executives, who operate with much less individual security and often with fewer amenities than soldiers, are personally involved in the mission, and are committed for the long term to addressing whatever needs may arise. They are where they are by choice, and are devoted to their vocation. Many of them find it difficult to believe that soldiers might be truly committed to the same goals as they are (National Defence Headquarters, 1999: 13).

In Miller’s study (1999: 193-194), relief workers expressed the view that soldiers were there simply because they were ordered to be there. This, in turn, led some relief workers to feel morally superior to soldiers. ‘In a number of interviews, distrust of the military was translated into comments suggesting that the US military or individual soldiers help out only because they are ordered to do so or have self-interested reasons for doing so.’

Differences in organizational structure can affect the way groups interact. What is the hierarchy in the organization? How are decisions taken? Organizations such as NGOs tend to have a more flattened hierarchy with decentralized decision-making. When one American colonel in Bosnia referred to NGOs as ‘one general and many privates’, the response of an NGO executive was ‘How about one general and many colonels?’ (cited in Moskos, 2000: 36). According to Colonel Bob Stewart, the commander of the first British deployment to Bosnia in 1992: ‘The military are hierarchical, authoritarian, centralized, large and robust, while UNHCR is flat, consensus-based with highly decentralized field offices’ (cited in Williams, 1998: 36). Thus, the UNHCR’s perceived lack of structure and tendency to delegate decision-making to people of a much younger age than the military can be a source of frustration.

In addition, the gender and ethnic composition of the organizations in theatre may affect the way they interact with one another. Soldiers on peace operations are predominantly male, whilst relief workers are often
females in their late twenties to early forties (Miller, 1999: 193). Similarly, UN field staff is often female. UN agencies such as the UNHCR recruit women on a positive-discrimination basis, which means that half of the staff of UN agencies and NGOs operating in Bosnia are female (Williams, 1998: 34). Young male soldiers between 19 and 22 years old may have difficulty dealing with relief workers who are female and considerably older. Finally, ethnic (including racial, cultural and religious) differences can influence the way organizations behave towards one another and the local population. Miller and Moskos (1995: 615-637) showed that military units that were mixed-race and mixed-gender had more humanitarian attitudes to the local population than all-male uniracial units, which adopted a more aggressive stance towards locals.

3. Tasks and Ways of Accomplishing them

It is my belief that the greatest contribution that the military can make is to restore order and security so that humanitarian activities can then take place. However, increasingly the military is being asked to undertake humanitarian and development activities. In Kosovo, for example, the Canadian Battle Group’s CIMIC cell actually maintained and ran several development projects, worth $750,000 Canadian dollars, on behalf of the Canadian International Development Agency. According to the military, this allowed the Battle Group directly to address the needs of the local population and helped them win local support for their presence (De Laney, 2001). This type of ‘hearts and minds’ campaign to win over the locals can also promote support for the operation back home. Almost any military article on CIMIC will have the inevitable photograph of a soldier with children. This, of course, attracts more sympathy than coverage of any military action the soldiers might undertake.

But not everyone agrees that development activities should be within the scope of a Battle Group. As General Briquemont (1995) has commented, ‘the military cannot take the place of humanitarian organizations, which have their own objectives and methods and their own know-how; it is clearly useless to try to outdo the ICRC or the UNHCR’. An ICRC representative even goes so far as to criticize the concept of CIMIC itself. A degree of caution should be exercised when referring to CIMIC. In
whichever way the concept is interpreted, it refers first and foremost to a military function. It is thus not an appropriate term for describing the ICRC’s relations with the military, or for describing the function of a delegate whose essential role is liaising with the military. The inherent danger of CIMIC is that it might induce the military to go beyond their (military) mandate and focus more on humanitarian activities than on peace and security tasks (Studer, 2001: 7).

The other problem with mixing military and humanitarian measures is the possible confusion that can arise in the minds of the local population. Ogata (1995: 119-127) tells us the UNHCR’s humanitarian activities have become closely entwined with the military, strengthening its humanitarian capacity, but also complicating its efforts. ‘If UN peacekeeping forces were to engage in offensive action, it would no longer be possible to maintain the non-political and impartial base of the UNHCR’s humanitarian activities, however serious the needs of the victims might be.’ The ICRC has exactly the same position. According to one ICRC official, when the dividing line between humanitarian and military action becomes blurred, ‘the very concept of humanitarian action, which is at the heart of the ICRC’s mandate and activities, risks being undermined’ (Studer, 2001: 1).

Ogata also expresses concern over the effect that military operations have on the neutral and impartial image of relief efforts. Whilst UNPROFOR convoy escorts, for example, provided protection and deterred attack, in some cases their presence heightened local hostility (Williams, 1998: 40). Again, the ICRC shares this view: ‘This is perhaps the ICRC’s main concern, in particular the risk of weakening the concept of impartial humanitarian action in the eyes of the belligerents. This concern is due less to the limits of military involvement in humanitarian action per se than to the ‘contagious’ effect that it may have on civilian humanitarian activities, because any association with military missions – real or perceived – is likely to affect the way in which the population gauges the neutrality of the civilian humanitarian workers, insofar as they are – or are judged to be – no longer ‘innocent bystanders’, but rather potential parties to the conflict. Mixing mandates risks turning
humanitarian workers into perceived enemy agents and thus jeopardizing their personal safety’ (Studer, 2001: 5).

Similarly, when I was in the Canadian Area of Responsibility in Bosnia, some NGOs in the town of Drvar refused to have any more contact with the military because they had been targeted during riots. They felt that they had been singled out for aggression because of their association with the military. Therefore, tensions can arise between humanitarian and military actors because of their respective mandates and modes of operation. Humanitarian organizations are concerned with protecting people and ensuring basic human rights and the security of the victims on all sides of a conflict, whereas the military use of force might be directed just against one party in a conflict.

Of course, the military is also concerned with upholding objectivity, and this can lead to maintaining distance from the local population. Due to security issues, military personnel find themselves in armed camps, behind fortified walls and barbed wire. They remain separate from the local population with little opportunity for extended social contact. Keeping distance from the local population can be perceived as demonstrating a lack of trust in the host population. This is not to say that the military does not go into the community to help. In Bosnia, the Canadians rebuilt a hospital wing, set up a dental clinic, build a woodshed for a school, and cut and delivered wood to the elderly, etc. However, soldiers like to do things for people rather than with them. By contrast, relief workers often place themselves in the midst of the local population with few boundaries (be they physical or social) between. Because of the proximity, relief organizations often incorporate local cultural modes in the way they accomplish their tasks. This is reflected in work habits: ‘The military’s standards and preferred way of completing its tasks (the most rapid, most efficient, highest quality way) do not mesh with the NGO approach, which employs, teaches, and gives control to members of the community, incorporates local cultural modes, and uses locally accessible resources when possible. In Bosnia, the USAID director at that time observed, “[The US military] had a tendency to want to take over, so we had to stop that, I have to teach the military each time not to run things”’ (Miller, 1999: 192).
The NGOs themselves can have mandates differing from one another, and this can lead to tensions with the military. The inability of NGOs to collaborate with one another was often cited as a problem during my trip to Bosnia in 1998. I was told, ‘NGOs are a business, each with their own agenda and sometimes their own agendas don’t coincide with other NGO activities. Sometimes NGOs don’t want to talk to each other’. One problem the Canadians faced was that the UNHCR wanted to return refugees (Serbs), whilst another organization wanted to get the (Croat) Council going. ‘So they have different mandates and get into conflict with each other. Sometimes the NGOs here seem to be working at cross-purposes to each other.’ Another interviewee, commenting on the SFOR mission, said NGOs were not well co-ordinated, which created ‘duplication of effort, missed information, poorly completed projects and villages with rebuilt homes, but no electricity or water and a host of other problems’.

Sometimes there is a gap between civil and military understandings of the strategic goals of a mission. Garofano (1999: 47), for example, tells us that in Bosnia US military leaders did not believe that they had a mandate to perform nation-building (and may have wanted to avoid the burden of one). On the other hand, humanitarian workers express frustration with the military’s inability to act in certain situations: ‘Our director witnessed a guy firing randomly in the air after leaving the scene of a crime. A UN peacekeeping truck was looking, trying not to get shot, but otherwise doing nothing. I’m sure they were careful because they didn’t have a mandate to act. I imagine they were ordered not to do anything. That would be ok, but the military is here doing what?’ (Relief worker quoted in Miller, 1999: 187).

Relief workers commonly call upon military forces to become more actively and deeply involved. In Bosnia, a relief worker complained: ‘You cannot leave de-mining up to the [warring] parties. You have to take responsibility. You say not, you’re not the police, fine; not de-mining, fine; not capturing war criminals, fine. What are you doing? You have to take responsibility for something’ (Relief worker quoted in Miller, 1999: 189). And in Haiti, relief workers pushed for more military commitment: ‘The UN [troops] should participate more in peacekeeping: patrols and
police work. Foreign troops are not supposed to get involved in local actions, but people think they could have done more to disarm the local thugs’ (Relief worker quoted in Miller, 1999: 189).

On the other hand, many NGOs ‘seemed almost intentionally blind to the political and military implications of some of the suggestions and requests they made both privately and to the media’ (Appathurai and Lysyshyn, 1997: 7). During the crisis in the Great Lakes Region, following the Rwandan disaster of 1994, this was reflected in different opinions as to what was an appropriate role for the military, i.e. some NGOs wanted the military to go into the refugee camps in Eastern Congo (then Zaire) and separate and/or disarm belligerents (Appathurai and Lysyshyn, 1997: 9). However, fulfilling the tasks the humanitarian agencies wanted would have involved serious risks, and it would also have required important political decisions that many participating nations did not want to take.

4. Definitions of Success and Time Frames

According to Pope (1994), the long-term commitments of NGOs in a region may lead to substantial differences as to how mission accomplishment is defined. NGOs may not declare a mission a success until all human suffering has been alleviated in the area. Public opinion and the media, on the other hand, may simply want to put an end to fighting (send in troops in order to prevent the conflict from escalating). The national politicians may have a different definition of success (no casualties in the field, good publicity for their government, etc.).

The military’s definition of success is determined by the mission that has to be accomplished. In addition, European military commanders have informed me that a mission may be considered a success if their troops sustain no casualties and they are able to bring them all home safely – even if the actual mandate was not completely fulfilled. This can be interpreted by some as indifference to the local population or the humanitarian aspects of the mission. According to Miller (1999: 191), the US military shares similar concerns about avoiding casualties among its own people and about ‘mission creep’, i.e. prolonging a mission because new
objectives are constantly being set. ‘Many aid workers have detected these concerns, and look down on the military leaders as wanting to perform only the minimum required and then withdrawing as quickly as possible.’

The brevity of military tours (usually six months) can also cause tension with NGOs, which are often the first to enter and the last to leave a troubled area. ‘Once familiarized with local conditions, [military] officers have little time left to establish solid working relationships with their civilian counterparts, or acclimatize themselves to local values, culture and politics. […] By contrast, it is unusual for civilians to serve for less than 12 months. […] It was not unusual for civilians with UNPROFOR to be in their post for three years.’ (Williams, 1998: 36) Moreover, different military units may have different forms of rotation with some armies rotating individuals whilst others rotate whole or parts of units at a single time. Furthermore, humanitarian agencies sometimes demonstrate a misunderstanding of the speed at which the military can deploy. In the Great Lakes crisis, ‘there was a clear expectation that armies would be fully deployed in theatre almost instantly after a political decision was taken. It was not well understood that this operation involved the movement of tons of machinery and hundreds of people to Africa, and their establishment on the ground, all of which takes time’ (Appathurai and Lysyshyn, 1997: 12).

Last (1998: 166) discusses immediate (2-6 months), short-term (1-2 years), medium-term (5-10) years and long-term (10+ years) intervention in the Former Yugoslavia. In each of these time frames, the focus is different. Thus, for example, in the immediate and short-term phase after a conflict, military and civil security are the primary focus, whilst in the medium and long term the emphasis is placed on economic reconstruction, education and development. Each of these forms of intervention requires different resources (military and security forces vs. social and economic development projects) and different social actors (military and police vs. relief and development agents). Thus, tension can occur when different social actors are operating with different time frames in mind in the same theatre of operations.
Tensions can also arise when no final status has been adequately defined. As C. Dandekar and J. Gow (1997: 327-348) have pointed out, one of the serious points of tension in a strategic peace operation is that the belligerents are in control of the end state and it is only when they decide that the conflict has been satisfactorily resolved that the peace mission will end. Thus, the Former Yugoslavia could end up as a long Cyprus-type mission. In peace operations where the goal of the mission is defined as humanitarian, it becomes difficult to decide when the operation should come to an end. In the case of Congo (Zaire), for example, when the refugees were freed from coercion and began to return to Rwanda, the international community then engaged in a debate over whether the military mission was still required. Those who defined the role of the military mission as humanitarian noted that there were still people in need and supported the extension of the mission. However, as Appathurai and Lysyshyn (1997: 11) point out, ‘there will always be people in need in eastern Zaire’.

5. Abilities to Exert Influence and Control Information

Different groups are able to exert influence at a number of levels. Indeed, the decision to embark on a peace operation may arise because of public pressure caused by NGO and media reports. Public opinion can also play a critical role in the decision to send in or pull out troops. Organizations such as NGOs and the media are able to exert influence not only at the national political level, but also in the international arena. This can frustrate military commanders, who are not able to influence political and public opinion the same way. During the Great Lakes crisis, the NGOs had political interests not unlike governments. According to Appathurai and Lysyshyn (1997: 6-7), ‘these agencies have relationships with parties on the ground and with other national governments, and compete with each other for influence and financing. Some (not all) of these clearly tried to influence the Multinational Force during the crisis, providing suspiciously high numbers of refugees in need and using the media as a lever’. According to Delaney (2001), this was also the case in Kosovo, where local civil authorities and humanitarian organizations exaggerated the acuteness of problems and the means needed to address them in order to get more funds and resources. The commander then
finds her or himself trying to explain the discrepancy between the information (s)he has about the local situation (numbers of refugees etc.) and the portrait that is being painted back home or in the international press.

Tied to the ability to exert influence is also the capacity to control information. A military commander finds her or himself at the interface of many relationships where different organizations want access to the information (s)he possesses. According to Miller, NGOs believe that the military can assist them in information gathering (Miller, 1997). In Bosnia, the Canadian military shared information with the NGOs through the population surveys the CIMIC staff carried out. Canadian military personnel also monitored returning refugees. In Kosovo, the Canadian CIMIC clerk established and maintained a database that kept track of population distribution, medical facilities, water supply, schools, civil authorities and shelter distribution (Delaney, 2001).

However, the intelligence community is a two-way street and NGOs must be willing to share information as well. Some organizations such as the ICRC are reluctant to share information because it might endanger some of their confidentiality agreements (Studer, 2001: 9). Nevertheless, as NGOs often have longer experience with the local population, their insights can be of value to the military. The military, however, has to be prepared to accept information that is not packaged in the way they are used to seeing it. According to one relief worker in Bosnia: ‘There’s no sense for the American military to reinvent the wheel: We had a lot of surveys and figures on refugees. The US military was starting to do it all over again. We saved them three to six months of work, and in return we have gotten a lot of support: They opened routes across the zone of separation, for example. Both of us come from very strong cultures and both of us think we’re right and know how to do things best. Who’s going to take the first step? We’ve gone through a process. In the beginning, we were very reluctant, but we made the first step to help them learn how we think, how we work, to try to get them to understand the value of what we’re doing. They started to realize how much we knew: that we had sensitivity to what’s going on in the country and that we could help them in situations in which they didn’t know what to do’ (Relief Worker quoted in Miller, 1999: 192).
In addition, different organizations are often unaware of what others are doing, so when NGOs criticize the military for ‘not doing enough’, it might be that they are simply not aware of what the military is actually doing. The Canadian military tries to facilitate the sharing of information and promotes co-ordination between NGOs. In Kosovo, for example, the Canadian Battle Group’s CIMIC cell acted as a go-between, finding an NGO to carry out well decontamination work and assisting them in finding adequate funding from available donors (Delaney, 2001). In Bosnia, the CIMIC liaison section’s role was to assist the international organizations in their Area of Responsibility, particularly the ICRC, the UNHCR, and their partners. CIMIC units also dealt with the smaller NGOs in the Area of Responsibility. One of the problems these civilian organizations face is that they are small. They have to be small to keep their overheads down and be capable of direct action. However, as they are small, they often lack access to current information and they cannot co-ordinate with other organizations. According to one OXFAM worker, the lack of coordination in Kosovo led to the duplication of essential services and competition among NGOs to work in the same camps.

Another gap in the information sharing related to Islamic activities. The Canadians had little or no information about any development actions by Islamic groups, which seemed to be quite active in Bosnia. Not only the military was ignorant of Islamic group activities. Moskos (2000: 46) reports that seven of the 33 NGOs with official standing in the United Nations operation in Somalia were Islamic. Yet, Moskos’ computer search of US press reports revealed that ‘not one story was ever written on any of the Muslim NGOs – not one’.

The military tries to be sensitive to the NGOs. ‘We don’t want to appear heavy-handed, so we try to arrive at consensus.’ In this way, the military tries to develop and co-ordinate NGO strategy. As one officer said to me, ‘it is important to show consistency of effort’. In Kosovo, the Canadian military organized weekly co-ordination conferences between representatives of the UNHCR, the NGOs, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), local civil authorities and military CIMIC representatives. At these meetings, the military provided information on
mine threats, safe routes, population distribution, schools, damage assessments and medical coverage (Delaney, 2001). This communication can be essential in areas where telephone communications and cellular coverage are practically non-existent. Similarly, the Canadian military in Bosnia organized regular meetings plus ad hoc information sharing between NGOs. One of the mechanisms for this was the so-called Principals’ Group. When I was there, the Principals’ Group of NGOs met in the Canadian camp in Coralici. The military facilitated the meeting and produced the agenda. I was told, ‘We decide the focus and explain why, so we can have a common effort’. In addition, the head of the Canadian Medical Unit in Bosnia had a monthly meeting with the World Health Organization in Bosnia, and (s)he also kept in contact with other medical staff in the area (for example, Médecins Sans Frontières) about the main medical problems in the region.

Finally, one cannot discuss control of information without discussing the media. Both the military and NGOs are concerned about their relations with the media. According to Moskos (2000: 33), ‘NGO funding often depends on favourable press coverage’. And, as a leading figure in the International Rescue Committee (quoted in Rieff, 1999: 27) remarked, ‘You go where governments or U.N. agencies want you to go to get your share of contracts that otherwise would go to other agencies. And one way to get such contracts is by getting the press to publicize your work’. This can lead to competition among NGOs for press coverage. Some members of the Canadian military find this ‘distasteful’. As one peacekeeper put it, ‘The theatrical demeanour of these organizations, their tendency to go into dangerous situations, and their disregard for cooperation with other groups are particularly irritating to peacekeepers. This sort of competition is particularly galling when a group places its pursuit of publicity above the goals of the overall peacekeeping mission’ (Pollick, 2000: 60).

The military presence in theatre can also be a valuable resource for NGOs, since it often draws political and media attention to an area. This can assist NGOs in publicizing their efforts and in raising funds. However, NGOs often have strained relations with the media, much the same way as the military does. As a senior officer in Sarajevo told Moskos
(2000: 34), ‘The media understand NGOs even less than we do’. The
military are often apprehensive about the media and particularly about
negative coverage. Then again, so are the NGOs. For the military, a bad
news story may spell the end of an individual’s career; for an NGO it
may mean the end of funding.

6. Control of Resources

In peace operations, the different organizations often find themselves in
competition for resources. The NGOs may be competing among them-
selves in order to secure funding and equipment and they may be com-
peting over access to certain areas or regions that the military must safe-
guard. The military deploys with valuable resources – food and medical
supplies, communication and construction equipment, transport and fuel,
etc. Relief workers in Haiti described to Miller how thousands of sold-
diers were deployed early in the mission, in 1994. At that time, they
shared their resources: ‘After Cyclone Gordon […] they volunteered.
And they had an outpost next to our office. We knew each other, were
friends, and they asked what support we needed. Engineers came out and
set the course of the river back, which had just spread out all over. They
made walls as barriers to prevent land degradation and protect the banks
of the rivers. They also did an aerial survey with their helicopters for us.
They worked well with the communities then’ (Relief worker quoted in
Miller, 1999: 188).

In Bosnia, the Canadians shared their personnel with the UN Mine Ac-
tion Centre. While I was there, the military had someone in Bihac work-
ing as the Centre co-ordinator. He checked safety, the techniques actu-
ally used to clear mines, and that the right people for the job were hired.
Canadians also worked closely with the UNHCR to anticipate resource
needs in Bosnia. However, I was told that the demands in 1998 were
small compared to 1994-1995, when the UNHCR used Canadian mili-
tary vehicles. During the Kosovo crisis, the numbers of refugees over-
whelmed the NGOs on the ground. The UNHCR asked NATO to co-
dordinate all transportation of food, relief supplies and medical care.
NATO troops also helped set up the camps for the hundreds of thou-
sands of refugees (Moskos, 2000: 50).
However, some organizations have grown increasingly wary of using military assets in carrying out their own operations. This is because military assets can be used simultaneously for peacekeeping or even peace enforcement at the same time that they are being used for humanitarian assistance in the same geographical area. So even though organizations such as the ICRC understand only too well the value of armed protection of ICRC equipment and personnel, they have become cautious of using military assets for their operations. In Somalia, for example, it was not possible for the ICRC to use military aircraft, which only the day before had been carrying military equipment for peace enforcement purposes (Studer, 2001: 10).

At other times, NGOs want the military to share its material resources. Unlike the positive description above, of NGO-military co-operation at the beginning of the mission in Haiti, by 1997 only a minimal US military force was present and it seemed to be conserving its resources. A relief worker expressed the following frustrations: ‘They have all that equipment here, money, people. Why not build roads, improve streets, build infrastructure? A lot of this is very capital-intensive and they have it. As it is, they’re spending all this money to be locked up behind walls, and we don’t know what they’re doing’ (Relief worker quoted in Miller, 1999: 188).

Similarly, when the group I observed first arrived in Bosnia, the NGOs wanted the military to deliver goods and cattle for them. The military said no. Thus, there is also competition over soldiers as resources. That is, there are a large number of competing demands placed upon a soldier’s time and upon military resources to accomplish both humanitarian and military aims. According to one Canadian officer I interviewed in the former Yugoslavia, they did not have the resources to meet the demands of both military and humanitarian tasks: ‘We are pushing the envelope and doing our damn best to keep all the balls in the air’.

Finally, there may be misunderstandings and disagreements as to the proper use of resources. Humanitarian agencies may want the military to go beyond its mandate in order to disarm the local population or catch
thieves and criminals. One example of different views on using and withholding resources can be seen in the following situation in Bosnia.

A Canadian-led team had arranged to cease SFOR-co-ordinated humanitarian aid to the town of Kotor Varos until the municipal leadership demonstrated a willingness to accept the return of displaced ethnic minorities. The team’s efforts were undermined several days later when an NGO announced a major donation to the town. The NGO thought it was more important for them to be seen providing aid to the town than for the humanitarian stakeholders to present a united front. With this NGO’s money the mayor was able to ignore pressure to accept minority returns (Canadian Department of National Defence, 1999: 22).

7. Conclusions

NGOs and the military may be strange bedfellows, but they will have to stay in the sheets together because of overlapping tasks and scarce resources in mission areas. Moreover, there is a growing consensus that co-ordination is both necessary and useful. Just as in any couple relationship, they have continuously to work at improving communication, building bridges and developing mutual respect if they are to coexist and co-operate. Otherwise, they will find themselves working at counter purposes to each other.

Although this article has stressed differences, it is also important to remember that NGOs and the military also share many things: a commitment to peace and stability; a hard-working mentality; international experience; life with hardship and danger; personal risk of injury, illness and/or death; decision making under pressure, a ‘can do’ attitude or a ‘make do with what you’ve got’ attitude; an appreciation of competence; a willingness to work among the suffering, the dying and/or the dead; a frustration with conditions on the ground; a frustration with decisions they believe are political and make their work less effective, etc. (Stiehm, 1998: 30). There is as much nobility in sacrificing your life for your country as in saving life in a country far from home.

Moskos has advanced the hypothesis that in peace operations we can observe an embryonic convergence between the two institutions: ‘a ‘sof-
tening’ of the military, if you will, and a ‘hardening’ of the NGOs’ (Moskos, 2000: 33). Thus, as the military and NGOs carry out overlapping missions in the same areas, they develop common ground for improved relations. A recent survey by Nuciari (2001) of 260 officers from nine countries indicates that officers had fewer problems with NGOs than they did with the local population.

There certainly appears to be a growing recognition by military forces of the value of working with NGOs. The US Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook (1997), for example, has a whole chapter on civil-military relations, which includes a discussion of NGOs, UN agencies and other international relief agencies. Moreover, the relief community is developing an appreciation of the military’s assistance in realizing humanitarian objectives. Efforts are underway to work more closely together. Flora MacDonald, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, went with NGOs to both Somalia and Rwanda. She said there were about 200 NGOs operating there and ‘the confusion was total’. However, MacDonald (cited in Ross, 2000: 4) said Kosovo was different in that there was tremendous integration in the work being done by the Canadian military and the NGOs there – integration she had not seen elsewhere.

Working together helps each community to view the other as equally professional and committed to common objectives. This is a very important point. In fact Miller’s (1997) central argument is: organizations that share a common goal and depend on one another to reach that goal, can develop a co-operative relationship and yet retain distinct organizational memberships and cultures. In short, you do not have to be best friends in order to be able to work well together. Good working relations can be developed and I believe that these relationships should be encouraged outside peace operations. Canadian Forces in 1996, for example, began an exchange with the NGO CARE in which an officer is attached to the organization on a six-month basis. Some NGOs send personnel to the military for mine awareness training. These types of exchanges promote mutual understanding.
In theatre, the CIMIC co-ordination centers permit detailed co-operation between the many NGOs and local authorities (Delaney, 2001; Pollick, 2000: 61). CIMIC operations need to be finely tuned and staffed with competent people. Often there are shortages, which means that a battle group is forced to use untrained officers in a CIMIC role or keep them ‘double-hatted’. This means that they can be taken away from their CIMIC tasks if their other duties call. Of course, for a military professional, a career in civil-military relations may not mean professional advancement the way being involved in the core business of combat does. There is a need for clear tracks of professional advancement possible in order to encourage participation in these functions. Another military option is to use reservists, who have a wide variety of non-traditional military skills. With this in mind, the Canadian Department of Defence intends to create units within the Reserves dedicated to CIMIC activities (Pollick, 2000: 62).

Another aid would be to co-locate headquarters in the same area. Of course, being close to each other is not a guarantee of effective communication; nevertheless, it could facilitate it. Dialogue can also be improved through pre-mission meetings between the military and NGOs, early agreement on responsibilities and objectives, central co-ordination, shared communications equipment, regular inter-agency meetings in-field, exchanged liaison officers, to name a few. It is also critical that relief agencies be included earlier in the strategic planning stages of an operation. A particular emphasis should be placed upon improving consultation at the policy level, information sharing and analysis. For the foreseeable future, at least, NGOs and the military have no choice but to remain in bed together if they are to ensure the co-ordination of humanitarian relief, reconstruction, peace building, and the political and security aspects of a mission.
References


Embedding with the Military in Eastern Afghanistan: The Role of Anthropologists in Peace & Stability Operations

Audrey Roberts et al.

“The key for Human Terrain Teams is to help us understand so we can decide which action to take or whether any action is even appropriate. The other enabling capabilities serve to take action based on this understanding. This knowledge provides the baseline. It is all about understanding.’

Brigadier General Vance (Canada), Commander Task Force Kandahar (23 July 2010)

Introduction

Since 2004, there has been an increased focus on recognizing the importance of cultural knowledge within the military. This has been reflected in conceptual frameworks, taxonomies, handbooks, military doctrine and other publications. The focus therein is on cultural knowledge as ‘what’ rather than ‘how’ this knowledge is fostered and institutionalized through systems and processes. Whereas processes and organizations
have long existed in military culture to assist commanders in visualizing friendly and enemy forces, there has been no similar system for providing understanding of the ‘human terrain’, or the socio-cultural environment.

There are multiple kinds of military and civilian researchers, collectors, analysts and advisors who use socio-cultural information to work towards a common goal. This common end is to inform decision-making and training processes appropriately about possibilities to build bridges with local actors in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, with the main purpose of bringing more of our military personnel home safely. Function is a key consideration to be defined within any cultural requirement.

There are multiple cultural functions that need to be fulfilled, ranging from collection of information, production and management of knowledge, analysis, integration, and then advising of military units and non-military entities on the tactical as well as the strategic levels, as well as multiple goals that these functions can work towards. Intent and process vary, as might the kind of cultural knowledge that is produced. The Human Terrain System is one such entity working in collaboration towards this common end.

At the time this paper was composed, there was common agreement within the United States (US) government, especially within the Department of Defense (DoD), and across North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries that culture is important, but few people could articulate exactly why and how it was important or how it could inform decision-making. Despite the increased focus on training cultural awareness and understanding, commanders continue to report that they lack sufficient operationally relevant expert advice and means to collect, analyze and operationalize information on the socio-cultural environment within their areas of operation.

Part I: The Human Terrain System Mission

The Human Terrain System (HTS) Project is a US Army-led supported initiative to provide support to non-lethal operations. Despite having a
mixed civilian-military operational capability, which HTS recruits, trains, deploys, and supports, serving as a dedicated, embedded capability for commanders on the ground, the system is what provides the robust, multi-layered support to decision-making. The primary deployed components of HTS are Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), Human Terrain Analyst Teams (HTATs), Theatre Co-ordination Element (TCE), Social Science Research and Analysis (SSRA), and the MAP-HT software package. The primary US-based components of HTS are the Research Reachback Center (RRC), Knowledge Management/IT Directorate, Training Directorate and Social Science Directorate. The roles of these HTS components as well as others will be described later in this paper.

HTS conducts rigorous operationally relevant socio-cultural research and analysis that is developed and maintained as a socio-cultural knowledge base, in order to enable culturally astute decision-making, enhance operational effectiveness and preserve and share socio-cultural institutional knowledge. HTS assists in the collection and analysis of how people view the world and how people are affected by our actions. This knowledge is used to inform and assist the planning, preparation, execution and assessment of non-lethal military missions/operations, extending understanding to the population and relationship-building for our soldiers.

**History of HTS**

The operational need for social science support to military operations was established in 2006 and 2007 by identifying operational gaps in Operational Need Statements submitted by commanders. These operational gaps were articulated by commanders at all levels operating in and returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. Symptoms included:

- Limited ability to conduct research, archive and transfer data and information about human terrain gained during operations,
- Limited socio-cultural knowledge bases,
- Inability to exploit open source and unclassified cultural information,
- Insufficient doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for ‘denied area ethnography’,
- Limited subject matter expertise (SME) support to assist commanders to understand human terrain, and the
- Inability to tap into the worldwide cultural knowledge capital.

In early 2006, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) responded to this operational need by developing an initial proof concept for providing social science support to military operations. Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), composed of individuals with social science and operational backgrounds, were to be deployed with tactical units to assist in bringing knowledge about the local population into a coherent analytic framework, in order to provide advice to commanders and staffs in the field. The ‘proof of concept phase’ included the deployment of two HTTs to Afghanistan and three HTTs to Iraq between 2007 and 2008, supported directly by the Research Reachback Center (RRC) and a Subject Matter Expert network (SME-Net) of contacts within the government and the academic community. After the concept was proved successful, based on commanders’ feedback and operational effect, HTS civilian personnel transitioned from contractors to Department of Army Civilians (DACs) in early 2009.

As of November 2010, HTS has thirteen teams deployed in Iraq, and thirty teams in Afghanistan. Currently, support is provided to the US Army, US Marines and US Special Operations Forces, as well as Polish, French, Canadian, British and other International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partners. HTS maintains a presence with Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) at brigade (brigade combat team) level, with Human Terrain Analysis Team (HTAT) at division level, and with the Theater Coordination Element (TCE) and Theater Support Office (TSO) at corps and ISAF-Joint Command headquarters in Afghanistan. In many cases, despite the majority of the operational capability serving as assets on HTTs at the brigade level, teams operate predominately at even lower (i.e. battalion and company) levels due to the nature of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Requests for Forces (RFF) have increased the continued demand for teams. Many of these requests have to go unfulfilled due to limited personnel and a very focused mission to support. Numerous countries have
also asked to send officers to HTS training at Fort Leavenworth (Kansas), where TRADOC (the HTS parent organization) is located. Although HTS hopes to be able to integrate other countries’ officers into the training, at the time of writing it is not yet in a position to do so. HTS has also received multiple requests to support Models & Simulations initiatives and additional area-based and methodology-based training that they have not been able to support as yet, but may be able to do so in the future. 98% of funding goes to operational support, with additional staff based in the US supporting our operational requirements through training HTS recruits and conducting outreach and limited leadership development.

The US Army has already approved a specific set of enduring capabilities in the Army Base Budget (beginning in Financial Year 2011). These capabilities include the HTS Project Office; the Research Reachback Center; the team training and support base; and knowledge management capabilities. Currently, TRADOC is conducting an assessment that will establish the scope of required HTS capabilities in the future, including service on deployments and in the US; giving support across the spectrum of conflict to the US Army and the other services, to the Department of Defense and in an inter-agency role.

Whilst the Human Terrain System was developed as a response to current operational gaps, there is significant evidence that socio-cultural understanding is necessary before conflicts begin. HTS therefore believes that it is ideally suited for pre-conflict assessments. Beyond the current fight, socio-cultural research and analysis capabilities will be employed prior to conflict and crisis in areas of interest. These activities will enable conflict detection and effective deterrence, and, if necessary, enable responsive ramp-up capacity during crisis response and transition to sustained operations. Additionally, with the ‘end of combat operations in Iraq’, established by 1 September 2010, we are already seeing that HTS teams are being utilized and operate differently in stability and training operations there, in increased partnership with the US Embassy and the State Department. This is evidence that there is an important role for HTS teams in post-conflict environments as well.
Human Terrain System Organization

HTS is composed of two parts: institutional and operational capabilities. As a learning organization that is flexible enough to respond to lessons learned and shifting needs, the composition of the institutional and operational capabilities is mutable. The institutional capability recruits, trains, deploys, supports and sustains the operational capability. It also supports US Army development of a Department of Defense Socio-cultural Knowledge Base and Support Center planned for May 2012. HTS data and products will be fully integrated in the DoD Socio-Cultural Knowledge Base and Support Center.

Operational Capability

The main HTS elements are the teams deployed in-country. These are the Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) at brigade and regimental level, the Human Terrain and Analysis Teams (HTATs) at the division echelon, and the Theater Co-ordination Element (TCE) at corps headquarters. All teams are composed of five to nine personnel, including a team leader and one or more social scientists, research managers, and analysts. These teams are fully integrated into their respective headquarters’ staffs, but task organization is based on the commander’s discretion. Some teams may serve as special staff with a direct line to the commander, whereas others may be situated under Civil Affairs, Information Operations, or Intelligence. HTT conducts field research among the local population, at times collecting information on the socio-cultural environment in which they are operating that has never been collected before. The teams then integrate this knowledge into planning, preparation, execution and assessment of operations.

The planning process is incremental. Socio-cultural reality is not. HTS teams need not necessarily be tied to a current operational cycle. They also help to shape future operations and conduct assessments following operations. However, current operational planning and execution is the primary domain in which cultural assets are considered.
'Map-HT Toolkit' is a hardware and software set provided to deployed teams and the Research Reachback Center, enabling field and open-source research, social network analysis and the provision of usable products to supported units.

Social Science Research & Analysis (SSRA) provides operationally relevant, empirical, qualitative and quantitative socio-cultural research conducted in-theater. Generally, support is provided to the operational-level commands, such as the HTAT and TCE elements at division and corps level. SSRA employs a local capability that conducts surveys, focus groups and other methodologies in order to help answer questions designed by teams and commands.

Theater Support Office (TSO) provides administrative and logistical support to the teams in-theater. The teams are attached to and/or ‘owned by’ the element they are supporting.

Institutional Base

The Project Office provides overall supervision and management of the Project. The Director reports to TRISA (TRADOC’s Intelligence Support Activity) and the TRADOC G2-branch.

The Research Reachback Center (RRC) employs social scientists and uniformed and civilian analysts providing additional research and analytic support for the HTS teams deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although the RRC’s two offices are based in the US, they are regionally focused and work in close collaboration with the teams deployed.

Subject Matter Expert-Networks (SME-Nets) consist of on-call, micro-regional focused academic and other civilian sector experts providing specific RRC support.

The Operations Directorate provides operations support to deployed teams and project staff. This Directorate mans an Operations Center on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week, with direct links to teams deployed in-theater.
The Knowledge Management / IT Directorate provides KM and IT support to deployed elements and the project staff.

The Social Science Directorate provides guidance, advice and support for the development of social science guidelines and practices within the project.

The Training Directorate provides overall management, supervision, and execution of the HTS training program, with approximately eleven classes per year; thirty-five students per class. Currently, curriculum redesign is ongoing, based on lessons learned and task analysis.

**What Makes HTS Different?**

Culture is being treated as the new answer, but it is not a formula for action. It is only part of the answer, and we need to look carefully at how and why it is important. While processes and organizations exist to assist commanders and staff in visualizing friendly and enemy forces, no similar system exists for providing understanding of the ‘human terrain’. HTS teams provide the commander and his staff with the ability to visualize and understand the socio-cultural environment of the areas they are operating in and that of areas of interest.

HTS teams conduct research planning and assessment in co-operation and collaboration with existing military elements such as Civil Affairs (CA) and Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and other elements through engagement meetings with local officials, provincial government officials, local leaders, and local communities, which assists the unit in addressing another aspect of the population: the average persons’ perspective. When the HTS teams incorporate the ‘grass-roots’, local perspective into the government and civil perspectives gathered by the other elements, a more robust and clear picture emerges about the dynamics of the entire population. This in-depth picture can then be integrated into the military decision-making process to increase positive effect.
By identifying local dynamics, structures, grievances, motivation, and change; assessing the population’s view of governmental effectiveness; and making recommendations on how to address them, HTS teams provide the unit with non-lethal options, assist the unit in preventing friction with members of the local population, thus building relationships, and track the second- and third-order effects that are likely to occur based on planned unit operations. Without developing means to integrate socio-cultural knowledge and methodologies (the ‘how’) into staff structure, processes, knowledge-sharing, training and education, understanding of ‘culture’ will never become institutionalized, but will remain the purview of subject matter experts and small teams, such as HTTs.

**Methodology**

The Human Terrain System (HTS) does not train military personnel to be social scientists. HTS hires social scientists and analysts who are already experts in their diverse fields. HTS social scientists all have graduate degrees and professional experience in fields ranging from economics, anthropology, law, development, history, international relations etc. HTS analysts and social scientists are taught how to conduct operationally relevant research and to work within the military decision-making process.

When the HTS teams conduct operationally relevant socio-cultural research and analysis, they follow ethical guidelines that encompass all of the social sciences and the US Army Human Subjects Review. Teams are required to secure informed consent from all ‘research subjects’ (interviewees) and are prohibited from researching ‘protected populations’ (such as detainees, etc.). When approached, potential interviewees often decline to be interviewed and that is respected. Additionally, HTS does have a peer review process for long-term projects and will soon implement institutional review boards for long-term research projects.

HTS does not ‘do atmospherics’. HTS teams provide a conduit between the local population and the unit through interactions, interviews, observations, and research so that the unit is more aware of the operational
environment. We are a complement to other staff elements, not a replacement for any existing staff or enabler.

The kinds of socio-cultural information that HTS assesses within the operational environment come from leaders and the population and include demographics, social, ethnic, religion, economy and government data, social change, and intersections of the above listed. How the population views the coalition efforts as well as the adversary, local population’s interests, areas of contention and what impact planned activities might have on operations are also assessed. It is not within the HTS mandate to pursue information related to insurgents, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or other weapons employed by insurgent elements intended to kill or maim our servicemen and women and the local population, names of people that might be involved in the insurgency or similar data. However, how insecurity affects the local population comes up frequently, as this is one of the population’s primary concerns. HTS teams only provide their unit with information related to IEDs and insurgent activity, if this information is provided to them, unsolicited, by the people they are interviewing. In turn, this information is handed over to the appropriate interlocutor, such as the patrol commander. There have been individuals with HTS who have deviated from these mission principles, but, when known, these incidents are addressed appropriately.

Most HTS teams collect information through an interpreter, who may be a local national or a native speaker from the United States. As experienced by other actors operating in other countries who do not speak the local language fluently, it is often very difficult to work with an interpreter. However well meaning, they might not speak the local dialect. In Afghanistan, the two predominant languages are commonly known to be Dari and Pashtu; however, the variance in local dialects and slang is usually understated. Even if you have an interpreter from the area, he might be perceived suspiciously by the population, as he might have previously worked with an intelligence unit or some other unit with a very different mission to that of HTS teams. Validity of the knowledge we produce is first and foremost the team’s primary concern after the safety of the people we interview and work with. HTS teams work very hard to develop the capacity of their interpreters to ask the difficult ques-
tions that we need to answer. Even if you have an all-star interpreter, what if he has five people speaking to him at once? What if he slept very little the evening before because of a rocket attack? How do you validate the information? ‘Triangulation’ of what multiple interviewees tell us is one of the key ways that we use to assess interviewees’ information.

Research is shaped by the commander’s information requirements, whether implied or explicit. Social scientists determine the methodological feasibility of research efforts, defining the research objective, formulating the research design, analyzing knowledge gaps, selecting collection and analysis methods, and developing appropriate research instruments such as interview protocols and surveys. Qualitative and quantitative data collection methodologies include direct observation, visual ethnography, key leader engagement, participant observation, depth interviewing, group or focus group interviewing, surveying, secondary source research, and mixed methods approaches. Quantitative, qualitative and mixed analytic methods are utilized, including text analysis, narrative analysis, effects analysis, structural analysis, geo-spatial analysis, social network analysis, cultural domain analysis, and trend analysis.

Diverse deliverables are produced from this research. The ‘human terrain’, or the socio-cultural environment, is something that can be mapped as one of many layers utilized, but mapping the socio-cultural environment is not enough. The socio-cultural environment is not static, flat, and easy to generalize across large areas. HTS team products, such as papers and power point presentations, are artifacts. They are not the integrating factor that necessarily affects the decision-making process. ‘Tribal’ maps are a perfect example of this. Tribal mapping is often treated as an end in itself. The maps are helpful in assessing ethnic or clan affiliations, but they do not tell you who identifies with whom, where ‘solidarity lines’ work (which are often based on particular conditions), when people will come together, or when they break apart. Maps do not tell you what and when other networks may matter or what mobilizes people.
Human Terrain Team AFI helped to produce this ‘tribal map’ for the 4th Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division in 2009.

It is the briefing or dialogue that is the critical avenue through which HTS products move from ‘interesting’ to informing the decision-making process and contributing to course of action development. Means for communication to and understanding diverse audiences is critical. Some information might be important for a lower level commander, which is not important for a general, and vice versa. Besides briefings and producing extensive assessments, we work shoulder-to-shoulder with our soldiers and officers to show them what we do and how they can do it, too. HTS is effecting change by helping to build relationships between our soldiers and the Afghans and Iraqis we work so closely with through extending understanding.
Socio-Cultural Research in the Operational Environment

As stated in the introduction, by 2009 there was common agreement within the United States government, especially within the Department of Defense, that culture is important, but many people could still not articulate exactly why and how it was important or how it could inform decision-making. An HTS staff member, for example, described her horror when a senior military official described ‘culture’ as the ‘new atom bomb’. It remains misunderstood.

Despite rigorous kinetic targeting standards, with multiple sources, temporal considerations and triangulation as the norm, unlike the ‘adversary’ who is recognized to be dynamic, the socio-cultural environment is often treated as static, flat, and easy to generalize across large areas. The need to triangulate sources and to recognize how diverse the environment is, with stark village-level differences, consideration of source motivation, or how the security situation and other stressors impact and are affected by socio-cultural environment, is still not always understood. Culture is not something you can isolate and check the block on. In sum, understanding culture enables re-framing.

Security, self-awareness of our military and interagency personnel, and socio-cultural factors should be looked at not only for their component parts, but how they relate to one other, especially on the tactical level. Once deployed, one of the most difficult challenges is dealing with violence while remaining self-aware. It is very difficult to manage emotion and the reactive nature of many of our operations, while continuing effectively to consider socio-cultural dynamics. HTS teams help our soldiers reframe while they are in a non-permissive environment like this, but their operational capability is low-density, or relatively small.

Challenges

Multiple other kinds of collectors, analysts and advisors use socio-cultural information to inform the decision-making process. Despite this truth, there are neither systems nor guidance on how these other enablers should collect, analyze and integrate socio-cultural information into the
decision-making process or the commander’s visualization of the battle space. Can an executable process and system for operationally relevant rigorous research and cultural advice be developed in a military environment, when existing socio-cultural enablers are sparsely available and have limited reach, without a dedicated socio-cultural asset, such as an HTT? The single most asked question I received during the three years serving with HTS was “How can you help my unit do what you do?” Training cultural awareness and cultural understanding is not enough. It is not wasted, but cultural awareness does not enable the military practitioner to use, collect, produce and utilize socio-cultural knowledge. Training towards human terrain collection methodology and culture general frameworks is a critical gap in the US Professional Military Education (PME) regime and not even included in pre-deployment training. Even if a socio-cultural research and analysis curriculum is incorporated into PME, it will take approximately two years to make operational lessons learned institutional.

Many organizations outside the US military and independent academics argue that one solution is to be found within HTS – increasing access to products. Many HTS products are prescriptive as well as descriptive. Teams make recommendations to a specific commander for specific operations during a specific period of time. Many recommendations should not be treated as something actionable outside of this context, but can still be considered as valuable and descriptive.

All Human Terrain System products belong to the US government and are mostly stored on classified systems. Unfortunately, many of our military units do not have the capability to allow all of their leaders regularly to utilize classified systems. Even if they have access to classified information in general, many of the people that need HTS products to prepare for deployments have limited access because they often do not know how to frame a question beforehand. There is a Request for Information process, if military/government entities have focused questions, but there are limited opportunities for private sector and academic access. On the one hand, government information, whatever the conduit, is often for official use only. On the other hand, there have been cases where HTS products have been ‘repackaged’ by outsiders and resold to
the US government. Regardless of these deficiencies, HTS products are becoming increasingly accessible to the people who need them most – decision-makers, educators and units – and should continue to be so with the US Army moving forward in integrating the multiple Army entities operating on issues related to culture.

Part II: Integrating into the Military

While ‘embedded’ in a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in Afghanistan over the course of twenty-two months, I conducted thematic and area operationally relevant ethnographic assessments in over 150 villages in five provinces, interviewed hundreds of Afghans, and produced over thirty assessments, adhering to rigorous ethical standards. I delivered over 200 briefings to the BCT, to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and to various International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) partners, to assist in decision-making at the tactical and operational levels.

There was a very steep learning curve for me when I first deployed as a member of a Human Terrain Team in early 2008. It did not take long to realize that, although I deployed to have an effect, my time deployed in Afghanistan would also have a profound effect on me. Initially, it was very difficult even to communicate with the first US Army unit that I was attached to. In many senses, I know it was equally a challenge for many members of the unit to be working with civilians.

Once I understood the organization, language, and processes, it began to become clearer how to integrate. One has to understand what ‘commander’s intent’ means. One has to understand the role of and know how to communicate with a wide variety of actors, ranging from young soldiers to generals and including Civil Affairs, Special Forces, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), US State Department, United Nations, local actors, Non-Governmental Organizations, other ISAF units (e.g. Polish, British, Canadian, Czech, Turkish) and others. However, understanding is only the beginning. It is more difficult to become relevant. You can be a legitimate actor at the table without being directly relevant to the commander’s mission. To become
relevant, you must show them the ‘So what?’ Why does it matter to them right now, what you have to contribute? You must show them what you can do for them, not what you did for a different commander yesterday, or – if you are working at the company level – what you did for their brigade or battalion commander. It does not matter if you are a civilian or a young woman. It does not matter whether you have just done your PhD or are already a grizzled old operator. What can you do for them? Every day you have to answer this question.

When you are out in the field, every day you have to show that you are either an asset or a liability. You live in a fish bowl. Your every step is being considered and analyzed. They know when you did not go to the gym. They know who you sat with two days in a row at lunch. They know if you tripped and fell when you were on a mission. They hear when you disassociate yourself from the unit by saying “Your unit” rather than “We”. Every step influences your credibility, relevance, and whether or not you will, on a more transcendental level, ‘become’ part of the unit. For most, it seems that the period of ‘becoming’ occurs when they go through very rough or very positive times together.

It is very difficult to maintain objectivity. We are administratively attached to the unit, but on a much deeper level we become part of the unit. Most of us feel that we ‘become’ part of the unit. We are attached to the unit to utilize rigorous social science methodology and analysis to help a military commander achieve the mission through non-lethal operations and other non-lethal means.

It is hard to parse out the boundary between abstract concepts like patriotism, mission, heroism, country, and very visceral experiences like war, death, immediacy, and brotherhood. In the last few years, three civilians on HTTs in Iraq and Afghanistan have been killed, with several wounded in action. Countless of our US and NATO soldiers, marines, and airmen, whom we have worked to support, have been killed. This leads one participating in this program to ask ‘What is it worth?’ because the risk is very, very real. Is it for engaged scholarship, for Afghanistan or Iraq, or for love of country? It is worth the very real effect that HTTs have on the units that we are attached to. It is for our soldiers, marines,
airmen and seamen. At the most immediate, critical level, we are helping to extend understanding in order to save lives.
First Steps in Post-Conflict State-Building: Establishing Critical Functions and Setting Priorities

Katarina Ammitzbøll and Harry Blair

I. Introduction

Over the past fifteen years, international and bilateral development agencies have become more and more involved in post-conflict state-building (PCSB) efforts. More than 40 such initiatives have been undertaken, beginning with countries like Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique in the early 1990s and running through Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan and Liberia in more recent years.\(^1\) New opportunities continue to emerge, as prospective candidates such as Somalia and Sudan hopefully wait in the wings for post-conflict assistance. Indeed, post-conflict state-building has become a major focus within the international development community.

Yet, despite all the experience the international community has accumulated in assisting the institution-building process in these countries, there is as yet only a limited understanding of how to prioritize and sequence the first steps to enable a post-conflict state to recover (or to establish, in the case of new states) the ability to provide essential state functions and manage the polity.

Study objective

This essay\(^2\) aims at contributing to the development of a practical understanding of how best to begin (re-) establishing basic state structures and

\(^1\) For a list, see the United Nations’ Peacekeeping website (UN 2007).

\(^2\) This essay is based largely on Blair and Ammitzboell (2007), a study sponsored jointly by the United Nations Development Programme and the United States Agency for International Development. Nothing in the article should be taken to represent any official position of either UNDP or USAID; all responsibility for
institutions that can manage the planning, co-ordination and recovery efforts that facilitate the emergence of a functioning state after a peace or political agreement has been signed or a Security Council Resolution has been endorsed. More specifically, two questions should be answered:

- What state-performed functions are most critical in the post-conflict setting?
- How should these functions be prioritized over the first 24 months or so?

The overall purpose of this article is to suggest an approach including all the key state functions that must be taken into account in any PCSB effort and offer a method for prioritizing them so that the most critical ones are addressed first. At the same time, a model will be constructed that will be adjustable enough to be adapted to the unique circumstances that will inevitably arise in any particular post-conflict situation. In sum, what might be termed a ‘flexible template’ will be proposed for prioritizing and sequencing donor-supported post-conflict state-building. Of course, even the most flexible model cannot cover every possible contingency, but this template should handle most PCSB situations, as long as they conform to a typical scenario that begins with a ceasefire and peace accord leading to a UN mandate and then proceeds to a state-building effort culminating in a handover (generally after an election) to domestic authorities and continuing donor assistance in the period afterwards.

This essay opens with a look at the core state functions, most (and in some cases all) of which the state has failed to provide in the more serious post-conflict situations. The subsequent section presents a scheme for prioritizing and sequencing donor assistance to support these functions.

such matters as well as for errors or other shortcomings rests with the authors. The original study (available at http://pantheon.yale.edu/~94/consulting_work.htm) included case studies of PCSB experiences in East Timor and Liberia. The present essay focuses on the more generic aspects of the larger one.
II. Core Functional Domains

The focus on PCSB that has emerged over the last decade or so has naturally occasioned considerable discussion on just what makes up ‘state-building’. What is it that donors should support? What is it that a state must do or provide if it is to become viable over time? There seems to be widespread consensus that to survive and prosper a viable state must manage certain core activities or functions. There even appears to be a virtual accord as to what elements should be included within these core functions.

But so far there is no agreement on just how a list of such functions should be put together. One impressive compilation comes from a joint effort on the part of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), producing a framework of four ‘pillars’: security; justice and reconciliation; social and economic well-being; and governance and participation (CSIS/AUSA 2002). The CSIS/AUSA framework has been adopted as a basic organizing concept by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in designing its own post-conflict state-building framework (NEPAD 2005). The NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Economics and Security Committee has also adopted a similar version of the four pillars. In another variant, Ghani and his colleagues constructed a list encompassing ten essential state functions (Ghani et al. 2005). Richard Caplan offers yet another set of five main state-building tasks (2005: 44).

The framework presented here includes five core state functions or ‘domains’, as shown in Figure 1. It largely parallels the CSIS/AUSA formulation with regard to security, justice/reconciliation and governance/participation, but splits social/economic well-being into economic and administrative components, and also adds the word ‘governance’ to all but the security domain. Our intentions here are twofold:

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3 As reported by van Gennip (2005).
To emphasize the administrative aspect of PCSB, in particular the need to build state capacity actually to deliver the services included in all the functions, a facet of PCSB that is frequently underplayed or ignored; and

To stress the need to think of the PCSB enterprise generally as a governance effort, i.e., one concerned with how and when to deploy donor and state resources to address citizens’ needs.

A brief discussion of the five functional domains and their components presented in Figure 1 follows.

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**Figure 1. Five Functional Domains in Post-Conflict States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECURITY</th>
<th>POLITICAL GOVERNANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence</td>
<td>Constitution (or operating rules)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriation/reintegration of refugees/ internally displaced persons</td>
<td>Legitimizing elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration of ex-combatants</td>
<td>Civil society &amp; media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuing security internally (police) and externally (border patrol, army)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE**

- Basic market formation and maintenance
- Employment generation
- Management of public finance
- State asset management (natural resources, environment)

**ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE**

- Civil service (pay & reform/rebuilding)
- Infrastructure provision
- Management of state service delivery activities
- Investment in human capital

**JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE**

- Rule of law
- Truth and reconciliation efforts
- Customary law (in many cases)

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4 For more on the need to include administrative capacity-building in a post-conflict context, see Blair (2007).
Security

For quite some time, the accepted standard of viable statehood has been Max Weber’s notion of a bargain between state and citizenry which accords to the state a legitimate monopoly over the use of violence, in return for which the state provides security of life (and usually property as well) to its citizens.\(^5\) This kind of ‘legitimacy’ is what citizens grant to the state in exchange for the security the latter provides to them. Since maintaining this monopoly over violence amounts to the *sine qua non* of a state’s existence, establishing and upholding it must be the first priority for any PCSB enterprise.\(^6\)

In most immediate post-conflict situations, attaining an initial monopoly of violence will mean a concerted effort at the *disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration* (DDR) of former combatants into civilian society.\(^7\) It follows that DDR – or more accurately the ‘DD’ phases of DDR – will become the first challenge confronting any PCSB initiative, which implies that a DDR strategy will have to be devised before any activity can begin. Usually this task is undertaken by a UN-mandated or organized peacekeeping force, which can number high thousands in some cases. How many troops and specific disarmament programmes will be needed critically depends on the situation at the time of their deployment as well as their state of training and discipline, which can vary greatly from one PCSB effort to another.

The ‘DD’ phase of DDR is supposed to be followed by the ‘R’ phase, the reintegration of ex-combatants. This has generally been more prob-

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\(^5\) Weber’s early 20\(^{th}\)-century formulation derives from Thomas Hobbes’s mid-17\(^{th}\)-century account of the same bargain. Weber’s notion of the monopoly over violence is widely appreciated in the PCSB literature (e.g., Kraus and Jutersonke 2005, Milliken and Krause 2002, Schwarz 2005).

\(^6\) Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say something like essentially upholding it. States like India and Thailand do not enjoy a monopoly of violence over 100\% of their territories, yet they are not seriously threatened by the festering violent minor conflicts they face in various territorial enclaves.

\(^7\) ‘Most’ situations does not mean all. In some (like East Timor), there will be few combatants left with arms, whilst in others (e.g. Afghanistan) there will be too many with arms to contemplate the first ‘D’ in DDR.
lematic than disarmament or demobilization, as donors have all too frequently failed to follow through on pledges made in the enthusiasm of the moment of the peace accord. Co-ordination has also been a serious issue, even when funding has arrived, as bilaterals tend to outsource rehabilitation activities like training to international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) with little attention being paid to making their contractors and grantees work together.

DDR is a challenging process for several reasons: it is almost impossible to control the supply of weapons or eliminate incentives to use weapons as part of identity politics or as a means of income; providing alternatives to former armed forces or ex-combatants proves a difficult task at best. Private sector growth is lacking and many ‘DD’ed’ people lack the education and skills to take up government work. The transition from disarmament to reintegration is therefore a complex and longer-term process.

It must be added that DDR does not concern only ex-combatants. There will also be huge numbers of refugees who have fled to other (usually neighbouring) countries and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have sought refuge somewhere within the country itself and now also need repatriation and reintegration. Together, the two groups will generally number hundreds of thousands and millions at times. Many will find their own way back home, but a very large proportion will need help to do so.

*Humanitarian assistance* inevitably accompanies any DDR initiative. Most PCSB efforts include the provision of food and shelter to large numbers of displaced persons at the front end. Fortunately, this task is one in which the donor community in general and the UN family in particular along with many INGOs have developed much hard-won expertise over the last several decades, and which usually moves along reasonably smoothly. Accordingly, it can be fitted in as appropriate. It should be noted, however, that, paradoxically, the humanitarian assistance provided by INGOs runs the risk of undermining the legitimacy of

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8 See UN, DDR report to SG, 2 March 2006: 4.
the state it intends to support by highlighting the government’s inability to provide such support. And the better the INGOs perform, the worse the state itself looks.

Though it is an extremely important first step in providing security, the DDR exercise constitutes only an initial step. Ongoing internal and external security must be sustained if the state is to remain a state. During the transitional period, the UN peacekeeping forces can generally accomplish this task, but preparation must be made for maintaining security after their departure. By the time of the peace accords, both the police and the military will probably have been thoroughly discredited or even altogether destroyed. Both institutions will probably have to be rebuilt, possibly en toto, depending on how ineffective and brutal they were during the conflict stage. This rebuilding may well be a massive, lengthy, and costly process.

**Political Governance**

The basic objective here is to secure and maintain the state’s legitimacy not just in the sense of exercising a monopoly over violence, but also in terms of deserving the allegiance and support of the population in return for responsiveness to the needs and desires of its people. Inasmuch as a principal reason for the conflict in the first place was the state’s failure to respond to these very needs and desires, as well as its lack of accountability for them, some serious state-building is in order. The post-conflict state will have to set up a constitutional order including effective executive and legislative authority to allow free and fair elections, to encourage independent media, to nurture an autonomous civil society, and to strengthen the rule of law. All of these are institutions which are either badly broken in the immediate post-conflict situation or never existed in the first place. In addition, the PCSB authority will have to identify and nurture a set of interim leaders as partners to manage the transitional state.\(^9\) In short, the state will have to perform politically as a

\(^9\) Fostering legitimate national authority basically consists of two different, but interrelated processes: a process for identifying national counterparts with which to engage and consult right after a peace or political agreement has been signed (and
state if it is to be legitimate. The requirements for doing so amount to a formidable list.

The first step in Political Governance will have to be establishing ‘operating rules of the political game’. This means a set of rules laying out how the polity will be administered over the transitional period in terms of structure (executive, legislative, judicial institutions and functions), participation (citizens’ rights, civil liberties), and accountability (especially elections). Some of these rules may be specified in the peace accords or perhaps in the pertinent UN resolution establishing the mandate. Others may already be stipulated in a constitution that essentially needs to be taken out of storage, dusted off, and put into effect. And still others will have to be established after the transitional governance structure has started operations, as it will not be possible to determine everything in advance. In any case, there has to be a set of rules determining what is or is not appropriate political behaviour, and these rules have to be accepted by all who wish to operate in the political arena.

Assuming that operating rules are in place, the central priority for Political Governance (and one often specified in the peace accords) has most often been preparing for a legitimizing national election to establish a representative national authority to which the international PCSB authority can hand over responsibility for those functions it has taken on. Whilst such a task would be quite straightforward (at least conceptually, if not always in practice) in circumstances where an election machinery is well established within an environment of long citizen experience with politics and voting, such as in Northern Ireland, in most PCSB countries there has been little or no machinery or experience to draw on, certainly in the recent past. Voter registration, civic education, candidate selection, campaign rules, balloting logistics (for voting, monitoring, counting), and post-election dispute resolution must all be provided for, often from scratch.

during an interim phase) up until a formal election establishes a new regime; and a
process to foster local ownership by consultation, local participation and the
building of legitimate political leadership.
In addition to their very real importance in determining who will steer the helm of state, these first elections often assume an incredibly significant role as a marker for both the PCSB donors and the recipient country, for they are perceived as designating the dividing line (which will hopefully prove to have been a watershed) between what was a transitional phase and a longer-lasting and well-structured developmental path. In the NEPAD framework, for example, elections constitute the end of the transitional phase of reconstruction and the beginning of its development phase (NEPAD 2005: 8).

But long before any election can take place, the PCSB authority must identify national counterparts with whom it can work in the meantime. Many and probably most of these persons will have been civil servants for the erstwhile government. Depending on the situation, however, it may well take considerable time and effort to locate them. In addition, it will be necessary to find, vet and recruit citizens who can play a policy-making and higher-level public management role as a political leadership stratum. Sometimes such leaders are determined through the peace accords, whilst in other instances some of them emerge from the professional Diaspora. Even when the international authority has what amounts to a trusteeship, it will still be necessary to locate such local counterparts, if only as policy consultants – an imperative that can only be ignored at considerable risk.

Two other elements of political participation and accountability requiring early attention are the media and civil society. In the course of the conflict preceding a peace accord, whatever independent print and broadcast media that existed earlier were in all probability either severely repressed or eliminated altogether. In many cases, neither existed at all independently of the state. In some cases, professionals from the Diaspora will return to assume or reassume responsibility for media bodies, but in others such institutions will have to start up ex nihilo. In any

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10 These nationals and their roles will be discussed under Administrative Governance below.

11 Such returnees often face resentment from those who stayed on through the conflict, though they can bring critical skills that would otherwise be missing.
event, it will be necessary to initiate serious efforts to build and strengthen independent media organizations, for essentially the same reasons that Alexis de Tocqueville thought them so important in the America he witnessed in the 1830s: the media inform citizens about what is happening and, just as importantly, the media enable citizens to find out what their fellows think about what is happening.

Civil society organizations are often less problematic, for even where they do not already exist, the immediate inflow of donor funds to the ‘third sector’ encourages new NGOs to form and move into action, and in many cases to provide services in sectors like health and education, where the former state had long failed in its obligations. In early days, some fraudulent ‘briefcase NGOs’ will divert donor funds to personal uses, and some well-meaning NGOs will founder and collapse through their own incompetence, but overall a pool of experience will build up, which will begin to make demands upon the state for accountability. Donor-sponsored advice and training can encourage that embryonic capacity to take up the kind of civil society advocacy that strengthens democratic pluralism by supporting groups representing minorities, women and other under-represented communities, as well as previously ignored fields like human rights and the environment.

The other three institutional structures noted in the first paragraph of this subsection are a legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. After elections have been held and a new government installed, donor attention will have to be directed to the legislature to build up its capacity to initiate policy and monitor the executive. Generally, however, these activities will come considerably later than the 24-month post-conflict timeframe employed in the present report, so they will not be covered here. Building up an effective executive decision-making capability depends on putting an executive in place (whether it be with a presidential or a parliamentary system), a step that will likewise come after the transitional period. As a mechanism for exercising accountability against the executive, the rule of law falls very much within this timeframe. How-

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12 Unlike administrative capacity, which is treated here under a separate heading (cf. Figure 1).
ever, it is so important that it forms a functional domain of its own, to be discussed below.

**Economic Governance**

This domain comprises four functions, all essential to the promotion of economic recovery and growth and all almost certain to be in more or less total disrepair at the outset of the PCSB process. The first and most immediate task is to nurture a *market economy* back into life. Some activities will begin almost immediately, for instance, setting up mobile phone systems (even where they did not exist in the pre-conflict era), but others will need considerable support, such as assisting credit facilities to support wholesale trade, transport, export promotion and the like. Even small-scale retailing may need help in the way of establishing market locations, though petty trading can be relied upon for the most part to resurrect itself.  

A second need is to *generate employment*. In most PCSB contexts, whilst there may be some employment in manufacturing or natural resource extraction, numbers tend to be quite small, so opportunities will lie primarily in construction, the service sector, and agriculture. Repairing the damage wrought by the conflict will make some jobs available, and the service sector will offer more – particularly in transportation and retail trading. Emergency job creation schemes can absorb numbers of ex-combatants and unemployed youth in these sectors, but all these occupations quickly become overrun with people offering to work. Accordingly, as the residual sector, agriculture will have to absorb the majority of the labour force in most PCSB countries.

The third challenge needing attention is *public finance*: getting control over the national budget, resuscitating a central bank, setting up an environment to support the banking sector, scooping out sources of state revenue, and so on. High-level corruption and the siphoning off of state assets was probably a main reason for the former regime forfeiting its

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13 Donors can help stimulate the retail market economy by procuring supplies and equipment locally, where possible.
legitimacy. Consequently, much effort may be required to prevent new elites from pursuing similar behaviour patterns; in addition to the political effects of elite venality, there are the economic consequences: public funds drained off into private pockets cannot become state revenues. And while things can coast along for a little while on the influx of foreign aid that comes with the peace accords, that largesse will soon begin to dry up, and the state will be hard pressed to raise revenues on its own. A fourth need is for state management of natural resources, real property assets, state-owned enterprises, and the environment. In a number of African countries, natural resources like diamonds were in effect privatized, initially by ruling elites and later by warlords for their own profit. In others, agricultural produce was similarly diverted both in the case of legal crops like cocoa and coffee and illegal ones such as poppy and coca. Often the environment has suffered great damage, as with uncontrolled timber logging.

Administrative Governance

The first Administrative Governance task will simply be to start paying government workers, who have been unpaid for months or even years in most post-conflict cases. Many of them have left their jobs and have perhaps become refugees or IDPs; those still with jobs have become badly demoralized after having no pay or possibility of working productively for a long time, and, of course, the services they provided have severely deteriorated or even disintegrated altogether. But some – probably a sizeable portion – of these employees will either still be at their posts or can be located and induced to return. If they are to begin getting drinking water, electricity, fire protection, waste removal, etc., back into working order, however, they must be given some minimal incentive to do so. They must be regularly paid their salaries. And especially for the most competent civil servants, these salaries must be adequate to prevent people from gravitating to the better-paying international community, where UN agencies, INGOs and embassies can offer much better remuneration.

14 In many cases, a Diaspora offers a rich source of expertise that can be tapped to help with the rebuilding effort.
In PCSB’s early days, as the civil service begins to pull itself back together, donors will find they have to rely on INGOs and foreign contractors to provide a large portion of (perhaps even virtually all) basic social services. But soon funding for expatriate operations will begin to dry up, so it will become necessary to start building domestic capacity to provide essential services. Some of this capacity can come from the non-public sector through in-country NGOs or private businesses on contract, but much will have to come from the public sector itself in the form of direct provision or oversight of non-state providers to ensure that standards are met and fraud prevented. This will mean a massive reform and civil service rebuilding effort to turn what was an ineffective and corrupt state administration into a capable and honest one which can both manage the higher tiers of the system dealing with public finance, state assets, and the like, and can deliver the services that the state has to provide, such as electricity, education, etc.\footnote{The state can monitor the provision of those services (e.g., electricity) that might be allocated to the private sector. For a more extensive discussion of post-conflict civil service rebuilding, see Blair (2007).}

Now comes what the bureaucracy actually does: provide *infrastructure* and *essential services*. The country’s basic infrastructure is sure to be in a state of sad disrepair, with unusable roads, disabled electric grids, destroyed water systems, shattered port facilities etc. All these have to be re-established and maintained, and the services that use these facilities will have to be restored: transport, electric supply, drinking water, shipping, etc.

A final casualty of the conflict is probably *investment in human capital*. Schools will have operated only haphazardly in much of the country, if they functioned at all. Older children will have missed several years’ education, and younger ones will not have entered the school system at all.

Likewise, the health delivery system will have badly deteriorated, so that gastro-intestinal diseases, mosquito-borne infirmities and the like have become epidemic, with severe consequences on life expectancy. More-
over, the challenge will not simply be one of restoring the status quo ante, for the levels of pre-conflict human capital investment were almost surely both inadequate and biased towards urban areas and elite constituencies within those areas. Even to begin providing equitable investment in human capital will require a great deal of work.

**Judicial Governance**

There are two primary needs here. One is for truth and reconciliation efforts to begin bringing some relief and closure to those who have suffered abuses and atrocities during the conflict period. Prosecution of the more serious offenders can be postponed for a while, to allow the situation to stabilize. Sooner or later, however, to the extent that the PCSB enterprise succeeds, increasingly widespread demands are sure to mount to bring the more egregious perpetrators to justice, as recent evidence from countries like Argentina and Chile has amply demonstrated.

But of at least equal – and arguably greater – importance is the whole judicial sector itself. For while truth and reconciliation efforts go on – or even if they become stalled – the regular judicial system is sure to need a major salvage effort to pull it out of the near total dysfunctionality into which the rule of law has almost certainly fallen. A civil law system will have to be rejuvenated to establish and guarantee the contract and property laws that will be necessary if the economy is to attract entrepreneurship and investment from home or abroad. The criminal justice system will also have to be rehabilitated if personal security and protection from criminal behaviour are to contribute to the legitimacy the state will need in order to survive. Finally, the judicial system should provide a check on the state itself – a process for citizens to seek redress against state abuses. Thus, courts will have to be renovated, equipped and staffed with qualified persons, such as judges, prosecutors and administrative personnel. These are all daunting prospects.

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16 As with infrastructure and general service provision, inequalities in human capital investment were probably high on the lists of grievances that precipitated the conflict in the first place. Along with Political Governance, Administrative Governance functions will have to be performed adequately for the state to attain legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens.
During transitional phases, there will inevitably be an overlap between a new or refurbished rule of law paradigm based on liberal principles/international norms and traditional justice systems. Before and even during the conflict, customary law and other traditional legal practices may have operated more or less unaffected at the local level. Even in a post-conflict setting, these practices may offer helpful alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the absence of a formal and codified legal system. Customary law is certainly not a panacea for the contemporary rule of law vacuum, but building on its assets can help while longer-term efforts to build the formal system are under way.

III. Prioritizing and Sequencing

This section will begin by distinguishing which among the five domains and 18 core functions most immediately need to be addressed once a UN mandate has been put into place. Then some approaches will be developed to prioritizing the remaining functions in a phasing process.

The First Phase: Most Critical Functions

All the functions that have been discussed could be termed ‘critical’ – for criticality is after all the basic idea of ‘core state functions’ that must be handled in the post-conflict situation. Each of the functions on the list in Figure 1 will have to be fulfilled, if the state is to endure over time as a viable system. But are some functions ‘more critical’ than others? The answer depends, of course, on the context, but it can be said that several could be considered ‘most critical’ – especially those needed in the very short run, immediately after the peace accord or another instrument takes effect.
In Figure 2, the PCSB timeframe has been divided into three phases.\(^{17}\) The initial start-up phase comprises the time between the UN mandate and the setting up of a transitional governance structure, generally several months as peacekeeping troops get into place. The second phase basically denotes the lifetime of the transitional arrangement. The third phase begins with the handover of authority to a domestic governing structure, with the division between the second and third phases generally marked by a national election occurring somewhere around 18-24 months after the initial peace accords.\(^{18}\) For each phase in Figure 2, some core state functions have been described as ‘most critical’ (heavy shading in the figure), others as somewhat less critical, but nonetheless serious (medium shading), and still others as having a lower priority (no shading). Needless to say, the exact designation of ‘most critical’ will differ from one post-conflict situation to another, but the basic idea of making these distinctions should remain valid across all PCSB experiences.

Security

The most obviously critical of these functions lies within the Security domain, i.e. establishing a *legitimate monopoly on the means of violence both external and internal*. Without this, as was only too evident in collapsed state situations like that experienced in Liberia in the 1990s or Somalia in the present decade, nothing else can work. To attain that monopoly entails taking charge of the DDR process, beginning with the DD phase.

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\(^{17}\) The original idea for the three phases comes from CSIS/AUSA (2002). The word ‘phase’ implies that the first phase stops before the second one begins, but in PCSB the phases really overlap. Work on restoring the electric grid, for example, must begin at the beginning of PCSB. The use of the ‘phase’ idea here thus differs somewhat from that of others like CSIS/AUSA (2002) and NEPAD (2005), which have employed a more strictly sequential approach.

\(^{18}\) This is the result of a study covering 16 cases (Ammitzboell and Torjesen 2006).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional domains</th>
<th>Core function</th>
<th>First phase (up to 4-5 months after UN mandate)</th>
<th>Second phase (up to 18-24 months after UN mandate)</th>
<th>Third phase (begins with turnover)</th>
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<td>Security</td>
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Key: 
- Urgent & heavy priority
- Serious but less urgent priority
- Lower priority
The R for reintegration in DDR is also most critical, for unless the ex-combatants are reintegrated into civilian life as contributing members of society, they will soon embroil both themselves and society in trouble again. Experience to date with the ‘R’ has been considerably less than totally successful, it is true, but this only means that better methods have to be developed. Even before DD begins to unfold, though, refugees and IDPs will begin to try to return home, generating chaos in the transportation system and needing food and shelter as they work their way home-wards. Accordingly, repatriation will be among the first orders of business, and humanitarian assistance to them will quickly become a most critical function.

Economic Governance

Yet externally provided security does not by itself automatically translate into institutional development and capacity-building. Other functional domains must be addressed right away as well, most especially that of Economic Governance. DDR for ex-combatants and repatriation for civilian displaced persons will not achieve any lasting results, unless there is work for those who have gone through these procedures, so employment generation has to be very high on the ‘most critical list’.

Getting a market system working again and strengthening private sector growth will also quickly become ‘most critical’, for the entire population – citizens who remained in place during the conflict as well as ex-combatants and civilian returnees – will need to obtain food and other basic necessities. A large proportion in each category will have been living from hand –to mouth for some time before the conflict ended, and collectively they will put immense pressure on PCSB authorities to enable them to obtain the necessities of life. Humanitarian assistance operations will, of course, meet some of the needs here in the short run, but even a huge scale of effort will not fill the gap, and in any event cannot be sustained for very long. Thus, market formation and maintenance for subsistence necessities will have to be a ‘most critical’ function. Some kind of currency will have to be made available, key farm-to-market transport links re-established, wholesalers for consumer dry goods enabled to resume operations, etc.
Administrative Governance

The civil service itself will probably be in a state of meltdown by the time the PCSB authority begins work, unpaid for months on end, demoralized, and with little incentive to return to work. Putting civil servants (or at least the essential ones – ‘ghost workers’ can be dealt with later on) on a payroll and back to work will surely be a ‘most critical’ function.

Second Phase: Transition

Security

Security does not stop with DDR; post-conflict countries need policing and border control, both of which have generally become vitiated, if not altogether defunct, during the conflict period. Reconstituting both must be a high priority. In some settings like Liberia, rebuilding the police will be most important, whilst in others, like East Timor, creating a national military force may assume equal priority with the police. Cross-border movement of arms and ex-combatants can also be a major threat, as in Afghanistan.

The DD enterprise will have wound down by the end of the first phase – indeed the completion of both the Ds in DD will be one of the markers signifying the movement from the first to the second phase. Similarly, refugees and IDPs will have returned home, and humanitarian assistance will have largely (if not completely) come to an end. Reintegration, however, will most likely be ongoing for both ex-combatants and returnees, who will continue to need assistance in readjusting to ordinary life.

Political Governance

Creating a monopoly over violence will establish the state (or pro tempore the PCSB authority itself, backed up by its peacekeeping force) as the countrywide epicentre of power and control. As long as it keeps its side of the ‘social contract’ (providing security to the population against non-state actors in exchange for their not challenging its monopoly over
violence), the state can retain that monopoly. But in any longer time-frame the state must acquire political credibility and legitimacy, which it can only do by providing services, fostering political participation, and establishing accountability. The first step along this path is generally a new constitution or establishment of interim ‘operating rules of the political game’ that can serve to guide the nation toward a legitimizing national election that will determine to whom the PCSB authority will hand over its power in a transition.

To facilitate both these endeavours, civil society and the media must acquire enough capacity both to publicize what is going on in the political arena and to enforce some accountability against the players operating in that arena. This latter point becomes especially important as the other two main agencies for exercising political accountability will not yet be up and running. The electoral process is not in place yet (it generally comes at the end of the second phase) and the judiciary probably has not become capable of playing any serious role either.

Economic Governance

Management of public finance constitutes another second-phase priority. A regulatory framework must be developed, currency must be stabilized, banks must be empowered to grant credit, foreign exchange facilities must be set up, revenue sources for the state must be established, a national budget must be developed and adhered to, and corruption must be curtailed to sustainable levels (assuming that it will never be eliminated). Employment generation will continue to demand serious attention in the second phase, for all the ex-combatants and returnees (to say nothing of all those whose income streams were disrupted by the conflict, but who stayed in place) will not have found work by the time the first phase ends. Both unemployment and underemployment will remain unacceptably high.

Administrative Governance

For a post-conflict country to move beyond re-establishing bare subsistence (or even to move very far into it), basic infrastructure and service
delivery will have to be restored. The road (possibly rail as well) net-
work will have to be made usable, which in most countries will entail
rebuilding bridges and culverts as well as repairing the roads themselves.
The electric grid – always one of the easiest and most vulnerable targets
during conflict – will need to be reconstituted. Water and sewage ser-
vices in the towns must be put back in working order. And for countries
enjoying access to the sea, port facilities will have to be made usable
again.

As the initial wave of INGO providers recedes, a thoroughgoing and
lengthy bureaucratic reform process will have to be undertaken to incul-
cate new skills and – more important by far – new norms of probity and
concern with the public weal.19 The second phase is the time to launch
such an effort, which can be significantly aided by civil society and the
media in promoting transparency and demanding accountability.

As implied just above, a major task for the civil service will be to man-
age human capital investment, particularly in the education and health
sectors. Both are invariably early casualties in conflict situations, and
where protracted conflict has engendered state collapse or where occu-
pying military forces have deliberately destroyed all facilities providing
these services, a concerted (and costly) effort will be needed to reopen
and re-operate them.

Judicial Governance

As noted earlier, this domain comprises two main functions, Rule of Law
(ROL) and Truth and Reconciliation (T&R). Citizen clamour will be for
T&R, and this is important, for people must believe that what happened
to them and to their families and neighbours during the conflict will not
be forgotten and ignored by the new polity or by history. Even if ac-
countability and retribution cannot be had immediately, recognition of
wrongs is sorely needed and can be established through truth commis-
sions, and reconciliation can at least be initiated. Accordingly, efforts to
set up a T&R commission should be launched in the first phase, but this

19 For more on these themes, see Blair (2007).
will take a while to accomplish. A T&R commission cannot be expected to begin any serious work until the second or even third phase. So it will be the case in the latter two phases that T&R becomes a top priority, as indicated in Figure 2.

The justice system itself will almost invariably exhibit deeper pathologies than T&R, for it has been around for much longer, generally in various degrees of indolence and decrepitude. It is arguably both the most difficult sector of all to reform (because of all the encrustations built up over time) and the easiest to ignore (because so many of its abuses like inaccessibility, huge case backlogs, and overflowing prisons are hidden from public view and affect society in a chronic rather than an acute manner). But ROL reform will be critical for the state to gain (and retain) legitimacy over time and if the economy is to function at much more than subsistence level. Accordingly, planning for such reform should begin in the first phase, and the reforms themselves should receive high-priority attention in the second and third phases (and beyond, for they will take many years fully to implement).

The process of building capacity in this sector can be measurably speeded up by strengthening *customary legal systems*, which often exist – often at several levels – to take some of the burden away from the formal judicial system. Though generally looked down upon as hopelessly primitive by those in the formal legal structure, these traditional systems have enormous potential as alternative dispute resolution bodies that have built public trust over the years and can materially reduce formal court backlogs.

**Third Phase: Post-Handover**

The third phase consists of the remaining core state functions not initiated earlier. As with those in the first and second phases, these functions will have to be provided for the state to continue in business over time, but the need for them to be up and running is not as great as for those

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20 For a discussion of ROL reform, see Stromseth et al. (2006), also Carothers (1999: 170-177; and 2006).
placed in the first two phases. It should also be noted that a number of the core functions begun in the first phase (e.g., employment generation) and especially the second phase (e.g., human capital investment, judicial reform) will have to be carried over to this final phase.

In the Economic Governance domain, countries with exploitable natural resources like oil, diamonds, and metals will have to assert control over them and administer their extraction and disposition. Historically, where they exist they have been pillaged and frequently privatized on a de facto basis (though they may officially have remained in the public sector). During the conflict they were commandeered by military factions for foreign sale with proceeds going toward personal profit and to sustain the combat effort. And in the post-conflict era, their exploitation is subject to corruption at all levels, especially at the top of the political hierarchy. The result of this history has been a state exchequer perennially starved of resources to support development (the ‘resource curse’ did not get its name for nothing). Much the same considerations apply to exportable cash crops, both legal (diverted through para-statals) and illegal (controlled by mafia-like organizations). Managing the disposition of these resources and cash crops, whether they are in the public or private sector, has to be a critical priority for the state.

With respect to Administrative Governance, the state management of service delivery activities will have to receive high priority in the third phase. In particular, the state directly (or indirectly through domestic NGOs) will have to replace the INGOs that were delivering essential services, even though the civil service rebuilding begun in the second phase will not have been completed by this time. But foreign funding will have begun to dry up by now, and, perhaps more importantly, continued reliance on outside sources will tend to preclude the state from strengthening its own capacity to provide services.

An additional comment would be in order at this point, relating to the planning of these functions. All will need some planning, of course, but

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21 ‘Cash crops’ should here be interpreted to include commodities like rubber, coffee and cocoa, but also timber.
several of those in the second and third phases will require planning far in advance of implementation. In particular, planning should begin immediately for elections, natural resource and crop disposition management, service delivery management and rule of law. All these functions will take considerable time to become operable – at least a couple of years before a credible election can be held and much longer before the rule of law will be effectively in place – but planning for them and investment in them should already begin when the PCSB authority commences its work. An initial delineation of phases would be appropriate in the assessment exercise that comes during the first phase, as the PCSB authority gets itself into action. Thus, any initial assessment report should lay out a set of phase guidelines.

Conclusions

This essay has tried to develop a flexible template that incorporates all the critical functions which sustainable states must perform and that can be adapted to most post-conflict state-building operations during the first two to three years. Each situation is, of course, unique, but the virtue of this template is that it can be adapted to whatever particularities might arise.

In most post-conflict experiences there will be several opportunities to determine the priorities and sequencing of the template and to modify both. The first will come with the peace accord or agreement that puts a formal end to the conflict itself. The parameters set out then will necessarily be more than somewhat determined by the exigencies of the moment, but a chance to amend things will come with the UN Security Council mandate that generally follows soon. A third chance for mid-course corrections will come in a post-mandate needs assessment, when inputs can be gathered both domestically and internationally as to what needs to be done when. And finally, periodic reviews of the peacekeeping operation afford further chances to adjust priorities and sequencing. A flexible template of the sort proposed here should prove well suited to such a series of opportunities for modification.
References


Preserving the Present as Past: The Role of Historians in Unconventional Operations

Tom Mockaitis

The task of the historian, proclaimed the great German scholar Leopold von Ranke, is to portray the past ‘as it really was’ (‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’). This rather obvious and seemingly simplistic formulation represented in its day an effort to turn what had been a branch of literature or ‘philosophy teaching by example’ into a modern discipline employing scientific methods to study the past. Known as the ‘father of modern historicism’, Ranke defined the canons of the field as they stand today. The historian examines primary sources, documents and artifacts from the period under study, and uses them to reconstruct and interpret events. However, since these sources are always fragmentary, incomplete, and removed from the complex context in which they were written, reconstructing the past ‘as it really was’ is no small task. To create a meaningful narrative, the historian must employ what philosopher of history R.G. Collingwood described as historical imagination, the ability to create ‘a web of imaginative construction stretched between certain fixed points provided by statements of his authorities [i.e., historical sources]’.

While traditional historians trying to reconstruct a long-dead past face a daunting enough task, scholars studying contemporary military operations encounter additional challenges. If they work for the military, they may deploy with the troops and, as official historians, they have greater access to documents and participants, but they may face pressure to provide a preferred version of events. If they are independent historians

doing field research, they are under less pressure to produce a specific interpretation, but have less access to sources and must worry about their own safety. Both official and independent historians often interview soldiers who participated in events. If they study current conflicts, they might even observe the activities of troops in the field and interview soldiers and local people during operations. Engaging in oral history puts them in the unique position of creating documents that they will then use to write their own ‘objective’ histories of events. How military historians meet the unusual challenges of their field determines the value of their work.

Military History and the Historical Profession

For the last half century, military history has been marginalized within the historical community as a whole. While this marginalization is most pronounced in the United States, it also occurs in many other Western nations. Few American universities have chairs of military history, let alone the departments of War Studies common in Europe. In an excellent essay on the ‘State of Military History’, Mark Moyar noted the disdain with which the historical profession views those who study war:

Historians unfamiliar with military history are often inclined to believe that military history is a simple business that does not require much intellectual skill or creativity, a misperception derived from a vision of military history as little more than a chronology of generals and battles.3

The popular appeal of books about war adds to the profession’s distrust, as the derogatory label ‘popularizer’ levelled at anyone writing for the general educated reader attests.

The prejudice of the historical profession towards military history has two unfortunate effects. First, it produces schizophrenia in study of the past. Even though armed conflict has been nearly continuous throughout human history, most historians never study it; for their part, military historians often study war in isolation from its broader social, political,

and economic context. This approach operates to the detriment of both. Marginalizing the study of war also isolates military historians from their colleagues studying other aspects of the past. With university and college departments distaining to hire them, military historians usually work for military and government institutions. This isolation deprives civilian students of valuable courses on war and makes the work of military historians even more suspect to non-military historians.

**Conventional Research Methods and Unconventional Fieldwork**

Military historians use the same methods to study the past as other historians. They survey the secondary literature, identify research questions, locate sources, and draw the best conclusions they can from the available evidence. As they often use sensitive materials, however, they frequently encounter frustrating roadblocks. Most governments restrict access to official documents for an extended period of time. Britain’s Public Records Act (1958) closed all documents for a minimum of 30 years and sensitive records for up to a century. The British Freedom of Information Act (2000) gives British subjects the right to request access to documents as soon as they are created, but exempts those related to security. The U.S. Freedom of Information Act asserts the government’s responsibility to make records available, but allows exemptions for security reasons. Rather than close files, government departments black out sensitive information on documents released. Other countries have similar laws that restrict access to documents on wars, making the military historian’s task more difficult.

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Besides the problem of getting access to official records on past wars, historians writing about recent and contemporary conflicts face additional challenges. To begin with, they study events soon after they have ended or as they unfold, well before the consequences of the conflict play out. Due to these limitations, many scholars maintain that such accounts are not really serious historical works. ‘Official histories’, in particular, i.e. official accounts written by historians or military officers for the military, do tend to chronicle events rather than analyze them. These accounts then become primary sources used by other historians to write more analytical works.

The Problem of Objectivity

Official historians face an additional challenge, the problem of maintaining objectivity while researching and writing about an institution for which they work. Loath to bite the hand that feeds them, they are usually reluctant to be overly critical of the operations they chronicle. I know of at least one historian at a staff college who was asked to change a conclusion because ‘the general would not like it’. Most official historians understand this caveat with having to be told explicitly to tread carefully. Even when they produce excellent analytical works, official historians fall under the suspicion of being mouthpieces of the organizations for which they work.

Even when the institution exerts no direct or indirect pressure, the official historian faces a more subtle danger of co-option. People who work together tend to bond. The official historian may thus be predisposed to portray the actions of the units about which he/she writes in the most positive light. This problem is similar to that faced by many embedded journalists during the invasion of Iraq. Assigned to specific combat units the country, these journalists felt that they had a better view of tactical-level combat than they would have by remaining in the rear. However, they also admitted that they tended to see things from the point of view
of the military and worried that they lacked sufficient detachment to be critical of what they observed.\footnote{For a discussion of these issues see Shahira Fahmy and Thomas Johnson, ‘How We Performed: Embedded Journalists’ Attitudes and Perceptions Towards Covering the Iraq War’, in: \textit{Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly} (June 1, 2005), 301-217.}

Official historians are seldom as close to combat as embedded journalists, but they face the same tension. The canons of their profession demand commitment to the truth, no matter how unpleasant. Self-interest and loyalty urge them to portray the institutions to which they belong and its members in the best possible light. Writing about current or recent conflict heightens this tension. Soldiers do not take well to academic critics, whom they feel do not understand the experience of combat. This resentment increases when memories and emotions, often surrounding the deaths of comrades, are fresh and raw.

Official historians may also encounter institutional resistance and even popular criticism if they challenge cherished notions of conflicts further in the past. Wars often form part of a nation’s foundational mythology, a narrative that uses events to create a flattering version of the collective past.\footnote{Benedict Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities} (London: Verso, 1983), 165-183.} The popular insistence by their children and grandchildren that those who fought World War II constitute ‘the greatest generation’ illustrates this point.\footnote{Tom Brokaw, \textit{The Greatest Generation} (New York: Random House, 2004) popularized this notion.} European nations occupied by the Germans during that war provide a further example of this tendency. They often resent historical claims that their parents and grandparents may have collaborated with as much (if not more) than they resisted their occupiers, especially in their treatment of Jews.

**Oral History**

Since military historians frequently use oral testimony to construct their narratives, this method of research deserves special attention. Oral history requires the historian to construct a set of questions to ask inter-

\footnote{For a discussion of these issues see Shahira Fahmy and Thomas Johnson, ‘How We Performed: Embedded Journalists’ Attitudes and Perceptions Towards Covering the Iraq War’, in: \textit{Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly} (June 1, 2005), 301-217.}
viewees. The goal is to get the subject to recall his/her experiences, which the interviewer then uses as a primary source along with other evidence. A good interviewer encourages the subject to relate the past without leading him/her to conclusions the interviewer wants to hear. The oral historian thus creates the very document he/she then uses.

While the interviewer must guard against introducing his/her own bias, the real problem of oral history lies with the nature of human memory. Interviews often take place years after the events under study. The interviewees will have forgotten much of what occurred. In the case of traumatic events, they may suppress or alter their memories or simply refuse to share them. Interviewees may also be self-conscious about their own behavior. In her oral history, Frauen: German Women Recall the Third Reich, Allison Owings found that guilt and denial caused many of her subjects to disclaim or rationalize their support for the Nazis.

Oral history can expose even independent historians to a milder form of the tension experienced by official historians. A good interviewer empathizes with the interviewee. Generous hospitality in the form of food and drink provided by a person delighted that someone wants to hear his/her story can compromise the historian’s objectivity. In many countries, those interviewed enjoy a kind of common law copyright over their remarks. Unless they sign a release form prior to the interview, something a soldier will almost never do, they have the right to review and approve how the historian uses their remarks. The historian may thus be limited in how he uses the material gathered from interviews.

**Unique Challenges of Unconventional Conflict**

In addition to the challenges faced by all military historians, those researching and writing about unconventional conflicts face compounded difficulties. The operations they cover are more diffuse and chaotic than

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conventional wars. There are no frontlines and rear areas, no major battles, and few epic events. Missions often consist of dozens of nations and sometimes hundreds of non-governmental, inter-governmental, international and private volunteer organizations. Simply making sense of the myriad of actors and their actions can be a daunting task.

My experience studying civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) during the Kosovo mission illustrates this complexity. Like any historian, I began by reading the secondary literature and conducting primary source research using United Nations documents. I soon realized that I would need to visit Kosovo to observe first-hand how the post-conflict peace building mission was progressing. I obtained a copy of the CIMIC plan briefing from Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), which I later learned bore no relationship to anything actually in place on the ground. Doing field research in Kosovo required getting permission from five different military establishments, a fraction of the total deployed, but a representative sample that included at least one troop-contributing nation from each of the five brigade areas of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). I also arranged to speak with representatives from the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and some NGOs. I followed this field work up with a research trip to Geneva, Switzerland to meet more representatives of the humanitarian community. What emerged from this extensive study was a picture not of a unified mission, but of at least five missions, one from each brigade area with several sub-missions and little unity of effort.¹²

Conclusion

Historical research is the art of the possible. The most interesting historical questions have little value if there are no sources to answer them. Historians must make the best use of the available evidence to recon-

¹² The research was funded by the U.S. Institute of Peace and resulted in publication of Thomas R. Mockaitis, Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: the Case of Kosovo (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies, U.S. Army War College, 2004).
struct and interpret the past. Often fragmentary and incomplete, the historical record requires the historian to exercise imagination while clearly distinguishing between undisputed fact and speculation ‘held tightly in check by the voices of the past’, to use a phrase coined by Natalie Zemon Davis. Historians’ works then become part of a body of literature, reviewed, disputed, and expanded upon by other historians.

Military historians face the same challenges as their colleagues studying other areas of the past. In addition, they must confront an array of issues unique to their discipline. As chroniclers of unfolding events or practitioners of oral history, they create sources that they then use for their own projects. They should then be make the recordings or transcripts of their interviews available to other historians by depositing them in archives. Often separate from and frequently held in low regard by the larger historical community, military historians frequently find their objectivity questioned. Those working for military and other government organizations face a real tension between the demands of their discipline and loyalty to the institutions that employ them. This tension heightens when the historian actually deploys with a military unit during an active conflict. The decentralized, often chaotic nature of unconventional war further complicates their task. The challenges facing military historians seem at times so daunting that they might be tempted to abandon the field, were it not for the fact that what they study is too important to be ignored.

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The Role of U.S. Historians in Peace & Stability Operations

Bianka J. Adams

*History is the last thing we care about during operations and the first thing we want afterwards. Then it is too late.*
Colonel William Ganoe, Chief Historian-Europe, World War II

In the United States, the U.S. Army is the service with the most extensive field historical program. Whilst the Navy, the Marines, and the Air Force also assemble and deploy teams of combat historians to collect historical records and to conduct oral history interviews, their programs are comparatively limited and their teams are constituted mostly on an ad hoc basis.¹ All the programs, however, serve the same purpose – to acquire a written and organized record of the achievements, experiences and sacrifices of units, soldiers, and sailors. Without it, the services would lose much of their institutional memory and would be the poorer for it.

The U.S. Army has a long tradition of field historical collection. During World War I, Secretary of War Newton Baker aimed at preserving war records in a systematic way when he ordered the establishment of a Historical Branch of the War Plans Division within the Army’s General Staff. The branch was to collate historical materials and prepare a number of monographs from the documentation. With no personnel assigned to conduct interviews in the field, however, the collection was of limited use to military historians interested in operations. Postwar personnel reduction in the Historical Branch also prevented the production of an analytical and documented history of the Army’s participation in the war. Finally, the remaining staff categorized the mass of documents col-

lected according to topics covering different aspects of the Great War and published them in volumes without analysis.¹

World War II brought a sea change for the Army’s historical program. In 1943, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall ordered the establishment of an additional Historical Branch in the G-2 Department, i.e. the Military Intelligence Division. The new branch was also to collect and compile historical records and to write a comprehensive account of the war. In addition, it was responsible for producing short monographs on selected combat actions for training and planning purposes. It became the fourteen-volume *American Forces in Action* series.² To create these timely and relevant accounts that offered some ‘lessons learned’, it was imperative to gather and to preserve historical materials at forward headquarters in the theater and to conduct oral history interviews with soldiers of all ranks as soon as possible after an action. In December 1943, Colonel Samuel L. A. Marshall, a reporter from Detroit who had made a name for himself as a military analyst, was the first to put together a team of two officers and one enlisted man to conduct combat interviews in the Pacific Theater of Operations. He perfected the group interview as a means for reconstructing what had actually happened during combat.³ The concept of a small, mobile history collection unit later became the standard. In the European Theater of Operations, Col. William A. Ganoe, the theater historian, organized Information and Historical Service teams of two officers and three enlisted men for each corps. Nearly three hundred officers and men worked in the historical units during the war.

Between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War, the Army took steps to expand and institutionalize the collection of historical materials and the writing of its official history. As it was no longer adequate for the new mission, in 1945 the Army removed the old Historical Branch from G-2 and re-established it as a division of its own under the command of a general officer in the Special Staff. By 1950, further expansion of its mandate and size warranted its re-designation as the Office of the Chief of Military History, the direct predecessor of today’s U.S. Army Center of Military History.5

During the same period, one of twenty-seven Information and Historical Service units of World War II remained on active duty until 1949 with the other twenty-six becoming a trained reservoir in the Organized Reserve Corps. When the Korean War broke out a year later, the Army had reorganized Military History Detachments into two ‘A’, six ‘B’, and four ‘C’ teams to support theater, corps, or divisional level commands. Each ‘A’ team had three historians, two officers and one non-commissioned officer, and a clerk and a driver, the ‘B’ teams had a major in command of a clerk and a driver, and a captain commanded the ‘C’ teams. One ‘A’, three ‘B’, and four ‘C’ teams were deployed to Korea. Whereas the concept looked good on paper, the teams were beset with problems as the war dragged on. The gravest of them was lack of support from line units that did not quite understand their purpose.6

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6 Wright, ‘Clio in Combat,’ p. 4.
During the Vietnam War, a total of thirty-five active Army detachments, comprising one officer-historian and a driver/clerk, collected historical records and conducted field interviews with bulky tape recorders. Corps, divisional, separate brigade, or equivalent sized headquarters received the teams, assigned them tasks and provided support – at least in theory. In practice, many commanders used the detachments to fill in as additional personnel in headquarters sections that were short of manpower, or simply ignored them. Following the Vietnam War, the Army reorganized the detachments again in the 1970s, when they assumed their current size and structure. One officer – usually a major who was ideally a professional historian or held an additional skill identifier as ‘Historian’ (5X), meaning that he had received professional academic training in the field of military history – commanded two non-commissioned officers, usually a sergeant first class and a staff sergeant. In combat and contingency operations, the mission of the small, independent Military History Detachment (MHD) was to collect historical material to supplement the historical records of Army units in the field. Theoretically, each theater
army, corps, division, separate combined arms brigade, armored cavalry regiment, and logistical or support command would have one MHD assigned or attached. In reality, though, depending on the extent of operations, not all units would receive a detachment because their number was limited. Military History Detachments served again during the Gulf War in 1990-1991 and during peace-keeping operations in the Balkans from 1996 to 1998.

![Figure 2 Military History Detachment Personnel and Equipment](Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History)

After the terrorist attacks on 11 September, 2001 and with the beginning of the war in Afghanistan a month later, the 44th MHD (Regular Army),

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7 Wright, ‘Clio in Combat’, p. 5; Field Manual No. 1–20 Military History Operations, p. 3-7-9.
the Center of Military History, and the U.S. Army Reserve Command endeavored to formalize Military History Detachment training.\(^8\) The program envisioned a three-phase cycle of military history readiness exercises. Phase one was Exercise Delbrück – named for Hans Delbrück, a nineteenth-century German officer who was the first to apply scientific methods for capturing history through the use of military records. Phase two was named Exercise S.L.A.M. for Col. S. L. A. Marshall, and phase three was Exercise Clio – named after the muse of history. Detachments would demonstrate their competence in performing four core skills: identifying and collecting historical artifacts; conducting oral history interviews; assembling photographic documentation; and collecting historical documents. Phase one of the training program was supposed to take place at the Civil War Chickamauga battlefield. In the second phase, the MHD would be deployed to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin in California, and in the third phase it would take part in a full-scale military exercise.\(^9\)

From 2002 until 2006, military history detachment training consisted of two weeks using the Civil War Chattanooga battlefield as the training location. Exercise Delbrück, the ‘Crawl Phase’, consisted of one week of classroom and hands-on instruction providing basic knowledge of battlefield historical collection methods and requirements on the individual: conducting interviews; collecting documents; managing the collection and writing an operations data report.\(^10\) Exercise S.L.A.M, the collective training portion, took up the second week. This ‘Walk Phase’ was evalu-

\(^8\) Army Regulation 870–5 Historical Activities, Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 21 September 2007, 4-7, pp. 10-11.

\(^9\) Lee S. Dr. Harford, Jr. ‘Documenting the past training the military history units: there are 22 military history detachments in the Army, […] 16 in the Army Reserve’, Army Reserve Magazine (Summer 2002), pp. 1-2, accessed on 21 September 2010 at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KAB/is_2_48/ai_92408824/.

\(^10\) ATRRS 300-BCHQ: Basic Combat Historian Qualification Course Overview, U.S. Army Center of Military History, n.d.; An operations data report (ODR) is an annotated chronology of the unit’s operations fully supported by an indexed set of copies of key historical documents, Field Manual No. 1–20 Military History Operations, p. 3-6.
ated externally and had the MHD preparing a collection plan, collecting documents, conducting interviews, and preparing an Operations Data Report and Narrative in a field environment. When available, the units were then deployed to a combat training center for the ‘Run Phase’, also evaluated externally, where they interacted with a combat unit, integrating into its battle rhythm, conducting interviews, collecting documents and preparing an ‘operations data report’ on that unit’s operations.\(^\text{11}\)

![Figure 3 MHD Mobilizations since 9/11, 2001](Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History)

With U.S. Forces engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003, demand for support from Military History Detachments increased rapidly, shortening time available for training. In 2003, there were twenty-two detachments, with one in the active Army, sixteen in the Army Reserve, and five in the National Guard. Three Military History Detachments covered the initial surge into Afghanistan in 2002 and twelve followed U.S. troops into Iraq in 2003. By 2006, the number of detachments deployed had

\(^{11}\) ATRRS 300-BCHQ: Basic Combat Historian Qualification Course Overview.
dropped to three, with two in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. A year later, it rose again to five, four of which went to Iraq.¹²

By 2007, there were a total of twenty-five Military History Detachments, with one in the Active Army, nineteen in the Reserve, and five in the National Guard. Four to six Military History Detachments were deployed at any one time. Most of the teams were formed ad hoc, with approximately six to nine months between organization and deployment. Of this short time, detachment members could devote about a month to training for the mission. Following a little more than a two-week period of instruction at Fort McPherson in Georgia and Catoosa Station near the Chickamauga battlefield, they would perhaps spend two weeks at the

National Training Center with a unit preparing to go into action. In 2007 and 2008, detachments completed their training at the Center of Military History in Fort McNair in Washington D.C., where they received two to three days of clarifying and final instruction. Although the officer position in the MHD calls for a professional military historian, most are not. This makes their serving as historical staff officers problematic because there is an expectation at command levels that a historian can analyze and write.  

In 2009, I served as Command Historian during the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division’s deployment as the command and control element of the ‘Multi-National Division – Baghdad’ (MND-B). As such, I was a staff officer on the Special Staff, supporting the commander and his staff. In a perfect world, every division has a Military History Detachment and a command historian, who focuses on the staff and command group and writes the command report. As it turned out, 2009 was the perfect year for field historical operations in Iraq. The 25th Infantry Division/Multi-National Division – North in Mosul had brought its divisional historian and had a MHD attached. The 34th Infantry Division/Multi-National Division – South in Basra had a uniformed historian and a MHD. The I Corps/ Multi-National Corps – Iraq deployed with a professional historian from the Center of Military History and had another uniformed historian from the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, who was serving as the MNC-I historian. The Army’s 44th MHD was attached to the 3rd Sustainment Command.

When the 1st CAV arrived at MND-B Headquarters in Baghdad at the end of January 2009, the 4th Infantry Division was in charge there. During the next ten days, soldiers from the outgoing and incoming divisions, from privates to commanding generals, conducted ‘left seat, right seat’ transition training. For five days, the Ivy Division’s troops would be in the ‘driver’s seat’ with the First Team’s troopers observing, and for the second five days they ‘switched seats’. As the Command Historian, I did not have a direct predecessor. Instead, the 4th Division’s Knowledge

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13 Robert S. Rush, Email message to Adams, 21 September 2010.
14 Field Manual No. 1–20 Military History Operations, 3-1-10.
Management Officer, who had performed the ‘historian function’ as an extra duty assignment, and the members of the 101st Military History Detachment, who were finishing their deployment, taught me how to navigate the classified portal, took me along to meetings, introduced me to the Multi-National Corps – Iraq historian, and took me on a ‘sight-seeing’ tour of the huge Victory Base Complex. Camp Liberty, my home for the coming year, was but one of four other camps on the huge base. From the 101st I also learned how to ‘catch rides’ into and around Baghdad with the Divisional Chaplain, the Civil Affairs Officers from G-9, and, most importantly, the G-3, Operations Officer, to visit Combat Outposts, Joint Security Stations, cultural monuments, and sheiks and other Iraqi community leaders. The 1st CAV officially took charge of Multi-National Division – Baghdad in a Transfer of Authority ceremony on 10 February 2009.

Figure 5 Deployed Structure of MHDs and Historians
(Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History)
My first duty after TOA was to write a fragmentary order or FRAGO that tasked all staff sections at headquarters and all units under the command of Multi-National Division – Baghdad with identifying and reporting contact information for their Unit Historical Officers. These unit historians would ensure that records of engagements and actions were preserved for use when writing the official history and would coordinate and prepare Military History Detachment visits to their command outposts or headquarters.\textsuperscript{15}

The 49th MHD replaced the 101st in March 2009. At the beginning of their assignment, the three members of the 49th – a major, a staff sergeant, and a specialist – and I agreed that I was responsible for document collection and interviews at headquarters and that the MHD was responsible for the brigades. This arrangement was supposed to prevent redundancy of effort – and avoid conflicts. In collecting historical materials documenting the operations of U.S. Forces, the 49th had three priorities: first and foremost, to gather electronic and paper documentation of operations compiled by U.S. Army units; second, to conduct oral history interviews with Army and other personnel to fill in gaps in the documentary record and to provide personal insights and perspectives by participants; and, finally, to catalog and to organize the collection. The MHD had authorization to collect Joint, Combined, and Other Agency documentation directly or as part of Army files.

To preserve the historically relevant records of the division’s efforts, I designed my electronic record collection to mirror the division’s headquarters staff organization as presented in the folders and subfolders on the portal website. I also included folders for the brigades, which the MHD used to collect and save documents they gathered on the units’ portals.

\textsuperscript{15} Army Regulation 870–5 Historical Activities, 4-7, p. 10.
Whenever possible, I accompanied the G-3 (Operations Officer) and the Fire Support Coordinator on trips ‘outside the wire’ to fire station openings, on visits to brigade headquarters, on a dismounted patrol of market streets, on visits to sheiks’ houses, and on inspections of Iraqi prison facilities and firing ranges. To record the staff officers’ opinions and assessments at certain times during the deployment, I conducted forty-eight oral history interviews. I interviewed most of the staff primaries at least once, some two or three times, and General Bolger every three months. I also provided input to the Multi-National Corps – Iraq historian’s quarterly histories and wrote a referenced and documented command report. For soldiers pursuing college or graduate degrees online, I made myself available as an ‘academic/thesis advisor’ to help with paper outlines, editing, and thesis proposals. To provide a good selection of professional reading material in military history to troopers at MND-B Headquarters and in the brigades, I set out to establish a professional reading bookshelf. ‘Armed’ with a publications account, I ordered U.S.
Army Center of Military History publications through the U.S. Army Europe website. Making sure that the other services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were also represented, my public historian colleagues in Washington, D.C., at the Pentagon, with the Marines at Quantico in Virginia, and in Leavenworth (Kansas) mailed me boxes filled with publications by their offices. As a result, the divisional military history bookshelf grew by leaps and bounds. Books dealing with counterinsurgency, exiting war, and very recent publications of battalion or company commanders’ experiences in Iraq were in demand. Staff primaries found the bookshelf useful for training their captains and majors and for their own continuing education.

Of course, not everything went smoothly. The most serious obstacle I encountered during my year with the 1st CAV in Iraq was the Army’s ban on using external storage devices with network computers. It complicated the work and, at times, drove me to distraction. Still, at the end of the year, the electronic record collection amounted to approximately 1.5 TB, including briefings, memos, pictures, maps, brigade histories and data, and interview files covering all staff sections. In addition, I submitted the beginnings of a Command Report about the deployment at the end of December, which I finished during a month in Fort Hood at the beginning of 2010.
Working with the records of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom), historians will venture into the new world of almost total electronic documentation. The First Gulf War produced a good deal of paper, and, whilst operations in the Balkans had a higher percentage of electronic data, they were packaged in relatively small lots. The ongoing ‘Global War on Terror’, on the other hand, involves every major unit in the Army, all of whom communicate prodigiously and almost exclusively via e-mail, PowerPoint, Word, or Excel. In 2009, the average MHD sent 1.2 TB back to CMH. Printed out, this would come to a stack of paper over ten kilometers high. In many cases, the electronic documents are not systematically collected and retired by units, but instead often reflect the organizational and informational needs of officers in action and of the MHD members that collected them.  

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16 FP OAA BRF 31 Jul 08, U.S. Army Center of Military History.
pare them for their tour even more important. Unfortunately, though, increased demand and multiple deployments have taken a toll on the quality of the training. In the case of the 49th MHD, two of the three members had received a month of training, with the third member not having received any at all. In the course of the deployment, it became apparent that the training course had been too short to stress fundamentals, such as properly labeling and effectively writing short abstracts of interview files.

On a more personal note, serving as a field historian on the headquarters staff in Baghdad at a time when the U.S. Forces were preparing to leave the country was the education of a lifetime. I gained valuable insights into the inner workings of a command post, and, more importantly, into the minds of soldiers doing their jobs far away from home and family on the frontlines of an amorphous war. I was fortunate to have the support of extraordinarily knowledgeable and experienced colleagues in the MNC-I and I Corps historians. The experiences I gained have shaped my thinking and will have a lasting impact on my future research and writing about the military.
British Army Operational Records since 2003

Bob Evans

Since 2003, the Army Historical Branch (HB(A)) of the British Ministry of Defence (UK MOD) has supported the British Army’s operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during a challenging period that has witnessed operations of a scale and complexity without precedent for the professional army. Simultaneously, the digitization of headquarters has revolutionized the way that command and control is exercised and – when combined with the first two factors – has significantly altered the nature and size of the army’s historical records. Almost all records are now electronic files, and a conservative estimate suggests that if they were printed on paper, then there would be at least one hundred times as much of it as what was generated in Iraq in 1991. As a consequence, HB(A) staff have had quickly to adapt their traditional roles to this new environment in order to remain effective and keep up with what can sometimes seem to be a never-ending cycle of change. HB(A) itself is a small branch, totalling no more than twelve members of staff at any one time since 2003.

The foundation of British army official history is based upon the simple, but effective ‘War Diary’ system that has been employed since the South African War (1899-1902). This system served the army and its official historians very well throughout its wars in the twentieth century. A war diary captured records that allowed the course of the fighting to be reconstructed, and collectively they provided an archive of official documents upon which a hierarchy of classified historical narratives and published official histories was based. A war diary was completed every month by every unit or formation headquarters deployed on operations. It was then returned to the UK, where it was stored centrally until it was transferred to the UK National Archives; this transfer generally took place at about the 30-year point. Prior to 2003, there were no substantial
changes to the original war diary system, although it had been referred to as the ‘Commander’s Diary’ since the 1970s.

By 2002, HB(A) had established that the system itself had become moribund and was badly in need of renewal and rejuvenation. Consequently, the instructions were rewritten and consolidated into one easily understandable document and the terminology they employed was brought up to date. The language used in the instructions before dated from the Second World War and, at best, they were difficult for a modern reader to decipher. One simple example of this was the decision to rebrand the system the ‘Operational Record (OR)’ to reduce ambiguity by clearly stating what the system sought to achieve.

Once a unit completed its war diary, it was sent to the main MOD records store. This meant that HB(A), as the process owner, had no ability to measure compliance and there was a suspicion that, in the absence of any governance regime, some units were either retaining their diaries or not completing their records at all. After a lengthy dialogue with the Army, HB(A) altered the system so that all monthly diaries were sent directly to HB(A). This allowed effective auditing of the diaries and the putting into place of additional measures to prompt units who failed to complete them every month. By mid-2004, the new instructions along with the underpinning governance regime were in place under the umbrella of what was now referred to as the ‘OR system’. This has continued to evolve and be refined as a result of operational experience, but it has reliably generated and archived some 5,150 monthly unit operational records since 2003.

This ‘process-based’ approach to gathering historical records meant that HB(A) and its predecessors generally did not deploy individual historians to operational theatres either to gather records or write history. This policy stood in contrast to the approach taken by many other countries including the United States and was based not upon any highly principled approach towards the gathering of historical records, but the fiscal constraints on the UK’s defence budget. Put simply, the war diary system was, and still is, the only one that was affordable. That said, by 2003, HB(A) was familiar enough with some of the advances being
made in the sphere of digital command and control to suspect that the OR process might well struggle to operate effectively at the higher levels of command.

Consequently, in February 2003, one month prior to the invasion of Iraq, HB(A) sent historians to the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), located at Northwood on the outskirts of London, where the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), a three-star officer, controls all British forces deployed on operations outside the UK. HB(A) had decided to pilot a new concept whereby its staff would compile the Operational Record on CJO's behalf. The intention was to have one historian collating key documents and composing a daily narrative from them, whilst a second historian attended all key meetings and briefings, noting key decisions and any significant information that had not appeared in documents circulated. At the end of every day, both historians built this non-documentary information into the narrative for that day. This meant that for every day of the war HB(A) had an easy-to-digest factual narrative of what had taken place from the perspective of that level of command. In addition, the key source documents that had been gathered were embedded within the narrative for easy access and also archived alongside it by type.

There was nothing complicated about the OR which HB(A) produced, but it turned out to be a considerably more complex task than had been initially envisaged. The intensity of the operation and the scale of information that flowed around the headquarters were both far greater than had been foreseen and, although three historians were available to complete the OR, they could only sustain this effort for four months. Consequently, at the beginning of June 2003, when it was believed that major combat operations were over, the HB(A) staff ceased maintaining the OR.

This is not the place to examine all of the specific issues and lessons arising from this experiment in detail, but a good example is the consequence of the ostensibly straightforward decision to base the chronological overview on a calendar day. Although this was the correct decision, it caused major problems when it came to reconciling all of the
reports and returns from CJO’s subordinate formations and information circulated in meetings. The reason for this is that none of the many subordinate and coalition elements used a common 24-hour reporting cycle. Thus, the Air Component Command (ACC) daily reports ran from 0400 hrs to 0400 hrs; the Land Component from 0600 to 0600; the Maritime component from 0200 to 0200 and CJO’s reporting cycle ran from 0700 to 0700. These times were not arbitrary, as there were sound reasons why each worked to different periods, but it created a major headache when it came to reconciling all of the information into a calendar day. This was further compounded when ambiguous statements of time were included in the text of the reports. So, if the ACC report contained the phrase ‘This morning…’ when did that mean? These temporal problems which vexed the historian responsible for the collection of documents also applied to the historian attending an almost continuous sequence of briefings, beginning at 0500 hrs and finishing at 2100 hrs every day. Considerable time was spent making sure that events were recorded against the correct calendar day. To avoid errors, the historians’ work effectively had to transcend a three-day period.

One unanticipated benefit of the OR was the degree to which the command staff came to rely upon it and the historians when they required access to accurate historical information. Because of the vast quantities of information flowing around the headquarters, it became tremendously difficult for staff officers to track down key documents sometimes within a week of their creation. The historians’ ability to make documents available quickly from the OR undoubtedly assisted their assimilation into the headquarters and acceptance by its staff officers.

These and many other lessons were learned on this first deployment, and the PJHQ OR for this first phase of Operation Telic became the prototype for future HB(A) deployments in Afghanistan, even though the methodology has continued to evolve. The suspicion that the generic OR process was not suitable for higher headquarters had proved to be correct, and after some discussion it was decided that HB(A) would attempt to deploy two specialists with all divisional and corps headquarters commanded by British Generals and deployed to Afghanistan. To date,
twelve HB(A) staff have deployed to Afghanistan for a cumulative total of eighty-four months.

This was a considerable undertaking, not just for the actual deployments that have been completed by HB(A)’s staff, but also because of the very time-consuming preparation preceding each deployment. Considerable time is taken up completing a range of pre-deployment courses and the specific training HB(A) has developed for its deploying historians. In addition, a dialogue has to be initiated with the headquarters at least six months before the deployment to ensure that its information management processes are fully understood by the historians and that the command staff understand what the historians will be doing and how they can benefit from their presence. Not least, the general commanding the formation has to be convinced that the presence of historians will be an asset rather than a liability to him and his headquarters. Invariably, every headquarters uses different computer systems, and courses need to be completed so that the historians can access and use these systems safely and efficiently. Finally, the historians must attend the sequence of mission rehearsal exercises the headquarters conducts; some of which can last up to two weeks. These exercises familiarise the headquarters with the role of the historians and allow crucial relationships to be established in a benign environment.

The IT issue was also a broader one for HB(A). Not only had the quantities of information exploded, but it had also changed from being paper-based to almost exclusively electronic files. This meant that the entire branch, not just those who deployed, had to develop a new skill set and become comfortable with all aspects of computers and the applications which are run on them. Not to do so would have meant that HB(A) staff could no longer have effectively accessed the primary records to complete their duties. It should be remembered, of course, that official historians work with primary records from the moment they are created. Therefore, not being ‘IT literate’ in this day and age would be analogous to a more academic historian not having a good reading knowledge of the language of his primary paper records. The PowerPoint slide, for example, has become the key document for transacting information within UK military headquarters.
Looking back over the last eight years, there were times when it was very tempting for HB(A) to walk away from its support to ongoing operations and focus on its more historical functions. However, it would have been a mistake for it to cede jurisdiction over the Army’s operational records and retreat to a position where it simply waited for historical records to be delivered to it. Had it done so, large amounts of valuable historical records would almost certainly have been lost.

The decision to adapt to the dramatic changes in operations by evolving existing, proven systems was also a correct one. Radical overhauls to the approach to the work of UK official historians would have run a high risk of failure – a failure that would have led to critical gaps in the historical documentation.

HB(A) has not got everything right. It would like to run a properly established interview programme, but it does the best it can with the resource available to it. Furthermore, with the shift in the centre of gravity of its work to a more operational focus, it can no longer even aspire to write official histories for publication. Rather, it strives to create and secure an archive of historical records which future historians can use when they come to write their histories of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. When that happens, these historians will hopefully appreciate the efforts of HB(A)’s staff in their endeavours to create a body of records which is more comprehensive than anything previously created.
Over the past four years, the Netherlands Ministry of Defence has employed operational war diarists with Task Force Uruzgan in southern Afghanistan and with headquarters Regional Command South at Kandahar. This article will focus on the origins and practices of the Dutch war diary, which has been established in view of the required accountability to government, parliament, society and the international community. The armed forces of the Netherlands therefore ensure that a reconstruction of events in their theatres of operations is prepared during a mission. Moreover, the army can utilize these sources for its internal learning processes, e.g. for ‘lessons learned’ and doctrine development. Besides, the Netherlands Institute of Military History is thus able to collect composed basic materials for research at a later date.

How did it all begin? In the years following the ‘Cold War’, the Dutch army participated in several peace support and post-conflict stabilization operations, at first mainly in the Balkans, and later, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, in Afghanistan and subsequently also in Iraq. Nevertheless, when we started deploying these units in the 1990s, nobody seemed aware that the operational archives from these missions had to be transferred to the appropriate authorities in the Netherlands. In those days, the only regulations on archival matters available to military units on deployment were on emergency procedures, i.e. on the measures to be taken when threatened by being overrun by opponents. Although commanders in the field were also explicitly obliged by regulations to ensure that documents were kept and that the unit’s archives would eventually be transferred to the appropriate authorities, nobody alerted them to the fact that this was indeed the case and would be required.
In fact, many units burnt their files because of the classified nature of materials. Only in one instance did an astute battalion commander in Bosnia rightly judge the historical value of the documents and had them transferred to his regimental museum. Some years later, the museum handed the archives over to the relevant bodies within the Dutch Ministry of Defence.

**Previous Experience**

This has not always been the case. The Dutch rebuilt their armed forces after World War II, adopting the U.S. Army organization in the early 1950s. Hence, the new army included positions for so-called ‘field historians’, a function copied from the American military organization. In the Netherlands, these record-keepers were integrated in higher staffs, like the National Territorial Command, the Command of the Field Army and at divisional level. Trained historians in uniform, to a large extent reserve officers, were to collect information on military operations, wherever possible supplemented by personal observations and on-the-spot interviews. However, in the absence of clear regulations and lacking any support, field historians could not do their job properly. The field historian participating in an exercise in 1952 reported that he had been ordered to update the map in the divisional information tent. As a result, the General Staff instructed the Military History Department to take the field historians under their wing. General Staff officers noted, however, that the military historians were not really prepared to take on a wartime role. They complained that most historians were intimately acquainted with the history of previous ages, such as the War of the Spanish Succession, but had little or no interest in contemporary history.

To get a feeling for their new role, in 1952 the Dutch military historians visited their American counterparts at Headquarters European Command in Karlsruhe, Germany. The Americans were gratified that the Dutch wanted to organize a field history division along American lines. They had to admit, however, that there was no training programme in the U.S. military that the Dutch could adopt.
Furthermore, the Americans were very adamant about a different topic: the peacetime location of field historians with regard to their impartiality. Placing a historian permanently with his wartime unit was out of the question, they emphasized, as this might severely compromise his objectivity. He would – in the words of a senior American officer – run the risk of writing ‘an apology for the commander’ instead of history. However, the Chief of the General Staff of the Dutch Army decided otherwise. He feared that an external field historian would be viewed as an ‘odd man out’ or a ‘peeping tom’, and was better off already being a member of the unit and acquainted with the staff in peacetime. The first time field historians used the new ‘American-style’ manual was in 1957. Dutch field historians were present at large-scale exercises at the end of the 1950s and in the 1960s. However, in 1968 the Army was hit by severe cutbacks. Field historians at the divisional level and at National Territorial Command disappeared, leaving only two field historians at army corps headquarters, of which the Netherlands had a single one. The system itself went into hibernation. The army corps field historians were assigned wartime positions, but did not participate in the large-scale exercises of the 1970s and 1980s. In 1979, our predecessors at the Military History Department tried to breathe new life into the system when the Dutch government decided to contribute an infantry battalion to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). They had no success.

**Srebrenica and its Aftermath**

This situation lasted until July 1995, when the town of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia, supposedly under Dutch ‘blue helmet’ protection, was overrun and 8,000 men were massacred. In many ways, this tragic event turned out to be a watershed for operational record-keeping in the Royal Netherlands Army. In accordance with regulations, the unit commander in Srebrenica decided to burn his unit archives. As a result, the Ministry of Defence had an extremely difficult time reconstructing what exactly had happened. This inability to provide members of parliament and the media, and hence society as a whole, with answers to the tragedy gave cause to a lot of rumours about the course of events. Eventually, it took
an independent commission of inquiry six years to come up with a satisfac-
tory report.

After Srebrenica, the Commanding Officer of the Army instructed the
Military History Department to overhaul the operational record-keeping
system. Of course, we already had some ideas about the structure we
would ideally like to have in place. We envisioned creating two-man
teams consisting of a qualified archivist and an operational war diarist.
To get a feeling for the do’s and don’ts of operational record-keeping, a
number of field trips were made to Dutch units that were serving with
the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia (SFOR) at that time.

It became clear that the specialized archivists of the Ministry of Defence
– all civilians – were not very keen to go on operational deployments in
conflict areas. They were unwilling to co-operate and could not be
forced to go. Therefore, the first operational record-keeper to leave for
Bosnia in 1997 was an active duty officer. It was his task to compile the
unit archives and forward them to the Netherlands. The reason for send-
ing an officer was that we secretly hoped that in due time the record-
keeper would be able not only to organize the unit archives, but also to
maintain an operational diary, a narrative of the operation and its under-
lying decision-making process. For the time being, this was not possible,
because so soon after the Srebrenica tragedy commanding officers indi-
cated they felt victimized by what had happened there and by the reac-
tions back home. They were convinced that senior command wanted to
scrutinize their actions more closely and would use the diary to start mi-
cro-managing them. To put it bluntly: the operational diarist was re-
garded as a potential spy from the higher deck.
The impasse ended in 2002. That year it was decided that the German-Netherlands Corps would provide the staff for the headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan. Two operational diarists or ‘Einsatz-Tagebuch-Führer’ were members of the crisis establishment of the Corps. In fact, it appears that the two field historians who had originally been part of the 1st Netherlands Army Corps had actually survived the transition to the bi-national Corps headquarters’ structure in 1995. As part of the agreements on the division of labour between the Dutch and the Germans within the combined headquarters, the Netherlands were responsible for providing the operational diarists.

It will thus come as no surprise that the Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH), the successor to the Military History Department, was
asked to provide the operational diarist for service in Kabul. The institute, however, had had no experience whatsoever with keeping an operational diary. Therefore, the post of diarist was regarded as a unique opportunity to put the war diary into practice, to compile ‘lessons learned’ and to learn from others. The diarist received training at the Bundeswehr Operations Command in Potsdam.

In accordance with German regulations, we determined that the diary was to provide the operational commander and his staff officers with an insight into the decision-making process and facilitate the reconstruction of complex events. It was also to serve as a corporate memory of the mission, which is necessary because personnel and units rotate in and out of theatre every four to six months. Furthermore, the information from the diary is used to judge applications for gallantry awards. In the longer term, it is a source for generating ‘lessons learned’ and developing doctrine. Last, but certainly not least, the diary is an important source for historical research, both by professionals and amateurs, like veterans and their next of kin.

Based on the lessons learned from HQ ISAF in 2003, the war diary system was improved and institutionalized. The diary kicked off in earnest in August 2006, when a Dutch Task Force was deployed for the first time to the southern Afghan province of Uruzgan in the course of the ISAF’s expansion of its operations to that part of the war-torn country. Since then we have had an operational diarist in Uruzgan non-stop until 2010. In 2006/2007, and again in 2008/2009, when Dutch generals assumed command of Regional Command South headquarters, we had a war diarist at this level as well.

Every diarist – usually a reserve or active duty officer who also holds an M.A. degree in history – has done a six-month tour. When he goes on leave somewhere midway, he is replaced for a period of about four weeks by a historian from the Netherlands Institute of Military History. For us as professional military historians, who are also reserve officers, this provides a unique opportunity to track developments in time in the AOR and in the evolution of the war diary.
Keeping an operational diary is a full-time job, and certainly not a ‘nine to five’ one. Diarists usually start the day at 7 a.m. and close shop between 9 and 10 p.m. During the day, they attend many meetings and briefings, study relevant documents, talk to staff officers to clarify issues and, of course, draft the narrative of the diary itself. When there are too many meetings to attend, the war diarist has to attend those most relevant to the decision-making process.

Keeping the operational war diary is no sinecure. It requires sharp senses, an academic attitude and a clear understanding of the complex environment in which modern military operations take place. The diarist also needs to show eagerness and tact in collecting information from high-ranking officers without being intrusive. The diarist makes a factual summary of events and reports. However, the field historian does not analyze or judge. The diary is chronological and businesslike. Many appendices are added to the diary text – such as orders, instructions, alerts, situation reports, evaluations, charts, maps, images, interview reports and intelligence files. It requires discipline, making long hours for almost seven days a week, for a period of up to six months.

The diarist assumes the role of participatory researcher. The diarist should not be part of the diary’s substance. He tries to be as objective as possible in reconstructing the decision-making process. This is relatively easy for the replacement diarists, who are deployed for shorter periods of time. The full-term diarists, who are in the field with a staff for six months, have greater difficulty ‘keeping their distance’, but they are coached by us at ‘the back office’.

Over the years, the diarists have been recruited among professional and reserve officers who have a degree in history, but also among civilians. Before a historian is deployed, he will be given basic military training. After all, he must be tried and tested in the military language and in the methods of action. The training course consists of three parts. First of all, there is general military training. This is followed by an officer training crash-course and finally by a fortnight of courses on staff techniques. It will take some time before the diary is available for research by historians and journalists, as the diary contains classified information. Dis-
closing the diary at the present might endanger Dutch military personnel and/or the personnel of our allies. Furthermore, the diary would enable a shrewd researcher to work out the tactics, techniques and procedures of Dutch forces. This information is also relevant in other conflict areas. For the time being, access to the diary is therefore limited to a small number of defence employees, who need the diary for professional reasons. The diary may also contain classified information from one of our coalition partners, which is an additional complicating circumstance. We need to have their formal permission before the diary can be released.

A View to the Future

In August 2010, the Dutch mission in Uruzgan province ended. Our first operational war diary in decades will therefore come to an end with the redeployment of troops. We can then begin to assess our performance as record-keepers, discuss the issues of objectivity and quality control, and fine-tune our organization for the next deployment, for which the Dutch are already making preparations.
Where We Stand in 2011: Perspectives for the Future

Fred Tanner

‘Peacekeeping is a microcosm of all the issues and tensions that exist within the peace, security and development dimension of the international system.’ This statement accurately puts the cutting edge position of international crisis management into the limelight. Ever since it evolved after the foundation of the UN, peacekeeping has not only kept scholars of peace, security and development issues busy, and ink flowing, it has also been taken into account and criticized by international public opinion. As the international environment changed, and with it the three dimensions covering peacekeeping, International crisis management had to adapt considerably over the years to face the new challenges. This short article will give a brief overview of the development of peace operations over the last fifty years, before analyzing the situation of international crisis management at the present by focusing on the most problematic issues of peacekeeping. Finally, some perspectives will be provided of what future Crisis Management will have to focus on in order to overcome the current problems.

It is probably this very ‘cutting edge position’ which underlies the fact that peacekeeping missions have considerably changed their appearance over the about sixty years of their existence. During the first two decades, peace operations were still undefined and mainly consisted of monitoring ceasefires. Only the large-scale UN Operations in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964 gave an early impression of the dimension

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1 The author wishes to thank Deborah Huber for her valuable contributions.
2 Cedric De Coninck / Andreas Stensland / Thierry Tardy (eds.), Beyond the ‘New Horizon’: Proceedings from the UN Peacekeeping Future Challenges Seminar 2010 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010), p. 23 [hereafter Beyond the ‘New Horizon’].
peacekeeping operations would take decades later.\footnote{The Congo intervention was followed by a long period marked by UN reluctance to initiate major peacekeeping missions, as the failure of the great effort in the Congo withdrew the UN’s focus to ‘doing what was feasible’. The small quantity of interventions was also caused by the stalemate of the Cold War, which affected the UN Security Council as well. In this context, the end of the East-West confrontation in 1989 spelled a dramatic change for UN peacekeeping: from being essentially light-armed military operations, they changed into more multidimensional and larger-scale ones. But this overconfident atmosphere ended in the mid-1990s with the three traumatic missions in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia. When Kofi Annan took office as UN Secretary General in 1997, he endeavoured to return to a more pragmatic approach. The last two decades of international conflict management have witnessed the transformation which has made International crisis management into what it is today. Structured by a ‘division of work’ between various international actors, from the 1990s up until today the model peace mission has mainly operated in situations where ethnic conflicts deprive people of peace and security. Moreover, the last decade has seen the impact of the negative sides of globalization on peace operations. As current conflicts become more transnational and non-military in nature, they pose new obstacles, particularly as they usually involve regional stakeholders.}

The continuous danger of this ethnic divide is still one of the root causes of conflict. Ethnic exclusion policies and separatism, as illustrated by the recent example of the hostilities in Kyrgyzstan, are still a major concern of conflict management in 2011. But at the centre of anxiety today are the long-standing missions in the Western Balkans (Kosovo and Bosnia), Afghanistan and Iraq. These large-scale interventions – the longer they last, the more unpopular they become – are the best illustrations of the current AIDS pandemic.

\footnote{As regards the history of the Austrian contribution to peacekeeping operations starting with the Congo mission, the Army Museum in Vienna (Heeresgeschichtliches Museum Wien) held an informative exhibition: Schutz & Hilfe - 50 Jahre Auslandseinsatz from June to November 2010.}

ongoing challenges to peacekeeping. First of all, they indicate how important it is to view peacekeeping as an accompanying measure to a comprehensive conflict transformation process, where peacekeeping, peace-building and state-building have to go hand in hand.

A peace mission is not possible without civilian capabilities, which, in a cultural awareness approach, can help to bring about long-term stability. The initial lack of success in Afghanistan, for example, has stressed the importance of specific analysis competences, enabling peacekeepers to take into account not only cultural sensitivities, but also the causality of the conflict – elements which will help them put their efforts on the right track. It is crucial, for instance, to understand the circumstances of the outcome of the conflict on the different conflict parties in order to embark on the relevant stabilization process.

Experience from the Western Balkans has taught us that an early democratization process is not always a key priority. While national administration and security actors are not ready to take over, guaranteeing the security of the population by enhancing the rule of law has to come first. In this respect, a peacekeeping mission has to adapt its military operation to accompany, for instance, a Security Sector Reform (SSR), in which the development of the justice and police systems are supported in the country concerned. This has to go hand in hand with the reconstruction of the economy, comprising, among other elements, the fight against corruption. The role of the European Union in the Balkans through the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) is a good example of how new ‘peacekeeping tools’ at our disposal, such as SSR, can be put into practice. Furthermore, it illustrated the concept of institutional pull, whereby the presence of the EU in the region enhanced local efforts at state-building, not least with the perspective of future membership of the EU. This institutional pull has shown to be of importance for effective reconstruction after a conflict.

It thus becomes clear that we are witnessing the emergence of an interface between the domains of peacekeeping, peace-building and state-building. The elements mentioned above underline the importance of a long-term state-building and stabilization process through a better con-
conflict transition management. In many ways, this contradicts the hitherto popular notion of an ‘exit strategy’ and raises e.g. questions as to the NATO plan to let ISAF troops leave the Hindu Kush by 2014, handing over the responsibility for security to local army and police.\(^5\) Whereas military experts argue that the security situation in Afghanistan has never since 2001 been as instable as at the present, realities on the ground can hardly explain such a strategy, which is clearly the result of domestic policy agendas. This example raises the issue of finding the right moment for peacekeepers to hand over responsibility to a national (i.e. host country) administration. While taking into account that institution implementation takes a long time, crisis managers have to be aware of the danger of a dependency syndrome, or even an occupation syndrome, meaning that if the right moment is missed, further and more latent tensions in the conflict may emerge. When multiple actors are present, the fixation and implementation of a common ‘expiry date’ of the mission is even harder to reach.

Better co-ordination of the different actors is crucial throughout a peace operation. Although different actors have differing priorities, there has to be a guarantee that everyone is pulling on the same rope. To do so, collective and integrated planning has to become the norm amongst the different peacekeepers. Whereas a given conflict situation is a common space which cannot be compartmentalized, overlaps have to be avoided nonetheless in order to ensure efficiency. Therefore, partnerships have to be expanded in the sphere of peacekeeping. This also applies when it comes to including the local as well as the informal sectors. This Comprehensive Approach to peacekeeping is also the main focus of the UN Department of Peacekeeping’s non-paper *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*.

The multiplicity of peacekeeping actors present and the co-ordination difficulties entailed are one side of the coin. The other is the issue of

managing consent amongst all stakeholders in the conflict, particularly the local actors. Recent conflicts have therefore become more complex not only due to parties coming in from the outside to manage the crisis, but also, as mentioned above, due to the multiplicity of (often regional) stakeholders in the conflict. Managing consent between all the parties has thus become one of the major challenges of peacekeeping. When seeking co-ordination, co-operation and consent, special attention should be paid to the chief stakeholder, which is the local government ‘hosting’ the operation. If a UN peacekeeping intervention is to succeed, the full co-operation of the host government is essential if the UN is not to be perceived as an occupation force. More delicate is the question of advocacy for consent when this implies engaging terrorist groups. Their implication in a conflict makes dealing with them in the peace process a necessity, but they might be ignored by other parties as well as international public opinion.

This leads to the question as to what extent peacekeeping actors, be they the UN or one of its partners, have to act with the consent of the international community. Arguing, as the Charter has done since the date of its inception, that a conflict in one place affects the peace of all countries, would this not automatically make the international community a stakeholder? And to what extent can peacekeeping operations be run in the name of this community? This is the question underlying the debate over the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) concept, which stipulates the right (or even the duty) of the international community to intervene, if necessary by force, in a conflict, as it has a responsibility to protect the population under attack. This concept, which was formulated in 2005, has found greater acceptance over the last few years, but it is evidently criticized on the grounds of state sovereignty by countries that might be directly or indirectly affected by such an intervention. While certain scholars argue that ‘the moment of R2P has already passed’, it still remains pertinent for a broad discussion of the topic of the use of force in peacekeeping missions.

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As was argued in *Beyond the New Horizon* (see footnote 1), one of the main issues for future peacekeeping is to find options on how to have more and a broader range of civilian and military personnel available for such missions, as this would form the basis for a greater legitimacy of UN intervention. However, the question which has to be dealt with beforehand is whether the UN is the right institution to undertake such ‘robust peacekeeping’. In its narrow definition, robust peacekeeping is ‘the use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, to defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process’.  

The problematic issue of the use of force has become more prominent for the UN over the last decade, as the protection of civilians and the need to counter terrorist threats have become the chief concern of peacekeeping. The importance of these two elements is the reason why most of the mandates of UN operations during the last few years have authorized the use of force to protect the population in general and minorities in particular from immediate physical violence. But criticism of robust peacekeeping is widespread, usually because it is a concept not defined clearly enough as regards its consequences and necessities. Not even the definition quoted above has found common ground, as it not accepted by all UN member states and can therefore not be implemented.

In order to fulfil the role the UN claims for itself, it has to maintain an impartial position as far as possible in a given conflict with a view to preserving its role as a legitimate and reliable interlocutor. This position is endangered if UN interventions become more coercive through the use of force and resemble warfare or peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping. Not only might robustness violate the ‘contract’ with the local government, it might also negatively affect public opinion. Therefore,

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7 UN Capstone Doctrine, 98. Quoted by Thierry Tardy in ‘Robust Peacekeeping: A False Good Idea?’, ibid, p. 67.
8 Ibid., p. 19.
UN-led operations should continue to subscribe to the Brahimi guidelines and become more versatile in peace-building and state-building efforts. However, robustness is often necessary, especially when linked to the protection of civilians. This finally implies that more interventions should be undertaken by regional organizations such as the African Union, NATO or the European Union in close co-operation with the UN, rather than by the UN itself. Moreover, robustness is contingent on its support by Security Council members and Troup Contributing Countries (TCC), as well as on a clear political framework. This reiterates the necessity of strengthening partnerships in peacekeeping, as advocated by the New Horizon Report.

The most indicative examples of such multidimensional and multilateral peace support are the recent collaborative operations in Africa. While the UN mostly focused on support through the dialogue between the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (AUSPC), EU funding helped the sustainability of the stabilization operation in Darfur and Somalia. This division of assignments illustrates one of the greatest challenges of inter-organizational coordination in this field: building functioning and efficient partnerships and at the same time avoiding tilting towards paternalism. The importance of regional organizations was already underlined in the 1992 Agenda for Peace and again in the Secretary General’s report Larger Freedom in 2005, which called for the ‘establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities’ to create a stable partnership between the UN and regional institutions such as EU or AU, both of which have gone through a noticeable development in their engagement in

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11 Tardy, ‘Robust Peacekeeping’ (as fn. 6).
peacekeeping. Such local organizations are valuable partners for the UN, as they provide useful regional insight, expertise and resources.\(^\text{14}\)

The success of future peace operations lies in a coherent approach by the international community, which recognizes the primacy of local actors and host states. It is therefore necessary that the issues and uncertainties discussed above are collectively addressed and clarified. However, whilst being coherent and legitimate, peacekeeping should stay as flexible as it has been over the last two decades, involving the different entities and their comparative advantages in their contribution towards peace missions in a broad and effective partnership. The answer to this twofold challenge would be a global peacekeeping system managing coordination and coherence among the multiple actors involved. One could imagine, for example, a steering body similar to the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) or a development of the latter into the field of peacekeeping. This could also help to bridge the gap between the realm of peacekeeping and broader peace-building and conflict stabilization.

Looking into the future, the question has to be asked whether the concept and understanding of peacekeeping may evolve again over a long period of time, as world power is shifting to the East and Chinese understanding of peace operations is becoming more influential in the Security Council.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., pp. 78-81.
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