Preventing Future Yugoslavias: The Views of CSCE/OSCE Negotiators, 1993 and 1997

Introduction

This is the fourth published report on an ongoing research project to monitor developments in post-Cold War Europe, involving efforts to solicit and analyse the views of (primarily) heads of delegation to the most inclusive trans-Atlantic/pan-European peace and security system comprising all the former enemies of the Cold War and neutral and non-aligned: the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), formerly the Conference on Security and Cupertino in Europe (CSCE), based in Vienna, Austria.

The project began with my tenure as a William C. Foster Fellow as a Visiting Scholar with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) during 1989–1990 when, among other things, I served on the U.S. delegation to the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) which occurred within the context of the (then) CSCE in Vienna. This experience revealed to me the potential of the CSCE for shaping the peace and security environment of post-Cold War Europe, transforming it from a bipolar confrontational system into a system of common security. In effect, I discovered in Vienna an opportunity to apply conflict/conflict resolution theory to practice, as part of my overarching goal to participate in the development and implementation of peace and security systems for post-Cold War Europe.

This opportunity was realised to some extent by a NATO Research Fellowship which enabled me to return to Vienna in 1993 to conduct interviews of heads of delegation to the CSCE (see Sandole, 1994, 1995a) and subsequently, a Fulbright OSCE Regional Research Scholarship which brought me back to Vienna in 1997 to conduct a follow-up study with heads of delegation to the ("reframed") OSCE (see Sandole, 2000). More recently, an OSCE "Researcher in Residence" award brought me back to Vienna for a third round of interviews immediately following the conclusion of the NATO air war against Serbia over the Kosovo issue, in June 1999 (see Sandole, 2001).

Conflict Resolution Theory: Some Helpful Concepts

Similar to previous reports on this project (Sandole, 1998b, 1998c, 2000), here I wish only to highlight some aspects of theory relevant to dealing with violent conflict in general, including the violent ethnic conflicts of post-Cold War Europe, having discussed some of the causes and conditions of such conflict elsewhere (see Sandole, 1993a; 1999b, Chs. 6–7).

We can distinguish, for instance, between competitive and co-operative approaches to conflict resolution (see Deutsch, 1973). Competitive approaches are power-based, adversarial, confrontational, and zero-sum ("win-lose"), associated with a Realpolitik approach to human relations and often with destructive outcomes. Co-operative approaches, on the other hand, are nonpower-based, nonadversarial and positive sum ("win-win"), associated with an Idealpolitik approach and often with constructive outcomes (see Sandole, 1993a, 1999b, Ch. 6).

We can also distinguish between negative and positive peace (see Galtung, 1969). Negative peace is what most people, including diplomats, mean when they talk about "peace": the absence – either through prevention or cessation – of hostilities. There is nothing wrong with "peace" in this sense, and I personally wish we had more of it throughout the world – e.g., earlier in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda – but it is not the whole picture. Positive peace, which helps to complete the picture, is the absence of structural violence, i.e., systems in which members of certain ethnic, religious, racial and/or other groups have unequal access to...
economic, political, social and other resources typically presided over and enjoyed by members of mainstream groups (see ibid.). It is also the absence of cultural violence, which legitimises and makes acceptable structural violence (see Galtung, 1996).

A third and, for our purposes, final distinction is between track-1 and track-2 actors and approaches to conflict resolution. Track 1 deals with governmental, and track 2 with nongovernmental actors, mechanisms and processes at either the intra- or international level (see Davidson and Montville, 1981–82; McDonald and Bendahmane, 1987; Diamond and McDonald, 1996).

Track-1 warriors and diplomats have typically operated within a Realpolitik framework where they use various kinds and degrees of competitive means to achieve and maintain negative peace. A major objective of the project discussed here has been to explore, with CSCE/OSCE negotiators, to what extent, if any, there has been a shift away from a unidimensional Realpolitik paradigm comprised of track-1 actors employing competitive approaches to achieve and maintain negative peace, toward a multidimensional system comprised of these plus an Idealpolitik paradigm, with track-2 actors employing co-operative approaches to achieve and maintain positive peace; in other words, a shift away from a "cognitively simple" approach to one more likely to "capture the complexity" of the identity-based conflicts of the post-Cold War era (see Sandole, 1999b).

Some Brief Comments On The CSCE/OSCE: The Helsinki Process

The CSCE came into existence at the height of the Cold War, its initial negotiations starting in 1972 and ending in 1975, with the Helsinki Final Act establishing a basis for co-operative relations between the two rival treaty organisations of the Cold War period – the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) – plus the neutral and non-aligned.

Over the years, there have been numerous review and summit meetings of the CSCE further refining, and implementing provisions based on, the three "baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act (1975). By the end of the Cold War, these had evolved into the (1) political and military, (2) economic and environmental, and (3) humanitarian and human rights aspects of comprehensive security. Two of these, basket 1 with its emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and basket 3 with its emphasis on human rights, helped bring about the end of the Cold War.

Paradoxically, the otherwise "revolutionary" developments that helped bring about the end of the Cold War took place within the same time frame that one particular consequence of the ending of the Cold War also occurred: the implosion of Yugoslavia into brutal, genocidal warfare. During the summer of 1993, some 15 months after the Yugoslav wars had spilled over from Croatia into Bosnia-Herzegovina, I returned to Vienna as a NATO Research Fellow to elicit from heads of CSCE delegations their views on peace and security in Cold War Europe, including "what went wrong in former Yugoslavia?"

The 1993 CSCE Survey

During this phase of the project, which ran from June to July 1993, I interviewed 32 (primarily) heads of delegation from 29 of the (then) 53 participating States of the CSCE.

1993 CSCE Historical Context

Some of the major changes that had occurred in Europe between the time I served on the U.S. delegation to the CSBMs Negotiations in spring/summer 1990 and my return to Vienna in summer 1993, included:
1. the reunification of Germany;
2. the start-up and escalation of the wars in Yugoslavia and collapse of the country into five successor republics;
3. the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO);
4. democratic elections in and further democratisation of post-communist states in Eastern Europe;
5. Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe;
6. the collapse of the Soviet Union into 15 successor states;
7. the "Velvet Divorce" of the Czech and Slovak Republic (formerly Czechoslovakia) into the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic;
8. an increase in CSCE membership from 35 to 53, with the replacement of the two Germanies by a unified Germany; succession of the Czech and Slovak Republic by the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, both of which became members; replacement of the former Soviet Union by 15 successor republics, all of which became members; replacement of former Yugoslavia by five successor republics, four of which became members; plus the admission of Albania;
9. the establishment of the CSCE Centre for Conflict Prevention (CPC); the Secretariat; and Secretary-General in Vienna;
10. creation of the CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw;
11. creation of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Copenhagen;
12. creation of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in The Hague; and
13. NATO's creation of the North Atlantic Cupertino Council (NACC) to facilitate the pursuit of issues of common security with former members of the defunct WTO.

In general, the events of 1990 - 1993 were suggestive of major changes in the international system, primarily in East-West relations; in effect, a paradigm and behavioural shift in post-Cold War Europe, away from Realpolitik-based national security and toward Idealpolitik-based common security. Summer 1993 was an appropriate time, therefore, to gauge to what extent this shift was apparent in the discourse and, by implication, mindsets of senior representatives to the trans-Atlantic, pan-European CSCE, who, among others, were responsible for dealing with the return of genocidal warfare to Europe: to explore with them the "lessons of Yugoslavia" that might be relevant to dealing with similar conflicts later on.

1993 CSCE Research Design

Based upon information provided by the U.S. Information Service (USIS) in Vienna prior to arriving there in June 1993, I had written letters to the heads of all 53 delegations, informing them that I was a former member of the U.S. delegation to the CSBMs Negotiations and that I would be coming to Vienna as a NATO Research fellow to explore with them their views on peace and security in post-Cold War Europe. Upon arrival in Vienna, I contacted the offices of all 53 delegations and by the middle of July, succeeded in interviewing 32 of them from 29 participating states:

a) 13 NATO states: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United States, and United Kingdom (not included: France, Luxembourg and Spain);
b) 6 neutral and non-aligned states (NNA): Austria, Finland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Switzerland (not included: Cyprus, Holy See, Malta, Monaco, and Sweden);

c) 3 former Yugoslav republics (FYug): Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia (not included: Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro]);

d) 5 non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak Republic (not included: Romania); and


For a variety of reasons, I was unable to interview individuals from all 53 participating states. Instead, I interviewed persons from convenience samples (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, pp. 183–184) of the five main groupings, with some samples being more representative than others:

a) **NSWP**: 5/6 (83%);
b) **NATO**: 13/16 (81%);
c) **FYug**: 3/4 (75%);
d) **NNA**: 6/11 (55%); and
e) **FSU**: 2/15 (13%) — the least representative of all!

Interviews comprised 15 closed-ended and 12 open-ended questions (see ibid., pp. 253–255). The closed-ended questions reflected Likert scale-type responses; e.g., strongly agree (SA), Agree (A), Mixed Feelings (MF), Disagree (D), and Strongly Disagree (SD), where **SA=5, A=4, MF=3, D=2, and SD=1** (see ibid., pp. 465–467). Hence, the higher an interviewee's score on a particular item, the more in agreement she or he was with that item. To facilitate comparisons between the five groupings, group mean scores were computed for each of the 15 closed-ended questions.

The interview schedule reflected basically the schedule-structured format, where all interviewees were asked the same questions, with the same wording, and in the same order (see ibid., pp. 232–237), with the one exception that, on occasion, additional information was provided to some subjects to make a question clearer. The interviews were conducted usually in delegation offices, and lasted between 1 and 3 hours (which, given the busy schedules of the interviewees – the great majority of whom were delegation heads [usually ambassadors] – was rather remarkable).

1993 CSCE Research Results

Thus far, analyses of the 15 closed-ended questions have been conducted (see Sandole 1994, 1995a). This paper presents the first of the analyses of the open-ended questions, most of which dealt with the wars in former Yugoslavia:

Why hasn't the international community played a more effective role in stopping the wars in former Yugoslavia?

1. Is "Vance-Owen" dead?
2. How would you have dealt with Yugoslavia?
3. What do you think of the "safe havens"?
4. What is the value of CSCE missions?
5. What do you believe were the causes of the wars in former Yugoslavia?
6. Is there a danger of spill over?
7. How will the Yugoslav wars end?
8. What are the "lessons of Yugoslavia"?

I focus here only on the question, What are the "lessons of Yugoslavia"? Qualitative analysis of responses consisted of noting each respondent's answer to the question, identifying common themes within each of the five groupings, and then noting dissimilar as well as common themes across groupings (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, pp. 292–296). This led to the results presented below in Table 1.

### Table 1
Comparisons Across the Five Groupings for 1993: Common/Dissimilar "Lessons of Yugoslavia"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PD/CP</th>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Coord</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Democ</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NNA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYug</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSWP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of 31</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By far, the overwhelming similarity/commonality across the five CSCE groupings for 1993 was an emphasis on the need for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention ["PD/CP"] (1st ranking), followed by the likelihood that the wars in FYug would serve as a model for others elsewhere, especially in the former Soviet Union ["Model"] (2nd ranking).\(^2\)

Three of the groupings (NATO, the NNA, and FSU) talked of the need to focus attention on complex, (identity-based) ethnic-type conflicts ["Ethnic"] (3rd ranking), but only two of these (perhaps, not surprisingly, the former superpower adversaries of the Cold War, NATO and the FSU) talked of the need for forceful action in such situations ["Force"] (4th ranking). Two (NATO, and the NNA) talked about the need for complementarity and co-ordination among the various actors involved in dealing with such situations ["Coord"] (5th ranking). One of these (the NNA) referred to the need for democracy building ["Democ"] (7th ranking) while some in the other (NATO) said there were "no lessons" learned from the wars in former Yugoslavia ["None"] (6th ranking).

### THE 1997 OSCE SURVEY

The Fulbright award allowed me to return to Vienna during May – August 1997, to conduct a second round of interviews and, because of the similarity between the questions for both the 1993 and 1997 surveys, explore the external validity of the findings of the 1993 CSCE study; i.e., the extent to which the findings for the CSCE in 1993 were applicable to the OSCE in 1997 (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, pp. 113–115). To put this
another way, the Fulbright Scholarship allowed me to test the 1993 CSCE findings as hypotheses in the 1997 OSCE setting.

Also, between the two surveys, the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been brought to an end by NATO and the Dayton peace process and the efforts of, among others, U.S. negotiator Richard C. Holbrooke in summer-autumn 1995 (see Holbrooke, 1998; also Bildt, 1998). What the Fulbright award also allowed me to do, therefore, was to view the Dayton peace process and the return of negative peace to Bosnia, as a "natural" or "social experiment": "where the changes [in a situation were] produced, not by the scientist's intervention [as in a laboratory], but by that of the policy maker or practitioner" (Kaplan, 1964, pp. 164 - 165; also see Katz, 1953, pp. 78 - 79). In other words, I could do a successive cross sectional study (see Campbell and Katona, 1953, pp. 24 - 25), based on data collected from CSCE negotiators two years before and from OSCE negotiators two years after NATO and the Dayton Peace Accords brought negative peace to Bosnia.

1997 OSCE Historical Context

In addition, between the 1993 and 1997 surveys, the CSCE had been "reinvented" as the OSCE, with Macedonia and Andorra increasing the membership from 53 to 55. Other changes included NATO's creation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) to facilitate, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cupertino Council (NACC), collaboration between NATO and its former WTO adversaries on issues of common security; the disastrous Russian-Chechen war of 1994–1996; the campaign to "enlarge" (expand) NATO, right up to the borders of the former Soviet Union, culminating in the July 1997 offer to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to begin negotiating entry into NATO (a status they would achieve by March 1999); NATO's "sweetener" to the Russian Federation in the form of the Founding Act which gave Russia a voice but not a veto in NATO deliberations; and the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which replaced the NACC and enhanced the PfP.

The summer of 1997 was an appropriate time, therefore, to explore to what extent (if any) the net effect of this mix of developments – but especially the extraordinary cessation of the Bosnian wars – was a continuation, strengthening or change in trends noted in the 1993 CSCE survey (e.g., the trend toward preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention), enhancing or diminishing some and/or revealing other "lessons learned" by senior representatives to the OSCE about how to deal with future Yugoslav-type conflicts.

1997 OSCE Research Design

Once again, prior to departing for Vienna I wrote letters to the heads of the OSCE delegations, informing them that I had been a member of the U.S. delegation to the CSBMs Negotiations and subsequently a NATO Research Fellow, and planned to return to Vienna as a Fulbright OSCE Regional Research Scholar to conduct interviews similar to those that I had conducted during my NATO Fellowship in 1993.

Upon my arrival in Vienna in early May 1997, I contacted all delegations and, by the end of August, succeeded in interviewing 47 individuals from 46 of the 55 participating States:

a) 15 NATO states: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States (not included: Iceland);

b) 9 neutral and non-aligned states (NNA): Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Holy See, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Sweden, and Switzerland (not included: Monaco, San Marino
c) 4 former Yugoslav republics (FYug): Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia (not included: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY: Serbia and Montenegro]);

d) 6 non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovak Republic; and

e) 12 former Soviet republics (FSU): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine (not included: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan).

Clearly, in terms of representativeness, I did better in 1997 than in 1993:

a) NSWP: 6/6 (100%);

b) NATO: 15/16 (94%);

c) NNA: 9/11 (82%);

d) FYug: 4/5 (80%); and

e) FSU: 12/15 (80%).

Although still a "convenience sample," 46 interviewed delegations out of a population of 55 OSCE participating states nevertheless represented 84 percent of that population, which was frustratingly close to being a "population sample."

I also interviewed five officials of the OSCE Secretariat (whose responses are included in this paper) and the representatives of four OSCE Partners for Cupertino: Japan, Korea, Morocco, and Egypt (whose views will be analysed for later reports on this project).

Again, basically schedule-structured interviews, comprising closed- and open-ended questions, were conducted usually in delegation offices, with interviews lasting between one and three hours. The closed-ended questions, with some exceptions, were basically the same as those for 1993 (including the Likert-type response structure) – the exceptions dealing with updated revisions of text and recent and future developments such as NATO enlargement and the withdrawal of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) from Bosnia, then planned for June 1998.

1997 OSCE Research Results

Open-ended questions dealing with the wars in former Yugoslavia included:

1. Why didn't the international community do more to stop the wars in former Yugoslavia?

2. Looking back, how would you have dealt with the wars in former Yugoslavia?

3. What do you believe were the causes of the wars in former Yugoslavia?

4. There is the view that a major cause of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the attempt to establish an Islamic republic in Europe. Have you heard of that view? What do you think of it?

5. If hostilities were to resume in Bosnia, e.g., with the withdrawal of SFOR, what is the danger of the conflict spilling over to other areas?

6. What would it take, in your view, to prevent a resumption of hostilities in Bosnia? What can the OSCE do?

7. Beyond Dayton, how will the wars in former Yugoslavia ultimately end?

8. What are the "Lessons of Yugoslavia"?
9. How could the OSCE help to prevent "future Yugoslavias"?

Again, the responses only to the question, What are the "Lessons of Yugoslavia"?, were examined, distilling from the individual responses common themes for each of the groupings and noting the dissimilar as well as common themes among them (including, for 1997, the OSCE Secretariat).

Table 2
Comparisons Across the Six Groupings for 1997: Common/Dissimilar "Lessons of Yugoslavia"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PD/CP</th>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Coord</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Ethn</th>
<th>Demo</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>NNA</td>
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<td>FYug</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSWP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
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<td>Total of 52</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Across the five basic groupings of OSCE members and OSCE Secretariat for 1997, the dominant "lesson learned" from the wars in former Yugoslavia was the need for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention ["PD/CP"] (1st ranking); followed by the need for coordination among the various actors involved in such activities ["Coord"] (2nd ranking); the need to pay attention to complex (identity-based), ethnic-type conflicts ["Ethn"] (3rd ranking); with some in four of the six groupings believing that forceful or otherwise resolute (decisive) action may be necessary in such situations ["Force"] (4th ranking); and some in three of the groupings subscribing to the need for U.S. leadership in such ["US"] (5th ranking). Other themes were the need for democracy building ["Demo"] (6th ranking); the idea that the wars in former Yugoslavia might be a model for others elsewhere ["Model"] (7th ranking); and that there were no "lessons" learned ["None"] (8th ranking).

The 1993 CSCE And 1997 OSCE Surveys Compared

The major similarity between the results of the 1993 CSCE and 1997 OSCE surveys was that the need for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention was ranked first as the dominant "Lesson of Yugoslavia" for both surveys, with the proportion subscribing to this view increasing slightly from 1993 (45%) to 1997 (50%).

The need for forceful (resolute, decisive) action remained at fourth place for both 1993 and 1997, but, in terms of respondents subscribing to such views, increased slightly from 1993 (16%) to 1997 (17%).
One of the big changes was that the need for a division of labour, complementarity and coordination among actors involved in preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention increased from fifth place in 1993 (13%) to second place for 1997 (44%). Another major change was that the idea that the wars in former Yugoslavia might constitute a model for others elsewhere decreased from second place in 1993 (29%) to seventh place in 1997 (6%).

While the proportion of respondents subscribing to the view that there was a need to pay attention to complex (identity-based), ethnic-type conflicts increased from 1993 (23%) to 1997 (33%), the rankings remained at third place for both surveys. Such was nearly the case for those subscribing to the view that there was a need for democracy building, which increased from 1993 (3%) to 1997 (10%), while the rankings remained basically the same (seventh and sixth place, respectively).

Finally, although the view that there was a need for U.S. leadership in preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention (and beyond!) was manifested only in the 1997 survey, it was not present at a significant level: only 13% of the respondents subscribed to this view, which was ranked in fifth place.

Theory Revisited: Interpretation Of Findings

What are we to make of these findings, and the consistency and/or changes observed between 1993 and 1997? That proportionately more respondents referred to the need for preventive diplomacy as the primary lesson of the wars in former Yugoslavia in 1997 (50%) than in 1993 (45%), for instance, can be seen against the background of developments in preventive diplomacy. Although coined in 1960 by then UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld (Lund, 1996, p. 32), "preventive diplomacy" was not an oft-thought-of concept until 1992 when then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published his An Agenda for Peace, broadening as well as publicising the term. This was the same year that the CSCE had decided to send missions into the field to provide "early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management" and to create the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) (see CSCE Helsinki Document 1992). It was also one year before I conducted the initial, 1993 survey and some four years before Michael Lund (1996) published his major contribution to institutionalising the concept, itself one year before I conducted my follow-up, 1997 survey.

In other words, although it was the dominant "lesson" to have emerged from both surveys, preventive diplomacy may have been referred to more often in 1997 than in 1993 – and most impressively, in terms of the need to co-ordinate the activities of actors involved in such activities – in large part because it was more embedded in the "track-1 and "track-2" conflict resolution cultures and lexicons in 1997 than in 1993. As Anatol Rapoport (1974, p. 7) reminds us, "what men think or say about human conflict ... has a great bearing on the nature of human conflict and its consequences." Quite simply, by 1997, the men (and women) of the OSCE were thinking more about co-ordinated preventive diplomacy than their CSCE predecessors had done in 1993; moreover, they had a more concretised sense of where preventive diplomacy could be useful: in complex (identity-based), ethnic-type conflicts such as those that had given rise to the wars in former Yugoslavia.

The significant decrease between 1993 (29%) and 1997 (6%) in those subscribing to the view that the wars in former Yugoslavia might constitute a model for others elsewhere (especially in the former Soviet Union) might have a lot to do with the cessation of the ("first") Russian-Chechen war in 1996, and with the relative success of the U.S./NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the Dayton Peace Accords: a mission that had been in place some 18 months by the time I conducted the 1997 OSCE
survey. This could also explain the absence of references to the need for U.S. leadership in the 1993 survey, but their presence (although, again, not at a critical level) in the 1997 survey.

One final point worth mentioning is that in 1993, 10 percent of CSCE respondents claimed that there were "no lessons" learned from Yugoslavia, whereas in 1997, only four percent of OSCE respondents made that claim. Clearly, proportionately more respondents in 1997 felt that there were lessons learned than in 1993, perhaps because of the relative success of NATO and the Dayton peace process in achieving and maintaining the "negative peace" in Bosnia since the fall of 1995.

Conclusion

At first, these findings suggested that the "paradigm and behavioural shift" from national to common security associated with the end of the Cold War in general, and with developments in the CSCE/OSCE in particular, was on track, with co-ordinated approaches to preventive diplomacy/conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building – involving a significant U.S. presence – becoming more and more thought about, talked about and (political will "willing") more likely to translate into corresponding action as the OSCE and other track-1 and track-2 actors approached positive as well as negative peace in post-Cold War Europe.

Kosovo, building upon the co-ordinated mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, could have been a major validation of these propositions. However, as suggested by more recent events, including results of my third round of interviews with OSCE representatives conducted during summer 1999 (see Sandole, 2001), the nature of NATO's intervention in Kosovo – a 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia during March – June 1999, to halt the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo's Albanians – caused a rupture in East-West relations and, apparently, a decrease in overall consensus within the OSCE. If the contentious NATO intervention in Kosovo in spring/summer 1999 was, in fact, responsible for the decrease in consensus within the OSCE between 1997 and 1999, then it is conceivable that the relatively more successful NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1995 was responsible for a significant increase in consensus within the CSCE/OSCE between 1993 and 1997 (see ibid.), as well as for the aforementioned increase in the proportion of respondents holding positive views about co-ordinated preventive diplomacy in ethnic-type conflicts.

To conclude, an essential next step in the CSCE/OSCE project is to examine for 1999, as we have here for 1993 and 1997, OSCE respondents' answers to the question, "What are the 'lessons of Yugoslavia'?" This will extend the analysis of responses to three points in time, inclusive of NATO's intervention in Kosovo as well as Bosnia, and in the process, enhance our knowledge about what senior OSCE representatives believe the international community can do to more effectively deal with, and perhaps prevent, "future Yugoslavias," as well as what factors may have shaped their views in this regard.

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Notes

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 40th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), Washington, DC, 16-20 February 1999.

2. The first three published reports can be found in Sandole (1995a, 2000, 2001). The CSCE officially became the OSCE on 1 January 1995 (see CSCE Budapest Document 1994).


4. See Maresca (1985) for an insider's account of the development of the CSCE during the Cold War; and Bloed (1993, 1997) for an "extensive analysis of the origin, development and basic features of the Helsinki process," from 1972 until 1995, with accompanying official documents. For specific discussions of the role of the CSCE/OSCE in the post-Cold War
world, see Lucas (1990, 1993); Kemp (1996); Sandole (1999b, Ch. 7); and Hopmann (1999, 2000).

For monthly, quarterly, annual and other periodic reports on the OSCE, see the OSCE Review: European Security (published by the Finnish Committee for European Security [STETE]; e-mail: stete@kaapeli.fi) and the Helsinki Monitor: Quarterly on Security and Cooperation in Europe (published by the Netherlands Helsinki Committee [NHC]; e-mail: office@nhc.nl); and documentation from the OSCE Secretariat, including the monthly OSCE Newsletter and Secretary General's Annual Report (e-mail: info@osce.org, or see the OSCE Website at: http://www.osce.org).

5 Germany, Italy, and the United States each made two representatives available for interview. Among the remaining states in the sample, one representative from each was interviewed. Hence, 29 CSCE states in the sample plus 3 additional interviewees = a total of 32 interviewees. Twenty-three of these (72 percent) were heads of delegation (Sandole, 1995a, p. 136 [fn. 12]).

6 Although a member of the CSCE, the "rump" Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was banned from attending all meetings of the CSCE at the end of the 4th CSCE review conference in Helsinki, on 8 July 1992, because of its (particularly Serbia's) responsibility for fomenting and sustaining the genocidal warfare in former Yugoslavia.

7 The remaining successor republic of former Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, although not then a member of the CSCE, had "observer" status by the summer of 1993.

8 Many of the successor states of the former Soviet Union either did not have CSCE delegations in Vienna by summer 1993, or if they did, they were usually "one-man shows" representing their governments at various levels (e.g., to the State of Austria and the United Nations in Vienna as well as to the CSCE) and, therefore, their representatives were generally unavailable for interview. This was also the case with other CSCE participating states that were either not represented in Vienna (e.g., Malta) or if they were, their busy representatives were not available for interview (e.g., Albania). (Albania, incidentally, does not belong to any of the five main groupings.)

9 All interviews were conducted in English. With the exception of the American, British, and Canadian representatives, for whom English was their mother tongue, the other representatives spoke English as one of their foreign languages. Some of these individuals requested additional information "in English" for a particular question to be clearer to them. On the assumption that this provision of additional information on an ad hoc basis could have affected the comparability of responses between individuals to the same item, as partial checks interviewees were invited to explain their SA-SD answers in an open-ended fashion – "in the margin," so to speak – as well as to respond to the 12 open-ended questions, many of which overlapped with the closed-ended ones.

10 Elsewhere I have referred to the phenomenon of wars in former Yugoslavia stimulating wars elsewhere (e.g., in the former Soviet Union) as one example of spillover, which I call multiplier-effect systemic contagion (see Sandole, 1999b, pp. 148-150).

11 The FRY remained banned from attending all meetings of the OSCE because of its (particularly Serbia's) role in fomenting and sustaining the genocidal warfare in former Yugoslavia: a situation which continued subsequently with the brutal Serbian repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The situation only changed when, following the toppling of Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic from power in October 2000, the FRY was allowed, on 10 November 2000, to occupy the seat previously held at the OSCE by the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) (see OSCE Newsletter, 2000).
I interviewed one person from each participating state in the overall sample, with the exception that the U.S. delegation had two persons available for interview (hence, 47 persons from 46 participating states). Thirty-seven (79 percent) of the interviewees were heads of delegation. (Two persons in the 1997 survey were also present in the 1993 survey.)

As in 1993, I was unable to reach certain participating states, either because they were not represented in Vienna (e.g., Andorra, the newest OSCE member) or if they were, were represented by busy delegations (e.g., Kazakhstan). I succeeded in contacting some delegations, even talking with their ambassadors, but for a variety of reasons, was unable to conduct the standard interview (e.g., Albania, Tajikistan). (Andorra, like Albania, is not a member of any of the five main groupings.)

The number of closed-ended questions for the 1997 OSCE study was also the same as that for the 1993 CSCE study (15). The number of open-ended questions for 1997 (21), however, was nearly double that for 1993 (12). For both 1993 and 1997, the majority of the open-ended questions dealt with the wars in former Yugoslavia. Again, this paper is the initial report of analyses of responses to the open-ended questions.

In this connection, see the comments by OSCE Secretary General Giancarlo Aragona in OSCE Review (1998).

One possible hint of this, in February 1999, was President Clinton's statement that: U.S. ground troops should participate in a NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo to give the warring sides "the confidence to lay down their arms." "Bosnia taught us a lesson," Clinton said in his weekly radio address, referring to the estimated quarter-million people killed in [Bosnia] before NATO peacekeepers intervened. "If we wait until casualties mount and war spreads, any effort to stop it will come at a higher price under more dangerous conditions" (emphasis added) (Priest, 1999, p. A1).