

**International Working Session:
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Military Cooperation in the EU

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It is with great pleasure and I feel most honoured that I have been invited back to address the Forum. Much has happened since we last met. We are of course enjoying the benefits of the Austrian Presidency of the EU and I can report it has been a most successful time for all. You should all be most pleased with the nations' work which has attracted considerable praise from other Member States.

So I thought that it might be useful to update you on the changes that have occurred since our meeting in Schloss Rothschild in late May 2005 at Reichenau. Hence in addition to the main topic I have added a few slides to scope the changes and bring you all unto date.

The EU Military Committee

The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body established within the Council (no formal Defence Ministers Councils yet). It provides for maximum consultation and co-operation among EU members, gives military advice and makes recommendations to relevant EU bodies. It provides military direction to EUMS. The EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) represented by their Military Representatives (MILREPs). The Chairman of the EUMC (CEUMC) attends meetings of the Council when decisions with defence implications are to be taken.

The EUMC meets at the level of CHODs as and when necessary (normally twice a year), and is the highest military body established within the Council and provides military direction to the European Military Staff (EUMS).


The EUMC is responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. It exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU framework. Its functions (among others) are:

- It is the source of military advice based on consensus.
- It is the forum for military consultation and cooperation between the Member States in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management.
- The EUMC monitors the proper execution of military operations conducted under the responsibility of the Operation Commander.

The European Military Staff and the Key Changes

The structure is now composed of six Divisions and Executive Office, supporting directly COS/DG and Chairman of the EUMC/EUMC WG. Its specific roles are:

- To enhance EU's capacity for planning & conduct of civ-mil crisis management
- operations
- Institutionalising civ-mil integration
- Standing civ-mil body within the EUMS
- Including Operations Centre nucleus



This has the impact of changing our augmentation arrangements and the EU command and control options.


In the new Division called the Civ/Mil Cell, there are two main components each working at different levels:

- The Strategic Planning Branch which works at the political-strategic level, composed of 18 EUMS / CGS / CION action officers.
- The Military-Strategic level (this is not the current EUMS working level), composed of 4 EUMS Officers and 4 housekeepers.

This requires different skill sets, aimed at preparing for work in the operations arena and also to assist/augment MS HQs as required. Furthermore it will also form the Permanent Key Nucleus of the Ops Centre.

The Ops Centre becomes fully capable when the Key Nucleus Reinforced is further augmented by personnel drawn from:

- EUMS
- DGE
- Other CGS bodies
- MS



Under the direction of the Op Cdr, who will be appointed by the Members States in a Council Decision, it conducts the mission at the strategic level.

You should note that it is intended that for civilian aspects, direction at the strategic level remains with DGE, the principle of civilian control of civil crisis management will be respected.


The illustration to the left captures the relationship between capability and augmentation. On the left hand vertical axis you can see the manning numbers in terms of total personnel and below, the military/civilian split.

On activation, the Key Nucleus will be reinforced by additional personnel within 5 days and should achieve an Initial Operating Capability, i.e. the ability to plan. The Key Nucleus Reinforced will, with further augmentation, be complete and reach the Full Operational Capability, i.e. the ability to plan and operate. The type of mission will influence the exact composition of the Ops Centre staff.

These new changes now produce three command and control options including two designs for an autonomous operation and one with NATO under Berlin plus arrangements.

Returning to the new organisation, in addition, we now have established the EU Cell at SHAPE, as a permanent body within SHAPE and following the principle of reciprocally, the NATO Liaison Team within EUMS. The third element is the newly created liaison post to the United Nations in New York.

Before I leave this situation we anticipate that the new Chairman will be French (currently the French CHOD General Henri Bentegeat), and the new Director General to come from the UK (the ex EUFOR Comd in Bosnia David Leakey).



The Headline Goals

Now turning to the main subject, it seemed sensible to scope where we are in developing our capabilities, goals and future thinking on military cooperation especially as the Austrian Presidency will be submitting the latest results to the EU Council at the ministerial level in the next weeks.

To begin we had the head line goals to be achieved by 2003. Note these included civilian and military requirement; a key indicator of the need to have a comprehensive approach to planning and performance.

Head Line Goals to be achieved by end 2003

- | Military | Civilian |
|--|--|
| Article 17 (2)
(Petersberg Tasks): | • Policing: <ul style="list-style-type: none">– 5000 Officers (1400 deployable within 30 days) |
| • Humanitarian & Rescue Tasks | • Rule of Law: <ul style="list-style-type: none">– 282 judges, prosecutors, penitentiary |
| • Peacekeeping Tasks | • Civil Administration: <ul style="list-style-type: none">– 160 administrators |
| • Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking | • Civil Protection: <ul style="list-style-type: none">– >2000 experts |



E U M S

The actual target though was not wholly met – an assessment showed that our capabilities were “limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls”.

The next step was to define our future political ambition which was extracted from the European Security Strategy. Of note here is the list of perceived threats which then shaped our capability planning:

- Terrorism
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Regional Conflicts
- State Failure
- Organized Crime

The outcome was the definition of the European Security and Defense policy which is based on the belief that there are complex, dynamic, interrelated threats and

uniqueness of each crisis/region which will require the use of a mixture of instruments if we are to achieve a coherent approach.

This methodology also requires the development of civilian capabilities, and the resultant civil Head Line Goals were developed. In particular this meant that more capabilities were required. For instance the Priority areas and Commitments include:

- Police: 5.700 officers
- Rule of Law: 630 officials (judges, prosecutors, penitentiary personnel)
- Civilian Administration: 560 experts (e.g. civil registration, custom services)
- Civil Protection: 5.000 personnel
- Monitoring capability: 500 personnel
- Support to EU Special Representatives: 390 experts (human rights, political affairs, gender and SSR)
- and the establishment of the European Gendarmerie Force: FR, IT, ES, NL, PT; at EU's disposal: 800 in 30 days

Now we turn to the detailed aspects of the Military Headline Goal. The ESS required us to have higher readiness forces capable of deploying over large distances with the chance to take on the broader challenges associated with security and not just defence issues.

So in addition to the old Head Line Goals known as the Petersburg tasks, these were expanded to include:

- Institution Building
- Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR)
- Security Sector Reform (SSR)
- Support for third countries in combating terrorism

This has resulted in a focus on quality and rapid response looking for readiness of around 5 – 10 days, with the aim to have various Force Packages that are interoperable, deployable and sustainable.

We then took the analysis forward using specific scenarios based on the possible missions:

- Separation of Parties by Force (SOPF)
- Stabilisation, Reconstruction and MA to third Countries (SR)
- Conflict Prevention (CP)
- Evacuation Operation in a non permissive environment (EO)
- Assistance to Humanitarian Operations (HA)

I wish now though to focus on one aspect that for me highlights the need for increasing military cooperation in the EU. That is the EU Battle Group Concept.

The EU Battle Groups

The Battle Group (BG) is a specific form of Rapid Response Element and is one possible answer to the timely provision of the necessary capabilities for an EU Rapid Response operation.

In this context a BG is defined as the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations, able to operate for up to 120 days with relevant logistic support.

It is based on a combined arms, battalion sized force and re-enforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements.

It will be based on the principle of multinationality and could be formed by a Framework Nation or a multinational coalition of Member States. In any case, interoperability and military effectiveness have to be the key criteria.


Finally a BG must be associated with a (F)HQ and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers.

A BG-package consists of 3 main parts:

- the BG, composed of the core of the BG, the infantry battalion and a mission specific mix of combat support and combat service support assets and capabilities;
- the FHQ, including dedicated Staff and CIS-support, and multinational augmentees;
- finally also a mission specific mix of associated operational and strategic enablers.

The C2 structure follows the agreed and accepted structure but there are key points to note:

- First, there is the need for the closest of linkages between the Battle Group and the Force Level Headquarters.
- Second there is the need to coordinate across the various enablers and the components both at the operational and tactical levels.
- Third and most significantly for the forum’s topic, there is the need for cooperation across the member states and any participating third parties, as the concept is based on multinationality and the role of the framework nation.
- Fourth, there is the need at the political-military and military-strategic level to ensure the EU Member States and NATO partners de-conflict their support to the BG roster and the NRF respectively.



These may seem like onerous tasks but so far, judging from the contributions out to 2010, the concept has been well received by the Member States who have met the challenge and want to participate. I chaired the last BG Coordination Conference in May and reported to the EUMC that we were on track to achieving the Full Operational Capability of having two BG available in any six month period by 1 January 2007.

The ambition set out in the Headline Goal 2010 is that the EU should be able to take the decision to launch an operation within five days of the approval of a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and that forces start implementing their mission on the ground no later than ten days after that decision. This requires that BGs are to be built on assets and capabilities held at a readiness of five to ten days.

These parameters though are very demanding and if I leave you with one challenge it is how the Member States are going to achieve this. Returning to the subject you asked me to address, it seems to me that the BG Concept encapsulates the problems and benefits of increasing military cooperation in the EU.

The concept is like an ice berg; you only see the obvious need to make it work on the ground at the tactical level. It is evidently clear that tactics, sops, doctrine, equipment interoperability are all absolute requirements and are readily understood and practiced. However the real problems are elsewhere. For instance in nations where domestic arrangements have to fit within a very tight time frame to achieve the decision to launch the operation. Parliament may have to be consulted and

Ministries of Defense engaged in intra and external discussions and agreements with other departments and nationalities. For instance I think that the timings allow for around 36 hours analysing the CONOPS before making a decision to support or reject the proposals and some nation has to lead the development of that document beforehand! It requires much thinking and some quiet, sensible and pragmatic planning.

There is also the cooperation required to ensure the strategic enablers are in place and can meet the challenge. For instance we may have an idea of the C2 arrangements, size and shape of the force, i.e. how many linear and cubic metres are required to be lifted, how many outsize loads have been identified but we do not know where the drop off point is or the actual mission. And so only after some tailoring of the force will the actual lift and sustainment requirements become clear yet the target is to have this force operating on the ground ten days after the decision to launch!

Now there are probably more examples that show this need and I am aware that the Austrian Presidency has submitted papers on the need for adopting better cooperation and comprehensive planning approaches. So for completeness may I end by signaling that this topic has both a military and civilian aspect if we are to meet the challenges outlined in the European Security Strategy. For instance I quote from the most recent document which concerns the need to improve the EU response to Emergency and Crisis response:

“The Council has endorsed an operational Manual on EU emergency and crisis coordination. Firstly, this

manual sets out interim EU crisis coordination arrangements for political coordination in Brussels for major emergencies inside or outside the European Union directly affecting a number of Member States or engaging the entire European Union. These arrangements do not supplant existing rapid alert systems; they will help fill any gaps and provide input for coordinated action or decisions by the Council. The manual will be updated in the light of tests, experience and practice.

Secondly, the manual pre-identifies operational networks and emergency support available in Member States which could be called upon in the event of coordinated terrorist attacks or an influenza pandemic. The Presidency, the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commission will continue to develop the manual to cover other emergency situations.

Member States have already put or are putting in place the necessary internal structures to be able to respond rapidly to all requests for assistance in relation to emergencies or crises. In doing so, Member States should consider whether, for the purpose of these arrangements, an overarching national contact point for the coordination of all emergency and crisis situations would ensure greater effectiveness”.

I leave you with the thought that this idea should be taken forward soon.