Introduction: Finland’s policy towards international security cooperation in the post-cold war era

A new point of departure – a new security policy

Entering the second post-cold war decade, Europe presents a security environment where change continues to be a central feature. New tasks, issues and conflicts shape the varied security agenda. At the same time, states have overwhelmingly adopted cooperation as their overall approach to the increasingly complex set of security needs. Although the new Europe, unlike the frozen cold-war constellation, has experienced open and violent conflicts, albeit regional and local, there is no longer just one divisive issue for states to address in search of security and stability. In contrast, a functioning and successful security policy has to entail a capability to manage social, economic and ideational transformation as a whole and its specific aspects. As a result of the adoption of such a comprehensive concept of security, politico-military security is embedded in a broader and more nuanced risk and threat assessment, although there are distinct differences among states and regions in the wider Europe.

For Finland, integration and the transforming security environment in post-cold war Europe has opened a new kind of arena for its foreign policy. This article deals with the nature and extent of the change in Finland’s policy in the area of security and defence. The more specific question posed is how Finnish security and defence policy is shaped by the opportunity for increased participation in defence diplomacy, international politico-military cooperation and by the possibility of military alignment.

Change in the European security order is shaped by structural, institutional and ideational factors that relate to power, governance and identity as its formative areas of activity. Accordingly, all the main theories of international relations – neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism – need to be used in explaining and understanding the foreign policies of states adapting to, coping with and shaping their security environment in Europe. This is equally true for Finland, which has moved from a peripheral position into the core of European politics, while continuing to attend to its specific geopolitical interests.¹

From its historical, socio-cultural and geopolitical vantage points, Finland has deepened and broadened its involvement in international security cooperation throughout the post-cold war era. The primary consequence of the change in Europe at large has been increased room for action for Finland in international affairs affecting its security, including high politics. Finland’s capability to strive for increased autonomy and ensure its freedom of action has

¹ I have analysed Finland’s foreign and security policy using the framework of three theories in Möttölä (1998). For a similar approach to analysing the explanatory power of neorealism, utilitarian liberalism and constructivism on German foreign policy after unification, see Rittberger, ed. (forthcoming).
been strengthened by the removal or mitigation of geopolitical constraints that have historically and traditionally guided its security policy.

Secondly, the development of a multilayered institutional structure for international cooperation has provided Finland with increased opportunities to contribute to collective action in security management. The prospect of an increased role for common norms and institutions in international security and the possibility of achieving gains that benefit all participants are especially significant developments for a small country like Finland, located in a region with an enormous potential for change.

Thirdly, the opening up of the security order has instigated a new identity formation within and between states and societies. Preferences and interests are not all fixed but are also constructed in the new dynamics of international and social relations. For Finland, new ingredients for identity formation are created by domestic political changes and engagement in integration as well as by broader international normative developments.

To meet the challenge of promoting security through change and cooperation, Finland has been engaged on two parallel and complementary tracks, namely the strengthening and institutionalisation of cooperative security in the common OSCE space and the deepening and enlargement of political and security integration within the selective European Union. Partnership with NATO has been a key element in Finland’s contribution to politico-military security in the wider Europe, while the development of the security and defence dimension of the EU has opened new tasks and opportunities in the same field. The option of military alignment has been embedded in the evolving and pragmatic approach to security policy, although it has not emerged as a concrete choice for Finland to act upon.

In addition to the general effects of membership of the EU and partnership with NATO, a special focus is placed by Finland on promoting its interests towards Russia and security and stability in Finland's own region of Northern Europe. It is within the triangular evolution of the EU, NATO and Russia/Northern Europe where implications of wider European change for Finnish security and defence policy primarily have to be analysed and assessed.

Post-cold war change

Finland emerged from the cold war as a recognised and effective player in global, European and regional international relations. During the cold war, the policy of neutrality – military non-alliance and non-involvement in great-power disputes, complemented by active international diplomacy and constructive cooperation with neighbours – had served Finland effectively as an instrument for pursuing national security interests and promoting wider international causes. The solution of national defence based on an indigenous denial capability had remained stable and credible, although it was critically dependent on great-power peace, in particular in view of the implications for the Finnish position in any crisis concerning the bilateral treaty arrangement with the Soviet Union.2

The policy of broadly-applied active neutrality was made impractical by the demise of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the East-West division and the advent of the New Europe. The Finnish security policy line was transformed into unreserved participation in the politics of cooperative security based on the accountability of all states for the common norms and

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2 The Finnish-Soviet Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) Treaty contained the possibility of military consultation and ultimately cooperation in case of attack on Finland or against the Soviet Union through Finland. The political rationale of the treaty for Finland was a preventive and deterring effect that would preclude its activation.
principles adopted in the Conference on Security and Co-operation/Organization for Security and Co-operation (CSCE/OSCE) framework. In addition, all states were committed to collective action in implementing those obligations. After the Paris Summit of 1990, those democratic values had become realisable throughout the CSCE/OSCE space, when the unification of Europe was adopted as a common goal without any rival set of political values. The common norms would be used as standards and yardsticks for evaluating, and reacting to, the behaviour of other states. There would be no room for impartial or detached positions in situations where they were violated nor did Finland look for such autonomy. Moreover, Finland had no more security commitments in bilateral cooperation with its great-power neighbour after the replacement of the Finnish-Soviet treaty with an arrangement based on CSCE principles, similar to the general line adopted by Russia’s neighbours and partners in Eastern, Central and Western Europe.

The CSCE/OSCE process, which for Finland represented the salient and immediate part of the international system, had turned from a forum for enhancing the neutrality position into a forum for practical security policy with the potential of multiple roles and cooperative constellations for Finland. Commitment to the emerging common security space in Europe corresponded to a long-term policy for Finland. As a small and potentially marginalised state, Finland had been an advocate for, and a tested mediator in, multilateral diplomacy of détente in the CSCE and UN frameworks. Overcoming political fault-lines and lines of division in Europe remained an essential goal for Finnish security policy. Consequently, Finland was one of the foremost supporters of the concept of comprehensive security and strengthening of the capability for collective action within the OSCE community of states. At the same time, the competence of the United Nations and the unique legitimising status of the Security Council for the system of collective security maintained their place in the Finnish normative and practical outlook on world politics.

A mature Nordic-Western democracy, Finland – like the other established European neutrals – had stayed outside the European Community principally for reasons of foreign policy, although it had been involved otherwise in global and European economic integration. With the end of the cold war and the imminent dissolution of the Soviet Union after the abortive coup in 1991, Finland embarked on the road towards full participation at the core of political and economic integration in Europe through membership of what was becoming the European Union.

The immediate reason for the application for EU membership in 1992 was to gain an equal position with competitors; in particular with neighbouring Sweden that had applied a year earlier, in the determination and management of the rules of the vital Single Market. A related incentive was to ensure access to the economic benefits of future integration, beyond those provided by the European Economic Area agreement concluded earlier.

In addition, there were political and security motives involved, although they were not equally transparent in the decision-making process or as prominent in the subsequent

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3 In such an arrangement, obligations on cooperation in international conflict would be devoted to the use of multilateral fora and bilateral commitments are only of the negative (non-use) guarantees. See Agreement on the Foundations of Relations between the Republic of Finland and the Russian Federation of 1992.

4 For the role of Finland and other neutral states in the CSCE process, see Leatherman (1991) and Hakovirta (1988). For the change of Finland’s security policy from neutrality to engagement, see Möttölä (1993). For a doctrinal and practical presentation of Finnish security policy in the post-cold war system, see Security in a Changing World (1995).

5 On a comparative analysis of the road towards membership, see Luif (1995).
referendum debate. Although the Moscow coup was an alarm signal of risks that could arise from an implosion of the neighbouring great power, political and security reasons were primarily related to longer-term perspectives, being specifically predicated on further transformation of the European Union and its vital contribution to the European security order as a whole. The perspective opened by accession to the Union was seized as a foundation for an offensive rather than defensive strategy for integration and overall foreign policies.

Moreover, although the Finns had always felt that their country belonged to Western Europe on the basis of its Nordic political and economic system, full membership of the European Union was to complete—particularly in the perceptions and political images held by outsiders—Finland’s and the Finns’ identification with the core of the democratic value community. In many ways, Finland was turned from an exceptional into a normal case among the developed democratic Western European countries.

An adapted security policy doctrine

Cognisant that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) did not provide for common defence, which rather facilitated the Finnish quest for membership by contributing to its acceptance among Finnish elites and sections of the public not prepared for entry into a fully-fledged military alliance, Finland adopted and developed the more diffuse conception of “existential” security to be accrued from EU membership by mutual identification and solidarity among the members. Such protection would fall short of providing direct or automatic security guarantees inherent in collective defence. On the other hand, it would go beyond the sphere of strict military threat by aggression to cover other developments and situations that affect security in the broader sense. Moreover, the practical multilateral cooperation within the EU could indirectly provide military security by preventing such extreme threats from appearing and providing political support in case of a threat of force or actual aggression against a member-state. Above all, and immediately, EU membership would provide added security by strengthening Finland’s capability to influence issues that affect its core values and interests.

Relying on such a dynamic perception of the security implications of the Union, Finland engaged from the beginning of its membership, as a priority task, in the enhancement of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as an instrument for common security. Significant aspects of the CFSP pillar for Finland, as for all the other former neutrals as well as for a clear majority of the members, were its intergovernmental nature, the primacy of the unanimity rule and the right to case-by-case abstention in decisions and from joint actions on vital national security grounds. For Finland, such generic features of the CFSP acquis did not lessen its politically binding force or its potential effectiveness, which was primarily a question of political will. Consequently, Finland perceived entering into membership of the Union as engagement in a reciprocal political alliance that inherently excluded the possibility of taking a neutral stand towards events or developments affecting the security of the Union or its members.

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6 On the development of the Finnish elite opinion on accession, see Väyrynen (1993); on public opinion, see reports by Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies (EVA) on surveys of Finnish EU opinions from various years (most recently in 1999) and Pesonen and Vesa (1998).

7 On the offensive and defensive integration strategy, see Petersen (1998).

8 On this point, see Möttölä (1993).

9 The implications and conditions for Finland’s entry into the EC/EU were analysed from all angles in the government’s report to the Parliament that provided the basis for the legislators’ decision on the membership application: Finland and Membership of The European Community. Government’s Account to Parliament on the Impact of EC Membership in Finland. January 9, 1992. Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1992.
Limits and possibilities of military cooperation

From the onset of Finland’s adaptation to the post-cold war security environment in Europe, it became evident that Finland was not willing, nor did it see a compelling reason, to search for direct involvement in a military alliance, which in practice would have meant membership of NATO. This would have constituted a departure from the long-standing policy that had served its security in the difficult years of great-power confrontation. Moreover, Finland did not have a security deficit or an identity deficit such as those that prompted Central and Eastern European countries to orient towards NATO membership by the mid-1990s. There was neither a pull nor a push effect, domestically, for joining NATO.10

Moreover, there was no general external pressure to consider the issue in the immediate and optimistic post-cold war years, when NATO enlargement had yet to become a serious possibility and the alliance presented instead the Partnership for Peace (PfP) as an outreach arrangement best suited for the requirements of the evolving European security scene. As an indication of its belief in broad-based and pragmatically-oriented cooperation in responding to new security risks in Europe, Finland grasped this offer as an opportunity for promoting CSCE/OSCE-wide security, explicitly rescinding its use as a pre-accession strategy. Finland was the first among the former neutrals to engage itself with the “new” NATO by acquiring observer status with the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), moving on to PfP membership and in due time joining the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).11

While the implications of NATO contacts were practical and limited, the adjustment for EU membership constituted the first occasion for a doctrinal determination by Finland of the issue of defence. On one hand, Finland stressed that the Union was not a defence alliance, even after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, and that it allowed the adherence by a militarily non-aligned country to the Treaty without any reservations regarding its obligations on security and defence. On the other hand, and in accordance with an open-ended approach, Finland reaffirmed its commitment to the CFSP acquis in totality, including the long-term possibility of common defence subject to unanimous decision as outlined in the TEU.12

The outcome of this national assessment by Finland as an EU member and a NATO partner was a post-cold war defence solution based on continued military non-alliance and independent defence with a willingness and capability to engage in widening and deepening military cooperation for crisis management tasks. In the overall line of national security policy, the EU was constituted as a central element, responding to a wide range of security needs, although it was not in practice capable of acting in military crisis management and its role in armaments cooperation was limited. The EU was also opening a common defence

10 In accordance with the surveys conducted by the National Planning Commission on Defence Information (MTS) since 1996 on public opinion on military non-alliance and alignment, 69 percent favoured military non-alliance in 1996, 60 percent in 1998 and 74 percent in 1999. The latest survey was conducted during the NATO Kosovo campaign. Only 18 percent were in favour of military alignment in 1999. Of the possible models of military alignment, NATO is the most popular in 1999 (46 per cent) followed by an alliance with Sweden (26), full membership of the WEU (14) and an alliance with Russia (3). MTS tiedotteita ja katsauksia 30.6.1999.

11 Finland’s decision on NACC was widely viewed as a step with significance beyond its practical significance and as a sign of Finland’s more pragmatic and non-ideological approach towards NATO, compared with Sweden, for example.

12 A difference was made between common defence as a result of EU integration at some distant point and collective defence as constituted within the only functioning military alliance, NATO. Finland’s view on the compatibility of continued military non-alliance with membership, see statement by the Prime Minister: Government’s Notice to Parliament on Finland’s EC Membership Application. Address by Prime Minister Esko in Parliament, 16 March, 1992, in: Ulkopoliittisia lausuntoja ja asiakirjoja 1992, Helsinki 1993.
option that was, however, not viewed by Finland as relevant or salient in the prevailing or foreseeable situation. NATO membership was not an active issue, although it was a relevant factor in its new, "non-article V" form. In all, Finland’s approach to military cooperation was to emphasise the pragmatic adjustment of international institutions and national arrangements to real security needs at hand in post-cold war Europe.

Political aspects of adjustment

Neutrality – which precludes binding military alignment in peacetime and includes obligation to non-belligerence in case of war – had not grown into a matter of principle or an element of identity for Finland, like it was for Sweden, nor did it have a legal foundation that was central for the status of "permanently" neutral Switzerland and Austria. Although the neutrality policy was widely supported by Finnish public opinion and identified with the active foreign policy that had brought diplomatic successes enhancing national self-confidence, it was viewed primarily as an instrumental policy to secure vital national interests and gain room for action in the difficult and precarious geopolitical position imposed on Finland by the victorious powers at the end of the Second World War. Indeed, neutrality was the best possible option to mitigate the constraints placed on the Finnish policy and cushion the bilateralism of the relations with the great-power neighbour.

The expanding pattern of multilateral security cooperation, first in the OSCE and then, more importantly, in the EU framework fundamentally changed the political context for Finland’s policy towards its Eastern neighbour and also the instruments and arrangements available for pursuing its national and wider interests. Similarly vital were the changes that took place and continued to unravel in the Soviet Union/Russia itself. Neither of these processes of change were fundamental enough or sufficiently clear-cut or irrevocable to make the Finnish perception of its endangered geopolitical position completely outdated, but they underscored a shift from bilateralism to multilateralism, from a reactive to a proactive line of action and from a predominantly politico-military to a broader and less stressing assessment of security risks.

As the Soviet Union was replaced by a democratising Russia and the great-power overlay was lifted, it did not mean that Finland would cease to be sensitive towards, or in fact, concerned about the impact of its security policy choices on Finnish-Russian relations or regional stability at large. Military, while global nuclear confrontation did not exist any longer as a factor creating tension in Northern Europe, the focus was transferred to the conventional sphere and regional and subregional security, emphasising the importance for stability of Finland’s national defence capability. Despite the scaling down of its capabilities – by design and by default – beyond the Finnish border, Russia remained a regional military great power that was highly sensitive about the security of its borders and the prospects of stability in nearby regions.13

On the political plane, Finland joined its EU partners and the western countries in general in striving to present positive incentives for Russia to engage in the unifying Europe and to avoid encouraging self-isolationist or nationalist tendencies inside Russia. In the absence of a clear military threat, military alignment did not arise as a means for balancing or bandwagoning or as a generic or specific answer to security challenges at hand. On the contrary, it was clear to the Finnish leadership that Finland would best promote regional

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13 Upon the changes in the early 1990s, Finland engaged Russia in a dialogue on military openness in an effort to track Russia’s deployment pattern in the areas across the common border. Although contacts produced no new information of strategic significance, they were considered a sign of new openness.
stability, and thus its own security, by staying outside military alliances and maintaining its independent defence, to be developed as a choice of its own.

Alertness towards military stability was connected with the recognition that power continued to matter in post-cold war Europe despite institutional and liberal changes. The attention devoted to Russia was part of a strong regional emphasis in Finland’s security policy that both reflected the changes under way generally in the OSCE space and strove to make use of them for particular local purposes. The Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe in a wider sense had emerged as an area ripe for the application of the OSCE concept of comprehensive and indivisible security through increased cooperation, while an organic linkage was to be preserved with adherence to the common norms and principles and overall OSCE practices. The regional focus served two essential goals of Finnish security policy; namely it offered Russia a channel for engagement in European transformation and unification and supported the Baltic States in their reform, transition and eventual integration with the democratic core of Europe.¹⁴

The engagement of the political and material resources of the EU offered an inherently new basis for the promotion of Finland’s interests vis-à-vis Russia. Through its commitment – without ideological reservations – to the common OSCE norms and principles, notably by signing up to the Paris Charter and other basic CSCE/OSCE documents, and later joining the Council of Europe, Russia had adhered to the accountability regime which focussed on implementing the attendant obligations with good faith and in mutual cooperation and support. As the EU based its policy of engagement and conditionality towards Russia on the OSCE obligations, Finland was able to adopt the EU as a forum and instrument for its policy towards Russia without any prior – or, as it soon turned out, subsequent – reservations or exceptions. It was crucial for the feasibility and workability of this approach that Russia did not perceive the EU as a strategic challenge like NATO.¹⁵

Upon achieving its pre-accession status and from the beginning of full EU membership, Finland participated actively in the formulation of the Union’s common policies towards Russia, stressing the practical significance of the Union’s assistance and support programmes for Russia’s democratic and market transition and the need to follow closely Russian political and economic developments. While Finland reminded the partners that its accession had brought to the Union its only common border with Russia, it also linked the benefits gained from its cross-border cooperation with Russia with common EU interests. An active Finnish policy of support and cooperation towards nearby regions in Russia was mutually fortifying with the deployment of joint EU resources in promoting transition and stability in Russia.¹⁶

Basic factors in Finnish security policy: a systematic approach

To what extent and how are states to meet their security and defence needs through cooperation and mutual obligations? Although the focus here lies on the politico-military

¹⁴ On the regional security order in the Baltic Sea region, see Möttölä (1998a) and other articles in NEBI Yearbook (1998, 1999).
¹⁵ Finland made this point explicitly in its comment on the Commission’s avis on Finland, see The Finnish Government’s Stand on the Statement by the EC Commission on Finland’s Application for Membership, 4 November 1992. That Russia would make no exception for Finnish policies was demonstrated in Finland’s joining with other like-minded states in using the CSCE mechanism in requesting a Soviet explanation on events in Riga and Vilnius in 1991.
¹⁶ One of the primary new elements in Finland’s post-cold war policy was an active approach to regional and subregional stability.
sphere, it will not be isolated from – but is rather supplanted by – the broader security environment.

Within the inclusive OSCE context, the European Union and NATO are the main providers of security by exclusive political and military alignment. In addition, their outreach arrangements and conditional enlargement schemes contribute critically to an extensive though uneven network of security cooperation in the wider European space.

The effects of membership of the EU and partnership with NATO on Finnish security policy are embedded in, and derived from, the changing international security order. The EU offers a potential for common defence in the long run but relates primarily to broad security concerns other than military. NATO offers an option of a functioning military alliance but is primarily preoccupied with developing a broader role that responds to other politico-military challenges than to military threats against its members.

The role and position of the EU and NATO in the framework of action in Finnish security policy can be assessed systematically by the main theories or approaches of International Relations, which invoke respectively power, governance and identity as the driving elements of security change. The salient politico-military security environment consists of the interplay between OSCE/Europe-wide and subregional developments, with Russia playing a key role at both levels. Figure 1 offers a framework for explaining and predicting Finland’s security policy towards these key players in a systematic manner.17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>Russia/Region</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security by Solidarity</td>
<td>Freedom of Choice</td>
<td>Effects of Enlargement on Regional Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP/CESDP Capability</td>
<td>Russian Military Doctrine</td>
<td>Membership Option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement of Disputes</td>
<td>Russian Role in Military</td>
<td>Defence Benefits by Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>involving Russia</td>
<td>Stability and Openness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy of Enlargement</td>
<td>Cross-Border and Subregional Cooperation</td>
<td>Regional Effects of PfP/MAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Dimension</td>
<td>Nordic-Baltic Community</td>
<td>Support to Baltic Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership with Russia</td>
<td>Regional Institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in Regional Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeanisation of CFSP</td>
<td>Management of the Past</td>
<td>Indipendent Defence as Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Identity</td>
<td>Perceptions of the Future</td>
<td>Future of Geopolitics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“EU-Baltic Sea”-Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 1** Implications of the EU membership and NATO partnership and developments involving Russia and the Northern European region for Finland’s security and defence policy. Agendas and issues in the areas of power, governance and identity.

17 I have analysed Finland’s security policy in such a theoretical framework in Möttölä (1998, figure, p. 376).
The national doctrine of security policy

The most recent "White Book" outlines the basic factors in Finland’s security and defence policy as follows:

"military non-alliance, an independent defence and membership of the European Union. Finland's security position is centrally influenced by Russia and being a neighbour with Russia, the situation in Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region and the development of relations between NATO and Russia." (p. 47)\(^{18}\)

This approach to security policy is inherently geopolitical and realistic, reflecting the perspective of power. The salient security environment is regional – European and subregional – and adjacent to Finnish territory (Northern Europe, the Nordic-Baltic subregion); and the key factors highlighted are great powers or great-power relations (Russia and NATO). The point of departure for determining the policy line is a solution and doctrine for national defence (non-alliance, independent defence) in accordance with the traditional concept of military security.\(^{19}\)

At the same time, there is a geoeconomic, functional and institutionalist angle to the doctrine, reflecting the perspective of governance. The emphasis is laid on membership of the European Union, which is primarily perceived as a civilian power and an engine of political and economic integration. Moreover, a reference is made to sub-regional cooperation in Northern Europe related to the broad concept of security.

While stressing that EU membership has increased Finland’s opportunities to influence international developments and broadened its responsibilities in European security matters, particularly in stability policy, the report goes on to assess the role of the Union in politico-military security:

"EU membership does not provide guarantees of military security, but does entail protection based on mutual solidarity. The Union is founded on the concept that its own and its member states’ security are inseparable. The influence of the EU on security depends on its economic strength and political cohesion." (p. 48)\(^{20}\)

In the Finnish view, the security benefits provided by the Union are based on reciprocity and are dependent on efficiency in the field of the CFSP, with an envisaged threshold effect on defence:

“As a member of the Union, Finland can not be impartial in a conflict between the Union and a third party. On the other hand, membership strengthens Finland’s security position and raises the threshold that would have to be surmounted in order to exert pressure on it. Finland’s credible independent defence supports the common security of the Union and its members. An effective Union accords with Finland’s security interests.” (p. 48)\(^{20}\)

NATO is positioned as an element in the framework of action, not singled out or taken as a point of departure for security policy formation. At the same time, Finland’s relationship with NATO, which incorporates collective defence as an option and politico-military cooperation as an active element, is placed within a dynamic and adaptive security policy:

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\(^{19}\) Power, governance and identity are three main variables in security order change. The governmental report is by definition focussed on politico-military security as it is tasked to serve defence planning.

\(^{20}\) The report maintains (p. 48) that the EMU, in deepening integration economically and strengthening political coherence, will also enhance security based on mutual security.
"Under the prevailing circumstances, Finland supports the stability of Northern Europe and of Europe as a whole by remaining outside military alliances as well as by maintaining and developing a national defence that is credible relative to the security environment." (p. 53)

"Finland will assess the effectiveness of the policy of non-alliance and military cooperation against the background of an evolving security configuration in Europe and as part of the development of the European Union." (p. 53)

Although identity as a factor in security policy is not directly visible in the formulation of the core doctrine, its meaning becomes evident and tangible in the perspective of international change and in the deeper analysis of the elements outlined as essential. More generally, ideational factors are increasingly providing a reference point and a guiding incentive for action – both for parties involved and security managers – in the politics of cooperation and conflict in post-cold war Europe.

For Finland, the European Union represents a new and growing identity factor.21 The Union provides to an increasing extent the context for both value-based and strategic-operational argumentation in the formulation and conduct of the Finnish foreign and security policy. Moreover, the Union epitomises the broad concept of security, including the role of identity in post-cold war Europe. Membership has engaged Finland in a new and compelling way in ideational politics, especially on human rights issues, through the Union’s leading role.

In the identity perspective, there is a distinct difference between the EU and NATO. Among the countries with a background of special relations with the Soviet Union and non-membership of NATO, there is a fundamental difference between Finland and Central and Eastern European states – while there are similarities, with differing emphases, between Finland and the other post-neutrals – in the post-cold war evolution of their security policies. For Finland, emerging from the cold war as an established democracy, there existed no such value deficit or security deficit as many Central and Eastern European countries experienced, nor was NATO membership viewed as a solution to remedy any such deficits or meet identity needs in general. While Finland was building expanded relations on the basis of its political and economic system, Central and Eastern European countries were entering system transformation as a condition for closer relations.

The primary concern for Finland is to avoid an influence deficit occurring as a consequence of the changes unravelling since the end of the cold war. The main guarantee against a relative weakening of Finland’s position is seen in membership of the EU, envisaged as providing added value to Finland’s engagement in European affairs. Moreover, Finland has joined a common process of identity formation with its EU partners. For Finland, NATO membership is not a quick fix but an option that may or may not be taken up. The defining issue is the feasibility of the national defence solution; internal and external factors will have to change and identity transformation will have to take place for Finland to reassess its position or adapt to changed conditions.

Security implications of EU membership

The Finnish concept of security benefits gained from EU membership does not entail common defence in the traditional ("article V/5") meaning of mutual security guarantees to be invoked in case of aggression. What is expected is "existential security" derived from the access to influence provided by the Union and based on mutual solidarity and cumulative practices and experiences of political and economic integration. In the event of a threat of or

21 On the identity background in Finland’s accession, see Tiilikainen (1998).
the use of military force against a member-state, the TEU obligations would not necessarily generate military assistance but the Union and its member-states would "not stand idle" in such a situation, either. They could provide political and economic support, impose sanctions, exert pressure against escalation and perform institutional lobbying in competent international security organisations, where EU countries play a key role. If the EU itself were not able to respond, it would indirectly facilitate access to other security mechanisms – such as NATO, the OSCE or the UN – with the purpose of assisting the member-state in distress. In the event of non-military risks and threats, on the other hand, the full power of the CFSP and other pillars would come into play under the TEU in support of the member-state in need.

Consequently, Finland supports the strengthening of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, complemented by the first and third pillars, with the purpose of enhancing the efficiency and credibility of the Union in performing security tasks across the board for the Union and its member-states. More recently, the development of the CFSP acquis has encompassed in new and tangible ways the common security and defence dimension, aiming at a capability for autonomous military crisis management. The evolving security and defence dimension would contribute to the overall capability of the Union to respond to the wide range of security challenges in the complex post-cold war Europe. Moreover, a Union with a more comprehensive, across-the-board capability in security policy would be better equipped to deal with disputes and conflicts where Russia is engaged or involved and, consequently, promote regional transition and stability and peaceful Russian-Baltic relations in Northern Europe. A more effective CFSP will provide a more effective instrument of preventive security.

Europeanisation of foreign policy

An important factor in determining the effect of security gains from EU membership is the extent to which Finland’s foreign and security policy is formulated, conducted and implemented within, and thus shaped by, the EU context. Upon its accession to membership, Finland saw foreign policy cooperation in the EU framework as being supplementary to national policy-making. Due to its intergovernmental and consensus nature, the CFSP would not limit sovereignty or put a stress on freedom of choice. Nor would engagement in joint EU policies or actions as such cause substantive changes in the established Finnish line because of the common value base and similarities in long-term behavioural patterns.

The perspective of change in foreign policy through integration has focussed on influence and power rather than substance or identity. In accordance with the adaptation model, a state's "influence capability" on external conditions will grow with EU membership, while integration will also increase its "stress sensitivity" or internal vulnerability to external effects. The model will encourage full engagement in Union policies and actions to balance those effects by a high level of participation and a strategy entailing demands, commitments, counterweight and concession, as the overall outcome will strengthen the country’s position and security. Finland can itself influence this balance by participating actively in common policy-making and striving to ensure its presence at the core of the developing Union. Such a strategy, which has guided Finland throughout its membership, calls for a forward-looking attitude towards cooperation and forgoing reservations over common policies.22

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22 On the adaptation model, see Petersen (1977; 1998). There are four alternative integration strategies: dominance, balance, quiescence and acquiescence. Finland’s transition from the cold war era to the new Europe is analysed through the adaptation model in Möttölä (1993). For a commentary of the adaptation model, see Larsen (2000).
The interest-oriented approach has not prevented Finnish decision-makers from realising and recognising that the Union, as a sui generis institution, would have a many-sided and deep influence on foreign policy beyond merely providing access to more power and influence. The impact of potentially deepening EU cooperation, despite its intergovernmental nature, would most likely be greater, particularly in the longer run, than that of participation in international organisations in general. Such effects will come in many forms, some of them obvious and others specific to EU integration.\footnote{On the analysis of European foreign policy, see Manners and Whitman (2000) and White (1999); on practical features of the CFSP, see Smith (2000).}

One set of reasons for this concerns the habit and culture of cooperation within the Union. Foreign policy cooperation throughout the EC/EPC (European Political Co-operation) to the EU/CFSP\footnote{For an overview of the development and functioning of the EPC/CFSP, see Cameron (1999).} has generated a problem-solving approach rather than one of bargaining or package dealing, promoting a sense of collective policy making among the members. Moreover, there exists among the members a primary need for consultation and a reflex to coordinate before national decisions are taken. The EPC/CFSP has largely remained a distinct process of its own, ensuring that differences in national foreign policies have not interfered with the overall process of integration, including the economic sector and other key sectors. More recently, the development and implementation of the CFSP and its security and defence dimension, on the basis of the TEU (Maastricht and Amsterdam), has provided its share of added value to overall integration of the Union. Thus, the CFSP has become a significant element in the institutional and functional growth of the Union as an international player with comprehensive competence and capability.

There are several institutional reasons for the “Europeanisation” of foreign policy, namely increased dependence on the information distributed through the CFSP mechanism, an expanding common agenda of new issues – based on common challenges to societies and brought about by the global responsibilities of the Union –, the socialisation of foreign policy makers and experts working together in the common forum, the opening of the foreign policy process to domestic policy influences in member-states, and the impact of bureaucratic politics in general.

It is obvious that foreign policy integration within the EU does not only have regulative, constraining or other instrumental effects. The Union has also constitutive effects that change not only power relations and influence capabilities but also the substance of policy choices and preferences of the member-states. As a result, the formation of member-states’ policies is derived from national “raw materials” and “Europeanised” elements. The interests and preferences of the member-states are affected by institutionalised cooperation, but in the dense institutional context of intra-EU interaction they may also be constructed from beginning to completion within the common social process.

Similarly, collective foreign and security policy making can contribute to the formation of the foreign policy identities of the member-states. They would maintain their individual corporate identities based on the intrinsic, self-organising qualities of their societies, but their social identities, which they attribute to themselves while including the perspective of others, would be shaped by the integration process. In addition to member-states as autonomous units with their identities, a supplementary EU identity is emerging which the member-states create and constitute together and to which they attach themselves.\footnote{On such a constructivist approach, see Larsen (2000).}
The impact of joint policy making on national decisions varies, in the EU context, from case to case and from country to country. It depends not only on the salience of the issue for a member-state or the variation of national positions among members but also on the functioning of the CFSP, and on the extent to which the EU is competent, active or relevant in various issue-areas. Moreover, the common positions or actions taken by the Union may be either concrete or specific or too general or flexible to make a difference in practice.

The impact of the CFSP for Finland can be measured by identifying the institutional contexts where national policies in different issue-areas are formulated. There are areas where practically all issues go through the CFSP mechanism with little residue left outside the EU context for pursuing national policy. Secondly, there are areas where a member-state can conduct its policies through the EU and other multilateral security institutions, which will also affect its choices and preferences. Thirdly, there are areas where the EU has no role or which member-states want or agree to keep as their private domain and outside common policy making.

For Finland, the third category would cover national defence; the second group would include military crisis management and conflict management as well as regional security and cooperation in Northern Europe. A wide range of international issues, disputes and conflicts as well as policies of stability promotion in and outside Europe would fall under the first category. The exclusive position or dominance of the EU as a forum in certain issue-areas does not necessarily mean that Finnish policy would be constituted or altered by the Europeanising effect; it can remain based on the established Finnish perceptions and doctrines regarding the issue. One reason might be the overwhelming weight of the national position; another reason might be that the institutional or socialising impact on national policies is weak. Moreover, the Finnish national policies and those emerging as a result of common policy making at the EU level could be substantively similar in the first place, which would make it difficult to measure the impact of Europeanisation.

Finland’s policy towards Russia reflects this model of complex influences. Initially, on joining the Union, Finland felt a need to reassure its European partners that it had no intention of invoking reservations in its engagement in the Union’s common policies towards Russia, while stressing the importance of the issue for Finnish security. Upon accession, Finland could see its national objectives coinciding with the consensus EU line on engagement and partnership with Russia. In the longer term, the formulation and conduct of the Finnish policy towards Russia has been increasingly constituted in the EU context.26

Similarly, Finland has striven to draw the EU increasingly into the politics of stability and transition support in Northern Europe, which has enlarged the Union’s role in Finnish policies in this traditionally vital domain as well.

Even in the area of defence, the Union’s role as a context for Finnish policies has expanded in the wake of the formation of the common security and defence policy, although the Union is not regarded as having a direct effect on military defence per se. Here, Finland retains established national stands as its private domain, while the EU’s common policies have been tentative or limited. At the same time, however, committed to broad consensus among members, Finland is engaged in developing common endeavours with the potential of “Europeanising” its security and defence policy making.

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26 An indication of this tendency is Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen’s statement of 27 March 2000 on Vladimir Putin’s victory in the Russian presidential elections, which referred only to the Union and not once to Finland. On this development, see Pursiainen (1999). On the possibilities of a small member to influence the CFSP, see Jørgensen (1999).
The security and defence dimension of the EU

Finland’s support for the enhancement of the EU’s capability to respond to a wider range of security challenges was distinctly manifested in the joint proposal with Sweden on crisis management made in 1996 in the context of the revision of the TEU. The initiative, which was largely adopted in the final outcome at Amsterdam, determined that military crisis management was an obligation of the CFSP, defined its contents as the Petersberg tasks (although not including the concept of peacemaking, which was considered outdated and misleading) and specified the WEU as the operational framework for implementing such decisions by the Union, with the expectation of NATO resources being available for the WEU. The Finnish-Swedish model was predicated on the separation of common defence policy from common defence, adopted in the Maastricht Treaty, and turned the concept of common defence policy into a concrete policy of action. The initiative proved that steps can be made in strengthening the capability of the Union in important and relevant aspects of security policy without prejudice to the specific character of member-states’ defence solutions – non-alliance or NATO membership – or the future possibility of common defence.

The EU-WEU model for European military crisis management had never been applied, either on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty or since the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, before the French-British St. Malo initiative in 1998 opened a new phase in the development of the EU’s security and defence dimension. In the new model, the EU, in addition to decision-making, takes over the planning and direction of military crisis management operations, while the WEU will be scaled down as an organisation. In the same manner as previously, the EU expects to be able to rely on NATO’s support in the conduct of EU-led crisis management operations.

The basic rationale behind Finland’s support for further work in the field remains, or is even strengthened, by the new model based on the joint sovereign autonomy of the Fifteen. Finland’s position as a full EU member will be enhanced, since, as an observer with the WEU, it would have to rely on specific arrangements in order to participate in the implementation of EU decisions by the WEU on an equal footing with those EU partners who are full WEU members and even with non-EU NATO members. Finland ended up in a central role also in the development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). Launched by the Cologne Summit, the first steps in moving the programme forward were negotiated during the Finnish Presidency and adopted by the Helsinki Summit in December 1999.

The CESDP project makes the European alternative of crisis management more credible by simplifying the institutional framework and adopting a mechanism for generating the necessary resources among the member-states for an EU stand-by force defined as the headline goal. At the same time, there are guiding principles of particular concern for the militarily non-allied members of the Union. A clear distinction will remain between the Petersberg tasks (crisis management) and common defence, which is not to be affected by the

27 A joint memorandum addressed to the member-states launched the initiative: The IGC and the security and defence dimension – towards an enhanced EU role in crisis management. Memorandum, 25 April 1996, by Finland and Sweden.

28 An annex to the Presidency Conclusions contained Presidency Reports to the Helsinki European Council on “Strengthening the common European policy on security and defence” and on “Non-military crisis management of the European Union”.
initiative.\textsuperscript{29} There will be no incorporation of the WEU into the EU, but the Union will adapt its institutions to take over WEU functions. Furthermore, Article V guarantees will not be adopted by the EU, as the Brussels Treaty will remain in force for its signatories. There will be full equality among the EU members – irrespective of whether they are NATO members or PfP partners – in all the decisions and actions of the Union. Full respect should be maintained for the Union’s decision-making autonomy even when it is taking recourse to NATO assets.

Contributions to EU-led operations would be based on the sovereign decisions of member-states, which may have varying national policies, traditions and legislation on participation in peacekeeping or crisis management operations (regarding the rules of engagement, peace enforcement, and UN or OSCE authorisation). Finnish legislation requires a UN or OSCE mandate for the participation of Finnish troops in international operations, which may be run by regional institutions such as NATO in addition to the UN or the OSCE. Moreover, the mandate for such operations should exclude military coercion as a means of settling a dispute among the parties concerned, while the rules of engagement contained in the enlarged form of peacekeeping and crisis management embodied by SFOR and KFOR fall within the allowed range.\textsuperscript{30}

The process of developing, institutionalising and operationalising the CESDP will entail in time an EU-NATO interface, providing a framework for consultation, cooperation and transparency during normal peaceful times and the shaping of an EU decision on mounting an operation. There will also be an arrangement for the Union's recourse to NATO assets and capabilities in the implementation of an operation. In the progress report adopted by the Helsinki Summit, there is a politically significant clause which recognises NATO’s leading role in crisis management and expresses an assurance that the Union will not become a competing or duplicating player that would weaken the transatlantic relationship. At the same time, the Union's decision-making autonomy for its actions is emphasised. Moreover, the common external policies and the unified institutional framework underline the role of the Union as a player with a comprehensive role in crisis management. This role is further strengthened by the parallel enhancement of the Union’s capability for non-military crisis management.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{29} To dispel fears or suspicions by militarily non-aligned members as well as the most ardent NATO members, the summiteers endorsed a straight political statement assuring that the CESDP process “does not imply the creation of a European army”.

\textsuperscript{30} Finnish legislation on peacekeeping has been amended several times since the end of the cold war – during which Finland was a recognised and leading contributor to traditional UN peacekeeping – to adapt to the changed circumstances and requirements. The first amendment allowed for OSCE-mandated and -led peacekeeping; the second added regional institutions such as NATO/PfP as possible leaders of operations and widened the scope of defensive use of force to “enlarged peacekeeping” while excluding “peace enforcement”. The latest amendment (based on an inter-agency working group report submitted to the Minister of Defence in 29 October 1999) under consideration strives to eliminate the confusion created for Finnish commanders on the ground by the interpretation of the terminology concerning “peace enforcement”, while leaving it up to the government together with the Parliament to assess case by case the feasibility of the mandate regarding the rules of engagement and the use of force for Finnish participation.

\textsuperscript{31} The Helsinki Summit adopted two progress reports, on CESDP and non-military crisis management. In the follow-up to Helsinki, the idea of establishing an appropriate institutional structure for civilian crisis management has gained more ground, while it was opposed by several members prior to Helsinki so as not to question the primacy of taking steps in the area of military capabilities. The foreign ministers of Finland and Sweden called for an improvement of the Union’s capability for civilian crisis management (civilian police, the judiciary, local administration, rescue) in tact with the capability for joint military action in a joint article published on 30 April 2000 in Finnish and Swedish newspapers. Specifically, they called for the allocation of one percent of police force to international tasks and for a headline goal to be set by the Union for civilian crisis management.
The evolving relationship between the EU and NATO, together with their projects on enhancing their capabilities in the field, emphasises the primacy of crisis management in European security. For Finland, the situation allows for an opportunity to engage fully within the Union and cooperate with NATO on issues relevant for security and stability in its salient environment, in the wider Europe and in the closer subregion. At the same time, the growing possibility for a Union-led operation and the deepening engagement in ongoing and potential NATO-led operations facilitate Finland's adjustment to a security environment where the collective use of military force has become a recurring feature of security management and where Finland will have to carry its share of the burden in the developing politico-military governance. Joining partners and like-minded countries along this path has been an important part of Finland’s evolution to involvement in the mainstream and the core of Western European integration.32

The EU-NATO relationship is not an issue that would divide the EU members along the allied-non-allied lines, as all of them recognise the vital significance of NATO assets for EU crisis management. There are underlying and long-term differences, however, in the relative emphasis placed on Europeanist, theoretical, pragmatic or military objectives, respectively, in the construction of the common security and defence policy. Those differences have to be accommodated in the CESDP process. Finland’s position combines the primacy of pragmatic reasons with an inherently growing role of integration-related motivations. See Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Security and Defence Dimension of the CFSP of the European Union</th>
<th>Developing a Capability for Autonomous Military Crisis Management</th>
<th>Establishing a Common Defence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Internal Change</td>
<td>1 – Political</td>
<td>2 – Theoretical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responding to External Change</td>
<td>3 - Pragmatic</td>
<td>4 - Military</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 2 Development of the common security and defence policy of the European Union: means, objectives and motivations (1 – 4).**

The NATO air campaign over Serbia and Kosovo, although a case of military coercion and not peacekeeping of any form, has nourished the discussion on the upper limit that the EU should be prepared for in the use of force in military crisis management. In the Helsinki report, it was formulated as “the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding…”. On the other hand, the Petersberg tasks (“humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”) have not been specified in more concrete or operational terms by the Union. In planning for fulfilling the headline goal for EU-led operations set in Helsinki, the “most demanding” scenarios may have to be spelled out by the Union collectively.

Within NATO, the shortfalls revealed by the Kosovo operation, in particular in the capabilities of the European members, have led to an ambitious programme of improvement guided by the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). As NATO members will not let the level of ambition set by the DCI to be undermined by a more lenient standard within the EU work, the DCI perspective will, indirectly, facilitate the work, and affect the discussion, on meeting

32 To an extent, although for different reasons, Finland’s dilemma with the rules of engagement and peace enforcement can be compared with Germany, which throughout the post-cold war era has been agonising on the question of sending its troops outside its own and Alliance borders to participate in international operations.
the headline goal among the EU members. At the same time, most experts do not expect a need to arise for the Union to undertake robust crisis management operations in the near future.

Together with the emphasis on the Article 5/V as the backbone in robust and potentially risky crisis management operations, an attempt to equal the EU concept of military crisis management with that developed by the NATO/WEU may put stress on the relationship between NATO and non-NATO members of the Union. It may test the understanding reached on the framework conditions of the CESDP, as Finland and other militarily non-allied members – and possibly other smaller members as well – remain committed to an interpretation of the Petersberg tasks that excludes not only military coercion but also offensive action in general if not based on an established political agreement or mandate regarding the settlement of the crisis in question. Consequently, an attempt to stretch the limits of the Petersberg tasks may create a rift that leads to disagreement on the concept of EU crisis management or to a pattern of opting out by those members that are not politically or militarily capable to take part in what they consider too forcible a military action in crisis management. Such a situation would become a challenge for Finland’s doctrine of remaining at the core of EU politics.

The work on CESDP is an active item – in contrast to the dormant NATO issue – on the Finnish foreign and security policy agenda. It is viewed in the context of consistent support for a more effective CFSP where Finland is involved, as a full and equal participant, at the core of the Union’s decision-making and joint action. At the same time, the idea of common defence as part of the culmination of the integration process, while not a current topic, is not considered problematic or inconsistent with the commitment to military non-alliance adopted for the post-cold war environment.

In fact, an opting-out within a variable geometry, where Article V of the Brussels Treaty is incorporated into the Union acquis, would go against Finland’s national interest and compromise the basic philosophy of its EU policy, as it would require an exemption. On the other hand, a commitment to a future common defence that is not expected to be put in place under the prevailing or even foreseeable circumstances, strengthens Finland’s position and its capacity to enjoy security benefits from Union membership. In accordance with this reasoning, an EU defence alliance is expected to emerge only as a response to a withdrawal of the U.S. security presence in Europe, not as an alternative or rival to NATO as it stands at present.

Among the EU members, Finland joins the mainstream in recognising the indispensable contribution of NATO to European crisis management, primarily for practical or resource-related reasons and in avoiding any unnecessary political disputes with its leading member or misperceptions in Washington. At the same time, Finland does not wish to see any institutional blurring between the EU and NATO or the WEU in the development of the CESDP or in the implementation of EU-led operations. The integrity of the Union in acting upon its competence, and in accordance with its acquis, has an inherent and crucial value for Finland as a full member. All in all, an underlying principle in the Finnish thinking is that the long-term security effects of EU membership will emerge on their own merits and not be connected with Finland’s relationship with NATO.

Russia and regional security

In the perspective of comprehensive security gains, EU membership is expected to have a deterrent or preventive effect, not only on potential or real aggressive designs but also in a
more structural manner, through the contribution of the Union to stability promotion, early
warning and conflict prevention in Europe at large. Such security-enhancing functions of the
Union are evident in many ways in relations with Russia and in developments in Northern
Europe, which constitute the immediate security environment for Finland. Enlargement is the
main instrument for influencing the region in the long term, while the Northern Dimension is
aimed at making the Union’s impact more effective.

The EU’s political actions, including soft forms of sanctions, towards Russia, in
connection with the first and second Chechen conflicts, have demonstrated the Union’s
concern for its compliance with such vital, agreed norms and principles as those concerning
human rights and international humanitarian law. Although not particularly effective in
modifying or altering Russia’s behaviour on the ground or in the short term, the measures
undertaken jointly by the Union concern Russian behaviour in local and ethnic conflicts, a
pattern, which has potentially broader implications for its nearby regions in general. In a
related manner, the Union has been directly or indirectly involved in the developments
surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, where Finland has played an active role, and in Ukraine and
Belarus, where Russia is an indispensable player.

The Union’s contribution, directly and through the OSCE and the Council of Europe, in
promoting stability and the settlement of disputes between Russia and the Baltic States and in
urging both sides to follow the OSCE and other international norms and standards regarding
borders and minority and aliens’ rights has likewise established a pattern that is reassuring in
the context of Finland’s long-term national interests in its own region and in Europe at large.
More recently, the Union has given attention to the future stability of Kaliningrad, which is
viewed as a future exclave within an enlarged Union.

The potential and real contribution of the EU’s stabilising influence in Northern Europe,
with its accent on support for transition, is most notably incorporated in the Northern
Dimension concept initiated by Finland that provides a framework for making the Union's
common policies towards the region and partners within the region more effective and
creative. The Union’s policy of encouraging and supporting Russia’s engagement in European
cooperation and unification, laid down in the common strategy on Russia and employed in the
Northern Dimension, is in the fundamental interest of Finland, which can promote the
objectives of the policy also through its bilateral relations and cross-border cooperation with
Russia.

Finland does not have a long or significant tradition of European identity, being a
peripheral player. A prominent feature of Finland’s contribution to the formation of the
Union’s living identity is making the new and only common border of the Union with Russia
a reality. A new image is one of an "EU Baltic Sea" region to be created by the Union’s future
enlargement to Poland and the Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which was

33 See the statement on Chechnya by the Helsinki Summit 1999. On the EU’s efforts to influence Russia during
the first Chechen war, see Pursiainen (1996; 1999a).
34 Finland volunteered to act with Russia as co-chairman of the OSCE mission to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict in 1995-1996. Finland tried to involve its EU partners in the work. For the report, see Finland as a
Mediator in the Karabakh Conflict. Report by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Ms. Tarja Halonen to the
Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament on the activities of Finland as co-chairman of the OSCE. Ministry
35 On Kaliningrad, see Joenniemi, Dewar and Fairlie (2000).
36 On the Northern Dimension, see the Presidency Conclusions of the Luxembourg (1997), Vienna (1998),
Conference on the Northern Dimension (Helsinki, 11-12 November 1999).
enhanced by the Helsinki 1999 decisions that further emphasise the importance of the EU-Russian relationship and the Northern Dimension.37

The effects of NATO partnership and the issue of membership

Finland’s relationship with NATO is governed by practical objectives regarding participation, responsibility and influence in international politico-military cooperation. The need to approach and learn to work with NATO stems from Finland’s willingness and determination to contribute to broadly-based military and security cooperation in Europe, where NATO plays the undisputed central role. To Finland, it is vital for the acceptability and credibility of international security management that there is a balance between the responsibility and the influence of states providing contributions. An appropriate improvement in rights and opportunities to shape the conditions of Finland’s contribution to the conduct of crisis management operations should accompany its enhanced cooperation with NATO.

Pragmatic orientation reflects the predominantly instrumental nature of the effects of relations with NATO on Finland’s foreign and security policy. In this regard, cooperation with NATO will affect Finland’s capability to pursue its interests and objectives and use its national resources in collective and multilateral actions. On the other hand, the relationship with NATO is not constitutive: the Finnish interests and preferences that lie behind the pattern of partnership have been shaped prior to, or externally to, contacts with NATO.38

Even though the primary perspective towards NATO is related to power in international relations, there is also a growing agenda connected with NATO in the governance of security cooperation in Europe. Moreover, and notwithstanding the distinct difference between the EU and NATO, there are implications for identity formation, although to a large extent they are inhibitive rather than constructive. Finland does not see any free-riding implications in staying outside NATO membership due to its significant role and burden in contributing to the stability of its strategically important region.

Perceptions of the old and new NATO

In Finland’s perception of the security implications of NATO membership for an individual member-state and Europe at large, there is a balance between the Alliance’s core and new missions. There is a growing awareness and recognition, not only among the foreign policy elite but also the general public, of the indispensable (“non-article V”) role of NATO and its resources in crisis management in Europe. At the same time, the new emphasis does not overshadow the original and fundamental purpose of the Alliance in the Finnish outlook, which was constructed by the cold-war experience of NATO as a balancing influence in the bilateral confrontation and by the post-cold war perception of NATO as a continuing deterrent against a resurgent expansionist Russia – however unlikely the latter scenario might be.

The key argument for maintaining, and eventually acting upon, the membership option is based on the security guarantee offered by the article V mission of NATO. The added

37 On recent high politics in the Baltic Sea region, see Mouritzen (1999).
38 No domestic changes are expected on the basis of recent presidential elections. In her inaugural address, President Tarja Halonen made an explicit point that preparing for applying for membership of NATO was not part of Finland’s foreign and security policy line, see Address by President of the Republic Tarja Halonen to Parliament on 1 March 2000. Her runner-up in the election, Esko Aho was even more clearly against NATO membership.
influence offered by membership for NATO’s non-article V missions does not appear to be a sufficient reason for choosing membership. Likewise, EU membership cannot replace or provide a substitute for the article V benefits of NATO membership, if traditional military security guarantees were deemed necessary. Consequently, Finnish thinking recognises that NATO membership with its article V obligations would commit Finland to a wider and more demanding concept of military crisis management as well, including the possibility of engaging in military coercion as exemplified by the air campaign against Yugoslavia.

In the perspective of power politics and realist thinking, the basic argument for maintaining non-alliance based on a military security calculation is that, in the absence of military threat and without tangible security benefits to be gained by NATO membership, there is no reason to put prospects of continued regional stability at risk by provoking potential Russian countermoves. Stability and security in the immediate region is best promoted and ensured by Finnish (and Swedish) non-alliance combined with a credible national defence that is adapted to the local circumstances and geostrategic changes and conducted in the context of an active role within the EU and in partnership with NATO. 39

Conditions for non-alliance

The balanced view of a NATO with two missions allows for Finland’s growing and regulated engagement in the Partnership for Peace on its specific merits. Although an active PfP partner, Finland does not view PfP as a channel or preparatory phase towards membership but as a tool for participating in, contributing to, and influencing common European security. Accordingly, Finland has from early on supported the stability promotion and conflict prevention functions of the new NATO by contributing to common preparedness and interoperability within the PfP and participating in actual NATO-led crisis management operations in the Balkans. 40

Finland has intensified its participation in the PfP as it has been developed and NATO has opened up new partnership goals for partners under the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership (EMOP) initiative. Finland has participated in and contributed to the Planning and Review Process (PARP) whereby Finland is developing its national stand-by units and their interoperability with NATO/PfP. At the same time, Finnish officers have access to partnership staff elements and may have, in due course, to CJTF staffs that plan and prepare inside the NATO planning structure European operations to be conducted by the WEU or the EU. Such military contacts provide information and enhance the capability of Finnish troops to collaborate in operations where different military traditions and cultures mingle.

In addition to enhancing their technical preparedness, closer military contacts with NATO have also socialising effects on Finnish participants. Although such effects are not as discernible or strong as in the case of the EU, they have a potential to affect Finnish identity in the field of security and defence. As a new experience, professional political (Finland has

39 It is an indication of the disappearance of neutrality as a system-wide factor in the European security order that Austria’s moves on the NATO membership issue would not have a decisive or even guiding influence on Finland’s choices. In the new situation, the former neutrals view their security increasingly in a regional or subregional context, which is the reason for sustained interdependence between the Finnish and Swedish security policies. In contrast, Austria’s possible initiative hinted by the conservative-led government to introduce the Article V/WEU commitment into the EU acquis – not likely to be adopted – would force Finland and Sweden to take stands which – if adopted – might lead to an opting out. On another prognostication on the effect of an Austrian example, see Jakobson (1998).
40 Finland has 120 troops in SFOR as part of the Nordic-Polish unit and a battalion of 800 troops deployed to KFOR in August 1999 as the first unit from a European non-NATO country.
established a diplomatic mission to NATO) and military contacts with the transatlantic
defence community will provide a broader background to Finland’s relations with the United
States and larger EU members in security affairs.

While the main purpose of participation in PfP is to contribute to and benefit from stability
promotion and cooperative security in Europe at large, there is added value sought and gained
for Finnish national defence as well. NATO’s offer of partnership and its criteria for
interoperability have provided a primary external incentive for the ongoing structural reform
in the Finnish defence forces that will produce a state-of-the-art brigade-size readiness force
available for international tasks. Moreover, the experience and information gained from
cooperating with a great-power alliance benefits the development and modernisation of
Finland's own defence forces and armaments industry. Although the requirements and
objectives set for NATO’s members after Kosovo in the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI)
largely go beyond those of Finland, the high standards may be filtered through the PARP
process to benefit a partner like Finland in its own armaments development and defence
reform work.41

In parallel, implementation of the headline goal set within the CESDP process for the EU
members will reinforce the adaptation of the Finnish defence forces to the growing
requirements of multilateral military crisis management. Although neither the quantitative nor
the qualitative criteria would seem to call for Finland to go beyond the existing or planned
capability to fulfil its obligations in such an EU readiness force, the combined effect of the
NATO/PARP connection and the EU/CESDP commitment can be expected to guide Finnish
defence policy in a mutually reinforcing manner in the future. Although Finland views itself
primarily as a producer rather than as a consumer of security, interoperability will improve
Finland's possibilities and capabilities to receive military assistance in a crisis, which is its
inherent right as a UN and OSCE member.42

The argument for joining NATO – even without an established need for Article 5
guarantees – to gain increased influence, is based on several grounds.43 The immediate reason
offered is that membership is only possible to attain in times of peace and not during a
worsening crisis. Second, there is a majority of NATO members within the EU who dominate
the decision-making and act on their joint interests. Third, the PfP relationship does not offer
sufficient influence in practice, a proposition witnessed by the decisions on launching SFOR
and KFOR.

The argument related to the additional influence brought by NATO membership in matters
affecting Finnish interests remains on the agenda, but it has not been strong enough to
challenge the primacy of the security guarantee argument as a basis for considering NATO
membership, or to supplant the argument for regional stability and transition support carried
by the present policy, which also emphasises the primary role of the EU in broad security.
There are limits to a small state's influence in any configuration involving great powers.

Finland is acutely aware of the problem concerning the balance between responsibility and
contribution on the ground, on one hand, and power and influence in planning and decision-
making, on the other hand, in cooperation between NATO and its partners. At the same time,
it is regarded by its nature as an inherent issue that requires continuing work and vigilance.
While a disparity vis-à-vis full members will inevitably remain, it need not prevent partners

41 According to the long-term defence plan adopted in 1997, there will be three readiness brigades of high
firepower and mobility as part of the operational forces in wartime. One of these first-line brigades will be
earmarked also for international duties.
42 This point is made explicitly in the 1997 Defence White Book, p. 52.
43 This is the underlying argument in Ries (1999); see also Dörfer (1997).
from having, in each concrete case, a satisfactory influence on joint actions and a necessary control over their own contribution, if the rules and principles of cooperation are made clear enough and applied in good faith.

PfP-era events have revealed the limited nature of non-members’ possibilities to influence, or obtain advance information about, the shaping of NATO’s decisions. Most recently, the influence deficit was apparent in the mounting of the KFOR operation, even though it took place after the adoption of the Political-Military Framework (PMF) aimed at providing a more tangible and early role for partners in shaping NATO decisions that involve a role for their prospective contributions. As NATO established a membership assistance programme (MAP) for candidate countries in 1999, Finland’s concern is to maintain equal rights for all participants in PfP activities so that MAP would not create two-level cooperation in crisis management proper.

Finland’s experience has shown that there is no NATO caucus within the EU, either formal or functional. There are issues where the internal politics of NATO has an influence on its members’ behaviour as EU members but they vary from case to case. The CESDP has presented an agenda where NATO is directly relevant. Here, NATO members differ in the emphasis they place on the primacy of NATO. Smaller and larger members may see their interests differently as well. To the extent that larger NATO members have been able to coordinate their position within the Union, as, for example, on the headline goal issue, it has been an effective and decisive influence on the formulation of the outcome.

**Freedom of choice, regional security and the NATO option**

Despite its practical tone, there is also an identity dimension to the Finnish policy towards NATO, in particular regarding the issue of membership. The core elements of the military security doctrine, namely the national defence solution based on independent defence and the avoidance of entanglement in a great-power alliance, have roots in the Finnish self-image shaped by geopolitical perceptions and historical experiences that are much deeper than neutrality, for example.

The lonely fight against a great power at the outset of the Second World War has affected the general Finnish view of the value of security assurances. The credibility of great-power assurances to a peripheral state remains low or is at least questioned. Suspicions related to abandonment are retained not only among the general public but within the political and military elite as well. Entrapment is not so prominent a risk, although it reveals the other side of the coin: if there is no credibility or added value in common defence, why take the additional risk connected with entrapping adventures while Finland has a demanding defence task of its own. As an indication of this ideational factor, support for NATO membership dropped clearly after NATO’s war over Kosovo. At the same time, the self-confidence of Finland has increased, as its military security position has improved dramatically in relative

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44 According to the survey conducted in 1999, support for military non-alliance reached its highest point since 1996 and increased by 14 percent points from 1998. According to another survey made in 1999, 41 percent of the Finns favour staying outside NATO even if Sweden and the Baltic States would join, which was an increase from 34 percent in 1996. In the same survey, 58 percent were of the opinion that Finland has to be able to defend herself in all circumstances, as others would not be of help in that endeavour. See EVA-raportti (1999).
and absolute terms since the cold war, measured against threatening intentions or capabilities in the environment.  

Moreover, the credibility of potential membership in Finnish eyes will be influenced by perceptions of the future of geopolitics in general and the future of Russia as a great power in particular. To the extent that a structural realist perception is upheld, the threshold to membership remains high but potentially brittle. If a fundamental change is envisaged affecting common security between Russia and the Western powers, it might lower the threshold to membership but at the same time decrease its added value. An additional element that affects identity formation for the Finns is their management of the past, which includes the legacy of the two wars with the Soviet Union and the ceded territories. Although there is no open colloquy on any border issue between the Finnish and Russian governments and irredentist views in Finland are moderate and far from being in the majority, the political and psychological handling of the question has a bearing on Finnish perceptions of Russia and future geopolitics in general.

The most significant ideational factor affecting the construction of the foreign and security policy identity of Finland in the post-cold war era is enjoyment of the freedom of choice. A guiding principle in Finland's behaviour has been to ensure respect for the inherent right of states to choose and change their security arrangements. Enshrined in the OSCE acquis, the principle has been reinforced in the post-cold war transformation of Europe, producing a strengthened position that Finland is determined to use and maintain.

Freedom of choice is not only an aspect of identity, it is an issue around which power politics in a concrete manner is played in post-cold war Europe: by whom and how decisions on the formation and implementation of the European security order are made. In a wider context in Europe, freedom of choice is tested by the contention over NATO enlargement and it is measured by EU enlargement. In the regional context, Finland has been proactive in preventing developments – such as impeding transition or endangering stability – that could endanger the principle. One model would be a regionalised and separate security order in Northern Europe, which was perceived behind the abortive offers made by Russia on unilateral or joint security guarantees as alternatives to NATO membership, mainly targeted at the Baltic States, in 1997. Another case would be a unilateral and assertive NATO policy of enlargement, provoking Russia and destabilising the Baltic States and the Baltic Sea region at large.

In order to reject any unequal security arrangements and great-power vetoes over states in Northern Europe, Finland has directed the discussion away from the issue of security

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45 In Finland, like in all other neighbouring countries and other relevant states, the impact of the new Russian military doctrine adopted in 2000, with its emphasis on the role, including first use, of nuclear weapons and its enlarged threat and risk assessment, is followed closely. It has not raised any current alarm, however, as the main security indicators are seen in Russia’s foreign policy behaviour and the domestic scene, which have to be taken into consideration together with any military developments.

46 President Yeltsin made a significant move, when he admitted that the Winter War was the result of an aggression by Stalin’s Soviet Union. The Finnish government has maintained that it will not take up the issue unless Russia is prepared to discuss it. In fact, the public discussion has evolved to deal more with prospects of increased contacts transcending the border than returning the ceded territories as such, cf. Joenniemi (1998). According to a survey in 1999 (EVA-raportti), 63 percent of the Finns thought that, as a neighbour to Russia, Finland was more secure being a member of the EU than being outside of the Union.

47 The Russian initiatives including a suggestion of Russian unilateral or multilateral Russian-western positive security guarantees for the Baltic States and recommendation to Finland and Sweden to stay outside military alliances were made in autumn 1997. In the context of the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Helsinki, 20-21 March 1997, President Martti Ahtisaari stressed Finland’s right to freedom of choice as an indirect commentary to President Yeltsin’s remarks.
guarantees. There are specific security concerns in Northern Europe that can be promoted by bilateral or subregional measures taken within the wider European regime. Finland has suggested, in an initiative put forward together with Sweden to Russia and other neighbouring states, supplementary confidence- and security-building measures based on the OSCE-wide principles on military CSBMs. Regional security efforts may be discussed in established international forums such as the EAPC.\textsuperscript{48} Moreover, the scaling down of Russian forces beyond the common border, unilaterally and through the flank regime of the CFE Treaty, remains an important condition for regional security and stability as well as political confidence.\textsuperscript{49}

As a preventive and active policy, while emphasising the right of the Baltic States to freedom of choice, Finland has engaged NATO in a bilateral dialogue on the principles and effects of its enlargement policy in Northern Europe. This dialogue and other information have revealed no significant divergence of interest or assessment. NATO's policy of enlargement, as led by the United States, takes account of the interests of regional stability and stresses the importance of political and economic transition promoted by the EU, and even early EU enlargement to the Baltic States, for comprehensive security and stability in the region.\textsuperscript{50}

NATO's support to candidates through the PfP and MAP will promote defence transition and the capability for cooperative crisis management among the Baltic States, thus strengthening regional stability. Finland promotes the same objectives by participating in regional PfP activities and in Baltic security assistance cooperation among a group of NATO and Nordic countries. The objectives are further promoted by Finland and other Nordic countries in their bilateral support for the Baltic States in defence and peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{51}

The membership option policy, referred to by Finland in a low-key manner, is drawn from the freedom of choice principle. Its effects on the behaviour of Russia or other players can only be assessed indirectly, since no negotiations or other concrete actions on testing or activating the option have taken place or are under way. At times, Russia expresses confidence in the continuity of the Finnish policy of non-alliance, a form of diplomatic pressure that reflects the importance of the issue for Russia.

\textit{Conclusions and implications for the future}

Finland's approach to international cooperation in the area of security and defence constitutes a pragmatically oriented and evolving policy with long-term consequences that remain open and optional. The implications of membership of the European Union for Finland’s position in international security differ from those arising from partnership with

\textsuperscript{48} The initiative was addressed as a memorandum towards the countries concerned and presented at the OSCE on 22 April 1998 (FSC.DEL/104/98).

\textsuperscript{49} The amended CFE Treaty was adopted in Istanbul in 1999. The original flank rules were amended in 1996 to allow for Russia increased freedom of deployment in the Pskov area beyond the Baltic borders, but Russia committed itself to restraint in such deployments. A discussion on the merits of joining the CFE is likely to emerge in Sweden and Finland as follow-up to the Istanbul decisions. Both countries have viewed the CFE verification regime too intrusive and incompatible for their mobilisation-based defence systems, although Sweden is adjusting the depot structure of its wartime materiel to overcome that obstacle. There are factors involved as well in a decision on accession to the CFE, which was opened for new signatories by the Istanbul outcome.

\textsuperscript{50} The first discussion took place in 1996. Finland and Sweden have made efforts to coordinate their approaches towards NATO.

\textsuperscript{51} The Baltsea (Baltic Security Assistance) coordination has been institutionalised but it has remained relatively ineffective. Finland has concentrated its efforts on supporting and providing technical assistance to Estonia.
NATO. Likewise, the security benefits sought from an integrating security community are different from the effects envisaged as being generated by cooperation with a military alliance.

While longer-term effects of the connections may differ fundamentally, there is a common agenda to be addressed through the EU and NATO in the security environment of today’s and tomorrow’s Europe. Rather than being alternative routes for security policy making, the arrangements with the EU and NATO entail a complementary set of actions – even creating a division of labour – within the overall Finnish doctrine. Both of them have a perspective to power, governance and identity in international relations.

Within the CFSP of the European Union, and its common security and defence dimension, Finland is constructing, together with the other member-states, a capability for military crisis management. In that process, Finland is also involved in constituting the norms and principles that underscore the identity of the EU as an international player with a growing role in security and defence affairs. Finland’s relationship with the Union is placed on a durable track with guidelines and goalposts in place.

The impact on Finnish security of an EU more capable in crisis management is indirect and preventive, as it will be better able to enhance stability and defuse conflicts in the salient international environment. Being a full member, Finland will benefit from the increased influence provided by the Union as a whole without having to claim a legitimate position, which it has to strive for in the context of NATO co-operation. At the same time, by conducting an active or assertive membership policy Finland can establish a stronger position in shaping the Union’s policies and their consequences for security and stability.

If the Union decides to introduce a common defence, such a change would add a new, direct effect on Finnish national security from EU membership. To ensure for itself an equal position in influencing decisions and guiding their effects on international security, Finland would have to reposition itself within the Union and reassess its doctrine of independent defence. Such a national identity change would be cushioned by the long-term participation in common identity formation within the Union.

In its partnership with NATO, Finland has an instrumental relationship towards NATO’s capability in military crisis management. Finland is not able to participate in the construction of NATO’s identity as the basis for the country’s role in international relations. On the other hand, an active partnership policy gives added value to Finland’s influence in international security affairs. An altogether more capable PfP will strengthen Finnish security indirectly by preventing and resolving conflicts in the salient environment.

If Finland were to decide to join a common defence through NATO membership, the change would have a direct effect on Finland’s international position and the conditions of its national security. To be able to contribute to the future formation of NATO, Finland would have to change its traditional perceptions of defence and engage in a new kind of common identity formation within the Alliance. Finland’s relationship with NATO is a mix of established continuity and potential discontinuity.

EU membership provides power for political initiatives that shape security. NATO provides access to management of security. Their linkage is strengthening as the CESDP develops further. Together, EU membership and NATO partnership offer means to shape security and stability in Northern Europe and to engage Russia.

In the context of broader European development, external and domestic factors in Finnish security and defence continue to change. Identity formation has taken place within the range of guiding principles set in the context of accession to membership of the EU and partnership
with NATO. Factors affecting identity are becoming more significant for security but their impact on Finland’s international engagement goes in different and contrasting directions.

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