TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY – A TURKISH VIEW

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The discussions on ESDI in Turkey became very intense since the EU Summit in Helsinki December 1999 where Turkey was officially given the status of a candidate for EU membership. Never before in the last 50 years of Turkey’s security discussions has such a level been reached as now. There are some concerns among the political as well as academic and military circles concerning the further developments of the ESDI. Whether those concerns are justifiable or not is another academic question. What matters here is that Turkey may take the ESDI process more seriously than the EU. It is the objective of the article to show how Turkey sees this process and what it thinks this process will lead to, with the aim to be part of it.

During the political Union negotiations which led up to the Maastricht Treaty launching the EU in the early 1990s, the most contentious debate focused on the nature of the ESDI and the future of the WEU. One aspect of the Maastricht Treaty left the status of ESDI edging closer to a link between the WEU and the EU. This was the decision to give the automatic right to all EU member states to become members of the WEU. The ESDI that emerged from Maastricht assigned a central role to the WEU in essence, a role of double allegiance to both the Union and NATO. The two relationships are asymmetrical in nature and evolutionary in substance. To reflect this relationship in more concrete terms, the Maastricht declaration of the WEU Ministerial Council made the following offers: "States which are members of the EU are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European member states of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility to participate fully in the activities of WEU."

This is a paragraph of critical importance to Turkey in that it makes full membership in WEU conditional upon full membership in the EU. Thus, at Maastricht, the "European pillar of the Alliance" concept was given a flawed start due to the shortcomings of associate membership. To cite a few of those shortcomings:

Associate Members are not made party to the Brussels Treaty which constitutes the legal basis of the defense partnership embodied in the WEU. Most importantly, associate members are excluded from the security guarantee under Article 5 of the Treaty. (In fact, it has been the preference of certain WEU countries that the relationship to be established should be of a politically binding nature, and not be based on a legally binding international instrument. This is avoidance par excellence of truly binding reciprocal commitments which should be the sine qua non of any defense partnership.)

The status of Associate Membership is not reflected in the Brussels Treaty. That is, for all practical purposes, a membership category has been created, BUT without straightforward legal recognition.

The status of Associate Membership has a practical purpose: to enable participation in WEU activities. However, in principle, associate members can be denied participation when half the members object.

Within the context of the activities they take part in, associate members can express opinions, distribute written texts, etc. But they cannot block decisions. This means they cannot effectively object to anything. Their proposals need to find a sponsor among full members in order to be taken on board.

Being in a position to assume only Associate Membership, Turkey sought to contribute to the political and operational development of the WEU during a critical formative period. For
Turkey, a potentially problematic dimension of this evolutionary process is the nature and intensity of the relationship between the EU’s CFSP and the WEU. At Maastricht, it was agreed that the Union could make request of the WEU to undertake operations in Implementation of the CFSP decisions. If the interaction of the WEU and CFSP becomes dominant, the problem becomes evident: since Turkey is totally excluded from the policy and decision-making phase within the CFSP mechanisms, its place within the ESDI would be restricted to the receiving end of instructions. That is, for Turkey, the disadvantage is that as the WEU becomes increasingly subservient to the CFSP, the role of Associate Members is becoming restricted to the Implementation phase in the WEU. The EU says that it can include Turkey only in the preparation phase of a program or in the Implementation phase of crisis situations which necessitate intervention. Therefore, Turkey is likely to take part in operations or exercises. Yet, Turkey wishes to be in the decision-making mechanism. Turkey’s exclusion from the decision-making mechanism in ESDI poses problems for Turkey, because a significant aspect of Turkey’s desire to be part of the EU is also about security.

**Turkey’s security perceptions after the end of the cold war**

In terms of security policy, Turkey has defined the concepts of strategic partnership and strategic cooperation, which would affect Turkey’s new geopolitical axis. In terms of security, these concepts cover: joint action and cooperation in regional problems and incidents that occur in different areas of the world; military partnership agreements; formation of permanent commissions in economic, military, political and social fields and strategic cooperation as a result of agreements between mutually favored states. Two principles guide Turkey’s understanding of national security policy: protection of territorial and national integrity, and defense of legitimate rights and freedoms, but such a national security policy does not fit well into the overall European development characterized by multinational and multidimensional security policy organizations. For Turkish officials European security includes a military and economic-social dimension, the former mainly provided by an enlarged NATO and the latter by the enlarged EU. For Turkey, NATO membership forms the basis for any Turkish security policy to reach out to new regions with old neighbors, because NATO intervenes not only in the internal problems of Europe if there are threats to European security, but also in out-of-area conflicts and internal crisis. Thus, Ankara wants to see NATO, not the EU or the WEU to be the dominant security organization in Europe. Turkey opposes in fact the Europeanization of the Alliance because it fears this would diminish the U.S. role and could lead to a weakening of Article 5, which is on collective defense. Actually, the West needs a strong Turkish partner, as a key player in Western political and strategic architecture. In this context, only NATO can anchor Turkey as a basis of security and stability on NATO’s southern flank.

For the U.S., Turkey remains a critical political actor and a key strategic ally since it has become pivotal in a region of the world which is characterized by high volatility. After the Gulf War in 1991, the USA regarded Turkey as an anchor of stability in a region of growing volatility and it was expected to project that stability. Turkey is important in the post-Cold War times because it plays a notable geopolitical role in three areas, which are of great importance to the U.S.A.: the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caspian Basin. In each of these three areas, Turkey’s cooperation is critical to the achievement of broader American strategic objectives. For the strategic development of Eurasia, especially, the Newly Independent States, Turkey’s contribution is important. Moreover, Turkey is of greater value for the American regional interests as the crucial link in the East-West energy corridor, which will serve to bring the Caspian and Central Asian energy resources to the market. The U.S. continues to build its relationship with Turkey on geo-strategic assumptions and projections, and it has committed itself to maintain security in and for Turkey. The latest argument in
Washington’s criticism of the European plan to create an independent defense "identity" is that it must be open to non-EU members of NATO. In 1999, the then Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, acknowledged that an ever closer relationship between NATO and WEU to provide the basis for a true ESDI should take into account the interests of all allies. "Security is a broad, pro-active concept. To achieve lasting security, one must move from safeguarding it to actively promoting it. Turkey as an active and valued member of the Alliance, has contributed significantly to this shaping of our common security. Its proximity to the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean puts Turkey in the epicenter of change. As a secular Islamic democracy, and a staunch NATO ally, Turkey has never had a greater opportunity to play a bridge-building role in a region of considerable geopolitical complexity. It is this new role of Turkey that makes this country a major asset in NATO’s new cooperative approach to security…And contributing significantly to the Alliance’s outreach and cooperative activities with non-NATO countries, Turkey has a particular importance in developing the new cooperative security architecture in Europe…Turkey has played a full part in getting the Alliance to where we stand today. It will play an equally important part in getting us where we want to go: towards 21st century that is more stable and secure than the century we soon will be leaving behind…”

Turkey’s inclusion in the process is technically difficult, but with the efforts of Javier Solana (currently, EU High Commissioner for CFSP and Secretary General of the WEU), these difficulties are attempted to be overcome, because Solana is not only concerned with European Security in general, but is also concerned about Mediterranean security. While the U.S. and consequently NATO, perceive Turkey as a strategic asset, the Europeans concentrate more on the conditions in Turkey. The U.S. favors more intensive integration of Turkey with Europe, whereas the EU is not yet prepared to accept Turkey as a member. In Europe, the end of the Cold War raised questions about where Turkey fits into the overall European architecture. Though in Helsinki the EU acknowledged commitment to that end, the EU is still reluctant to admit Turkey because it fears that Turkish membership will extend the borders of the EU to include new problems which do not concern the European mainland.

However, for Turkey, the question of how the coming European security architecture would be developed and what could and should be Turkey’s place is of paramount importance. Without EU membership and participation in the CFSP, Turkey would have difficulty in pursuing foreign policy goals in that European efforts to create a distinct ESDI threaten to increase Turkey’s isolation from Europe. Moreover, the countries that will be accepted to Europe will constitute the core of the European security structure, and with the acceptance of new members in EU and NATO, it will become harder for Turkey to be part of the WEU. So, the direct participation of Turkey in the debate on European defense and security policy will become less likely. Thus, if Turkey does not join the EU in the near future, it can find itself excluded from the key decisions that affect Europe’s security. The EU has been ambiguous in defining its relationship with Turkey, and if the EU’s approach continues to prevail, Turkey’s present position in security will proceed under U.S. influence. Since the political challenges facing the EU and the U.S. differ considerably, it will be difficult to establish a common American-European policy toward Turkey’s future function in the Western Alliance.

Turkey’s arguments with respect to its status in the process of ESDI

Being a non-member of the EU, Turkey became an Associate Member of the WEU in 1992. However, legally, Associate Member status does not have a treaty basis. In this context, Turkey argues that defense is a very sensitive area, hence partnerships should be based on legally defined mutual rights and obligations, and the participation level of Associate Members to the WEU should be strengthened. In this sense, Turkey mentions the decision
taken in the Erfurt Ministerial Meeting in 1997 to facilitate the participation of Associate Members in individual operations. For Turkey, all European NATO allies should be given the opportunity to be full members of WEU. In conformity with the thesis that security is indivisible, Turkey believes that full members of the EU, the WEU, and the Europeans members of NATO should ultimately be one and the same in order to facilitate the development of a genuine ESDI. For Turkey, ESDI should be perceived as a genuine and realistic response to the strategic facts and requirements of an uncertain security environment.

Turkish perspective, the absorption of the WEU into the second pillar of the EU presents problems regarding the status of its legal and political acquis with the WEU since Turkey is not a participant in the CFSP process. That is why Turkey preferred the absorption of the WEU into the EU within a new fourth pillar, whereby the WEU would be absorbed as it is with all its acquis and with an opt-out clause for EU members who do not wish to participate, similar to the European Monetary Union and the Schengen Agreements.

Transparency, inclusiveness and indivisibility are fundamental principles for Turkey. What is more, practical considerations over security interests are not negligible. In Petersberg type operations, it is likely that for the foreseeable future, any crisis to emerge is likely to occur in a region of close proximity to Turkey, as its geo-strategic setting is surrounded by turbulent regions, from the Balkans, the Caucasus to the Middle East. Therefore, any Petersberg type operation to be deliberated within the EU Council in relation to these regions will have a direct bearing on Turkey’s national security interests. Already, there is a feeling in Turkish decision-making circles that NATO’s European allies seem to be indifferent to threats facing Turkey, then Turkey might revert to a re-nationalization of its defense, which would be loath for NATO or a future ESDI, since Turkey has demonstrated that it is a reliable and staunch NATO ally.

Now that Turkey is a candidate country for EU membership, it urges the replacement of Maastricht formulations by an approach addressing relations with each prospective member on its own politico-strategic merits. This argument of Turkey finds strong scholarly support, too. For instance, Ludger Kühnhardt argues that since the WEU is the would-be European pillar of NATO, Turkish membership in the WEU is a logical consequence. Hence he proposes that Turkey should be declared a candidate to the EU and integrated fully in the WEU. Similarly, Stephen Larrabee argues that the requirements for membership in the WEU should be changed to allow Turkey to become a full member of the WEU without first becoming a member of the EU. Turkey argues that throughout the Helsinki process, it can contribute to the EU in terms of security considering that Turkey is, militarily, more capable than all 15 members of the EU. In her official line of argument, Turkey departs from the thesis that because it shouldered the European security and defense within NATO for 50 years, it is necessary for Turkey to take part in ESDI. Turkish officials argue that the EU should not underestimate Turkish capabilities, because they are not less than those of the Europeans.

The problem stems mainly from the fact that both the Atlantic Alliance and the EU are employing a dual strategy to promote stability in the wider Europe: integrating new members and offering comprehensive forms of cooperation to those states for which membership is not (yet) an option. This dual strategy reflects the need to carry enlargement forward, yet not compromise the internal functioning of the institutions. After Helsinki, there are two important challenges that the EU and NATO face: making the strategic imperative of enlargement compatible with the need to maintain institutional effectiveness, and the impact of an emerging ESDI on the transatlantic relationship.
The recent Turkish developments in the ESDI discussion

Since the Turkish attitude toward the ESDI acquired firm shape, Turkey acknowledged that it saw the concept of security in its entirety only in NATO. At the 1998 and 1999 Washington Summits, Turkey declared that if it is to be out of the decision making mechanisms of the ESDI, it would veto the use of NATO assets to assist the implementation of the decision-making mechanism. One week later, Turkey reiterated its reservations in the North Atlantic Summit which was held at the Foreign Ministerial Level.

In Cologne, a serious discussion about a merger of WEU and the EU took place, which could pose real problems for Turkey, but given the considerable differences in the member countries’ views and in membership, it is likely to take time. As a promising development, at the February 2000 Munich Security Policies Conference, Rudolph Scharping acknowledged that those which are members of NATO, but not of the EU should participate in Eurocorps.

Turkey argued in Munich that since it has no shortcoming in its capabilities, Turkey should be admitted into WEU. In international platforms, the U.S. shows eager support for Turkey in terms of its stance toward the ESDI. Recently, on May 1, a high-level security group meeting was held in Washington concerning ESDI. The U.S. declared its opposition to the EU approach of not including Turkey in ESDI. Turkey also declared that it would not agree for an alternative security arrangement. It can be argued that since the ESDI, in the short and medium term, will inevitably utilize NATO assets, hence U.S. assets, Turkey is in an advantageous position regarding its position to be included in the process of ESDI.

Still, on the part of the EU, there were no positive remarks regarding Turkey. On May 8, 2000 an EU informal ministerial meeting was held in Azores Islands, Portugal, and ESDI was discussed, however, there were no satisfactory results for Turkey; consequently, Turkey again remained excluded from the decision-making mechanisms.

The WEU Expanded Foreign and Security Ministerial Meeting in Porto on May 15 was important with respect to putting in action all meetings which were held since the Cologne meeting in June 1999. The Porto Declaration underlined that non-EU members of NATO and candidate states for EU membership would be invited to contribute to the development of European military capacity. The candidate countries were proposed to make necessary arrangements in order to contribute to the EU in terms of crisis management. The chairman of the EU Assembly, Klaus Buhler, emphasized that after the EU takes the responsibility in terms of security, it is important to take all the measures in order not to leave the non-EU members of NATO in a disadvantaged position.

On May 22, the EU General Affairs Council, held at Foreign Ministerial Level, convened in Brussels in order to arrange the proceedings of the Feira Summit, where the Portuguese term of presidency ends. The ESDI is one of the main issues which have been discussed at the Feira Summit. Portugal was invited by the European Council in Helsinki to report on the Feira Summit, including "proposals on principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and recommendations on developing modalities for EU-NATO relations, to permit cooperation on the appropriate military response to a crisis, as set out in Washington and at Cologne." However, Portugal’s draft report rendered Turkey apprehensive because the draft document proposed to tackle the EU-NATO relationship in a platform which would include the 15 EU members, the 13 EU candidate countries, and Norway and Iceland. On the other hand, Turkey wishes to discuss EU-NATO relations and European security issues in general, in a platform which would gather EU member states and the European allies of NATO, because Turkey is restless about the 15+15 format including the Greek Cypriot Administration. In this sense, Turkey insistingly stresses that it refuses to discuss security issues with non-NATO or non-EU members.

Furthermore, for EU-led operations, the presidency also proposed to assign NATO
assets and capabilities permanently to the EU under an agreement which would be signed between the EU and NATO. With respect to this point, relying on the Washington Summit Declaration, Turkey insisted that NATO assets should be assigned to EU-led operations on a case-by-case basis. Hence, Ankara seems to be ready to use its rights within NATO for the Implementation of the Washington Summit final communiqué. In terms of the planning component of EU-led operations, even if NATO capabilities would be used, in the process of political and military planning, the proposal did not endorse the possibility for the six NATO allies (Turkey, Norway and Iceland) to participate in these deliberations. Along with this, even though these states would contribute to these EU-led operations, the documents stated that they would be able to participate as advisors in the EU’s daily evaluation meetings. The Florence meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which convened at Foreign Ministerial Level on May 24, confronted mainly three issues: the insufficiency of coordination and communication among the institutions; the reduction in the security expenditures of the EU members; and the difficulty in decision taking and sharing common positions among the EU members in times of crisis. The final communiqué that followed stated that the deliberations should accelerate in order for the Alliance to get ready for the new defense identity’s entry into force, which was proclaimed at the Washington Summit. In this framework, the communiqué has reiterated that the main institution which would undertake the security commitment of continental Europe was NATO and that ESDI demonstrated that the EU should strengthen its intervention capabilities in terms of situations like Kosovo. The communiqué, hinting at the utilization of NATO assets in EU-led operations by the authorization of the North Atlantic Council, stressed that it was necessary to consider the participation of the non-EU member states in the decision-making mechanisms of the ESDI, and that a formula must be devised. The ministers acknowledged that the decision about the ESDI which would be taken in the Feira Summit of the EU would be of great importance to NATO. In the NATO Council of Ministers Meeting on May 24, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem reiterated Turkey’s approach with respect to the ESDI and stated that Turkey is displeased and dissatisfied about this draft text which would be submitted by the EU in June 13, 2000. The other non-EU NATO members Canada, Norway and Iceland – affirmed this position of Turkey. Cem underlined the issues that Turkey is concerned about in the ESDI. These concerns were: taking up the working methods of the WEU, the inclusion of Turkey in the decision-making process of operations which would be undertaken with NATO assets, and to heed Turkey’s security concerns in EU-only operations. In her press conference in Florence following the North Atlantic Council Summit, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated that work on developing Europe’s own security force should not remain on a technocratic level. She pointed out the European efforts of developing defense capabilities to that end and underlined that ESDI would lose credibility if it did not go beyond a written protocol. On May 25, Albright met her counterpart, Turkish Foreign Minister Cem, in Florence. In this meeting, Turkey–Greece relations, the Cyprus issue and ESDI were discussed between the two colleagues. Albright emphatically stated that Turkey should be in the decision-making mechanisms in the framework of the ESDI. She said, "The security of the European continent is unthinkable without Turkey." The U.S. sensitivity to Turkey’s status was also witnessed by Albright’s reservation of substantial time for Cem. What is more, during his last visit to Europe, in Lisbon, President Clinton pointed out the need to include Turkey in the decision-making mechanisms of the ESDI and reiterated in Germany that Turkey should be in the European Union. Following these landmark summits and meetings, a recent significant development about the ESDI was WEU Secretary General Javier Solana’s visit to Turkey in June 2000. The visit was notable because the most important item on Solana’s agenda was the ESDI, and the visit took place just before the EU Summit in Portugal where ESDI would be discussed.
thoroughly. Solana had a very optimistic tone towards Turkey and to what it had accomplished since the Helsinki Summit. He admitted that Turkey had a substantial interest in taking part in the EU’s crisis management operations. However, he conveyed the message that Turkey would not be able to take part in the Political Committee, which was formed under ESDI, and the decision-making mechanism, but that mutual consultations would be carried on continuously. In this context, Solana stated that the EU is engaged in a task to set up permanent advisory mechanisms in terms of European security and defense and crisis intervention between Turkey and the European Union. In this context, he referred to a special cooperation project which was designed for non-EU NATO Allies. This mechanism would give Turkey the right to participate in every operation where NATO assets would be used, and in the decision-making mechanisms of the operations that Turkey participates in, it would assign Turkey an equal status with other participants. Concomitantly, Solana offered Turkey participation in the daily evaluation-supervision meetings of the operations in which Turkey would participate militarily. The issue of how this mechanism would be implemented and how it would operate would be tackled in the European Council Meeting in Feira on 19-29 June. Still, Turkey considers the loopholes in this mechanism. For instance, it is worried about those operations, in which Turkey would not participate and which might pose a challenge to Turkey’s interests. In return, Ankara reiterated its demand to participate in the political and military committees of the ESDI.

This view can be rationalized by considering that the WEU is incapable of undertaking a contingency operation with its own assets in the absence of air support and intelligence capabilities. Hence, Turkey is in a position to keep its “veto card” against NATO support of WEU operations. This view was also acknowledged by Defense Minister Sabahattin Çakmakçılı. He stated in his interview on NTV that the efforts to reconcile the respective approaches of the EU and that Turkey would have access to various capabilities in NATO including the veto power. However, the decision to use the veto would depend on circumstances and interests of Turkey at the time. He stressed that Turkey’s position would be clearer in the direction of Solana’s messages during his visit to Turkey. He also added that all NATO allies agree with Turkey’s arguments on the ESDI, but that he was not clear on how this stance would be reflected in practice.

Turkey devotes substantial effort to contribute to the European security framework, and after the introduction of the "Headline Goal" in the Helsinki European Council, Turkey put forward the suggestion for its contribution to this initiative. In this interview on NTV, Solana also evaluated Turkey’s offer to contribute to the Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 troops. He said that the EU members are content with it and he was hopeful that Turkey’s offer would be accepted. However, experts state that the powerful members of the EU, like France and Germany, do not look positively to Turkey’s demand to have the right of having a say in the decision-making mechanisms of the ESDI.

The forthcoming WEU Parliamentary Assembly Meetings in Paris on 5-8 June would be of relevance for Turkey. In these meetings, Turkey will be represented by a Turkish National Assembly delegation, chaired by the Democratic Left Party MP Uluğ Gürkan. Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister of France, which will be taking over the term of presidency from Portugal, would clarify the attitude of the EU with respect to Ankara’s concerns and arguments about the ESDI. Besides, the Portuguese Defense Minister, Castro Caldas, and the WEU Secretary General, Javier Solana, will be among those who will take the floor in Paris. It is expected that the discussions about the ESDI would occupy the prime position before the other issues on the agenda, such as the situation in Kosovo, European security architecture in the process of the ESDI, in June 2000.
Conclusion

European security is not proceeding without problems. Even though for the development of a genuine ESDI, political determination and flexibility is necessary, its main problem is, from the Turkish point of view, the lack of political will. The issue of what type of a mechanism or system will be applied in order to manage nuclear power has not yet been resolved. Memberships in sensitive areas of security and defense should be full, otherwise they are flawed. The status of WEU Associate Member States who are not EU members – Turkey, Norway, Iceland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – is unclear. At the moment, the Associate Members fully participate in the WEU Council. But once the WEU Council ceases to exist and the WEU’s functions are transferred to the EU Council, it is not clear whether WEU Associate Members will have any input into the decision-making process or whether they will be consulted at any stage of EU-ESDI deliberations.

Overlapping memberships are required for consistency between the decision-making and Implementation processes. Thus, the rigidities of Maastricht should be removed in terms of memberships in the EU and WEU. Turkey has been and remains NATO’s fundamental and irreplaceable partner in a region of volatility and unstable transformation. The most crucial necessity for firmly anchoring Turkey to the West is to include it also in the emerging European political architecture. The EU membership and incorporation into the European security framework are of greatest importance for Turkey’s political priorities. When Europe attaches Turkey firmly to its new political system which it is expected to do, it will encounter fewer problems in its Southeastern neighborhood. The stabilization of Turkey by its inclusion in the European architecture would also improve Europe’s stability. The question of Turkey’s place within the developing European security policy framework should be considered thoroughly. For the Europeans, the main task will be to avoid unnecessary strains in their relations with Turkey. The exclusion and marginalization of Turkey from the emerging European security architecture introduces substantial stumbling blocks. If the Europeans pursue the strategy of complementing a stable European security architecture by a politically and economically stable regional neighborhood, Turkey and its future relations with the European Union have to be included in the design. For the EU, it should be clear that without a resolution of Turkey’s status, Europe’s security cannot be sufficiently planned since post-Cold War European security is marked rather by uncertainty which entails considering the concept of security in its entirety. At least, until the EU reaches such a conclusion, Turkey’s concern will be legitimate and justifiable.

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Anmerkungen
The research on Turkey’s view concerning the ESDI in this article covers only the discussions until the end of July 2000.
T. Morali, ibid.


Ludger Kühnhardt, op. cit., p. 234.


F.S.Larrabee, op. cit., p. 114.


Ludger Kühnhardt, op. cit., p. 217.


Ludger Kühnhardt, op. cit., p. 234.


Erol Mütercimler, op. cit., p. 18.

Heinz Kramer, op. cit., p. 223.

Heinz Kramer, op. cit., p. 223.


Gülnur Aybet, op. cit.


F.S. Larrabee, op. cit., p. 169.

After Turkey has been excluded from the ESDI in the Feira meeting, Heinz Kramer published articles in the Turkish Daily Milliyet presenting the argument that the concerns of Turkey after this exclusion decision are baseless and that Turkey, in the final analysis, as a NATO member in case of crisis will take the decision together with NATO, and the EU needs the confirmation of Turkey in any case. Heinz Kramer, "Türkiye’nin kaygiları yersiz” (The Turkish concerns are baseless), Milliyet Daily, 12-13 July 2000. Therefore, Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, an expert on security issues at Bilkent University in Ankara, argued in response to Kramer that Turkey’s concerns are very well based and the EU’s decision to exclude Turkey from the ESDI is a wrong one. He also pointed out that the EU should not assume that Turkey can be considered further on as a "well-behaved child" as during the Cold War years. See Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Ankara kaygılanmaka haklı”, (Ankara’s concerns are legitimate), Milliyet Daily, 20 July 2000. For the official statements after NATO’s decision in Brussels during mid-July see "Türkiye’nin AGSK zaferi” (Turkey’s ESDI victory), Hürriyet Daily, 19 July 2000 and for the disappointment after Feira see "Türkiye’siz Olmaz" (Not Without Turkey), Hürriyet Daily, 28 June 2000.


See the intervention of Turkish Defense Minister Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu at the same conference in this respect, Hürriyet Daily, European Edition, 7 February 2000.


Dünyaya Bakis (World View), NTV, 29 May-2 June 2000.


Interview with Javier Solana by Güldener Sonumut in Brussels for NTV-Dünyaya Bakis (Worldview), 31 May 2000.


Gülnur Aybet, op. cit.

Turan Morali, op. cit.

