

**PART V:**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

# Executive Summary

Frederic Labarre

The workshop started with general considerations about cooperative security. The panel animated by Drs. Sandole, Plantev and Vetschera elicited a number of important concepts for the sustainment of successful post-conflict developments in the Balkans. The panellists submitted these concepts to different levels of examination.

Dr. Sandole, for example, continued to emphasize reconstruction, implemented by way of multi-track investment initiatives, such as a regional fund for conflict transformation. Clearly, the appearance of meaningful change and improvements in the daily lives of Balkan residents goes hand-in-hand with the local ownership of stabilisation efforts. Dr. Sandole would like to see these efforts integrate local talents so as to give meaningful activities to people, which would help them focus on the improvement of their personal lives, and not be seduced by the promises of extremists.

Dr. Pantev attached greater importance on a recalibration of approaches also within a multinational framework, but along an agenda based on the resolution of technical issues. According to Dr. Pantev, these issues can be resolved using tradition bargaining methods (linkages, exchanges, trade-offs, compromises, etc.) or creative problem-solving, by developing solutions as if actors' identities were removed from the problem.

Dr. Vetschera reminds us that concepts need to be clarified. "There is a difference", he says, "between cooperative security and non-cooperative security, the first being security with each other, whereas the latter is security from each other." Creative problem solving, as proposed by Dr. Sandole and Dr. Pantev, for example, will work if the benefits of different groups cooperating outweigh those of working in isolation. Confidence and security building measures and disarmament since the Dayton

Peace Accords were signed in 1995, coupled with changes in leadership in the region, have led to a reduction of threat perception and greater influence of trade interdependence. As participation in Euro-Atlantic institutions seems to be the preferred way ahead, links between regional good-behaviour and integration must be made manifest at all levels.

The first panellist were mutually complementary insofar as emphasis on negotiated solutions within a multinational framework must lead to a policy of cooperative security leading to integration (as defined by membership into Euro-Atlantic institutions) and this, despite the manifestations of “compromise fatigue” in the region.

We could argue that cooperative security successes hinged on the perfection of certain approaches and concepts, such as attention to technical issues. If we compare with the post-conflict developments in the wake of the Second World War, we notice that the road to reconciliation went from agreement on concrete, tangible, “bread and butter” issues, such as sharing interest first on coal and steel, and later on nuclear energy. Just recently, what has now become the EU is grappling with the possibilities of a common defence and foreign policy, an overarching constitution, and has already achieved, in large part, success with a common currency. That some of these issues remain controversial to this day should not blind us to the fact that giant integrative leaps have been made since WWII, to the benefit of all. In the Balkans, the process seems to be working in reverse, from macro-political decisions (disarmament) and now, sharing interests in more mundane issues, such as disaster relief, energy security, border management, transport issues, etc.

Because of this, and despite a “nationalistic rollback” (which is perhaps more symptomatic of a shift to the political right worldwide rather than pure regional chauvinism), we may be permitted to ask whether any political entity should be allowed Westphalian sovereignty over any piece of geography. If a policy of cooperative security is supposed to lead to Euro-Atlantic membership, the traditional notion of control of territory starts to lose its meaning, because loyalties will need to be redirected from the nation towards the larger community. The consequence is greater security, leaving only residual sovereignty to the newly consti-

tuted political authorities. Clearly, this has consequences for the future status of Kosovo.

The implications for state-building processes are therefore clear. Jolyon Naegele reported that despite systematic difficulties made by Belgrade, UNMIK had steadily devolved a certain number of jurisdictions and responsibilities to Kosovo. The new problem is the emergence of the Russian variable in the equation. The status of Kosovo, and with it the prospects of cooperative security between great powers, could be frustrated by the persistent linkage by Russia of topics unrelated to the security situation in Kosovo.

It seems clear that the resolution of the question of Kosovo cannot take place in isolation, and this is why Mr. Peci submitted three potential scenarios. One would be the progressive phasing-out of UNMIK which would suggest a relative stabilisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. Another would involve a unilateral declaration of independence and the last one would be the outright rejection of the Ahtisaari proposal of supervised sovereignty. To Mr. Peci, independence risks Serbian intervention, buttressed by a bold and confident Russia. This would be the worst scenario, according to him, worst than the “palestinization” of Kosovo that the rejection of the Ahtisaari proposal would entail.

Dušan Janjić agrees with the latter assessment, which would automatically mean a “freezing” of the conflict by Serbia, aiming at gaining time, perhaps consolidating its position vis-à-vis Kosovo the way that Russia has consolidated its own towards Chechnya. This scenario would be particularly potent if the EU and the United States proved unable or unwilling to resist pressures in that direction.

Presently, the geo-strategic situation would seem to indicate that a responsible position would be to support the Ahtisaari proposal in view of Europe’s strategic dependence on Russian gas exports, and on the EU-US commitment to a non-nuclear Iran, which also requires Russian cooperation. This is why the assessment made of the U.S. position by Mr. John Erath of the State Department, seems one of pragmatism; the United States wants violence in the region to stop. This, however,

doesn't indicate that the United States prefers negative peace (absence of violence) to positive peace (active cooperation). On the contrary, according to Mr. Erath, independence is perhaps not the most important objective. This would seem to confirm the conclusions of the first panel which presses a policy of integration against cooperative security. Negative peace would be the ironic starting point of state-building efforts which would lead to Euro-Atlantic integration.

However, Denisa Sarajlić-Maglić and Matthew Rhodes noted some caveats. Not only is regional stability hostage to a clarification of the status of Kosovo, but the recovery of Bosnia-Herzegovina seems to be stalemated. EU members show only limited interest in direct investment in the region, and all sides raise obstacles to day-to-day cooperation. This situation is compounded by dysfunctional institutional centres, a somewhat discredited Office of the High Representative of the UN and a lack of legal measures enabling BiH to ameliorate internal conditions autonomously. For Matthew Rhodes, this is consistent with a general "crisis of confidence" in democratic state-building that can be observed in the greater region, even in countries, like Hungary, that have had otherwise successful transitions.

Elites and society in the region grasp with great difficulty the consequences of international agencies' withdrawal, but furthermore there is even greater incomprehension of the fact that democratic decision-making is "messy, untidy, and chaotic" by its very definition. Also according to Dr. Rhodes, the tendency by non-resident experts to exaggerate the security risks should not blind us to the fact that the inelegance of the democratic process is a matter of routine.

Against this background of guarded and tentative optimism, Franz-Lothar Altmann announced the recent creation of a Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) replacing the Stability Pact for South East Europe. Designed to sustain the achievements of the latter and support recovery with a view to joining Euro-Atlantic institutions, this initiative is the direct heir to the Western European experience of functional integration.

This initiative was not only necessary, it was logical. As has been argued above, the process of post-conflict stabilisation in the Balkans has been undertaken in reverse from the normal “EU process”. This is not a pejorative statement; what has been done so far has been done with the best intentions and with the tools at hand. The RCC pursues the same goals as the ever-integrating EU; using a professional bureaucracy recruited and partly funded from the region, it will coordinate the intake and distribution of UN, EU, U.S. and non-EU aid packages. It can be safely assumed that this will beg for a greater proportion of hirings (from the dozen or so individuals today) so that the RCC as the first indigenous multinational institution, will be able to dilute national loyalties into a successful clearing house for international aid. For this to happen, the RCC initiative *must therefore be successful if it is to survive*. The RCC represents a vastly different dynamic from the last 15 years, one that is pregnant with potential, because the focus will be on technical and human needs, social and home affairs, and the development of human capital and parliamentary cooperation.

Amadeo Watkins and Sandro Knezovic have confirmed this optimistic understanding of the situation by stressing that American pressure at the NATO Riga Summit of November 2006 that all the countries of the region should be under the same security umbrella (hence the extension of PfP privileges to Serbia, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina). This gives commonality of direction and to the notion that regional cooperation, either through the RCC, PfP, or other agencies, was a training ground for EU and/or NATO membership. The progressive drawing-down of forces in the region would seem to indicate that integration is a foregone conclusion. Dr. Watkins has noted, however, that the domestic capacity for absorbing this sea change is weak. The lack of transparency, leadership and the slow rate of reform of domestic intelligence and policing is an obstacle to the permutation of their role as agent of the state to protector of the citizenry.

This is why the fourth and last panel, animated by Sonja Biserko, Dragana Klincov and Nina Dobrković reiterated that the human rights and human security situation in the region is dependent on the wars that preceded. Justice continues to be hijacked for political purposes. Despite the

fact that refugee returns have proceeded apace, there is no indication at the moment that the Serbian society is ready to take stock of its responsibility for the troubles in the Balkans. Mrs. Dobrković confirms that people are not ready to even accept certain rights for a multitude of reasons. As we have heard from representatives of BiH and Albania, the promotion of civil society building continues to hamper state-building, as the former process continues to be done through donors' agenda.

The fourth panel has cast a potent light between state rights and human rights. At the base of this debate, is the persistently overlooked fact that all states have once been created under conditions that raised doubts on their very legitimacy. This legitimacy had to be buttressed and protected by enlisting the citizens in its defence (against other states, but also against factionalism). The citizen is therefore a subject of the state, rather than an object. Human rights do not have a voice, and cannot be called "inherent" in such conditions. We see now that the Balkans' problem is perhaps not only one of competing ethnic groups, but of an immature conception of the citizen. Recent international politics developments suggest that this complex is far from being exclusive to South East Europe. We can presume that Russian interior policy, Ukrainian political stalemate and Bielorussian autocracy is a feature of this complex.

This 14<sup>th</sup> workshop has shown astonishing consistency in terms of agenda setting: most panellist and participants concur that economic freedom, access to contested areas, be they markets or territories, can be reconciled by the manifest interest in Euro-Atlantic institutional participation, generated by cooperative security policies. We can optimistic thanks to the creation of the RCC, but in terms of human security and state-building, understanding of the difficulties is hampered by confusion of concepts and agendas.

We confuse concepts when we forget the origins of "human security". For example, we have heard pronouncements as to the "responsibility to protect" and the "responsibility to prevent" during our discussions. Human security, deliberations have shown, remains elusive if we take it as an ideal goal. It is elusive because elite agenda *does not* correspond to human security. We neglect this because humanitarian responders, great

powers and generally well-intentioned actors understand state-building as a goal that will generate benefits as in their own experience on the one hand, and as the inherent responsibility of the state on the other. But for the elite, there is no need for state-building, for what is a state? A state – “stato” in the Machiavellian parlance – is a type of relation between ruler and ruled.

There are two types of states; social-contract type states, and Weberian type states. In the first instance, social-contract states are generally minimalist, meaning they intervene less in constituents’ private pursuits. They demand less than they supply to the constituency. For many countries, nearly all of the Euro-Atlantic region, this is the norm. This is what is called a civil society.

In the other instance, however, the Weberian state is the only holder of the means of legitimate violence. The central authority constantly demands obedience and service from the constituents (using propaganda, police action, nationalistic manipulation, etc.). The state *uses* its citizens. They provide their services to the state for its security (at the detriment of their own, would write Barry Buzan). This is not a civil society; it is a militant society.

Therefore the challenge that remains is one of leadership and society transformation from militant to civil. Civil society is unfortunately not a goal that exists outside human experience; it has to be achieved. Created, not discovered. All states were at one time militant societies. The doubtful legitimacy of a political construction such as a state demanded this service from its inhabitants.

But this has changed as mentalities, technology, and security concerns have changed, and time passed. Up until now, much effort has focused on transmitting knowledge of the processes – the “how” (democratic, electoral, legal, judicial, etc.). Too little time was spent on the “why”. Elites and citizens in the Balkans should develop the confidence that these processes do not mean the end of their states, that the provision of human rights, while they may lead to the defeat of a president or prime minister, will not mean the obliteration of the presidency or parliament.

The quality of the panellists and presentations coming from citizens of the region shows that changes in state and individual perceptions are possible, that a civil conception of the state can exist in the mind as the individual participates to a militant society proves this.

If we asked Serbs, Bosnians, or Kosovar Albanians whether a clarification of Kosovo independence (or alternatively, preservation of territorial integrity) is more important than gainful employment, universal health-care, and quality education, perhaps awareness could be permitted to arise as to the responsibility of rulers to guarantee human security rather than regime survival.