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BUILDING PEACE IN POST-NATO BOSNIA: A RECOMMENDED ACTION PLAN

INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) is scheduled to assume control of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the end of 2004 (Dempsey, 2004ab). "Negative peace" (i.e., the absence of hostilities [Galtung, 1969, 1996]) was brought back to Bosnia by NATO military action following the genocidal massacres in Srebenica of 11 July 1995, plus the Dayton Peace process culminating in a treaty by December 1995. Peace in the region has been maintained since then by a NATO-led peace enforcement mission, initially the Implementation Force (IFOR), and later SFOR.

What is the nature of the situation that the new "European Force" (EFOR) is about to enter? Five years after the Dayton Peace Accords brought negative peace to Bosnia, Jeffrey Smith (2000, p. A1) wrote:

Five years into a multibillion-dollar effort to construct a viable, peaceful country from the ruins of Bosnia's civil war, Western governments are tiring of the job, citing rampant corruption, persistent ethnic hatred and a seemingly open-ended need for NATO peacekeeping troops.

Many large aid donors, including the [U.S.], the World Bank and the [UN] say they will cut their assistance to Bosnia in the next year, in some cases by as much as a third. Members of NATO are weighing new cuts in its 20,000-member force after reducing strength from 32,000 at the outset.
Bosnians worry that major reductions in aid and troops could reignite the 1992-1995 war that shocked the world with neighbor-against-neighbor bloodletting and shelling of cities. As U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Michael L. Dodson, the top NATO commander in Bosnia note[d], the troops are "the glue that holds all this together" (emphasis added).

According to a more recent assessment:

What does it take for outside powers to rebuild a war-ruined and badly divided country? Bosnia offers a state-of-the-art—and sobering—example. Seven years after a U.S. intervention helped end its civil war and Western troops poured in to keep the peace, the Balkan nation of 3.5 million remains far from able to live on its own. The good news is that the horrific fighting that killed a quarter of a million people in less than four years has not been renewed, that several hundred thousand refugees and victims of ethnic cleansing have returned to their homes, and that peaceful and free elections were held [in October 2002] for all levels of government—the sixth elections to be staged in as many years. But the [negative] peace continues to depend on 12,000 foreign troops, including 2,000 Americans; the functioning of government relies in no small part on the interventions of a Western "high representative" with near-dictatorial powers; and, most discouraging of all, the victors in the recent elections were the same nationalist parties that tore the country apart a decade ago. Bosnia is not now a failed state, but it is a center for the trafficking of women and narcotics, a hide-out for war criminals and a steady drain on Western aid and Defense budgets. It's not likely to collapse soon, but neither will foreign troops and administrators likely
be able to safely pull out for many years to come (WP, 2002).

An assessment of neighbouring Croatia (CWWPP, 2004, p. 3) indicates that:

The situation with regard to psychological trauma, non-violent conflict resolution and reconciliation continues to be poor and/or is deteriorating in the region. Suicides and domestic violence continue to increase. The unemployment situation remains catastrophic and is not improving. There is little hope among people that solutions will be found. Unfortunately, there is little input from local and national governments and international organizations on any of these issues, and politics remains a major barrier to progress. Non-governmental organizations, both local and foreign, fight from month to month to survive and to do what they can, but it is difficult for most organizations to remain alive.

The recent elections in both Croatia and Serbia also give cause for concern. The parties that started the war won in both cases.

We feel strongly that this region that is on the edge of Europe is being ignored, and that this policy is a dangerous one for Europe and the world. The problems here have not even begun to be solved.

And in March 2004:

Kosovo ... took a very disturbing turn, with the most extensive ethnic violence seen there since 1999, resulting in 19 killed, 900 wounded and hundreds of Serb houses, churches and monasteries destroyed or damaged (ICG, 2004).
As a result, some in Bosnia are wondering if a similar regression into violence is likely for them as well, especially with the upcoming transition from NATO's SFOR to the EU's EFOR as guarantor of security (private communication).

Hence, the challenge facing the EU: how to assume control of the military mission from NATO in such a way that the EU can work together with Bosnians to build positive peace in the country – i.e., reducing if not eliminating the underlying causes and conditions of violent conflict – and, given the intimate interconnections between conflicts in the Balkans, in the region as a whole.

NEPSS: A BASIS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION IN BOSNIA?

In recent years, I have been working on a design for a New European Peace and Security System (NEPSS) to intervene into the latent and manifest conflicts of post-Cold War Europe in a way that could prevent "Future Yugoslavias" (see Sandole, 1993; 1995; 1998a; 1999a, Ch. 7; 1999b). Given the "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1993, 1996) linkage between the Balkan Wars of the 1990s and the global war on terrorism, NEPSS may also be relevant to preventing future instances of the "new" (post-9/11) terrorism (see "Beirut to Bosnia," 1993). As U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz has commented:

September 11 has clearly changed the stakes for the [U.S.] in dealing with security issues in those areas that could be sanctuaries for terrorists. [Bosnia would not be] just any failed state around the world, but one with a Muslim population in the heart of Europe. (...) Even today ... Bosnia remains a channel for terrorist networks to move money and people (cited in Shanker, 2003).

The New European Peace and Security System (NEPSS)

NEPSS – a "work in progress" – comprises descriptive and prescriptive elements; i.e., developments that have occurred or are occurring as well as those that could or should occur to maximize the positive implications of actual developments.

**Descriptive Elements of NEPSS**

*Descriptively*, NEPSS is a model for a post-Cold War peace and security system in Europe that calls for making use of, and integrating, existing institutions and mechanisms within the overall context of the OSCE.\(^{371}\) OSCE plays a pivotal role in NEPSS because, in addition to its (now) 55 participating States representing all of the former Cold War adversaries and the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) of Europe, its traditional three "basket" structure (see Helsinki Final Act, 1975) provides a basis for integrating existing European and trans-Atlantic institutions and processes into interdependent components of a post-Cold War peace and security system:

- **Basket 1**: originally Security in general; later Political/Military Dimensions of Comprehensive Security.
  - NATO/NACC [EAPC]
  - Partnership for Peace; WEU/EU;

- **Basket 2**: Economic and Environmental Dimensions of Comprehensive Security.
  - EU/European Free Trade Association (EFTA);

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\(^{371}\) The OSCE succeeded its predecessor, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), on 1 January 1995. "Within the overall context of the OSCE" means within the framework of, but not subsumed (in a hierarchical relationship) to, the OSCE.

The Western organizations mentioned above, corresponding to each of three "baskets," have in recent years been reaching out to former adversaries in the East, if not to explicitly encourage their membership, then certainly to otherwise liaise and collaborate with them in previously unprecedented ways, which augurs well for their membership later on. In effect, the existing organizations, led by NATO, have been participating in an unprecedented paradigm shift away from Cold War-era, Realpolitik national security to post-Cold War, Idealpolitik common security.

Basket 1: Political and Military Dimensions of Security

Under Basket 1, NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) has been collaborating with its former adversaries, first in the form of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), then the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and more recently, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which has succeeded the NACC.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was created at the NATO Rome summit of 7-8 November 1991, to facilitate consultations and cooperation in security matters among the former Cold War adversaries (see NATO Rome Summit, 1991). It represented the concretization of sentiments expressed in the Joint Declaration of the Paris CSCE summit, furthering the paradigm shift from confrontational (national security) to collaborative (common security) processes.372

372 By 1 January 1993, NACC comprised 38 members:
The Partnership for Peace (PfP), created at the NATO Brussels summit of 10-11 January 1994, has been open to all members of the OSCE, and not just, as in the case of NACC, to the former Cold War adversaries. The PfP

(a) the 16 members of NATO (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United States, and the United Kingdom);

(b) the 6 Eastern European former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia);

(c) Albania;

(d) the 3 Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania);

(e) Russia and the 11 remaining former Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan); plus,

(f) one observer: Finland (see Rotfeld, 1993, p. 177).

By 1997, NACC membership climbed to 40 with the addition of Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, plus 4 observers with Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland joining Finland in that role (see NATO Basic Fact Sheet Nr. 2, 1997).

The Western European Union (WEU) – the "European pillar" of NATO and eventual security arm of the EU (see below) – created a similar organization in 1992, the WEU Consultative Forum, with Central and Southeast European states. In addition to the 10 WEU members (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) and 3 associate members (Iceland, Norway, and Turkey), the Consultative Forum included 10 associate partners (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and 5 observers (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) (see Walker, 1993, pp. 50-51; Walker, 1994, pp. 48, 54; YIO, 1997/98, pp. 1656-57).

During the Cologne EU Summit in June 1999, "European leaders approved a landmark document ... that formally commit[ted] the EU to a common policy on security and defense aimed at giving it 'capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces'" (James and Schmid, 1999). By the time of the Helsinki EU Summit in December 1999, the WEU had been absorbed by the EU as the basis for its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with former NATO secretary general Javier Solana as its high representative (Fitchett, 1999; Hoagland, 1999).
built upon NACC (and the paradigm shift) by inviting the neutral and nonaligned (NNA) to join with NATO and the former Warsaw Treaty countries in developing a common security system through bilateral arrangements between NATO and each Partner country for, among others, joint planning, training and exercises to facilitate PfP participation in peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian and other operations. By summer 1996, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) included the NATO 16 and 27 others, including (after months of tense delays) Russia, for a total of 43 members (see Williams, 1994; CSCE Digest, 1996). Among the 27 non-NATO members were the 6 Eastern European members of the former Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia); 14 former Soviet successor states (i.e., all with the exception of Tajikistan); 2 former Yugoslav republics (Macedonia and Slovenia); Albania; and 4 neutral and nonaligned (Austria, Finland, Malta, and Sweden). Malta has since withdrawn, while another member of the neutral and nonaligned, Switzerland, has joined.

PfP also encourages the expectation that membership will ultimately lead to entry into an expanding and undoubtedly, "reinvented" NATO (see NATO Brussels Summit, 1994): originally a source of concern for Russians who felt that, notwithstanding their membership in the Partnership, eventual NATO membership did not apply to them and who, in any case, still defined NATO in Cold War terms.

At its 8-9 July 1997 summit in Madrid, NATO invited three former Warsaw Pact members – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – to negotiate

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By 1998, Tajikistan was a member as well, for a total of 44 PfP members: the same as the 40 members of the (now defunct) NACC and its 4 observers or, the 44 members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) which replaced the NACC in May 1997 (see NATO Fact Sheet Nr. 9, 1997; PfP, 1998).

And by 2002, Tajikistan dropped out but then became a member again, plus Croatia and Ireland had become members as well, bringing the total membership to 46, all of which are also members of the EAPC (see EAPC, 2003; PfP, 2002).
entry into NATO. Given Russian sensitivities to NATO "enlargement" (expansion), the Madrid invitation was preceded by the *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between [NATO] and the Russian Federation*, signed in Paris on 27 May 1997, which effectively allowed a Russian voice, but not a veto, in NATO deliberations. Madrid was also preceded by a meeting on 29 May of NATO foreign ministers in Sintra, Portugal, establishing the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which succeeded and went beyond the NACC, and enhanced the PfP, by promising to "bring NATO and its Partners even closer together with more intensive military exercises, planning, consultations and other activities" (White, 1997, p. 13). Together with the NATO-Ukraine Charter, also agreed to at Sintra and signed at Madrid, these developments furthered the paradigm shift from national to common security (see AP, 1997; *OSCE Newsletter*, 1997; *OSCE Review*, 1997).\(^{375}\)

\(^{374}\) On 8 September 1995, then Russian President Boris Yeltsin, perhaps in part to defuse criticism of his policies by ultranationalists and others, condemned, in the wake of the genocidal fall of Srebrenica (Bosnia-Herzegovina), NATO's bombing of Bosnian Serb positions, even hinting that in addition to humanitarian aid for Serbian refugees from Croatia, "Russia might consider also sending military aid if the NATO attacks continue." He also made a connection between NATO's bombing and its planned expansion up to Russia's borders, arguing that the latter "will mean a conflagration of war throughout all Europe" (see Hoffman, 1995). Further:

In Moscow, ..., antagonism towards NATO's expansion [was] growing. Polish and Hungarian accession to NATO would be unwelcome but tolerated; the Baltics would be a different matter.

Leading Russian military strategists ... warned that Moscow could respond by repositioning tactical short-range nuclear missiles on its western borders.

Viktor Mikhailov, Russia's atomic energy minister, ... even suggested bombing Czech bases if the republic becomes part of NATO's military infrastructure (Hearst, 1996).

\(^{375}\) The first meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) took place at the Madrid NATO summit on 9 July 1997 (the same day that the NATO-Ukraine Charter was signed) with the 44 member nations discussing the role of the EAPC in conflict resolution and crisis management, and its relationships with the UN, OSCE, and NATO (see Marshall, 1997).

As already indicated, "All members of PfP are also members of the [post-NACC] EAPC," the overarching framework within which PfP activities occur (see Balanzino, 1997; *NATO Fact Sheet Nr. 9*, 1997; PfP, 1998).
Nevertheless, with the recent entry of the three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – into NATO, Russia once again expressed its concerns with NATO moving right up to its frontier, in effect, creating a Cold War-era bipolar line of demarcation (see Myers, 2004).

Basket 2: Economic and Environmental Dimensions of Security

The European Union (EU) is the premier organization for facilitating realization of the goals implicit in the OSCE’s Basket 2 emphasis on promoting "economic and social progress and the improvement of the conditions of life" (Helsinki Final Act, 1975, p. 89). Despite crises over the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (see, e.g., Levinson, et al., 1992), the EU has been pursuing the further development of a "common economic space"; e.g., negotiations between the (then) European Community (EC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) during 1989-1992, to create a European Economic Area (EEA), "which was to come into force on 1 January 1993 and include 19 countries" (Europe in Figures, 1995, p. 24), representing "the world's biggest and wealthiest single market [with a population, at the time, of 380 million]" (Drozdiak, 1991).376

[This] agreement breaking down the barriers between the remaining economic blocs in Western Europe also [was] expected to accelerate the process of eventually incorporating the impoverished new democracies in the eastern part of the continent ....

Jacques Delors, the [former] president of the EC's executive commission, said ... that the Community may include as many as 30 member states in the future.

376 By 1 January 1995, the EEA had 18 members – the 15 EU members, plus Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein – minus Switzerland which had rejected membership through a referendum (see Europe in Figures, 1995, p. 24).
The EU, therefore, has been poised to take in additional members, including states which were formerly adversaries; e.g., those involved in the Pact on Stability in Europe: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (see Helenius, 1995). Indeed, at its summit meeting in Luxembourg in December 1997, the EU invited the three candidates for NATO membership – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – one other Pact country, Estonia, plus Slovenia and Cyprus, to begin to negotiate entry into the EU. In addition:

the EU [would] be working closely with another five states that [had] expressed an interest in joining the union: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia [the remaining Pact countries]. These states [would] be offered expanded political and economic assistance from the EU with an eye toward eventual membership (The Week in Germany, 1997, p. 1).

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377 By 1 January 1995, EU membership climbed to 15 with the addition of Austria, Finland, and Sweden to Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom (Europe in Figures, 1995, p. 24).

378 As a reflection of, among other things, the "clash of civilizations" (see Huntington, 1993, 1996) within NATO:

the EU leaders decided in Luxembourg against including [Turkey] in the expansion process. ... Turkey, an associate member of the EU and its predecessors since 1964, [had] been seeking to join the EU for the past ten years (The Week in Germany, 1997, pp. 1, 2). (Also see Hockstader, 1997; Hockstader and Couturier, 1997; IHT, 1997.)

Two years later, however, at the EU Summit in Helsinki, EU leaders decided to accept Turkey as a candidate for eventual membership. But further reflective of the "clash of civilizations" dynamic among the Western allies:

... the president of the European Commission [Romano Prodi] warned that a difficult time lay ahead before the EU would be ready to admit its first Islamic and non-European member. ... Some, including the president of the European Parliament, Nicole Fontaine, expressed fears that the dramatic proposed enlargement would dilute Europe's identity and cohesiveness (emphasis added) (James, 1999, p. 1).
And on 16 June 2001:

After a three-day summit [in Göteborg] marred by the worst street violence in Swedish history, leaders of the 15-member European Union agreed ...to a firm timetable to admit new members from Eastern Europe by 2004. ... The summit's final communiqué called the enlargement process 'irreversible.' That was particularly good news for the candidates likely to be admitted first – Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Poland. The EU began talks with those countries and with Cyprus in 1998 and with Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and Malta last year (Richburg, 2001).

In any case:

Talks on Turkish admission [would] not even begin until 2004, to give Ankara time to settle its quarrels with Athens [in the Aegean and over Cyprus].

The European leaders [also] decided to start entry talks in February [2000] with Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Malta. Talks [had] already begun with Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Cyprus (ibid., p. 5).
Reflecting in part the assumption that increases in living standards in these and other countries would undermine some of the factors that encouraged the violent expression of ethnic and other conflicts during the 1990s, Walker (1993, p. 50) suggested that:

As the [EU] gradually encompasses many of Europe's new democracies at least in closer association arrangements, and some of them as full members, it could become the most important European organization for mitigating ethnic tensions.379

The following is one example of relevant post-Cold War developments involving the EU under Basket 2, with which I have been involved (UNECE, 2002, pp. 1-2):

The proliferation of conflicts in Europe following the end of the Cold War has created new challenges and opportunities – of great complexity – for intergovern-mental and national institutions dealing with economic and environmental aspects of security:

Organisations and alliances such as the European Union, OSCE, NATO, and UNECE [UN Economic Commission for Europe] have taken the lead to define the nature and scope of the new security environment and the shifting economic and environmental dynamics contributing to it. These organizations and unions have also been instrumental in engineering the type of constructive dialogue which allows new strategies, policies, responses and instruments for conflict prevention and resolution to be developed. The

379 Walker (1993, p. 50) adds: "This will be true as much because of the 'socializing' effect of constant contact and co-operation among interior, justice, social affairs or other ministries, as well as those responsible for economic and foreign policy, as because of specific agreements."
various institutions agree that the time is right to further refine approaches to conflict prevention and resolution and enhance their effectiveness.

The Villiers Colloquium, hosted by UNECE-OSCE with input from NATO experts and the participation of a broad spectrum of governmental, business and civil society specialists, is a critical contribution to the renewed efforts to develop more effective responses both to developing and actual conflicts. Furthermore, the meeting agreed that conflict prevention, based on effective use of early warning indicators and detailed analyses of the causes of individual conflicts, is the most politically and economically preferential approach.

The participants identified three primary causes of conflict in Europe, namely: economic decline and rising poverty; growing inequality between and within states; and weak and uncertain state institutions. Key secondary causes, which can act to sustain conflicts, include: high unemployment, notably amongst youth; and the abuse of ethnicity as a form of political strategy.

The role of parallel structures (terrorist and organized crime groups) and their ability to access international financing, from both seemingly legitimate and illegal sources, are also key destabilizing factors. Consistent and well resourced efforts, based on international cooperation, will be required to effectively subdue and dismantle these parallel structures.

Macroeconomic challenges linked to the processes of globalisation and the transition to market economies create additional stresses for those states where the key focus
remains state building and establishing the integrity of their borders.

The Villiers Colloquium has laid the foundation for a continuing Villiers Group which, if realized, will have the aim of establishing a comprehensive framework to facilitate more effective preventive responses to conflict and emergency security issues (emphasis added).

What is striking about the Villiers Colloquium is that, as with the EU itself, it goes beyond the economic and environmental dimensions of Basket 2, synergistically feeding into and reinforcing the political and military dimensions of Basket 1 and the humanitarian and human rights dimensions of Basket 3, to which we now turn.

**Basket 3: Humanitarian and Human Rights Dimensions of Security**

The humanitarian objectives associated with *Basket 3* are to further:

> the spiritual enrichment of the human personality without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, [through] increased cultural and educational exchanges, broader dissemination of information, contacts between people, and the solution of humanitarian problems (Helsinki Final Act, 1975, p. 113).

The realization of these goals is meant to occur "in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating states," listed as part of Basket 1, where Principle VII deals with "Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience,
religion or belief"; and Principle VIII, "Equal rights and self-determination of peoples" (ibid., pp. 80-81).  

The Council of Europe (CoE), which "makes being a functioning democracy a condition of membership" (Walker, 1993, pp. 47-48), has been instrumental in achieving these goals:

In considering applications for membership the Council conducts detailed examinations of national and local government laws, regulations and behaviour to ensure conformity not only with electoral, police, judicial and civil service practices of member states, but also with the European Convention on Human Rights. The Council also offers extensive information, training programmes and practical help to enable aspiring members to meet its standards, as well as to understand the practical problems of enforcing the European Convention on Human Rights [through the European Court of Human Rights which renders binding judgements on members' compliance with the Convention].

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380 Strictly speaking, therefore, the *Human Dimension* combines the humanitarian concerns of Basket 3 and the human rights concerns of Basket 1.

381 By 1989-1990, as the Cold War was coming to an end, the CoE consisted of 23 members: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (see CoE, 1998).

By the end of 1993, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – former adversaries of the West – had become members as well, bringing CoE membership up to 32 (ibid.). Many others had also applied, "including Russia and other member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)" (Walker, 1993, p. 47).

By the end of 1995, the Council's membership stood at 38 countries, including Albania, Andorra, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, and Ukraine (see CoE, 1998).
The actual or potential expansion of, among others, NATO, the EU, and Council of Europe within the framework of the OSCE is compatible with a major feature of NEPSS: no one – ethnic and other groups within states as well as states themselves (including the Russian Federation) – should be left out in terms of systems designed to enhance the political/military, economic/environmental, and humanitarian/human rights dimensions of comprehensive security. For post-Cold War Europe to "work," therefore, it must reflect, for all concerned, "peace, security and justice" (emphasis added) (Helsinki Final Act, 1975, p. 77, passim): to leave any party outside the "European house" would be to ensure that they have no stake in preserving it; worse, to encourage them to stand by while others attempt to burn it down!

To summarize, then, within the descriptive component of the NEPSS framework, NATO represents an example of political and military aspects; the European Union (EU) primarily an example of economic and environmental aspects; and the Council of Europe (CoE) an example of humanitarian and human rights aspects of the new, comprehensive sense of common security pioneered during the 1990s by the OSCE. More importantly, each of these heretofore Cold War institutions has been

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Russia was admitted in 1996, despite its continuing brutal campaign in Chechnya, because "there was also broad consensus within the council that denying Russia membership would be a blow to the country's advocates of democracy" (The Week in Germany, 1996). Croatia, one of the primary combatants of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, was also admitted in 1996, bringing total CoE membership up to 40 countries (see CoE, 1998).

In 1999, Georgia was admitted and in 2001, the remaining two states of the South Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan - in a "cold peace" over Nagorno-Karabakh - were admitted, bringing total CoE membership up to 43 (see CoE, 2001).

By 2003, membership climbed to 45 with the addition of two other primary combatants of the Balkans Wars of the 1990s, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia/Montenegro (see CoE, 2003).

For further information about the OSCE, see the Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2003 (OSCE, 2003).
reaching out to its former enemies, inviting them to either become members and/or join together in constituting new, post-Cold War institutions.

In continuation of this trend, at its November 2002 summit in Prague, NATO, which had already taken in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as members, had issued invitations to seven other former members of the defunct communist world – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia – all of which became members on 29 March 2004.

And at its December 2002 summit in Copenhagen, the EU issued invitations to Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, with all becoming members on 1 May 2004. In addition, on 12 May 2004, the EU began to

map out a new strategy for dealing with its "neighbours" from Morocco to Georgia, heralding further levels of co-operation but stopping short of an offer of membership.

The new policy offers the prospect of money, trade and security co-operation in exchange for progress in democratic and economic reforms.

For the first time the EU's horizons will extend to the Southern Caucasus, with the prospect of enhanced co-operation with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. ...

[Guenter Verheugen, the EU enlargement commissioner] will announce a framework under which initially seven countries would sign up to action plans for democratic and economic reform, which would be monitored by the [European] Commission.

269
If successful, the countries could then enjoy access to the EU's market of 450m people, help in building transport and energy networks with the EU and assistance in securing external frontiers against terrorists and traffickers.

The first wave in the programme are Moldova, Ukraine, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco, with Egypt and Lebanon expected to be included in the autumn (Parker & Cienski, 2004).

Again, all these developments are nothing short of revolutionary, facilitating further paradigm shifting away from Realpolitik, "zero-sum" national security toward Idealpolitik, "positive-sum" common security.

However, notable and revolutionary though these developments are, NEPSS is basically a descriptive model for an interstate peace and security system: the existing institutions and processes it would integrate in terms of OSCE's three "baskets" are basically interstate governmental organizations. As such, NEPSS would be likely to perpetuate international "business as usual," albeit a much improved version thereof. To be more effective in preventing Yugoslav-type conflicts in post-Cold War Europe, therefore, NEPSS requires a prescriptive element: something which deals with the intrastate level, for example, relations between minority and majority (e.g., ethnic or religious) groups within states.

**Prescriptive Elements of NEPSS**

Prescriptively, NEPSS is characterized by "integrated systems of conflict resolution networks," comprising multi-track mechanisms and processes, plus joint vertical/horizontal as well as reinforced horizontal dimensions (see Lund, 1996, Chs. 4 and 5; and Sandole, 1993, 1995, 1998a, 1999b).
Joint Vertical/Horizontal Integration

Under the joint vertical/horizontal dimension of integrated systems, we would have a mapping of sections of Europe in terms of local, societal, sub-regional, regional, and global levels of analysis, with track 2 (writ large) (nongovernmental) complementing track 1 (governmental) actors and processes whenever possible. Expanding upon the original track 1-2 dichotomy (see Davidson and Montville, 1981-82), Louise Diamond and John McDonald (1996) developed their Multi-Track Framework, where:

1. Track 1 remains the realm of official, governmental activity, *peacemaking through diplomacy*, with track 2 (writ large) subdivided into the following tracks:

2. Track 2 (writ small) (nongovernment/professional): *peacemaking through professional conflict resolution*.

3. Track 3 (business): *peacemaking through commerce*.

4. Track 4 (private citizen): *peacemaking through personal involvement*.

5. Track 5 (research, training, and education): *peacemaking through learning*.

6. Track 6 (activism): *peacemaking through advocacy*.

7. Track 7 (religion): *peacemaking through faith in action*.

8. Track 8 (funding): *peacemaking through providing resources*. And

9. Track 9 (communications and the media): *peacemaking*
through information.

The basic idea of "integrated systems" is that "all conflicts are local". And, assuming an early warning system to activate the preventive diplomacy envisaged by Michael Lund (1996) and others (e.g., Wallensteen, 1998; Kemp, 2001), conflicts developing at any local level could be responded to by a synergistic, horizontal combination of track 1-9 resources at that level – plus, vertically and diagonally, to the extent necessary, societal, sub regional, regional, and global levels as well.

Hence, following early warning of a developing conflict within the OSCE area that could spread to other levels, appropriate track 1 and track 2-9 conflict handling and intervention resources could be brought together – perhaps by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office or the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) assisted by an NGO (e.g., the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations [see Zaagman and Thorburn, 1997]) – to deal with the conflict at its initial ("local") level of incidence/observation, but including communication and collaboration with, and resources from, other levels as well, such that the conflict does not spill over to any of them. As Michael Lund (1996), anticipating the OSCE's "Platform for Cooperative Security" (OSCE Lisbon Document 1996, OSCE Istanbul Summit, 1999ab), put it:

the international community needs to think in terms of appropriate divisions of labour and complementarities (p. 144). ... The vertical division of labour ... would be achieved by pushing explicit direct responsibility and accountability downward ... to the parties to the conflicts themselves and to sub regional and regional actors. At the same time, extra local and extra regional states and the [UN] would provide appropriate facilitative, technical, political, and (if necessary) military support (emphasis added) (p. 183).
Together with violent conflict prevention, the joint vertical/horizontal dimension of NEPSS would include systems of conflict management, settlement, resolution, and transformation (see Sandole, 1998b):

(a) **Violent Conflict Prevention** = **Preventive Diplomacy** in former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's typology. Basically, this would be a proactive effort, based on conflict monitoring and early warning using, for example, data from the Uppsala (University) Conflict Data Project or the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) – including "Minorities at Risk" data – to track developing conflicts to "prevent a house from catching on fire" (see Wallensteen, 2002; www.pcr.uu.se/database/; Gurr, 1993; Gurr, 2000; Gurr, et al., 2000; Marshall and Gurr, 2003; www.cidcm.umd.edu/datasets.asp).

Despite a growing literature on violent conflict prevention/preventive diplomacy, especially since the publication of Michael Lund's (1996) classic work on the subject, such is rarely attempted. There are, however, notable exceptions such as the "quiet diplomacy" of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) (see Kemp, 2001) and the first-ever and, thus far, only UN preventive deployment mission (UNPREDEP), which was conducted in Macedonia (see Williams, 2000; Sokalski, 2003).

(b) **Conflict Management** = Arms Control Negotiations and Confidence-and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) in general. Conflict Management also = **Peacekeeping** (under Ch. 6 of the UN Charter) (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Conflict management/peacekeeping is attempted "reactively" whenever violent conflict prevention/preventive diplomacy has not been tried or if tried, has failed and the house has caught on fire. Such was the case with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia during 1992-1995. The aforementioned Uppsala Conflict Data Project or the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) datasets could also be used as a basis for tracking ongoing conflicts to ensure that the "fires" do not spread.
(c) **Conflict Settlement** = *Coercive Peacemaking* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). When conflict management/peacekeeping fails and the fire starts to spread as, in fact, happened with UNPROFOR, the international community then may step in to forcefully suppress the fire. Hence, following the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, NATO conducted military operations against Bosnian Serb positions. Together with the Dayton Peace Process (see Holbrooke, 1998), a "negative peace" was achieved by the end of 1995 which has since been maintained, initially by the Implementation Force (IFOR), then by the Stabilization Force (SFOR), and next by the European Force (EFORE).

(d) **Conflict Resolution** = *Noncoercive Peacemaking* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Putting out the fire does not necessarily deal with its underlying causes and conditions. This is where conflict resolution/noncoercive peacemaking enters the scene: to identify and render null and void the underlying combustible causes and conditions so that a particular fire does not start up again. By far, the premier example of an enterprise that does this in Europe (or anywhere else in the world) is the European Union.

(e) **Conflict Transformation** = *Peacebuilding* (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Once the causes and conditions of the particular fire have been identified and addressed, then the international community may decide to work with the survivors of the fire on their long-term relationships so that next time they have a conflict, they do not have to burn down the house, the neighbourhood, and the region. Since conflict transformation/peacebuilding is a response to the observation by Jean-Jacques Rousseau that "Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them" (Waltz, 1959, p. 232), interventions at this level may involve the creation of mechanisms that, had they existed in the first place, might have prevented the house from catching on fire.

Any of the above five types of intervention or a sequenced strategy employing all of them (which, collectively, could be viewed as *peacebuilding "writ large"*), could operate also at the local, societal, sub
regional, regional (EU/WEU, CoE, NATO/EAPC/PfP, OSCE), and global (UN) levels. In the event, track 2-9 (nongovernmental) mechanisms could complement track-1 (governmental) processes whenever possible. The premise here is, just as the causes and conditions of a violent conflict can be found at different levels, so an effective response to such a conflict would have to take into account factors at those levels as well.

Should the joint vertical/horizontal dimension fail to prevent "the house from catching on fire", then there may be a need for the reinforced horizontal dimension to become operational. This would involve the judicious use of Realpolitik force, but basically within an Idealpolitik framework, to achieve negative peace (put the fire out) but only as a "necessary" (although not "sufficient") condition for achieving positive peace: the elimination of the underlying causes and conditions.383

Reinforced Horizontal Integration

As indicated above, for NEPSS to succeed, especially if an initial attempt to employ the joint vertical/horizontal dimension of integrated systems fails, it should also include an "embedded" Realpolitik option for use as part of a larger whole consisting primarily of Idealpolitik measures and processes, to move to, but then beyond negative, and toward positive peace.

For instance, track-1 peace enforcement personnel, representing the UN, the OSCE, NATO, the EU, or something approaching a "representative sample" of the EAPC/PfP, might, under very clear conditions, enter a war zone to effect and/or enforce a negative peace, as a necessary (but clearly not sufficient) condition for moving toward positive peace. Such clear conditions should include the attempted imposition by one party of a genocidal "final solution" on another (e.g., in Rwanda in April 1994 or

383 A "necessary" condition is one that must be present in order for something else to occur, but its appearance does not make that "something else" occur automatically. A "sufficient" condition, on the other hand, is followed automatically by that "something else."
Srebrenica in Bosnia, in July 1995). In the event, the objectives of the peace enforcement operation would not include the bombing of civilian centres and the killing of tens of thousands in order to "win," or to "impose solutions," or – what is, in any case, impossible – to "solve" (through military means) the conflict, but (a) to prevent genocide, (b) permit international relief operations to get through to threatened populations, and (c) to separate the warring factions in order to afford them a "cooling-off" period, as a necessary (but again, not sufficient) condition of collaborative resolution of the conflict they have been expressing through violent means.

Some developments are suggestive of progressive reinforcement of NEPSS's descriptive character and the joint vertical/horizontal dimension of its prescriptive character – such as the emergence from the November 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul of the Charter for European Security, inclusive of the Platform for Co-operative Security (see OSCE Istanbul, 1999ab). Other developments, however, are suggestive of the sole narrow use of Realpolitik force; e.g., the destruction of Grozny and killings of tens of thousands of Chechen civilians in the Russian Federation. Even the 1999 NATO air war against Serbia over Kosovo – albeit clearly for the humanitarian purpose of preventing further genocidal ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians – falls more into the category of the narrow use of Realpolitik force basically within a Realpolitik (instead of an Idealpolitik) framework. (Only time will tell how the post-9/11 interventions into Afghanistan and Iraq will be ultimately characterized.)

Accordingly, Realpolitik force should always take place within something like the joint vertical/horizontal dimension of NEPSS's prescriptive component: within a framework that also allows for, and encourages

– conflict resolution (dealing with the underlying causes of the fire at hand) and

– conflict transformation (dealing with the long-term relationships among the survivors of the fire), as well as
– [violent] conflict prevention (preventing the house from catching on fire in the first place),

– conflict management (to prevent the spread of the fire if initial conflict prevention is not attempted or if attempted, fails), and

– conflict settlement (if management fails, forcefully putting out the fire) (see Sandole, 1998b).

If peace is not positive as well as negative – if it does not ultimately deal with the underlying "conflicts-as-start-up conditions" – then "conflict-as-process" will never be far from the surface, always available to be resurrected to come back to haunt us time and time again (see Sandole, 1999a, pp. 129-131): this is the ultimate message and "categorical imperative" of a complexity approach to conflict analysis and resolution (see Waldrop, 1992; Sandole, 1999a, Ch. 8).

Accordingly, in terms of former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's (1992) categories of intervention, Dayton represents for Bosnia-Herzegovina fairly successful peacemaking, both military (NATO bombing) and political (Richard Holbrooke's mission [see Holbrooke, 1998]). Dayton also represents successful peacekeeping/peace enforcement, with NATO's initial Implementation Force (IFOR) and subsequent Stabilization Force (SFOR).

As of his writing, peacebuilding still lags far behind. Operationally speaking, therefore, Dayton is a track-1/Realpolitik agreement still in need of a viable multi-track/Idealpolitik complement. And that is part of the continuing challenge for the international community: to design, implement, and follow through with such a component. Specifically, this is part of the EU's challenge when it assumes control of the SFOR mission!
The other part of the challenge is to persuade the Europeans and others to keep a credible, effective peacekeeping force in Bosnia beyond any politically motivated, unrealistically short time lines – long enough to ensure that negative peace holds. Bosnia is a clear case of where negative peace is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of positive peace. The reconstruction of Bosnia – in emotional/reconciliatory as well as physical/economic terms – will take years, and an appropriate peacekeeping/peace enforcement presence should stay long enough to ensure that the job gets done.

HOW CAN THE EUROPEAN UNION MAKE USE OF NEPSS?
The simplest answer to this question would be for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) strategists to make use of what already exists – as in the descriptive component of NEPSS – as a basis for translating something like NEPSS into action in the Balkans. What might come to mind in this regard is the EU’s Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, which has been in operation since 1999. Although the object of much criticism and of efforts to improve its operation (see Sandole, 2002; Jurekovic et al., 2002), the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe provides an existing conceptual and

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384 On 18 December 1997, President Clinton decided to extend the U.S. presence in Bosnia beyond the June 1998 deadline for SFOR:

With a blunt admission that he misjudged how long it would take to build lasting peace in Bosnia, President Clinton ... announced that he [had] decided in principle to keep U.S. military forces there past a June 1998 deadline and into the indefinite future. ... [He] said pulling out the U.S. force now would invite a return to ... ethnic violence (emphasis added) (Harris, 1997, p. A1).

Two months later, on 18 February 1998, "NATO decided ... to extend its military mission in Bosnia beyond June at roughly the current strength of 34,000 troops, although it may be reduced significantly after national elections there this fall" (WP, 1998a). Two days later, the "20 non-NATO countries that participate in the operation [also] approved extending the force's mandate beyond its June expiration date" (WP, 1998b). (Among these, Partnership for Peace [PIP] members included Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Ukraine. Non-PIP participants were Egypt, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, and Morocco [see Balanzino, 1997, p. 11].)
operational entry into force of a NEPSS-type system in the region, thereby enhancing its prospects for success. Much further work needs to be done, however, before that hypothesis can be fully tested.

As part of that effort, what has become known as the "European Community Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management" (EU, 2003a, p. 5) can be further developed:

Recent history in the Balkans, in Africa and elsewhere has shown that the international community needs to strengthen its capacity to better prevent conflicts from breaking out, to intervene more quickly and efficiently in crisis situations when conflicts do occur and to provide sustainable support for post-conflict reconstruction. Military peacekeepers are needed to monitor cease-fires and re-establish safe environments for the local population and international actors on the ground. Civilian experts, however, play a fundamental role in complex peace operations, in crisis as well as in post-conflict situations, by supporting democratisation and the rule of law, by strengthening human rights, and by rebuilding civil societies and viable civil administrations.

The European Union has taken up the challenge to boost its civilian peacekeeping and peace-building capacities and to improve the number of available and suitably qualified civilian personnel for peace missions. The European Council meetings at Feira in June 2000 and in Göteborg in June 2001 represented important milestones concerning efforts to critically take stock of the current levels of readiness and future preparation of civilians required for various crisis management activities. The existence of well-trained civilian experts ready to be deployed within a short amount of time was approved as important for the European Union's ability
to undertake the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks. However, many civilians assigned by Member States are not well trained or do not have previous mission experience. Experience has proved that the pool of people available on short notice has to be much larger than the actual number of people demanded. The creation of so called trained reserves is essential in order to provide civilian personnel for peace missions and field activities of the European Union and other international organizations like the United Nations, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe. These findings led the European Commission to launch a pilot project in October 2001 on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (also see EU, 2003b).

More recently (EU, 2003a, pp. 6-7):

Proposals [have been] developed with regard to the future training cooperation within the EU and with other international organizations with particular attention to very recent developments: The mandate of the European Council in Thessalonika to develop a co-ordinated EU training policy in the field of ESDP, with civilian and military dimensions as well as with the very recent Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament "The European Union and the United Nations: the Choice of Multilateralism" [COM (20002), 526 final of September 10, 2003] and the concrete implementation of the joint UN-EU declaration signed in New York, on September 24, 2003. Proposals for future training cooperation include:

– fostering closer training co-operation in the EU and the organization and co-ordination of training courses in order to enlarge the pool of well trained civilian experts available on short notice;
– contribution to a co-ordinated EU training policy in the field of ESDP, encompassing both civilian and military dimensions;

– exchange of information and co-operation between EU and other international organizations such as the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe;

– enhancement of the EU-UN training co-operation by a EU-UN training course based on the identification of joint standards and requirements;

– development of assessment criteria in order to see if the participants have attained the desired level of knowledge and competence; and

– support of compatible civilian personnel rosters on Member States and EU level which are important for the rapid deployment of qualified personnel for specific mission tasks (emphasis added) (also see www:eutraininggroup.net).

It is clear from the above that the EU is already working within the context of an NEPSS-type structure, including the joint vertical-horizontal dimension of the prescriptive component, and given the emphasis on the military as well as civilian dimensions of the EDSP, with implications for the reinforced horizontal dimension as well.

Further, these activities are taking place within the context of a global initiative stimulated by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in June 2001, urging "NGOs with an interest in conflict prevention to organise an international conference of local, national and international NGOs on their
role in conflict prevention and future interaction with the United Nations in this field" (ECCP, 2003a, p. 1).

The initiative has been responded to by the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) in Utrecht, The Netherlands, with the "Programme on the Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict." The Programme is being implemented through the "Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict" (GPPAC) and coordinated by an International Steering Group through its Secretariat at the European Centre for Conflict Prevention.

The Programme's overall objective is "To develop a common platform for effective action in conflict prevention from the community to the global level," by achieving the following specific goals:

- To explore fully the role of civil society in conflict prevention and peace-building.
- To improve interaction between civil society groups, the UN, regional organizations, and governments.
- To strengthen regional and international networking between conflict prevention actors.
- To promote the development of conflict-prevention theory and practice.
- To integrate regional experience into an International Agenda for conflict prevention.

According to current plans, an International Conference will take place at UN Headquarters in New York by 2005. The objective will be to analyze recommendations generated by 15 regions worldwide in order to develop an
"International Agenda to guide future conflict prevention initiatives" (also see ECCP, 2003bc; www.conflict-prevention.net).

Thus far, the very first regional meeting of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict has taken place in Dublin, Ireland, 31 March-2 April 2004:

This Dublin Action Agenda reflects outcomes of a consensus-building process among more than 200 participants, representing CSOs [civil society organizations], governments and multilateral organizations. It articulates common ground amongst those European CSOs committed to conflict prevention and puts forward key recommendations to strengthen strategic partnerships for preventing violent conflict and building a *culture of peace*. It identifies common goals and strategies to encourage national governments, European multilateral organizations (especially the EU) and the UN, as well as CSOs themselves, to better implement conflict prevention and peacebuilding policies.

These institutions are already committed to furthering this agenda and to the active engagement of CSOs in that process. This provides us with a real opportunity to have an impact. This Dublin Action Agenda was presented to the Irish Government – which presently holds the EU Presidency – on 2 April 2004. It will subsequently contribute to the development of an International Action Agenda, to be presented to the UN Secretary-General in July 2005 in New York (emphasis added) (ECCP, 2004, p. 2)

In effect, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) is an initiative for the worldwide development of something like NEPSS. Through the "top-down/bottom-up" synergy likely to be generated by international-regional interaction, collaboration, and coordination, this
program should facilitate the development of something like NEPSS – in its prescriptive as well as descriptive manifestations – in the Balkans in particular and Europe in general. This could, in turn, feed back into the further development of something like NEPSS in other regions and, ultimately, at the global level.

CONCLUSION

NEPSS has been presented in this article as a possibly appropriate design for the European Union to use as a basis for "capturing the complexity" of deep-rooted, identity-based conflicts such as those that characterized the Balkans during the 1990s, when the EU assumes control of the NATO-led SFOR mission in Bosnia.

It has been argued that NEPSS is relevant to dealing with such conflicts at any point in their development (latent, manifest/non-violent, manifest/violent), but preferably at their earliest stage, when the international community can be most proactive and effective with steps to achieve violent conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy.

Given the present state of affairs in Bosnia, a fully developed, "mature" NEPSS could facilitate further the transition from negative to positive peace, and perhaps reduce some of the motivation for those in the region and elsewhere who are, or could be, prepared to forfeit their lives in the commission of acts of catastrophic terrorism (see Hamburg, 2002).

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