

## **Panel I: “Transforming NATO and its Partnerships”**

### **Moderator:**

Prof. Dan Hamilton, Director, Center for Trans-Atlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

### **Presenters:**

Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Director and Theodore Roosevelt Chair, National Defense University, United States: “Transformation of Political-Military Aspects of NATO – What Needs to Be Done”

Col. Ralph Thiele, Director, Bundeswehr Center for Transformation, Germany: “What European NATO Allies Must Be Doing Re: Transformation”

### ***Overview***

This panel focused on both the general concepts of transformation and on the specific actions taken by NATO, the EU and the U.S. in this area. Dr. Hans Binnendijk discussed the political and diplomatic challenges facing NATO, the U.S., and the EU in the area of transformation, and how the lack of effective dialogue between these entities inhibits any synergy-building cooperation between them. He then suggested how each of these entities should approach the transformation of their own military to capitalize on their strengths despite the political and diplomatic roadblocks previously outlined. Col. Ralph Thiele emphasized the continuous nature of transformation, rather than considering it as a single event with a beginning and an end. He then discussed some of the specific conceptual elements of transformation, and finally outlined how the Bundeswehr was encouraging and executing transformation.

**Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Director and Theodore Roosevelt Chair, National Defense University, United States**  
**“Transformation of Political-Military Aspects of NATO – What Needs to Be Done”**

*Dr. Binnendijk began by explaining the variety of forms of military transformation, then spoke about the process of military transformation more generally. He moved on to a discussion of the specific challenges facing NATO as it confronts the need to transform its military.*


Over the past 800 years, there have been perhaps ten examples of military transformation. While each case has been different, due to unique historical circumstances, there are common elements as well. Generally there are new missions, there is always a new technology, there are new operational concepts designed to harness and use that technology, and new organizational structures that are created to implement those new organizational concepts. When you look at any of these cases historically, you will find that these elements have been present, and you will see that same thing in the United States today. The key technology involved here, of course, is information technology.

Perhaps the best way to illustrate this is to contrast very briefly for you Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, which took place eleven years later. During Desert Storm, the United States already had stealth technology, information technology, sensors, and precision munitions. There was a separation of the service battles and, for that matter, there was a separation of coalition battles. We did that by arraying people in different positions, but there really was not either a joint or concurrent operation. Now, what happened in Iraqi Freedom was very different. The battle was concurrent. We did not have a long air battle; rather, the air and ground battles were much more joint. The notion behind military transformation is to mass *effects*, not to mass *forces*, and you saw that in Iraqi Freedom. We won that

war with many fewer people on the ground than we did Desert Storm.

Now, there is another element that we saw in Iraqi Freedom and in the conflict in Afghanistan, and that is that there is a new theory of how you win: by taking out key nodes, you essentially collapse the regime rather than win by attrition. It is almost like a coup. If you were going to engineer a coup, you would use effects-based operations. It is not a war of attrition, and this is very important, because what it means is that, even though you collapse the Taliban regime, or Saddam Hussein's regime, you can drive what is left of the opposition underground. As a result, you don't have as clear-cut a victory in terms of defeating the enemy force. You collapse the regime, but you do not completely defeat the force.

What you have as a result of that is ongoing conflict, which is what we see Afghanistan and Iraq today. So, an unintended consequence has been that, while we have gotten very good at this first transformation—winning a high-intensity war—there is a demand now for a new transformation, a new capability, and it has to do with stabilization and reconstruction, which we are not particularly good at. You can go back and look at American military history, and see that we had this capability in the past (witness the Marshall Plan). But after Vietnam, we decided that we were not going to do that anymore. So we went into Iraq without the capability to deal with the results of the first military transformation, which was regime collapse. You win a quick victory, you are there with many fewer people in-theater, and you are not really prepared for the following stage. So what we have in the United States today is not just one military transformation, which is the high-tech network-centric form of systems transformation that you are all familiar with, but we are also trying to figure out how to negotiate this second transformation, which deals with how you do stabilization and reconstruction missions better, and how you connect the two together through concurrent planning.



If we expand the discussion to include Europe and NATO, we can see that we need some reforms on the political, diplomatic, and conceptual side. We need to figure out how to create a new strategic approach that will unite partners on both sides of the Atlantic. In short, we need to revitalize the trans-Atlantic dialogue. There are a number of bilateral discussions all the time, but the EU-U.S. dialogue has been stifled. The third dialogue should be between NATO and the EU, and that's not happening. Certainly they talk—there are monthly discussions on about five different levels—but those discussions are paralyzed, except when you have a Berlin-plus operation going on, like in Bosnia, in which case it goes forward. But the broad kind of dialogue on military affairs that these two institutions should be having is not taking place. We have to streamline decision-making. We have a NATO response force that is highly ready, highly deployable, but it does not do any good if you have a force that can move out in a week if it takes you three months to make a political decision about deployment. That is the kind of political-diplomatic transformation that is needed.

We also need to do a number of things in terms of military capabilities, and to try to figure out how to take some of these lessons that the United States is learning and pull that knowledge into NATO and the Partnership. The NATO Response Force and Allied command transformation are actually doing very well in moving the game forward. To be successful, you need to actually create a force or command or something that embodies the transformation, and then use that entity to drive it forward. Percentage goals do not work, lists do not work—the way you accomplish transformation is by creating commands or forces that are required to develop certain capabilities. What we should be doing over the next couple of years is pushing the NATO and EU transformation process and the Partnership transformation process further.

Right now, we have deployed almost everything we can in NATO. There is not much left that we can pull together and deploy quickly. So, we need to enhance that capability across the board. If we are going to be able to deal successfully with finance ministries all across Europe and at least keep defense budgets where they are (or hopefully increase them), we need a clear vision of what we want in terms of NATO's expeditionary capability. This middle triangle is about 250,000 people. If you look at the ground forces, it is certainly more than the 8 percent—it's 14 or 15 percent. It starts with special forces. We do not need a lot of special forces—200 to 300 people as the core capability. We are going to envision a very small core of about 300, and then a network of maybe 1000 or 2000 of other special operation forces.

Behind that you have the NATO Response Force. This is something I began working on in 2001, and its genesis really was the conflict in Afghanistan, where we had an Article V commitment in NATO. Our commander, Tommy Franks, was asked if he could use any NATO capabilities other than a number of very close allies. The answer was no. It was a big mistake, I think, politically, but he could not figure out how to fit NATO capabilities into the U.S. force framework. The NATO Response

Force was created in response to that problem. We have an initial operating capability that will be ready next year, but eventually we are going to have full operating capability for the NATO Response Force. It is a joint force of perhaps 20–25,000 troops, highly deployable, but not sustainable for long engagements; it could only operate for a month or so.

There are a couple of issues with the NATO Response Force. While European nations have been very forthcoming, the concern is that the U.S. is not contributing enough boots on the ground for the response force. Second, there is a concern that if we do not use the NATO Response Force quickly, we will lose it. Third, a number of the European allies are saying that they would like to do more in this respect, but they would like to have common funding for operations and even contributions to the NATO Response Force.

Then we have the stabilization and reconstruction force. The United States has learned the hard way that you need to have a capability in place right away—people there who have been thinking about what we call in the United States the Phase IV mission: the post-conflict mission. We made huge mistakes that we are still paying for today as a result of not having such a capability in place. The lesson we learned in the United States is that we need to build up this capability. The same thing is true for NATO. Actually, NATO and our European allies are very good at these stabilization and reconstruction operations, as has been shown in the Balkans and in Africa. We now have NATO capability in Afghanistan; in fact, NATO is going to take over that mission. So, the capabilities are there, but it is put together on an ad hoc basis.

We also need a NATO security-sector reform capability. This is another lesson both from Afghanistan and Iraq. We have had to go in there and rebuild the entire national security structure—the defense forces, the security forces, the police forces—and we did that pretty much on an ad hoc basis. We did not do a very good job of it to begin with, and we have learned a lot. So, the United States needs to have a standing capability to

do this kind of work. This is something again that our European allies are very good at. This has been inherent in the whole PfP process. So, Europe has some real skills—in fact many of the NATO members and Partnership countries have great experience in this area that the U.S. needs to figure out how to harness and use if we are ever in another situation like this.

In conclusion, I would like to turn to EU and U.S. military transformation. On the EU side, the European rapid reaction force is essentially troopless—it is not effective. I think the EU has recognized that, and for precisely that reason they have created these battle groups. Battle groups are essentially ground forces; they are not really joint in the first instance—they have got about 1500 troops, so they are small. They are highly deployable, and the vision for the use of such a force is a crisis management operation, probably in Africa. Just as the NATO defense force was an instrument for transformation and deployability in NATO, these battle groups serve the same function for the EU, in my view. The other area where the EU can contribute is constabulary forces, which are very much needed for these extended operations. Five European nations today are training their constabulary forces: the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France (in Vincenza). This is another important contribution that the EU can make.

The United States, as you know, is changing its forward-deployed structure in Europe, moving from about 110,000 troops down to probably 60,000 to 70,000. We are moving a lot of ground forces out of Germany, pushing some forces forward to Bulgaria, Romania, and a few other places. We are going to have at least one striker brigade (hopefully more) as part of this forward-deployed capability, and this striker brigade really does pull together many elements of military transformation. What we ought to be thinking about is taking the elements of the U.S. forward-deployed capability and training together with the NATO Response Force, so we can use those training exercises to transfer things we have learned in the United States in our own process of military transformation to the NATO Response Force.

**Col. Ralph Thiele, Director, Bundeswehr Center for Transformation, Germany**  
**“What European NATO Allies Must Be Doing Re: Transformation”**

*Colonel Thiele explained that the process of transforming the armed forces of the U.S. started as early as 1996, with a focus on modernization and joint operational capability. He then discussed the implications of these developments for the European members of NATO.*

**Transformation**

Modernization, structural change, innovative concepts, and technological developments, as well as close cooperation with coalition partners, are the preconditions of interoperable twenty-first-century forces. Transformation institutionalizes such change. In light of current and future security challenges, governmental instruments—and the armed forces in particular—need to be able to react to unforeseen developments and events in a timely and effective manner. Like the political, economic, social, and technological conditions in our societies that are subject to constant change, the armed forces have to adapt constantly.

The U.S. has never taken a limited approach to the transformation of its forces. Rather, transformation has been from the very beginning an interdepartmental effort. Transformation is the permanent search for new answers to new questions; it is not just one single reform program. It is about finding suitable, promising concepts and training methods through the use of networked information and communication technology. Transformation is about the synergy between concepts and training, technology and materiel, and governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both on the national and international level. It is about a new way of thinking and its translation into constant innovation.

The U.S. has also been striving to be joined in this effort by capable multinational partners in Europe and around the

globe, not only with regard to conceptual and technological aspects, but also with regard to taking a shared responsibility for global security. With the changing of the former ACLANT to “Allied Command Transformation” (ACT), the Alliance has moved forward in the development of transformational concepts and capabilities in accordance and in close partnership with the U.S. Joint Forces Command as promoter of the U.S. transformation.

Information superiority plays a vital role. Concepts and operational planning focus on C<sup>4</sup>IISTAR. (Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Information, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance). What is needed is a capability to conduct rapid decisive operations in a joint and multinational way. To be able to involve coalition partners, interoperability is the key to effectiveness and cooperation. Future armed forces will target the vital political, military, and social structures of the adversary through effects-based operations that take advantage of modern information and weapons technology.

While NATO is developing the NATO Response Force, and has placed significant emphasis on transformation, the EU has emerged as a separate deployer of member nations’ forces, with a military staff, development of a pool of forces available, and some capacity for operations planning. Given this background, what capabilities does Europe actually need?

European nations are responding to the U.S. transformation process, both individually and through institutions such as NATO and the European Union, by changing perceptions of threats and addressing previously identified capability gaps. Efforts toward the modernization of armed forces have paid off with increasing deployments of European troops for operations. However, there are still widely acknowledged weaknesses; institutional attempts to boost capabilities, through NATO and the EU, have so far largely failed. New efforts are now under way with the inauguration of NATO’s Allied Command Transformation and the NATO

Response Force, as well as the formation of the EU battle groups, the establishment of the EU Defense Agency, and the EU's formulation of new 2010 Headline Goals. Moreover, individual countries have structural reforms under way in a drive to use their resources more effectively.

To this end, NATO is the single most important bridge across the Atlantic. Europe is transforming its military capabilities under the Alliance's umbrella. The end-state of this approach is a Europe that is a robust and valuable partner of the U.S. in rapid decisive operations, crisis management, and civil-military stability operations. From an American point of view, the perspective of Europe as a global strategic actor holds several promises: Europe's technological assets contribute to the security of the U.S.; a U.S.-supported interoperability strategy that provides for the integration of European assets increases the relevance of transatlantic relations; and there is more flexibility in the transatlantic armaments sector, which is beneficial to the capabilities of all partners.

### **Transformational Concepts**

A key factor in implementing the transformational objectives is the capability to conduct network-centric operations. This is the fundamental basis for the capability of today's joint conduct of operations, and of future warfare as such. Units can be smaller, faster, more agile, modular, and multifunctional. Thus, armed conflicts can be resolved more effectively, faster, and with fewer casualties. Adversary decision processes can be impeded considerably or be made impossible by the speed and precision of friendly assets.

Effects-based operations are the emerging new doctrinal approach to the security challenges of the new millennium, as they explicitly focus on political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational effects. As a new concept of warfare and stability operations, effects-based operations describe how to apply military capabilities in conjunction with the other instruments of coalition power: diplomatic, civilian,

and economic means. Military actions will be focused on the precise application of capabilities, matched to produce effects that reduce an adversary's political and military coherence, break his will to fight, and neutralize his instruments of power. Thus the opponent is viewed from a systems perspective, where key links and nodes are identified to be engaged by the most appropriate means. The core capability of these operations is a superior command-and-control process which—based on a network of governmental and non-governmental experts' knowledge and instruments of power—makes it possible to project national power at an early stage to achieve a maximum effect.

Effects-based operations are directed by a standing joint forces headquarters (SFJHQ) and external partners—both virtual and physical—that have a constant presence of operational planners in an operational-level headquarters versed in effects-based planning and operations, and with the command-and-control capabilities to carry them out. The SFJHQ bases its decisions on the operational net assessment (ONA), which is a knowledge synthesis tool that includes intelligence and many other sources of knowledge that provide a continuous stream of information in support of an operational commander's decisions about desired “effects,” and provides a set of discrete tasks and actions to achieve those effects. In a multinational context, the operational net assessment provides a combined picture.

Within this network-centric, information-enabled environment, effects are the outcomes that are to be achieved in an operation. These outcomes can be influenced by targeting a set of nodes that are the materiel- and information-based elements that support the adversary's operations. Nodes can be influenced by a number of actions, which may take place in the diplomatic, information, military, or economic contexts. These actions require the use of resources, which are applied during operations to achieve the desired effects.

Flexibility and adaptability are crucial elements for efficiently and effectively harmonizing interagency operations.

The early engagement of non-military instruments of power is essential. Autonomy needs to be respected, as civilian agencies have a presence in crisis regions prior to military engagement. They provide continuity during transitions, and tend to be more focused on long-term solutions. Much expertise is resident within NGOs. These are particularly valuable resources when it comes to designing actions and effects, methods for assessment, and interpreting results. Consequently, a policy needs to be developed that facilitates the participation of NGOs, but honors their autonomy and neutrality.

First of all, there needs to be strategic political guidance to develop a coherent plan with military and non-military elements of governments and NGOs. A strategic framework provides a clear structure for the effects-based operations conducted by all actors. The elements to be considered include common and updated documentation, multinational training, closing interoperability gaps, awareness of cultural sensitivities, and standard terminology. Civilian and military leadership needs to be harmonized for interagency actions. While a military commander should lead during combat operations, a qualified civilian should lead during stability operations. A civilian authority should be designated and involved from the outset of contingency planning to achieve a seamless transition from combat operations to post-combat stability operations. There is an obvious need to establish policies, technologies, and procedures to enable multinational information sharing. The utility of the common knowledge base depends upon the ability to practically share data in a timely manner. It is especially the case in the field of stability operations that leadership and integration, synergy, and rapid action are crucial factors. Democratic-nation building requires an extraordinary amount of human skills, financial resources, and time. Effects-based operations are going to significantly change the multinational operations of the future. However, only in combination with political crisis management and civilian assets can these operations realize their full potential.

## **Bundeswehr Transformation**

Just as critical to the ability of NATO as to that of the European Union to successfully meet future challenges will be its members' ability to generate transformational capabilities. Any given nation's failure to transform would result in an erosion of the military relevance of the Alliance. Fundamental to a successful transformation process is a strong and sustained commitment on the part of all the member nations. In fact, the member states themselves are setting the new transformational standards and the speed of their translation into effective capabilities.

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. is the only military power with global interests and global range. Despite its political weight and comprehensive capabilities in military technology, it is aware of the fact that it can meet the asymmetrical challenges of the future only in reliable coalitions with effective international partners. Long-term success in the global fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction is only possible through cooperation. Therefore, the transformation of the U.S. armed forces is designed to integrate coalition partners in future common tasks. Within the framework of the Military Interoperability Council (MIC), Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. have already formed a comprehensive and highly qualified community for transformation advancement.

The Bundeswehr embarked on its transformational path only a few years ago, participating with other MIC nations in the U.S. Joint Forces Command's series of multinational experiments. As it is the military element of the German preventive security system, the Bundeswehr needs to be intricately integrated into the inclusive concept of "security," both at the European and the transatlantic level, and within the scope of the United Nations. Consequently, it is important to advance the Bundeswehr not only in accordance with the foreseeable security challenges of the future, but also to organize

the process of transformation in Europe in concurrence with German's trans-Atlantic and other interests.

For the Bundeswehr, this means that it has to continue with its development in all relevant fields in order to be a respected, capable, and interoperable partner in the multinational resolution of future crises and conflicts. To this end, Germany is prepared to keep providing forces, particularly for international peacekeeping and stabilization missions, and is building a new set of force categories: response forces, stabilization forces, and support forces. The capability to conduct network-centric operations will have a key role, in particular for the response forces. The roadmap to realizing the new force structure foresees an overall transformed force by 2010.

Germany's contributions to improving the EU's ability to act with regard to the battle group concept, to give but one example, and its contribution of roughly a quarter of the total forces of the NATO Response Force (NRF), send a clear message. The NRF is simultaneously the nucleus of an emerging European network-centric capability, a state-of-the-art force, and the key component of a common European security policy. As a consequence of the establishment of the NRF, Germany's network-centric capabilities will be reinforced.

Furthermore, Germany has initiated the battle group concept together with the U.K. and France. In order to strengthen the EU's crisis management capacity, rapidly deployable combat units of some 1500 troops each are to be created. This provides the EU with a military instrument similar to NATO's response force. The relevance and the scope of the crisis management capabilities of both NATO and the EU will improve considerably. The German approach to transformation supports the transformation processes of these two institutions, just as the further development of NATO and the EU are closely connected with the German transformation process.

Developing transformational capabilities will be the key not only for the German military, but for any nation that wishes to participate in a multinational environment in meeting twenty-

first-century security challenges. Transformational patterns can be found today anywhere in the world. This process needs to be addressed soon in order to enhance the standing of the European nations and to reinforce their credibility vis-à-vis their trans-Atlantic partners.

## **Panel II: “Preparing Tomorrow’s Leaders: Responding to New Challenges in Education”**

### **Moderators:**

Dr. Sam Grier, Dean, NATO Defense College

Mr. Patrick Lehmann, Chair, PfP Consortium Working Group,  
Curriculum Development

Ms. Lee Marvin-Zingg, Chair, PfP Consortium Working Group,  
Advanced Distributed Learning

### **Presenters:**

Professor Jarmo Toiskallio, Department of Education, National  
Defense College, Finland: “The Internationalization of  
Education: The Bologna Process as Trigger”

Dr. Jim Barrett, Director, Directorate of Learning Management,  
Canadian Defense Academy: “Integration of Civilian and  
Military Education”

Dr. Robert A. Wisher, Director, Advanced Distributed Learning,  
Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness,  
United States: “Information Age Reform: Individual and  
Institutional Utility of Advanced Distributed Learning”

### ***Overview***

Highlighting the need to effectively prepare tomorrow’s leaders, the members of this panel proposed a broad vision for moving beyond the traditional framework of military education. Professor Toiskallio conjectured that the PfP Consortium could play a leading and active role in developing military- and security-related education and training within the context of a common, international system of higher education. Dr. Barrett

highlighted the need to balance the continual tension between the practical and the theoretical in the field of defense education, particularly during a period that is ripe with potential for better integrating civilian and military education. He also posited that the future development of military education should adhere to three principles: protecting the military ethos, setting requirements based on real needs, and providing good support policies. In closing the panel, Dr. Wisher described Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) systems as providing access to high quality education and training that is tailored to individual needs and delivered cost-effectively. The ADL vision is to provide learning content that is reusable, durable, inter-operable, affordable, and accessible anytime and anywhere.

**Mr. Patrick Lehmann, Chair, PfP Consortium Working Group, Curriculum Development**

*Mr. Lehmann explained that the purpose of this panel is to go beyond the traditional framework of military education and look at new methods of teaching for preparing tomorrow's leaders in NATO and PfP nations. The panel will elaborate on collaborative networks and the challenges presented by new forms of education and training.*

**Professor Jarmo Toiskallio, Department of Education, National Defense College, Finland**

**“The Internationalization of Education: The Bologna Process as Trigger”**

*Professor Toiskallio first described the basic aims and ideas of the Bologna Process. Second, he outlined a model of the Bologna Process as a complex system. Finally, he gave some ideas for joint master degree programs, in which the PfP Consortium could play a leading developmental role.*

## **The Bologna Process**

The Bologna Process aims to create a coherent European area for higher education by the year 2010. The process grew out of meetings in May 1998 (the Sorbonne Declaration) and June 1999 (the Bologna Declaration) in which European education ministers affirmed the concept of the harmonization of the architecture of the European higher education system. Currently, there are forty-five countries participating in the Bologna Process. It is relevant to the PfP Consortium because the Bologna Process offers a unique opportunity for the Consortium to take an active and leading role in integrating university-level education in defense and security studies.

The five aims of the Bologna Process consist of:

1. Establishing easily readable and comparable degrees
2. Creating uniform degree structures
3. Establishing a system of credits (the European Credit Transfer System)
4. Increasing the mobility of students, teachers, researchers, and administrative staff
5. Promoting cooperation of quality assurance through the development of comparable criteria and methodologies

The idea of the Bologna Process is to create a common framework for higher education. The diversification of content and profile of degree programs calls for a common framework of reference in higher education to increase transparency, and thus to facilitate both national and international student mobility. Increasing student, teacher, and staff mobility adds to cultural understanding and promotes innovation in higher education. The great challenge of the Bologna Process is that conceptions of learning—and even the conceptions of humanity—might differ radically between nations and professions.


European universities are not seeking to unify their degree programs into a prescribed set of curricula. Rather, they are looking for points of common understanding based on diversity and autonomy. It is better to describe the process as a type of “tuning” rather than creating a uniform system of higher education. The “tuning” project in no way seeks to restrict the independence of academic and subject specialists, or damage local and national academic authority. Development of the process must not lead to a mono-linguistic world of higher education—multiculturalism and pluralism are to remain the intrinsic values of European higher education. Competencies should be understood as knowing and understanding (theoretical knowledge), knowing how to act (practical application of knowledge), and knowing how to be (values as an integral element of the way of perceiving and living with others in a social context).

### **The Challenges of the Bologna Process**

The Bologna Process, in its geographical, economic, and political composition, faces tremendous challenges. In addition to creating cooperation among the many governmental and academic organizations involved in university education, there are two main streams of educational culture. One is a knowledge society, with emphasis on information technology and information management (science, knowledge, research). The second is critical thinking, which involves intellectual creativity and ethics (development of action competencies). Both streams of educational culture are involved in the process. With respect to defense education, the ministers responsible for defense are also involved.

Higher education institutions should pursue discussions on learning outcomes and competencies in order to help move recognition procedures away from formal issues such as length of study and names of courses towards procedures based on the results of student learning. The most important priority is the

development of conceptual approaches for describing qualifications.



### **A Role for the PFP Consortium in the Bologna Process: Joint Degree Programs**

One method for moving the process along is the establishment of **joint degree programs**, which are high on the European educational-political agenda. As stated at the 2001 Prague Higher Education Summit, it is important to develop modules, courses, and curricula “offered in partnership by institutions from different countries and leading to a recognized joint degree.” The joint degree programs would be developed and approved together by several institutions. Students from each participating institution would study parts of the program at other institutions. The students’ stays at the participating institutions would be of comparable length. The periods of study and exams passed at the partner institutions would be fully and automatically recognized. Finally, professors of each participating institution would teach at the other institutions,

work out the curriculum jointly, and form joint commissions for examinations.

One example of a possible joint degree program that the PFP Consortium could help to create or organize would be a Master of Crisis Management degree. The aim of the degree would be to enable students to deeply understand the full range of conflict-prevention and crisis-management tasks through the development of a full range of civilian and military means. Students could study civil-military relations in an academy or university in one country, cultures in the university or academy of a second country, and ethics and politics in the university or academy of a third country. The integrating philosophy of the degree program would be human security.

## **Dr. Sam Grier, Dean, NATO Defense College**

*Dr. Grier explained that an aim of this panel is to inspire discussion and action that would help to leverage the work done by the PfP Consortium and to increase participation by NATO, especially in the area of education.*

We have an education network through the Conference of Commandants, but most of the work is based on annual meetings, while little is done between meetings. We would like to create an enterprise network underneath this level that supports the Conference of Commandants. One important related topic is embedding professional military education into civilian universities, so that military service members could earn master's degrees like those earned at universities in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K.

## **Dr. Jim Barrett, Director, Directorate of Learning Management, Canadian Defense Academy “Integration of Civilian and Military Education”**

*Professor Barrett explained that professional armies fought Europe's wars until the end of the eighteenth century. After some 200 years, we are returning to smaller professional armed forces. In the process, military education is coming to have more in common with civilian education.*

Tremendous technological change and the revolution in military affairs have dramatically changed the tactical soldier's world, even if the old laws of fire and maneuver still apply. Politically, strategically, and socially, the impact has been far more profound. While Clausewitz taught us that war is, or at least once was, a useful instrument of the state, we have learned from Al Qaeda that something similar to war is useful as an instrument of agencies less well-defined than states. Today, the professional soldier, the defense professional, and the defense and security actor all operate in a complex, globalized enterprise that touches every individual in one way or another. In this new

world of defense and security, we might very well ask, “What does it mean to be a modern military professional?”

Very frequently, the answers to that question have meant a broader and deeper education for officers. Never before have academics played so great a role in the formation of military officers, and never before have academic subjects formed so great a part of the military curriculum. We talk seriously about networks of academies and universities to provide the defense education that we seek. This talk will address the emerging military-academic world of defense education, the threats this increased academic influence is seen to pose to the traditional military ethos, and will pose suggestions for academic-military relations.

### **The Emerging Military-Academic System**

The post Cold-War world has seen at least three major impacts on the professional formation of officers. The first and perhaps the most evident of these is an increase in academic content and academic influence. Many senior officers of the Cold War period would be appalled at the current models of Britain’s Joint Service Command and Staff College, the Canadian Forces College, or the Baltic Defense College. But in these confusing times, the real utility of the academy is in imparting to officers an enhanced capacity to act strategically in unfamiliar circumstances.

The second major impact arises from both internally perceived needs but also from powerful external currents that militaries cannot escape: demands for career-long learning and recognizable degrees; the rapid growth of distance learning; the introduction of performance measurements; and a constant pressure to reduce costs. These have produced an agenda to develop all officers at a given rank to the same standard and at the same time to reduce the huge cost of military training and education. This agenda is heavily dependent on the successful use of distance learning. While distance learning does not offer the fantastic savings some once hoped for, active research,

practice, and experience have made distance learning more affordable, more effective, and more powerful. There are, nonetheless, continuing fears that the residential schoolhouse might be lost to the distance-learning onslaught. What may indeed be threatened is the old-style staff college, which generates little new insight but is a very congenial means of sharing knowledge. A modern staff, war, or defense college is very different. It is a source of new knowledge, and is therefore of fundamental importance for defense education. Distance learning is merely one vehicle for the distribution of that knowledge.

The new staff college offers the most visible sign of the cultural impact of increasing academic influence. In Newport, Carlisle, Quantico, Watchfield/Shrivenham, Toronto, Tartu, and other places, we see an established or growing quasi-academic environment, which brings together officers with field experience and professors of distinction. The academic tradition of exposing ideas to the rigorous criticism of peers finds fertile ground in these colleges. The commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps University said, “My officers need the stimulus of dissent.”

A scholar develops knowledge and expertise over a lifetime. The best become world-class experts in their fields of study. Professional soldiers, who acquire a broad suite of experiences over the course of a career, can, by devoting some fraction of their working life to education, come to understand deeply the profession in which they serve. Military education thus becomes a long-term enterprise, providing long-term collective memory and stability against the hasty introduction of random ideas. As a result, we can expect to find in our armed forces officers who are better equipped to deal with tactical uncertainty, who in the midst of an operation have a better sense of where the optimal points of leverage—military, political, social—might be found, and who better grasp the slower strategic modes.

Defense education is an emerging multi-disciplinary field that is quite unlike any purely academic discipline. It is neither purely theoretical nor purely practical, but depends heavily on both approaches. Within this inter-disciplinary world, there must be a tolerance of and a respect for the important ideas of those who lack scholarly credentials on the one hand, or field experience on the other. This respect must translate into the transparent analysis and criticism of ideas, at least within the boundaries of military education.

### **A Model of Officer Professional Development**

It may be instructive to consider the following simple model of officer professional development, based on the observation of recent developments. It is a hybrid model, in which only some of the required professional development is offered in residence. Some is to be completed by self-study or at a distance. We have extended the model even further, recognizing that some of what interests the officer can be found in civilian universities. There are three components:

1. Residential courses, largely consisting of war-fighting and operations planning, which make up the essential military core of the curriculum
2. Military distance learning, including courses in military history, military science, technology, and shorter courses of immediate relevance
3. Courses offered by other institutions, largely reflecting a broad liberal education

There are great strengths in this model. Properly implemented, it guarantees that officers learn essential military skills and core military values in the right setting, but it also ensures they are not educated in isolation from the society they serve. It offers opportunities for lifelong study of the profession of arms, and for critical input to, and assessment of, current military thinking. It offers a richer, more rigorous formation than most citizens could even hope for, and, over time, will

produce a cadre of knowledgeable and respected senior voices for defense and security in our national councils.

If there are strengths to this model, there are problems and risks as well. The past decade has seen an extraordinary window of opportunity open, within which military education has flourished. That window may not remain open forever. Inevitably, there has been a negative reaction to the intrusion of so much non-traditional material, and there are a few signs of strain. Educational accomplishments are no longer taken into account when U.S. Air Force officers are considered for promotion. Again in the U.S., officers have been denied educational opportunities because of the operational tempo. In Canada and elsewhere, more than a few senior officers have lamented the significant burden that additional education places on an already heavily loaded officer.

Many of the problems can be resolved readily enough, but there are issues that are cultural in origin, and these are less tractable. Soldiers and scholars value different things, and have different rhythms. Soldiers are required to respond rapidly to changing circumstances, while scholars are expected to analyze and debate them. The scholar must explore the complexity of ideas, while soldiers must simplify in order to act. Defense scholars must adapt to both rhythms, adopting what Patrick Lehmann calls a *géométrie variable*, based on mutual tolerance and respect.

### **Three Principles for the Design of Defense Education**

Properly designed and managed, defense education offers great hope, not just for better armed forces, but also for a more stable and peaceful world. It should be seen as a serious enterprise, not one to be left to those who do not understand the business or to those unwilling to confront the issues. I suggest three principles for defense education:

1. **Protect the military ethos.** This means that the schoolhouse (the war college or defense college) must be protected and nurtured, and that, within the war college, special attention must be paid to the socialization of defense scholars. Military professionalism is about far more than curriculum. The values, ideals, and ethos—those deep-in-the-gut bonds—are all best shared in a close, residential setting, in the company of students. While it is neither appropriate nor necessary that all professional development be done in the schoolhouse, it is critical that some be presented there. There is no better investment in defense education than bringing soldiers and scholars together to understand and respect the other's culture, modes, and rhythms, without compromising one's own culture, modes, and rhythms.
2. **Define requirements based on real needs.** Militaries have always set training requirements, but this is a more subtle process when there are desired educational components. These must not be determined by civilian academic credentials, but rather by real needs, as determined by a thorough military-academic analysis. If there is a need for graduate-level study of international relations, then set that only as the requirement, and then ensure that systems are in place to make it possible. Educational requirements can be stated in much more flexible terms than traditional military requirements, and they can often be acquired from external sources, thus permitting useful economies. Finally, when setting requirements, pay attention to the total training burden of the individual, and keep it within reasonable bounds.
3. **Establish good supporting policies.** Good policy will address the requirements of the individual, and will also result in an officer population that exhibits a broad spectrum of educational experience. Good policy will apply useful steering forces to that population, without imposing unnecessary burdens on individual officers.

Good policy will see that time and financial resources are made available for professional self-development. Good policy will ensure that appropriate credit is given—both military credit for civilian achievement and academic accreditation for military courses. For example, policy need not require or reward a master’s degree, but should make a master’s degree readily achievable. If a professional military education is to be accepted as a legitimate and welcome part of an officer’s professional development, then the utility of a broader foundation must be evident, and the acquisition of that broader learning must be attractive.

To conclude, if we really believe in security through transparency and interoperability, we could do far worse than to start with the education of soldiers. Defense education for collective security provides a visible and equitable platform for all nations, large and small, based on the ancient academic traditions of transparency and debate. No nation can, in such a forum, claim a monopoly on the truth. There is great potential here, and perhaps the time has come to see defense and security education as a calling, something more than a secondary activity for scholars or soldiers with other real priorities.

**Ms. Lee Marvin-Zingg, Chair, PfP Consortium Working Group, Advanced Distributed Learning**

*Ms. Marvin-Zingg explained that, as the age of information matures, e-knowledge should ripen. Educational institutions, militaries, and governments are prompting initiatives to benefit from information-age advances and promote efficiency as well. Information-age changes impact learning, teaching, methods, and the tools with which they are developed.*


**Dr. Robert A. Wisher, Director, Advanced Distributed Learning, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness, United States**  
**“Information Age Reform: Individual and Institutional Utility of Advanced Distributed Learning”**

*Dr. Wisher explained that there has been an increased interest in both professional education and in the use of electronic learning. Advanced distributed learning (ADL) strives to provide access to the highest quality education and training that is tailored to individual needs and delivered cost-effectively, anywhere and anytime. In assessing the institutional utility of ADL, the emphasis so far has been on infrastructure, costs, return on investment, and web hits rather than on the knowledge and education of individuals.*

An example of ADL is the OpenCourseWare Program operated by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which is a web-based publication of virtually all MIT course content. MIT OpenCourseWare can be accessed at <http://ocw.mit.edu>. Site highlights include syllabi, course calendars, lecture notes, exams, problem sets and solutions, labs and projects, and video lectures from over 1000 courses. OpenCourseWare is available on the World Wide Web to anybody at zero cost. However, OpenCourseWare is not an MIT education, it does not represent the interactive classroom environment, and it is not degree-granting. This web program has received millions of hits from every continent on the globe. The single largest user of OpenCourseWare, outside of MIT students, is the U.S. military (especially the U.S. Navy). This is a great example of the maxim, “If you will build it, they will come.”

In general, people are accessing MIT’s OpenCourseWare because they want to gain knowledge about a certain topic, not usually to supplement a course. The individual utility of ADL, which is under the control of the learner, is a function of

cognitive factors, meta-cognitive factors, motivational factors, social factors, and individual differences. Increasingly, individuals are taking responsibility for their own education, and the individual's motivation drives what he or she learns.




### Individual Utility to the Learner

1. **Cognitive factors.** The nature of the learning process is such that complex matter is best learned as an intentional process of constructing meaning from information and experience. Successful learners are active, goal-directed, and self-regulated. The goal of the learning process is to create meaningful, coherent representations of knowledge. Successful learners acquire thinking and learning strategies and pursue personally relevant goals. As part of the process of construction of knowledge, learners link new information with their existing knowledge and experience.

2. **Meta-cognitive factors.** These factors are related to how the learner thinks about thinking. Learners use strategies for selecting and monitoring mental operations. They reflect on how they think and learn. They use a repertoire of thinking and

reasoning strategies to achieve complex learning goals. The context of learning matters as well, due to the influence of environmental factors, culture, technology, and pedagogical practice.


3. **Motivational factors.** How much is learned is influenced by the learner's motivation. Beliefs, goals, and expectations can enhance or interfere with the learner's quality of thinking. Also, creativity and curiosity contribute to the



intrinsic motivation to learn. Successful learners perceive learning as interesting and personally relevant. Motivation has an effect on effort. Learning complex knowledge and skills requires extended learner effort and guided practice. Learning demands the investment of considerable energy and strategic effort, along with a long-term perspective.


4. **Social factors.** Learning is most effective when differential development across physical, intellectual, emotional, and social domains is taken into account. Learning is influenced by social interactions, interpersonal relations, and communication with others.

5. **Individual differences.** Learners have different strategies, approaches, and capabilities for learning that are a function of prior learning and heredity. They have acquired their own preferences for how they like to learn and the rate at which they learn. Learning is most effective when differences in linguistic, cultural, and social background are taken into account.



When all of these factors are taken into account, then ADL can be adapted and tailored to the characteristics of each individual. This can include the degree of assistance available, the degree of interaction among students, the speed and format of delivery, the type of requirements, and other factors of learning across the five dimensions as listed above. An example of ADL in the U.S. Navy indicated that most students could complete a course in an average of about half the time required for the legacy method of providing the same training. Completion time varied significantly based upon the type of learner and individual background.


The U.S. Navy is trying to incorporate several of this panel's themes via the five-vector model. Each person in the Navy maintains an individual scorecard along five dimensions:



professional development; personal development; leadership; certifications and qualifications; and performance. In the spirit of the Bologna Process, it might be of great interest for other organizations to consider a similar model for tracking and assessing individual development.

The vision behind ADL is to provide sharable content objects from across the World Wide Web through projects like CORDA (Content Object Repository Discovery and Registration Architecture). The content should be accessible, reusable, and durable. The content should also be interoperable, such as through projects like SCORM (Sharable Content Object Reference Model), which assemble content in real-time and on-demand. Lastly, the content should be affordable, so as to provide learning and assistance anytime, anywhere. This way, learners can participate in mobile learning (via laptops, PDAs, or other wireless systems), immersive learning environments

(combined Web-based courses with traditional classroom types of events), and the global information grid (currently being developed by the U.S. for the high-speed delivery of Web-based educational content).



## **Panel III: “Regional Co-operation as a Partnership Goal: Current Challenges to Security Sector Governance”**

### **Moderator and Presenter:**

Brigadier-General Karl A. Wohlgemuth, Senior Military Advisor, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

### **Presenters:**

Mr. Andreas Halbach, Regional Representative, International Organization for Migration: “Responses in Migration Governance to Security Issues in the CIS and Central Asia”

Mr. Sabri Ergen, Defense Cooperation, NATO Headquarters: “NATO’s Role in Regional Cooperation: Cultivating Stability and Security”

### ***Overview***

Regional cooperation is both a significant challenge and a significant opportunity for governments as they work together as partners to address issues that do not neatly follow national borders. Moreover, many issues can be much more effectively addressed when states cooperate within a region to share information, capabilities, and lessons about how to confront pressing security challenges. Brigadier-General Wohlgemuth provided a candid assessment of the difficulties facing the international community as they assist in the development of capacity in the nascent government of Afghanistan. While some progress has been made in the creation of the government and the conduct of elections, significant problems still exist, especially with respect to coordination and command among security forces and adjusting the power bases away from warlords and those in charge of the nation’s significant narcotics trade. Mr. Halbach explained the essential role that regional

cooperation plays in addressing the problem of migration, which is increasingly an issue with security, political, economic, trade, and diplomatic ramifications. Regional cooperation, such as the CIS Conference and its Program of Action, is an example of the type of approach that can enhance success in addressing such difficult issues. Mr. Ergen concluded the panel by explaining that NATO has and will continue to use its tools to facilitate regional cooperation, the best example of which is the southeast region cooperative group.

**Brigadier-General Karl A. Wohlgemuth, Senior Military Advisor, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan  
Introduction and Moderation, “Update from Afghanistan”**

*Following one year serving as the Senior Military Advisor to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Brigadier-General Wohlgemuth offered a personal update of the current situation in Afghanistan from his perspective. By his account, the international community may be repeating many of the same mistakes in Afghanistan made by the British and Soviets in the past. It was clear that, while he was critical at times, Brigadier-General Wohlgemuth’s comments were sincere and aimed at promoting change in the actions of the international community towards Afghanistan.*

The modern history of Afghanistan demonstrates that foreign efforts to create governments in Afghanistan can be doomed to failure. Currently, the international community appears to be repeating the same mistake of forcing families out of their tribal traditions into a government before the country is ready, without the social and economic preparation required for such dramatic changes.

Afghanistan faces significant challenges brought on by the global war on terror. While the situation may be improving, the country is still attempting to cope with ethnic and religious issues, tribal loyalties that extend across national boundaries,

communications systems that provide platforms for opposition groups, nongovernmental and multinational organizations and companies establishing competing power bases, and an increasing disparity between rich and poor. The international community must realize these challenges and, instead of forcing on the country a government for which it is not yet ready, it should only define the political criteria that would lead to international acceptance and a major redeployment effort. Then the global community should allow the Afghans themselves to work out political solutions that suit their current situation and challenges. Nevertheless, assistance, advice, and money are still needed.

Afghanistan is a very large country, bigger than France and nearly double the size of Germany, a country in which a severe mistake is continuously made. All news, political information, reports from CNN, and pictures come from Kabul. But Kabul is not Afghanistan. In fact, President Karzai actually only has the power of the Mayor of Kabul. Afghanistan is a country with a population of approximately 25 million people, with an average life expectancy of forty-two years, an average income of US\$700 per capita per year, and 75 percent illiteracy. It is a country where one out of five children dies by the age of five. The society has been torn apart by twenty-five years of invasion, occupation, and civil war, but the people long for peace.

The international community reacted to these issues by arranging the Bonn Agreement in December 2001 to establish an Afghan interim authority and an interim legal framework based on the 1964 Constitution. The agreement also called for elections within six months to establish an Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA), a constitution within eighteen months, and national elections within two years. Presidential elections were successfully carried out on 9 October 2004, and parliamentary elections will be held on 18 September 2005. District elections, however, had to be cancelled due to disputes over district borders. The agreement also requested the deployment of a

multinational security force (ISAF, deployed in December 2001) and UN assistance with voter registration. Furthermore, and very importantly, the agreement empowered the UN to investigate human rights abuses.

The principal challenge for Afghanistan today remains the opium economy and heroin production. The drug problem is not limited to Afghanistan, however. The trafficking routes run through all of Europe and Russia. Afghanistan produces 4000 tons of heroin a year. 60 percent of the gross national product is derived from the drug trade (US\$2.8 billion in farming and trafficking), and the remaining 40 percent comes from international aid. Thus the concept of preventing Afghanistan from *becoming* a narcotic state seems rather cynical. While the international community embarked on a poppy eradication program, it did not offer rural Afghans any alternative way to make a living. In fact, farmers were throwing their children in front of the eradication machinery because they could not feed them any longer, while drug lords are still profiting from the narcotics industry because they were able to store their harvest from last year while the prices continued to rise.

There are thousands of uniformed personnel present throughout Afghanistan. The police forces total 72,000 individuals, including the Afghan National Police, Border Police, and Provincial Police. Germany trained approximately 30,000 of these forces; 5000 are deployed to Kabul, and 800 are assigned to the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) security staff. Although this seems like a large number, the police are corrupt and largely ineffective. Then there is the U.S.-led coalition force of 19,000 soldiers, which acts without a UN mandate as part of the global war on terror, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), consisting of about 8,000 soldiers, which is accomplishing almost nothing other than securing themselves. The 26,000-strong Afghan National Army (ANA) has been well trained by the coalition forces, and is well received by the population. However, the largest problem facing these

forces is not necessarily the opposition; it is the lack of any unity of command between the U.S.-led coalition, ISAF and the UN.

The opposition consists of approximately 130,000 unofficial militia soldiers led by warlords who have become increasingly wealthy over the last decade. These individuals fought for twenty-five years against the Soviets and against each other. They did the dirty work for the coalition forces against the Taliban, and lost thousands of friends and family in the process. And now President Karzai has called back the individuals who left when the Soviets invaded, earned educations overseas, and has placed *them* in positions to run the country, while those who defended the country are put out of power. This is not going to work out.

There are also many security threats that must be faced in Afghanistan: the Taliban, Al Qaeda, warlords, political factions, and a very high level of criminal activity. The targets of opposition violence (of one form or another) now include political candidates, the voting process, the central government, the security forces (CFC-A/ISAF/ANA/Police), coalition forces, and the international community (UN/NGOs/GOs). In actuality, anyone wearing a uniform in the country is a potential target.

The daily methods of attack are car bombs, hand grenades, kidnappings, and explosive devices, with the worst-case scenarios being the use of hand-held Stinger missiles (which are found weekly) on international aircraft, or the assassination of President Karzai. But again, the most serious threat to the local populace is the U.S.-led coalition, with their search-and-kill operations, and the large amount of attendant collateral damage. Every person killed is simply summarized under “Taliban.” Thus, a paradigm shift is needed if the coalition wants to win the hearts and minds of the people.

UNAMA’s mission is to promote national reconciliation, to fulfill the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to the UN under the Bonn Agreement (including those related to human rights, the rule of law, and gender issues), and finally—working in coordination with the ATA—to manage all UN humanitarian

projects in Afghanistan. There are sixteen major UN agencies currently operating inside Afghanistan, and all UN programs lend support to the Afghan transition process and recognize the lead role played by the Afghan administration. The current activities ensure the effective and efficient operation of UN assistance programs, ensure that these programs address cross-cutting issues and apply sound principles grounded in gender equity and human rights, promote the development of self-sufficient and accountable Afghan government institutions, increase the ATA's ability to lead, and coordinate and manage the ongoing humanitarian crisis and the national reconstruction process.

However, the actions currently being taken by the international community are counterproductive. The international community employs the few educated individuals the government urgently needs, as well as inflating the salaries of uneducated workers. For example, a professor earns US\$90 per month, but a UN driver earns US\$500 a month. So if the professor can drive, he would rather work for the UN accomplishing menial tasks than work as a valuable asset to his government.

While there are clearly problems with the unity of command in Afghanistan, steps are already being taken to improve the current situation. Since ISAF took over the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the north and in the west, the next step will be to take over in the south in Kandahar and in the east. At present, the Turkish Army is in charge, although they are soon to be replaced by Italian troops. Next year, when the Allied Ready Reaction Corps under British leadership takes over, they will further enhance command and control.

**Mr. Andreas Halbach, Regional Representative,  
International Organization for Migration  
“Responses in Migration Governance to Security Issues in  
the CIS and Central Asia”**

*Mr. Halbach first prefaced his contribution by placing the connections between migration and security in a larger context. Mr. Halbach focused less on emergency and post-conflict situations, however, and instead presented a brief overview of what has been achieved in the framework of regional cooperation in the migration sector in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. He referred here, in particular, to the CIS Conference and its Program of Action, which in turn spawned other sub-regional initiatives. He then went on to recall some of the background and referred to the achievements, trends, cooperation, and government commitments.*

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and failed states are the topics of NATO transformation; they are not the leading topics on any migration menu, even if the global migration agenda, and with it International Organization for Migration (IOM) itself, have undergone a tremendous transformation of their own over the last decade. Nevertheless, there are significant links between terrorism or failed states on the one hand, and migration management on the other—e.g., organized crime income from human trafficking, estimated to be second only to that from drugs or arms, can flow towards terrorism. Furthermore, the intrinsic instability of failed states enhances push factors for population movements. NATO and IOM are increasingly cooperating in a number of thematic and geographical areas. They also have a history of cooperation in training, in pre-deployment exercises, and in formal operational staff officer courses. In fact, SHAPE and IOM have drafted a Memorandum of Agreement aimed at further strengthening cooperation.

When serving an organization that carries the label “migration,” one acquires a lot of detailed knowledge, but

struggles sometimes with the most simple and basic questions: What is migration all about? Is it about push and pull factors? Wanted versus unwanted migrants? Brain drain and brain gain? Threats to personal or state security or the security of living standards? What happens to the human right called “freedom of movement”? Such basic questions can be addressed within the framework of a couple of basic concepts:

- Migration is part of the modern human condition; it is a fact of daily life; it is simply inevitable.
- Globalization has freed the movement of goods, of capital, and of services—why then should it not affect the movement of people?

The essence of migration policy is *not* prevention; it is about devising a framework for the movement of people in times when developmental and demographic push and pull factors become stronger, and when the means of communication and mobility have expanded.

The magnitude of today’s migration flows is important to consider. 1965 saw an estimated 75 million migrants worldwide; today, we estimate 180 million migrants per year, which is some three percent of the world’s population, most of them economic or environmental migrants. Ten years from now, there may be 80 million more.

There is often a temptation to view migration merely as a subsidiary issue of economic policy, or of security policy, trade policy, demographic and population policy, and so on. But migration is a thoroughly crosscutting theme, a book of its own, with many chapters. Each chapter reveals complex challenges, which call for comprehensive consideration, dispassionate discourse, sober articulation, and a vision that is not encumbered by short-term political agendas. To migrate or not to migrate, that is *not* so much the question! How to *manage* migration, that is the real question.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, what were the main migration and population issues in the former Soviet

territories? They included forced displacement in the wake of armed conflict; sizeable population segments in several countries who had become residents of nations that were not their titular nations; the return of formerly deported peoples such as the Crimean Tartars or the Meskhetians; and also populations displaced by man-made disasters (e.g., around the Aral Sea or Chernobyl). Considering the mainly involuntary nature of these displacements, the UN General Assembly mandated the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to organize a conference in 1996, together with IOM and OSCE, and to create a framework for promoting stability and basic human rights. The CIS Conference process has been an innovative and comprehensive response, and its Program of Action contained a set of demanding principles, with institutional and operational parameters that placed an eye on prevention, and included a framework for international cooperation. The Program of Action was implemented against the backdrop of a political, economic, and social transition that has been more complex than expected. It brought together all the countries of the former Soviet Union, as well as neighboring countries and a large number of donor countries.

Following the mid-point review by the steering group in July 2000, the aim set for the next five years was to assist the countries of the region to put in place effective, rational, and humane migration management systems that are compatible with each other and with internationally acknowledged standards and best practices—systems that focus on the major migration challenges and their relation to economic development and the stability of states, but also on the human rights of migrants. IOM proposed a set of goals in the following areas:

- An integrated legislative, procedural, and institutional framework for migration management
- The management of irregular migration and of borders, with due regard to protection concerns

- The fight against trafficking in persons
- NGO development and institutional participation
- Enhanced regional cooperation and networking on migration issues
- The collection, analysis, and exchange of migration-related information in the interest of *better-informed* decision- and policy-making.

### **What Are the Current Trends?**

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Western Europe braced for an onslaught of irregular migrants from the East. The so-called Budapest Group was created as an inclusive platform for inter-state dialogue and policy recommendations to contain uncontrolled migration. However, contrary to what was anticipated in the Budapest Process, migration flows out of the CIS region did *not* overwhelm Western Europe, and soon began to stabilize. Today, the EC foresees a scenario in which, by the year 2030, the EU will face a gap of 20 million in its workforce, mainly for demographic reasons. Other factors also contributed to forestall any massive uncontrolled migration flows, such as new visa regimes, the effects of EU enlargement, the new security agenda that emerged after September 11, and improved economic growth and job opportunities in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan.

The mix of intersecting or overlapping pull and push factors of earlier years is increasingly overshadowed by one major migration concern, namely the search for economic opportunity. Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan saw migration outflows ranging from 14 to 24 percent of their populations, and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan saw similar, albeit smaller, outflows. Russia and Kazakhstan remain the primary destination countries within the region. However, significant net migration gains in Russia are offset by other demographic factors, with the result of a net population decline. Similar to Western Europe, demographic

decline in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine is a long-term issue. Russia has recognized it, and is developing an immigration policy to stabilize population levels and enhance economic development.

Much has been achieved in the framework of the CIS Conference. Countries of the region understood and acknowledged that migration is not only a national concern, but one that also depends on bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation in international institutions, including the CIS itself or bodies such as the Eurasian Economic Community. Cooperation also follows sub-regional dynamics and agendas in Central Asia, the Southern Caucasus, and the Western CIS, always bearing in mind Russia's significance in any sub-regional context. EU enlargement presents a new challenge to its new neighbors, such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus—countries faced with high levels of irregular transit migrants stranded against the new external borders of the EU. In response, they have come together in the Soderkoping Process (so named after a little town in Sweden) to clarify their common interests and entertain with their neighbors to the West a dialogue that aims to avoid the transformation of the old Iron Curtain into an “EU curtain.”

Regarding institutional and administrative reform, great progress was made in “institutionalizing” training for migration officials, in developing comprehensive training manuals, setting up independent training centers, and spearheading curricula for the training of trainers. Countries such as Ukraine and Azerbaijan are moving from military towards civilian border guard services.

Border management assessments have been conducted by the IOM in almost all countries of the region, most recently in Moldova. Follow-up efforts have included material improvements, equipment upgrades, better security checks, better-trained staff, and computerized exchange of passenger data between the border services and the relevant ministries. Pilot projects at selected border crossings aim to both curtail

illegal migration and ensure easy and humane passage for legitimate travelers and migrants. The new international security agenda has led governments to request assistance in modernizing travel documents and document issuing systems, and to adapt their visa policies to be consistent with international standards. The role of civil society in the region has also evolved further in the past decade. Capacity building in the South Caucasus has resulted in a network of NGOs that assist migrants through migrant information service points. Community-based disaster preparedness in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has been strengthened. In Central Asian countries, NGO capacity has been built to provide legal assistance for migrants. The Ferghana Valley Networking Initiative is a good example of cross-border cooperation. Under the slogan “Better Borders,” a regional NGO network aims to engage authorities in favor of easing legal border-crossings and granting permits for short-term seasonal labor arrangements in a region that is still largely characterized by unresolved border tensions.

Combating the traffic in persons and organized crime is an area where major progress has been made in several countries. Since 2000, most countries of the region have signed (and many have ratified) the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols on trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. Most countries in the region have pursued legislative amendments to their criminal codes, and a good number of countries have set up national working groups and task forces and have developed official action plans. Regional cooperation is strengthening in particular in the Western CIS, as illustrated by the three International Law Enforcement Conferences in Minsk, Kiev, and the last one just recently in Chisinau. Nonetheless, the demand for cheap labor and sexual services and the adaptive capacity of organized criminal networks remain a daunting challenge to progress in prevention and law enforcement. The importance of reinforcing cross-border, regional, and international cooperation in combating trafficking in persons cannot be overestimated.

## **Regional Cooperation**

Today, the countries of the former Soviet Union face many traditional migration challenges, such as irregular immigration, trafficking, international transit migration, or disrupted small-border traffic. But they face also increasing migratory flows for reasons of employment or economic distress. Where these flows had been governed by central planning in the former Soviet Union, they are now disrupted by new international borders. The CIS interior ministers and sub-regional groupings such as the Eurasian Economic Community have put migration issues on their agenda. The EU Neighborhood Strategy in the field of justice, freedom, and security, as well as EU technical assistance for third countries, increasingly shape policy development in the region, particularly in the area of border management and counter-trafficking efforts. The states now bordering the expanded EU—namely Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus—have stepped up their level of cooperation with new EU member states (the Soderkoping Process was mentioned earlier as an example of such cooperation). Central Asian states, along with neighboring countries Russia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, participate in a multifaceted regional dialogue and technical capacity-building program. The OSCE is thematizing migration in its human dimension, as well as in its economic and environmental dimension. Migration figures prominently on the agenda of the CBSS, as well as on that of the BSECO. Migration governance and terrorism are included in joint meetings of the CTC with regional organizations, such as the OSCE or the CIS. Last but not least, the majority of the countries in the region are now member states of IOM and participate in its international dialogue on migration.

## **Indicators of Government Commitment**

The past four years have indicated that most states are taking ownership of the issue and support modernization of the migration sector. Obviously, commitment tends to be strongest where national interests are in play, such as in border management or labor migration. The conversion of border guard units from military structures into civilian services, along with increased contributions to training facilities, are clear indicators of this commitment. So are national action plans and task forces to combat trafficking in persons. Migration issues are increasingly reflected in national development and poverty reduction strategies. Similarly, several countries have set up entirely new migration departments or reorganized existing structures in line with national priorities within the migration sector, be it under aspects of forced displacement, labor migration, or immigration of nationals. Resources are being allocated to improve document security. Increasing preparedness to acknowledge the human rights of migrants illustrates an emerging readiness to balance national security with human security interests. New national networks for the exchange of information and statistical data were instituted. Also noteworthy are the initiatives and reforms that aim to protect labor migrants abroad and to allocate funding for improved information services for potential migrants.

To sum up, the very nature of migration is dynamic, reinforced in turn by accelerating mobility and ease of communication. Much of it occurs across international borders in search of economic opportunities. Therefore, international—and, in particular, regional—dialogue and cooperation are essential to clarify the common interests of countries of origin, transit, and destination. Informed by international standards and good practice, regional dialogue and cooperation remain not only a major challenge, but a major opportunity: they are the main mantra of migration management.

**Mr. Sabri Ergen, Defense Cooperation, NATO Headquarters  
“NATO’s Role in Regional Cooperation: Cultivating  
Stability and Security”**

*Mr. Ergen has been involved in regional stabilization operations for five years now and began his remarks by commenting on a recent workshop on the border security process that was organized and hosted by Macedonia and backed by Switzerland and Hungary.*

During this workshop, it was remarkable to see the European Union, OSCE, and NATO cooperating on a concrete issue such as the border process with nations from Southeast Europe. Cross-border trafficking is an issue that has always endangered NATO operations, but landmark cooperation between countries is making a difference. NATO has assisted because there is a need to assist each other in terms of border control. The issue is also particularly alive now *vis-à-vis* the asymmetric threats of terrorism.

Regional cooperation builds confidence and security, helps transparency, and assists with interoperability. One important issue now is how to use this system of regional collaboration. The key requirements for the effective use of this new system of cooperation are political will and feedback from the local and theater levels to the political level, so that the cooperation is effective and inputs are acted on within the decision-making process. Sending permanent representatives to operational areas is one way for the NATO leadership to further ensure the value of regional cooperation.

Within NATO, there is a Southeast region cooperative group. This includes Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro, and can be as flexible as necessary to accomplish its objectives. This is only one example how NATO can adapt to changing situations. As part of the Stability Pact, we are assisting with South Eastern Europe’s defense and, while we are concentrating our efforts on South Eastern Europe because here there is sufficient political will, there will be

difficulties in replicating this approach in Central Asia. Thus, perhaps the way to go is to look not just at regions, but also at functional areas and to a certain extent at border security, which is not a primary NATO role. However, this is an issue connected with terrorism and other operational issues that threaten the security of the Euro-Atlantic area.

Therefore, any system of international security reform must include border control and security as a key issue. For instance, we can have true partnership in the planning and review process in terms of defense planning. This would assist the reform process in moving forward, and would also help further regional cooperation.

With respect to Afghanistan, meetings are being held concerning the narcotics trade in Afghanistan, and the ministers of the Euro-Atlantic Council did discuss this issue, but a solution is not easy to find. Nevertheless, regional cooperation—along with other efforts, such as effective border control and security—is an essential approach to solving many of these problems. However, it is not NATO's job to go out and tell nations to cooperate regionally. If they do wish to cooperate, though, NATO has various venues in which they may be able to assist, but this effort must come from the bottom up.

## **Panel IV: Preparing Tomorrow's Leaders: Promises and Pitfalls of Collaborative Educational Networks**

### **Moderators:**

Dr. Sam Grier, Dean of the NATO Defense College

Mr. Patrick Lehmann, Chair, PfP Consortium Working Group, Curriculum Development

Ms. Lee Margin-Zingg, Chair of the ADL Working Group

### **Presenters:**

Ms. Victoria Syme-Taylor, Defense Studies Department, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, United Kingdom

Lt. Colonel Jean d'Andurain, PfP and Cooperation Programs, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO Headquarters

Captain Thomas Ernst, Branch Head, Cooperation Dialogue and Partner Training, Headquarters SACT

Ms. Tanja Geiss, ADL Scientific Assistant, Policy Department, NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany

### ***Overview***

The panel opened with Ms. Victoria Syme-Taylor from the Joint Services Command and Staff College in the United Kingdom, who discussed her country's recognition of the need for joint military education that is concurrent with collaborative military education with governmental agencies, NGOs, and other institutions. This approach seeks to ensure that the military

remains close to the society it serves. The final three speakers discussed how NATO and PfP are developing and using collaborative education networks. Lt. Colonel Jean d'Andurain spoke about the Partnership Real-Time Information Management and Exchange System (PRIME) and the vision of NATO Headquarters for using it as the backbone for the NATO/PfP Education and Training Network. Captain Ernst gave a conceptual overview of ACT's view of the NATO/PfP Education and Training Network. Finally, Tanja Geiss provided insight into when such collaboration will be possible using this network, which has been developed by ACT.

**Ms. Victoria Syme-Taylor, Defense Studies Department,  
Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham,  
United Kingdom**

*Ms. Syme-Taylor provided examples of the changes in military education in the United Kingdom, particularly at the Joint Services Command and Staff College. She then described the philosophy behind the program's course design and development.*

The first consideration to keep in mind regarding modern military education is that integration is crucial, because the military is operating in a much wider sphere than was historically the case. What defense requires and what a military officer needs is something much greater than it was before. There is a far more robust requirement for professionalization in combat.

In post-conflict situations, military officers have to understand that they must work with other governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, civilian authorities, and so on. There are also political agendas out there that have to be understood, and there are particular cultural and identity issues that need to be recognized. The image of the military officer, as well as that of the soldier, sailor, or airman, has

changed; society views these roles in a very different way. Through education, it can no longer be said that the military stands outside of the norms of the society in which they work.

The military professional has to be a reflection of wider society. One way in which that can be seen is the way we deal with the media. At the Command and Staff College, we've recently launched a course for journalists that actually runs alongside the training for staff officers, so that journalists can see and understand how the military works, and so that the military can see how journalists work. We also have to be aware that these ideas on the education that officers receive are disseminated throughout their career. It is not something that they experience for only the nine months of the course, and when they finish is effectively deleted. It is an *update*; continuing professional development is a key element of military education.

There's a much greater awareness within NATO, for example, that the education of an NCO / Warrant Officer is just as important as the education of an officer, and that at all levels we have to disseminate this knowledge. And there is also an awareness that this kind of knowledge perhaps should be standardized within our coalitions—that we should all be talking in the same language.

General Sir John Kiszley underscored the importance of military education when he said that it was particularly crucial so that officers “are able to cope with uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity; and to embrace change.” *Change* is a word that we are constantly talking about at the JSCSC. Our mission is to provide the British armed services with command and staff training—at the junior, advanced, and higher level—to a world-class standard, in order to support the operational effectiveness of all three services.

The Staff College in the United Kingdom is a highly regarded military establishment. It is run on a joint basis, and it produces an elite educational approach. It is also forward looking; it has a concept of intellectual freedom and a wider contribution beyond the military sphere. It's a military

establishment that addresses the social dimensions of learning. It prepares students for warfare and operations, and its intellectual ethos is the key to these efforts. The whole premise is that the concept of the military ethos not be lost amid the observational burdens that may be placed on the education or training. This education is formative for all generations of officers. It must not be seen as a static educational approach; rather, it stresses that continuing professional education and development throughout the career is of vital importance. It strives to be unique, it has a world-class reputation, and it is a center of excellence.

Looking at the joint dimension of the approach, it's not just about everybody getting along well; it's not just about reaching the lowest common denominator of agreement; and it's not just about the espousal and teaching of joint doctrine. It is about shaping people who have the ability to deal with complexity, and about sharpening the skills and awareness of people who have a single-service understanding of a high order and are prepared to stand up and be counted in a joint debate. We've moved from a single-service Staff College training environment, where we had Navy, Army, and Air Force colleges, to a joint educational environment, to one that combines with external states and other agencies, to a model of interagency educational operation which looks into other organizations and which stands outside the purely military sphere.

### **What Is the Educational Approach?**

The educational objective is for director staff and DSD and students to all be educated to prepare for the future, to have open minds, to take intellectual risks, to debate and analyze, and above all be comfortable with uncertainty. But the balance is the enduring themes of military education that operate in this environment. These themes of course include history, doctrine, the strategic context, and academic studies. These exist alongside the contemporary experience of operations, technology, developing ideas, and experimentation. The actual experience that the students bring to the college has increased.

How to interpret that experience leads to a very different form of debate. That is the inductive foundation that links into the idea that they are prepared for the future.

The Joint Services Command and Staff College also makes a wider contribution. It doesn't just educate students; it also produces information that goes out to joint establishments within the U.K. and ministry institutional hierarchy, joint headquarters, the Joint Doctrinal Concepts Center, and other centers where this information is vital and training developments are discussed. This dissemination is done via seminar events and discussion groups. What the JSCSC also hopes to do is to contribute to the development of doctrine and intellectual capital within the field of defense. We recently set up an R-CAP stream, which has recently had its own website launched which is accessible to all people interested in military education and all staff colleges throughout the world, who can now look at the new information that is being produced at the college.

The college is also interagency in nature. The JSCSC deals with the Front Office in the Department of Foreign International Development, the GCHQ, intelligence gathering, and of course the Home Office. It also extends into information that goes to the Front Office but then is externalized beyond that. It is also a part of the Defense Academy, as well as of the broad umbrella organization that contributes information to the Royal College of Military Science, which addresses some of the wider issues dealing with national development, defense conversion, defense economics, and so on.

In the Joint Services Warrant Officers Course (Non-Commissioned Officers Training), we teach the functions of command, leadership, and management in the joint, combined and interagency environments. Personnel need to understand the capabilities, organization, and interdependence of the U.K.'s armed services in peace and across the full spectrum of conflict. They also need to develop the communication and judgmental abilities of a Warrant Officer in the joint and combined environments.

The aim of the Advanced Command and Staff Course is to prepare selected officers for high-grade appointments, to develop their analytical skills, and teach wider aspects of defense as a whole. The international aspect of the Advanced Command and Staff Course is becoming of greater significance, which we hope may be spread to other nations as appropriate. We also support lecture programs and seminars and host international visitors. In the training and education of international students, we feel that we need to use their cultural resources more effectively.

Our professional links are of vital importance. We have links with service war colleges, single-service staff colleges, and the National Defense University in the U.S., and other organizations throughout Europe, which are of vital importance, as well as institutions in other regions. An important aspect of this is that it produces interfaces that we seek to maintain between these organizations, so that we are conscious of the changes that are occurring outside the JSCSC with regard to military education.

### **What Challenges Do We Face in the Future?**

One key challenge is the concept of transformation with identity. To what extent does the transformation of military education change it into a collaborative network between states and the other governmental and non-governmental organizations? How can we do this while maintaining the identity of the particular military education that we offer?

One answer is that we believe that collaborative research allows us to have a greater understanding of the key issues that concern others outside our particular institution. It is very important that our collaborative research material is available to students and researchers, so that information that we have produced is disseminated effectively. This should produce open military minds, because that is what our military education system should be about. We are constantly talking in the U.K. and at the JSCSC about the danger of what we describe as

“stove-piping” within military education, which is the tendency to think in discrete, self-contained groups, without appropriate collaboration between those groups both internally and externally.

We also need to be aware that the concept of what the military represents is now much wider. We have to recognize the “civilianization,” as some have called it, of military education of the military mind. And we are very conscious of the requirement to try to train more people outside the military alongside our military officers. We offer short courses for members of non-governmental organizations, for the police force, for the judiciary—we have even had a short course for bishops.

In the U.K., we are still in a very early stage of understanding of how distributed learning (DL) platforms will operate. We are aware of the requirement to transform military education in that direction, and of course we welcome other developments in that field. But while the mission of the JSCSC remains the same, we need to adapt to those kinds of information educational challenges that we see happening in the world outside.

**Lt. Colonel Jean d’Andurain, PfP and Cooperation Programs, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO Headquarters**

*Lt. Col. d’Andurain explained that NATO has wrought a revolution in the way it is addressing the Partnership, and that there are collaborative ways in which the Partnership for Peace consortium members can work collaboratively with NATO headquarters.*

Security depends on the structural reform of states, in addition to the states’ military capabilities. So we are giving a new substantive focus to the Partnership, addressing primarily the Caucasus and Central Asia. We are refocusing on

developing new reform capabilities and new defense institutions—this approach has been endorsed by all forty-six heads of the member states.

To reinforce the decisions that were made at Istanbul, we want to work on education for reform, which goes far beyond interoperability. We are talking about values; we are talking about building institutions in support of democratic reform.

We need the help of the PfP Consortium, and of the individual members of the PfP Consortium, as to how you can contribute to this new approach by NATO toward the Partnership. We are developing national capabilities to support the reform of defense education institutions. We are currently holding discussions in NATO Headquarters on how curricula might be adapted to support the Partnership Action Plan for Defense Institution Building (PAP DIB), which is a tremendous result of the Istanbul summit.

What can NATO Headquarters offer? In our discussion here—if you are ready to accept it—what we can offer is an established, sophisticated, and operations-oriented framework for cooperation with Partners. We have been doing this for ten years, and we have a lot of experience; at this conference we are represented by many members with ample and diverse experiences. We also have access to heads of state, and to the highest levels of where the policy is made. We have a common conceptual and political platform, which is a definition of defense-institution building that has been agreed to by all the heads of state of the Partnership member nations. It is crucial to realize the importance of this step—they have all agreed on objectives on defense-institution building. This is what we call the Partnership Action Plan for Defense Institution Building. Along with up-to-date information, we can offer reliable insider knowledge on NATO relations with each of the Partner countries.

What we want to do is to work together—with a good framework, a sound conceptual basis, and access to information—in order to do a better job for the Partnership. To

do it, we at NATO Headquarters and the PFP Consortium Institutions need to establish close collaboration. Our proposal is that, in order to contribute to bringing people and institutions together, we would like to extend an invitation to the steering committee of the PFP Consortium to come to Brussels as a first step toward establishing this collaboration, to see how we can best work together on the collaborative approach.

**Captain (N) Thomas Ernst, Branch Head, Cooperation Dialogue and Partner Training, Headquarters SACT**

I was invited here to speak as a representative of SACT, to discuss the wealth of information in education and training and defense reform, and the collaborative network that we are working to establish.

Let me start with some remarks about the Strategic Commander, Allied Command–Transformation (SACT) mission and assets in this field. SACT is the strategic commander responsible for individual education and training for NATO, as well as for those programs that Partner nations choose to include in their military training offerings. SACT strives to use education and training to create military assets and forces that are interoperable with NATO forces, but also possess improved capabilities to participate in various NATO-led operations. Initially, through the PFP, SACT hopes to promote transparency among Partner nations’ defense forces, and ultimately transform their defenses into democratically controlled, efficiently operated, and economically feasible armed forces for their respective nations

The SACT is responsible not only for NATO nations but also for those nations who choose to operate with NATO. It pursues transformation both in the manner in which forces are organized and in how nations view their defense establishments, as well as in how they view the role of the military in their nation and how they see their defense forces interacting within and

among the community of nations. It is a transformation from the Cold War mindset into that of an international and active community, in which allies and partners bring to the table forces with capabilities that complement each other. The final product of all the various forces being brought together, united and working toward a common goal, is what we hope to achieve

So what are the means to contributing to that force from the collection of Allied and Partner military forces, services, and cultures? How can SACT accomplish its mission regarding the education and training of the troops making up this coherent force? As NATO forces work toward the end state of military transformation, the education of the officers and NCOs of that coherent force becomes critical.

To achieve the goal of many nations working together as one coherent force, it is necessary to have common frames of reference and a common knowledge base. The education of the personnel in the armed forces can be achieved in many ways. The first is through classroom instruction, which affords the students the opportunity to explore ideas and interact with their colleagues from other nations. Education can also be advanced through seminars and conferences or exchanges among the various NATO forces. These opportunities provide the members of the military a chance to understand other cultures, and it also provides a forum to introduce, instruct, and integrate a common NATO foundation or culture in which we can work toward common goals.

Extending the same experiences to the Partner nations provides their military personnel with the opportunity to experience and understand the NATO culture. Education is the means through which defense reform can first be introduced and discussed while exploring new ideas. The ultimate goal for Partner forces is to integrate them into NATO-led operations. As the educational foundations are established, Partner nations' forces can then train to NATO standards so as to become interoperable with NATO forces.

Naturally there are challenges and obstacles to the goal of working toward interoperability—items such as common equipment (or at least compatible equipment), as well as the ability to communicate with one another. But education forms the foundation for common experiences, which then aid in the communication of ideas, ultimately synchronizing actions while working from common frames of reference and a common knowledge base.

SACT's main methods of intervening in defense reform issues through education reform are classes, seminars, conferences, and expert team visits which are focused on specific functional areas of cooperation. The ACT part of the Partnership Work Plan (EAPWP) contains the various activities open for Partner nation participation. The opportunities are designed to promote effective and transparent cooperation among the participating nations.


So where does SACT hope to achieve this education of the member nations' military personnel, market the ideas of the Alliance, and transform nations' defenses? ACT's Joint Education and Training Subdivision focuses on a wide variety of forums in order to shape transformation throughout PfP nations. Some are all within a single command, some are part of the wider NATO command structure, and a large number of entities providing activities for the Alliance's Partnership Work Plan are internationally planned and operated. Let's take a closer look at how ACT connects to those vehicles for implementation.

The organizations shown in italics are the ones ACT owns, and the rest are the ones we have a connection with. SACT is joint-hatted with the U.S. Joint Forces Command, and its relationship is a powerful linkage, which is outward oriented and forms the foundation for common understanding and synchronization of transformation efforts across the Alliance. A fully functional and transparent relationship is the cornerstone of this vital engagement with the U.S.—as well as with other Alliance nations and Partners—for NATO's transformation, and

for for the imperative of international interoperability in the near future.

There are a number of entities throughout Europe that help give us a strong footprint there. We have a so-called STLE, which is a SACT staff element and representative at NATO Headquarters. The SEE (SACT Element in Europe) offers a footprint in Mans. These groups are in place in order to ensure that the closest possible relationships are maintained with Allied Command Operations and the NATO Headquarters committees, who—along with Allied nations—we regard as our customers.

### Transformation Structure (MC-324)



The main center for implementation is the Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, which already conducts collective training for the NATO Space Force and ICEF commanders and staffs. Drawing on lessons learned from units based in Kabul, Kosovo, and Iraq, the JCWW’s training efforts have been very well received from the operational customers. Of course, there is also the Joint Forces Training Center. They provide assistance in tactical training for Allied forces, helping to spread ideas on doctrine and operations to promote interoperability as a result.

Plus we have the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center in Portugal, where we capture lessons from operations. We also have a significant degree of partnering and networking with existing agencies, national institutes, and centers of excellence, along with the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center in Weiss, which will be associated with ACT once it is operational in 2007. We will be associated in a similar way with NATO education facilities that are used to train leaders and specialists.

ACT is the single point of coordination across all these institutions. When gaps in education and training are discovered in NATO, or new conceptual or operational procedures are introduced, or perhaps when the need for a new course is perceived, ACT works to find the solution. By coordinating our work with that of other institutions within the Partnership framework, we will avoid duplication. Centers of excellence and PfP training centers are important facilities for delivering transformation to the Alliance as well.


Some nations offer centers of excellence in various areas. The idea behind centers of excellence is that they are and will be nationally funded, supported, and manned. HQ-SACT is responsible for concept development, education, and training in NATO; we develop the standards for the NATO centers of excellence, working with the nations involved. ACAE will support ACT in its mission. The centers of excellence, if they can meet the required NATO standard, may hoist a small NATO flag on their flagpole. HQ-SACT can offer specialist education and training for other member nations or partners, and thus the centers of excellence will be a part of the NATO Education and Training Network.

As of today, we have a less fully formed relationship with the PfP Education and Training Centers (PTCs) than we have with the other education facilities or centers of excellence. The commandants of the PTCs meet at a regular conference chaired by the commandant of the NATO School at Oberammergau. Our intention is to establish closer and more formal relationships

to all PTCs, and thus help to support another member of the broader NATO education and training family.

Some of the realignment has already taken place. For example, the NATO Training Group has been restructured and made subordinate to one of the branches within our subdivision. We have also added our centers of excellence to the picture. In our opinion, we needed to streamline the processes and the lines of coordination among the participants in NATO for education and training, in order to establish a single and coherent network.

## NATO Educational Network




Last June we conducted a conference in Oberammergau at the NATO School in order to establish what we have labeled the “NATO / Pfp Education Network.” Sixty-six participants from various educational facilities within NATO attended, as well as PTC commandants, some center of excellence commandants, and representatives from seventeen nations. The basic concept is as follows: to better serve transformation goals, all education facilities (NATO and national military) should, to the greatest extent possible, work as a network in order to facilitate coordination and harmonization, avoid duplication of efforts, and allow the improved flow of information. The

network will consist of all NATO education facilities, centers of excellence, and PfP training centers; national education facilities will be invited to attend as well.

Some issues are listed here which the network should deal with. As you can see, we are envisioning two levels of linkage. Various sub-networks are already in existence, as well as an underlying electronic network, which is made up of all the necessary elements of managing, executing, and communicating content and activities. The network will also strive to establish a maximum level of commonality in our office. The network will not only include educational facilities. At ACT, we see ourselves as the hub in this network of sub-networks, which is continuing to develop.

The diagram below reflects the already established networks of networks that we are seeking to engage.

## NATO PfP Education & Training Network



The Commandant's Conference, for instance, chaired by the commandant of the NATO Defense College, is a good example of such a sub-network. The PfP Training Centers will have a conference chaired by the NATO School commandant, as was mentioned above. To sustain the network, and for coordination purposes, an annual educational seminar or conference will be conducted with participants drawn from the network's members.

## **Why a Network ?**

- **To better serve transformational goals**
- **To deepen existing relationship with other education facilities**
- **A venue for educators to meet in order to coordinate and facilitate a better use of resources**
- **Widen sources of expertise**
- **To avoid duplication of educational efforts**
- **Syncronize and harmonize curricula**
- **Revise directives**
- **Enable HQ SACT to spread a uniform transformation message to NATO including partners**
- **Foster a common understanding of the importance of education and training as a major tool for the implementation of transformation**
- **Common course documentation/ evaluation**
- **Sharing of a Knowledge Portal**
- **Common course data integrated in a Master Catalogue**

The primary idea behind this network is to establish a venue for educators to meet at least annually, coordinate their efforts and make better use of resources, widen their sources of expertise, and enable HQ-SACT to spread a uniform transformation message to NATO as a whole (including our partners). The network will be used to avoid duplication of education efforts, synchronize and harmonize curricula, revise directives as necessary, and foster a common understanding of the importance of education as a major tool for the implementation of military transformation.

**Ms. Tanja Geiss, ADL Scientific Assistant, Policy Department, NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany**

*Ms. Geiss discussed how the NATO School networks with international partners, using the ADL program at the NATO School as an example of how the Human Trafficking Module was created. Several courses are already on line.*



## ADL Networking



|  |                               |
|--|-------------------------------|
| <b>Course:</b>                                   |                               |
| NATO 101   | online                        |
| <b>Modules:</b>                                  |                               |
| NATO Overview                                    | online                        |
| CIMIC Overview                                   | online                        |
| NATO's PFP Program                               | online                        |
| Introduction to Satellite Operations             | online                        |
| NATO's Space Support                             | online                        |
| NATO's Space Applications                        | online (to be updated in '05) |
| Introduction to Information Operations           | online (to be updated in '05) |
| NATO's Reserve Forces                            | online (to be updated in '05) |
| Introduction to NATO Logistics                   | TBD                           |
| NATO/Partner Operational Staff                   | online                        |
| Combined Joint Task Force                        | online                        |
| Introduction to NATO's Maritime Operations       | online                        |
| Introduction to Environmental Awareness          | online                        |
| Peace Support Operations                         | online                        |
| Fundamentals of CBRN Defense                     | online                        |
| Introduction to the Operational Planning Process | online                        |
| Combating Trafficking in Human Beings            | online (since June 2005)      |

The NATO School is not able form networks with international partners by itself. It needs the support of Partner nations, and other ADL partners. ADL is priority at the NATO School. As a measure of the depth of the support that USJFCOM provides to the NATO School and this project, all of the courses listed will be completed and available online through their server through the summer.

With regard to networking on current political issues, and particularly the traffic in human beings, at the Istanbul Summit NATO adopted a policy on combating trafficking in human beings. Following this summit, the Curriculum Development Working Group met at the Geneva Center for Security Policy last

September and nominated a core working group for further discussion. This core group held its first meeting at the NATO School in Oberammergau in November 2004. They agreed on the development of three modules, and committed to present these modules at their next meeting in February 2005. Additionally, it was decided to make this an ADL module and make it available online, a module which was launched just yesterday.



## ADL Networking

JFCOM ADL Support – NATO School '05



|                      |           |   |
|----------------------|-----------|---|
| • NATO / NATO School | Apr. 05   | 1. <i>Joint Medical Planners Course</i><br>COL Stoffels         |
| • NATO / NATO School | Apr. 05   | 2. <i>Medical Intelligence</i><br>COL Stoffels                  |
| • NATO / NATO School | Apr. 05   | 3. <i>Senior Medical Staff Officer</i><br>COL Stoffels          |
| • NATO / NATO School | Apr. 05   | 4. <i>Major Incident Medical Management</i><br>COL Stoffels     |
| • NATO / NATO School | Sep. 05   | 5. <i>Resource Mgmt. In NATO</i><br>MAJ Calabuig                |
| • NATO / NATO School | Sep. 05   | 6. <i>European Security Defence Policy</i><br>TBD               |
| • NATO / NATO School | Sep. 05   | 7. <i>Crisis Management in NATO</i><br>MAJ Uras                 |
| • NATO / NATO School | Sep. 05   | 8. <i>Press and Media in NATO</i><br>LTC Hondrogiannis          |
| • NATO / NATO School | Sep. 05   | <i>Intro. to Information Operations</i><br>CDR Herrera (Update) |
| • NATO / NATO School | TBD 05    | <i>NATO Space Applications</i><br>MAJ Paquette (Update)         |
| • NATO / NATO School | Sep. 05   | <i>NATO's Reserve Forces</i><br>LTC Orth (Update)               |
| • NATO / NATO School | Sep. 05   | <i>Intro. to NATO Logistics</i><br>TBD                          |
| • NATO / NATO School | Completed | <i>Fundamentals of NATO</i><br>LtCol Kabs (Mod 1) / NDC / US    |

We also have a module for military commanders. It presents the responsibilities of the commander, and explains why this issue interferes with NATO missions and why it is a security problem. The last module was for military law enforcement entities, especially designed for the military police, which should help the MP's become more aware and provide them training on how they should treat, interview, and assist victims that they work with.

These modules were prepared with the assistance of subject matter experts. Some of the organizations that assisted us included the GCSP, the IOM, the EUPM, the UNDPKO, the GTZ, UNOHCHR, the UNODC, and the Norwegian and U.S. delegations to NATO, among others. Following the development of these three modules, GCSP, ISN, and the NATO School discussed how to develop an ADL module based on this same information. The ADL module has five learning objectives on combating the traffic human beings. They are:

- An explanation of the NATO Policy
- A general overview on the topic
- A discussion on the victims and the perpetrators of this crime
- An explanation of the impact of this crime on NATO-led operations
- The duties of NATO-led forces in preventing trafficking

These modules are available on the PfP P2 LMS (<http://pfplms.ethz.ch/p2lms/pfplms.html>) and the PfP LMS powered by ILIAS, which was demonstrated yesterday.

So clearly the NATO School is interested in networking. The several needs of the user can only be served by cooperation, for several reasons. First of all, there is a lack of experts on special issues. When there is a great demand for information on a specific issue, it is very difficult for a course director to become a subject matter expert. This can be solved by cooperation with subject matter experts not only within NATO, but also within NGOs and from other institutions. Secondly, ADL courses can be used to give a brief overview of a topic in a very short period of time. Courses can be developed quickly, but can also be kept to a high quality standard by utilizing the subject matter expertise within the network. This certainly cannot be completed by just one person. In the future, an ADL course should be able to be developed much more quickly, in a very

timely manner, which will keep up with demand and the demand for high quality by drawing on the expertise that exists within the NATO network.

So the road ahead for ADL at the NATO School includes our goal to bring all of our courses online with pre-learning packages, so that our students will be able to access them before signing up for classes and will be able to be much more prepared. We will also have post-course studies, which will use a knowledge portal accessible from the website so that former students and other interested persons can brush up on what they previously learned at the school and/or get the latest information on the various NATO issues and topics. We will also have course certifications, as well as further growth in connecting ADL with modeling and simulation exercises, such as the upcoming Viking Exercise in December 2005.