A GRASSROOTS APPROACH TO COMBATTING ORGANISED CRIME AND BUILDING PEACE IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE KOSOVO POLICE SERVICE

Many post-conflict settings experience significant increases in levels of crime and violence, due to the social and economic legacies of war. Unemployment, poverty, breakdown in law and order and fragile governance capacities create environments that foster the progress of illicit trade and serve to disrupt continuing rehabilitation efforts. Such conditions often lead to the emergence of an ‘uncivil society’, in the form of organised crime, nationalist extremism, or a combustible combination of both. However, there is ample evidence to show that reform and restructuring of the security sector – in particular, the criminal justice triad of the police, judiciary, and corrections systems – plays a vital role in preventing conflict, preserving social stability during crises, and supporting sustainable post-conflict peacebuilding and rehabilitation.

Peacebuilding strategies involving the creation of accountable and effective police and judicial institutions in order to provide a secure and safe environment for political, economic, and social development can be seen throughout the Balkans: the building of a strong police service in Bosnia, the creation of a more effective judiciary in Croatia, the transformation of the customs service in Albania, and the creation of an indigenous democratic police service in Kosovo. The task of creating the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and developing practices that comply with democratic norms and international human rights standards is central to durable peace in Kosovo and to long-term stability in South Eastern Europe (SEE).

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Statistics and public perceptions show that the security situation in Kosovo has improved and serious criminal activities have declined over the last two years. However, organised crime has gained an increasingly prominent role in Kosovo and is considered by analysts as a negative development affecting the final status issue. Activities such as trafficking in human beings (particularly for sexual exploitation), drugs, weapons and stolen vehicles, extortion and racketeering, large-scale smuggling in consumer goods (e.g., cigarettes), forgery of documents and money, and economic crime are widespread. In a recent study by the United Nations Development Program in Kosovo, organised crime is viewed by Albanian Kosovans as the sixth major problem for Kosovo in a list of 16 major problems, and by Serbian Kosovans as the seventh. These illicit activities are affecting all levels of society as they challenge human rights protection, undermine democratisation processes, disrespect the rule of law, and interfere with institution-building, reform efforts, and potential investment in Kosovo. Unbridled corruption and organised crime negatively affects the peacebuilding processes in Kosovo and – as networks transcend Kosovo’s porous borders – threaten stabilisation efforts in SEE.

In line with European Union and Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe arrangements (in particular, the Stability Pact Initiative to Fight Organised Crime (SPOC) and the London Statement on Defeating Organised Crime in South Eastern Europe), organised crime has been placed high on the agendas of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) in 2003. In his recent speech to the OSCE

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107 A recent UNDP survey reports that the main problems in Kosovo today – based on the answers of 6,000 interviewed citizens – are not crime or general security (7% and 5%, respectively), rather unemployment (indicated by 50% of Albanian interviewees, 38% of Others, and 9% of Serbs). See UNDP, The Kosovo Mosaic: Perceptions of Local Government and Public Services in Kosovo, March 2003; and UNDP, Kosovo Early Warning Report, Report #2, September-December 2002. See also, UNMIK Police Press Release, 29 October 2002. Although findings suggest that unemployment is about 49% in Kosovo, international agencies estimate up to 70%.

108 United States Institute of Peace, Kosovo Decision Time, Special Report 100, February 2003. Other factors include faltering economic progress, disaffection with the results of democratic reforms, and slow reconciliation processes, all of which may be linked to organized crime, causally or symptomatically.

Permanent Council, UN Special Representative to the Secretary General in Kosovo, Michael Steiner, reported: “We need to continue to battle organised crime, which still poisons the Balkans and threatens the security of Europe. We need to consolidate the rule of law. This means ensuring that all institutions respect human rights. It also means dismantling the parallel structures whose very existence undermines the rule of law.”

This has been reiterated by Lord George Robertson at a recent conference in Ohrid, Macedonia on border safety and management. By fostering democracy and respect for the rule of law – the cornerstones of conflict prevention and economic development – SRSG Steiner optimistically asserts that Kosovo could be the exporter of stability to SEE.

Whilst unprecedented opportunities for combating organised crime exist, few have been identified, developed, and implemented. A comprehensive, complementary multi-track approach to promoting security and combating organised crime must be vigorously adopted by an assortment of actors and agencies. Such an approach must not only tackle the symptoms arising from organised criminal activities, but also address the deep-rooted causes in order to prevent the necessary conditions for organised crime to flourish, particularly in marginalized communities and transitioning societies.

Analogous to multi-track approaches in the field of conflict resolution, this requires an effective combination of top, middle and grassroots strategies involving all sectors of society and operating at structural-constitutional as well as relational-community levels, with cooperation between involved international and internal agencies.

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110 Special Representative to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Michael Steiner, Intervention to the OSCE Permanent Council, 8 May 2003.

111 A multi-layered, multi-agency framework for combating organized crime was presented by Dennis J.D. Sandole, “Combating Crime in South East Europe: An Integrated, Co-ordinated, Multi-Level Approach”, at the 4th Reichenau Workshop, Crushing Crime in South East Europe: A Struggle of Domestic, Regional and European Dimensions, 16-19 May 2003. In short, the framework consists of local community, society, sub-regional, and regional contexts (vertical), overlayed with multi-track local, regional and international actors, including official leaders, business communities, non-government organizations, citizen diplomacy, research, training and education, activists, religious groups, funding authorities, and the media (horizontal).

Experiences of the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS)\textsuperscript{113} suggest that Kosovo could play a crucial role in regional stability through the training and professional development of the Kosovo Police Service to engage in crime prevention strategies in the communities themselves. Within this perspective, an organised crime strategy should not be limited to reactive operational law enforcement, but should include proactive measures to prevent it through effective democratic and community-based policing. Improved policing will reduce crime domestically, and may curb the spread of transnational organised crime, which threatens the fabric of society regionally and globally.

**Historical Perspectives of the Police in Kosovo**

Throughout the Milosevic regime, the mission of the police\textsuperscript{114} was to support the political regime under military/ethnic/partisan political command and control. The police did not require public legitimacy to be effective, and there were few, if any, accountability mechanisms. The police had a reputation among the Kosovan communities of intimating citizens; hence, the police were viewed as a ‘force’ used against people, rather than a ‘service’ for people. Inevitably, these experiences have a profound effect on the public’s perception of the capabilities, skills, and public legitimacy of the police even today.

The Military Technical Agreement ending NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo and Serbia resulted in the withdrawal not only of the Yugoslav military forces, but of the entire police and public order apparatus. As a result, the international community took on an executive

\textsuperscript{113} Information provided herewith on the KPSS has been obtained from first-hand experiences and internal, as well as public, documents.

\textsuperscript{114} The police were highly militarised, particularly the heavily armed paramilitary units called the Interior Special Police (MUPs), which were under \textit{de facto} if not \textit{de jure} command of the army. During the Yugoslav conflicts, these police units were essentially ‘up-graded’ into soldiers, fighting for the ethnic constituency to which their officers and members were loyal. Their ranks swelled by an influx of paramilitary personnel with little or no training. Before and during the war in Bosnia, police used the traditional practices of roadblocks, checkpoints and interrogation to harass and intimidate members of other ethnic communities. See Laina Reynolds, \textit{To Serve and Protect: The Reconstruction of Civilian Policing in Post-Settlement Peacebuilding}, Unpublished MA Dissertation, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK, 1999, pp. 69-9.
policing role for the UNMIK Civilian Police in some fields and by KFOR troops and military police in others. The OMIK Department of Police Education and Development was simultaneously mandated to promote the development of an institution to provide Kosovo with a sustainable, representative, community-based, local law enforcement service. This law enforcement service would be dedicated to maintaining civil law and order, promoting the rule of law, respecting human rights for all the people of Kosovo, and upholding international standards and practices. The newly constructed indigenous KPS would have to take an active role in rebuilding trust by reaching out to the community, and creating channels for communication about local security fears and needs.

According to a recent international article featuring the KPS, the “mere existence of an indigenous police service, built from scratch by the United Nations in the four years since the end of the NATO-led war against Serbia, is an extraordinary accomplishment” 115. Since the KPSS was established in 1999, 5,663 Basic Recruits – from all ethnic groups in the province – have graduated from 24 generations at the KPSS and have been deployed to the communities throughout the province. Currently, another 198 students are undergoing the 12-week basic training programme. Throughout Kosovo, the number of KPS Officers delivering police service now exceeds that of the UN Civilian Police. (Currently, there are 4,101 international police officers in the Mission, however, only 2,891 are patrolling the streets jointly with the KPS. The remaining officers are in Specialised Units, training capacities, or deployed elsewhere.)

Early measures of success are encouraging. A significant improvement in the province’s crime statistics testifies to improved security in Kosovo, assisted in part by the success of the training programme. Serious crime – from murder to kidnappings – has fallen dramatically since the KPS began operating. Murder rates are down from 245 in 2000 to 68 last year, robberies were down 73% in 2001 from a year

115 Green, op. cit.
earlier, arson fell 58%, and burglaries dropped more than 10%. Traffic fatalities, which may be a direct measure of how well the police enforce laws, dropped from 250 in 2000 to 132 last year. Moreover, the KPS Officers are working together in a co-operative, professional, multi-ethnic, mixed gender service; throughout Kosovo multi-ethnic patrol units provide law enforcement services to all ethnic communities. The latest public opinion poll, published in UNDP’s second Kosovo Early Warning Report, shows that respondents are now more satisfied with the work of KPS than they used to be (approximately 89% are satisfied or very satisfied), and marginally more satisfied than with the international civilian police (approximately 80%).

**Democratic Policing: “Police are the People, People are the Police”**

As Kosovo continues its challenging journey to democracy through building and strengthening democratic institutions, the KPS plays a vital role. For democracy to flourish, the people of Kosovo must have faith in the effectiveness, impartiality, and accountability of the police. Because organised crime thrives in environments where public trust of the police is low, the KPSS emphasis on effective democratic policing is fundamental to crime prevention, locally and regionally.

Upon entering the main building of the KPSS, the words written on the wall remind everyone of the democratic policing ideals that form the foundation of the KPS Officers’ training and their service to the community: “Police are the People, People are the Police”. When cadets commence their training, they sign a “Democratic Policing Contract” and adhere to it in their development towards becoming a KPS Officer.

Moreover, KPS officers have an ethical responsibility to maintain the highest possible standards of professional police behaviour. Any

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unethical behaviour exhibited by a KPS officer is subject to scrutiny by the public and may lead to a decrease in the public’s confidence or trust. The principles for maintaining these standards are expressed in the “Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials” adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979 and “Resolution 690 – The Declaration on the Police” adopted by the Council of Europe in 1979, in addition to the KPS Policies and Procedures Manual. The code of conduct is based on the concept of public service as a public trust; it reinforces the legal and human rights issues provided under the law.

Overview of the KPS Training Programme

There are six components of training undertaken by KPS Officers. The first, which forms the foundation, is Basic Training. It consists of two phases: a 12-week basic academy and a 15-week field training academy. The basic academy focuses on a strong core of legal and officer survival knowledge and skills and consists of approximately 500 hours of training, alternating between theoretical lectures and practical applications. The objective is to teach cadets the basic skills and ethics to safely begin the second phase of training. This is accomplished on the job while performing rudimentary law enforcement duties accompanied by an international civilian police Field Training Officer (FTO). FTOs are competitively selected and specially trained to serve in this phase of the programme. Their role is to serve as mentor, role model, and trainer, reinforcing the procedures and practices taught in the School, refining and evaluating performance in the real world of law enforcement. Training is guided by the Professional Development Reference (PDR), an evaluation portfolio developed by the KPSS to provide a guideline for training. PDRs are initiated on all students when they begin the basic programme and continue into the field-training component. They serve as a reference for student performance, a guide for continued development, a tool for action plans, and a document for certifying competency levels.

Whilst there are no lessons on organised crime in the 12-week Basic Training programme at KPSS, modules on “Democratic Policing”, “Human Rights”, “Code of Conduct”, “Ethics”, “Policing in a Multi-
Ethnic Society”, “Diversity Awareness”, “Gender Issues”, and “Community Policing” contribute to the professional, democratic training of KPS Officers.

As KPS reaches its basic recruitment target, the workload is accelerating toward the second and third training components, i.e., Specialized and Advanced Training programmes. These were developed to compensate for a relatively compressed basic academy and have been designed to promote full competency and fundamental specialization for all serving police officers, particularly in areas that are imperative for combating and preventing organised crime (including anti-trafficking and narcotics). Ideally, some of the specialized courses would be included in the basic training programme, however, in the interest of early rapid deployment to establish a fully-functioning indigenous police service, they are instead offered to officers throughout their service. The advanced courses embrace both management/supervision and technically advanced subject areas. The former is provided in incremental phases to compliment the selection and promotion of officers to first line, middle management, and senior management positions. The technical training is provided as special units are designated, organised and deployed (this includes border police and, potentially, an organised crime squad).

Re-certification training constitutes the fourth component. It is conducted annually for all KPS Officers to ensure and renew competency in skills associated with the use of force and survival. The KPSS is also focusing on capacity-building, a fifth training component. This is targeted at developing a basic cadre of police instructors and educational specialists. Currently, there are 55 fully qualified KPS Instructors assigned to the Police Training Division at the KPSS, with the aim of 125 KPS Instructors at the KPSS by 2005. Over 250 KPS Officers are also certified to deliver the re-certification training in the five operational regions. Finally, internships and training abroad have offered invaluable opportunities for KPS Officers to further develop their skills and increase the quality/standards of the service provided to the public.
KPSS Efforts to Combat Organised Crime

The training activities facilitated by the KPSS contribute to a proactive policing approach to prevent and/or respond to criminal activities. Concerted efforts by KPSS to combat organised crime began in 2002, commencing with discussions related to potential activities and partner organizations. The KPSS is currently liaising with UNMIK/KPS and the Kosovo Organised Crime Bureau (KOCB) with the aim of establishing a co-ordinated, multi-agency approach to combating organised crime in Kosovo.

The KOCB, established in April 2002 by UNMIK, is a highly specialised operational unit dealing specifically with organised crime-related matters. Prior to its establishment, no provisions were made for an organised crime unit within the executive law enforcement mission. The SRSG’s approval of the legal framework to fight organised crime, Regulation 2001/22 (‘‘Measures Against Organised Crime’’), which recognises the need to prevent and combat organised crime in Kosovo, Regulation 2002/6 (‘‘Covert Measures and Technical Measures of Surveillance and Investigation’’), which offers tactical and operational opportunities, and the arrival of a new Police Commissioner who set new priorities paved the way for the KOCB. The KOCB reports directly to the Police Commissioner under UNMIK Pillar I (Police and Justice). It is comprised entirely of internationals and, whilst the KOCB will soon start to recruit KPS Officers to serve in the unit, there are no final structural or administrative plans to integrate the KOCB into the KPS in the future.

Together with the KOCB, the KPSS is currently designing an appropriate organised crime training programme, to be funded bilaterally through the United States Department of Justice International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). KPS Officers will be recruited and screened by the KOCB and, upon completion of the course, they may be integrated into the KOCB.

KPSS will also host a three-day seminar on Organised Crime in Autumn 2003. The seminar will bring together key actors and agencies in Kosovo (from law enforcement, judiciary, customs and border authority,
private sector, local administration, education, community-based organizations, and media) in an effort to develop interagency co-ordination and co-operation. The seminar aims to disseminate information related to organised crime activities in Kosovo; explore domestic, regional, and international perspectives on trans-border organised crime; and develop multi-agency plans of action to combat and prevent organised crime.

Community-Based Policing: A Bottom-Up Strategy

The international community has attempted to replace reactive crisis intervention policies in SEE with a comprehensive long-term conflict prevention strategy (i.e., the Stability Pact\(^{119}\)). From a conflict resolution perspective it is apparent that reactive law enforcement approaches (i.e., waiting for a crime to occur before responding) should be complemented with pro-active policing (i.e., taking positive steps prior to the occurrence of a crime to prevent it from occurring). This approach is fundamentally community-based and requires working directly with community members and leaders.

Organised crime is fueled by weak economic, political, and social structures in the communities the police are serving. According to UNDP’s opinion poll, respondents acknowledged that the responsibility for corruption and organised crime falls upon the citizens themselves.\(^{120}\) Strategies to remove the incentives that motivate and nurture organised crime, unravel the criminal networks that sustain it, build and promote local support for action against crime, and to develop prevention mechanisms at the grassroots level have tremendous potential. By addressing some of the root causes in the community through problem-solving strategies employed by community policing practices, the evolution and dispersion of organised crime may cease. These

\(^{119}\) On the initiative of the European Union, on 10 June 1999, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was adopted by more than 40 nations and organizations to support the countries from SEE “in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region”. See http://www/stabilitypact.org.

\(^{120}\) UNDP, 2002, op. cit., p. 30.
approaches to law enforcement are generally still in experimental stages in the Balkans, however, the philosophy that underpins the approach is prevalent within the KPSS and the practices are being employed by community policing units throughout Kosovo.

Community policing is both a philosophy and a practice that actively involves the community in order to reduce, prevent, and detect crime. It assists the police in identifying and solving problems of concern to the people and contributes to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Moreover, it aims at creating partnerships between the police service and the community to ensure that the police continually provide quality services to the public. Community members have the right and responsibility to participate in the policing process in exchange for their support of law enforcement. Community policing emphasizes positive interaction with the public, in order to gain trust and confidence of the public to which they serve. If the community is involved with the police, it will begin to demonstrate a commonality of interest and belongingness, ensuring a sense of ownership and pride. Once community members sense that they have ownership of their crime prevention process and outcome, positive change will occur. Community policing will encourage citizens to work together to increase safety and security of their communities, which will extend beyond their community – and even state/provincial – boundaries.

Taking a clue from conflict transformation theory, effective community policing means ensuring that citizens who are affected by criminal activities discover and develop the power to put an end to them. It means increasing the participation of people in all sectors of society to find a voice. It means supporting 'people power' in combating organised crime.

Community-based policing utilizes flexible, creative problem-solving tools, characteristic of those in conflict resolution processes. The aim of interactive problem-solving tools is to improve the relationships between

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121 From the KPSS Basic Training Programme, “Community Policing”, Lesson #GP06.
the participants (in this case, the police and the community members), to concentrate on the needs of the people involved, and to get at the root causes of conflict (or, crime). One five-step model used in community policing requires participants to: (1) diagnose and prioritise problems that have some generalized impact in the communities; (2) analyse the problem by defining the both the causes and effects, as well as possible options; (3) design strategies and realistic options for solving the problem; (4) implement the strategies; and (5) evaluate and continuously monitor the results. Problem-solving theory focuses on existing institutions, social relations and cultural meaning which are often taken for granted – resources that already exist in the given context and which contribute to the bottom-up approach. Rather than measuring success in traditional terms (e.g., numbers of arrests and citations, stolen property recovered), the police measure success using indicators established in collaboration with those most affected by the problems, i.e., the stakeholders.

In order for the community-policing approach to be completely effective, it needs to be institutionalized. Although the KPS has a community-policing element in its policing activities, this fundamental element of democratic policing has not been institutionalized within its operations. This institutionalization is crucial to the success of community policing. Further training for KPS Officers will assist them in working in and with the communities they serve, and the increased inclusion of training in topics such as non-violent methods of conflict resolution should be a priority. Moreover, Kosovan community members must be more systematically engaged as participants and leaders in problem-solving forums and community-based policing methods.

123 Reynolds, op. cit.
Threats and Opportunities to the KPS’ Role in Combating Organised Crime

The KPS strategic plan envisions an end-strength of 6,300 officers, with a goal of maintaining a 15% minority and 15% female participation. By the end of 2003, all patrol operational enforcement is expected to transition from UN International Civilian Police to the KPS. Every year thereafter, one additional progressive level of responsibility, moving from first-line supervision to middle management, and culminating with senior management, will be handed over from international to local officers. By 2006, the operation, management and leadership of the KPS is expected to be entirely in the hands of local institutions.

As this transition takes place, several threats and opportunities may affect the ability of the KPS to effectively address organised crime issues. Given the low salaries of KPS officers, the potential for corruption, extortion, and abuse of position within the KPS is frequently cited. At this point in time, there are no serious discussions considering an increase in salaries to prevent such activities. However, the KPSS establishes a climate that fosters character development and moral habits. KPS Officers learn early in their training that standards in the police should be managed through a range of formal (regulation) and informal (common sense) factors – an ‘ethics infrastructure’. This should provide officers not only with the tools to identify and analyze ethical dilemmas but give them the ability to make the appropriate ethical choices (e.g., KPS Code of Police Ethics, KPS Code of Conduct). (Respondents from UNDP’s opinion poll believe that corruption is very widespread in many Kosovo institutions; however, according to Albanian Kosovan respondents, it is not very present in local police – only 8.2%.)

While training programmes can build individual competence and create a culture of ethics and professionalism, police administrative and operational structures cannot be established until such time as UNMIK permits a full transfer of responsibility to local authorities. Effective hand-over of institutional responsibilities to the appropriate Kosovo government ministries has been slow and frustrating, failing to contribute to a lasting solution with regard to the status of Kosovo.
Whilst the KPSS and the KPS are demonstrating increasing proactive, democratic policing approaches, the slow pace with which the Government of Kosovo and the Assembly are drafting and issuing laws is further hampered by the delays in the SRSG’s endorsement of the laws approved by the Assembly. Many of the domestic institutions are weak and, therefore, unable to implement the rule of law, provide effective protection of human rights, or demonstrate participatory democracy. Yet, without the international community and its protectorate powers, the KPSS/KPS would operate in a vacuum of state authority and security.

Co-operation between international and local law enforcement and judicial organisations have been limited. In the absence of an adequate interagency co-ordination mechanism, KPSS has focused on increasing its co-ordination with partner organisations, including UNMIK/KPS and KOCB. Closer cooperation has also been initiated between UNMIK/KPS, KOCB, Central Intelligence Unit, Central Criminal Investigations Unit, and the Trafficking and Prostitution Investigation Unit in dealing with organised crime networks. Additionally, professional training of other agencies and services involved in addressing issues arising from organised crime is required. To this end, the Kosovo Police Service School is institutionalizing standards and providing specialized training that is imperative for combating organised crime. With 27 million Euros invested in rebuilding the Police School, dialogue has been initiated regarding the future use of the venue as a training institution that will serve as a valuable resource for training in all areas of public safety and security (justice, law enforcement, penal management, fire and safety). Undoubtedly, a co-ordinated, multi-agency strategy would have a tremendous impact on combating organised crime in Kosovo.

Regional co-operation and training has also been insufficient. Although in the wider context of security sector reform, the importance of police training and regional cooperation of police has received wide acknowledgement by Stability Pact partners, few activities have taken place. The KPSS has liaised with regional police training institutions, including Bosnia, Macedonia, and Serbia to share experiences and curriculum and to initiate co-operation in counter-terrorism and serious
crimes. However, these initiatives should be significantly increased and may be better co-ordinated through the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the European Union, the OSCE’s Special Police Matters Unit, or the SPOC, and focus particularly on trans-border issues.

Abundant experiences in the field of conflict resolution have proven that bottom-up approaches to transforming conflict are crucial in fostering self-sufficiency and producing viable and sustainable peace. Central to this approach is the participation of local people in the process. Typically, however, prescriptive top-down processes imposed from above by the international community (exemplified by UNMIK), which tend to overlook the cultural contextual issues and local resources and mechanisms, are favoured over grassroots activities. A bottom-up approach to crime and conflict prevention, initiated by local communities and working alongside KPS Officers, is one track in a multi-tracked approach to combating organised crime. Solutions will be achieved through the empowerment of participants (citizens and police) and enhanced local control of the legal system by the communities. A comprehensive strategy for combating organised crime would involve multiple actors operating at the top, middle and grassroots levels and engaging in a variety of activities.

The international community must, therefore, continue to support the vital work in training and developing the Kosovo Police Service, as declared in the 4742\textsuperscript{nd} UN Security Council Meeting on 23 April 2003\textsuperscript{125}. Shortcuts such as reducing the length of training, leaving judicial reform to be dealt with later, failing to build management and command systems to keep pace with the deployments or failing to provide ongoing support beyond the typical short-term period of a peace process may lead to problems.\textsuperscript{126} The international community must coordinate and share the responsibility of ongoing bilateral support until

\textsuperscript{124} For a more comprehensive discussion of top-down and bottom-up approaches to peacebuilding, see John Paul Lederach, \textit{Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies}, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, 1997.

\textsuperscript{125} See the speeches by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and the Representatives for the Russian Federation and United Kingdom

transfer of responsibility to local authority can be made effectively and until there is evidence to support the notion that effective democratic, community-based policing in Kosovo is contributing to the prevention of conflict, eradication of organised crime and promotion of social, political and economic stability in Kosovo and SEE.

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