

The Economic Impact of Peacekeeping: An Update

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Introduction

The literature on war economies and their implications for post-conflict peacebuilding is fairly extensive.¹ UN peacekeeping operations are conducted in 16 of those economies but the literature on their economic impact was not well-grounded in data until publication of *The Economic Impact of Peacekeeping* (EIP) in 2006.² EIP research teams, managed by the Peace Dividend Trust and working in collaboration with the Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), visited eight complex UN peacekeeping operations, interviewed mission leaders, mission contractors, and host government officials and gathered data from the missions' books that are not routinely published in mission expenditure reports. EIP carefully parsed the local content of missions' spending from the rest of their expenditures, folding into its calculus of local impact only funds that "landed" in the mission area. Not included in local impact were such things as UN payments to states for troops deployed for peacekeeping; payments for wear and tear on the military equipment that came with them; salaries of international staff (which were presumed to be banked elsewhere, as even living allowances per diem were not taken fully in cash by most staff in most missions); procurement by the mission of

¹ For good synopses, see Heiko Nitzschke & Kaysie Studdard, "The Legacies of War Economies: Challenges and Options for Peacemaking and Peacebuilding," *International Peacekeeping* 12, No. 2 (Summer 2005): 222–239, and Monika Heupel, "Shadow trade war economies and their challenge to peacebuilding," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9 (2006): 140-169.

² Michael Carnahan, William Durch, and Scott Gilmore, "Economic Impact of Peacekeeping [EIP]: Final Report" New York: Peace Dividend Trust for the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, March 2006, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/. A shortened version appeared as Michael Carnahan, Scott Gilmore, and William Durch, "New Data on the Economic Impact of UN Peacekeeping," *International Peacekeeping* 14, No. 3 (June 2007): 384-402.

imported goods or services; and procurement for the mission via so-called “systems contracts” managed from UN Headquarters in New York.

The three main categories of local spending that remain after all such “external” spending had been pruned away were: (1) living allowances distributed in cash (for UN staff and experts on mission – this is called Mission Subsistence Allowance, or MSA; for UN Volunteers (UNV) it is Volunteer Living Allowance, or VLA); (2) the salaries of locally-hired mission staff (“national staff”); and (3) the local content of mission procurement (goods and services originating in the state hosting the mission). All of these are, in effect, the incidental cash injections into the local economy that peacekeeping operations make just by deploying and doing their jobs. They are not intended as development efforts, although EIP suggested that procurement could be better-targeted at local vendors and that greater effort could be made by UN technical assessment missions to identify potential vendors in the local economy. It also argued that some of the money spent hiring national staff might better be directed to local contractors who could in turn hire multiple individuals at prevailing local wages in lieu of each national staff post, while avoiding some of the wage inflation and hollowing out of local businesses and institutions that mission (and other international) hiring practices tend to create.³ EIP did not discuss the “quick impact project” (QIP) lines that most peacekeeping missions have in their annual budgets; this chapter will address them briefly.

Primarily, however, the chapter updates the public expenditure data for the eight missions analyzed in the EIP report, through 2007–08, and adds the missions in South Sudan and Darfur, established in 2005 and 2007, respectively.⁴ Being the result of a desk review, it cannot replicate the summer 2005 field research that permitted direct calculation of MSA fractions taken in cash and percentage of local content in mission procurement.

³ EIP, esp. pp. 46–55.

⁴ The UN’s peacekeeping fiscal year begins on 1 July and ends on 30 June, so each mission budget year straddles two calendar years.

The local economic impact of the UN operations analyzed in this chapter, which together represent three quarters of the UN's peacekeeping budget for 2007-08, averages 1.2 to 1.4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of host states (depending on which spending scenario one credits), ranging from as little as 0.1 percent in Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire to as much as 4 percent in Liberia and Timor-Leste. By and large, these missions are significant contributors to the economies in which they deploy. How they and their personnel choose to acquire goods and services can make a real and early difference in the economic trajectory of a post-conflict state, during the so-called golden "hour" (first year) after major conflict ends, supplementing humanitarian aid and putting cash into the economy before longer-term development assistance or investment are engaged.⁵

The remaining sections of this chapter address its methodology in greater detail, present its findings over time and missions, and offer summary conclusions and recommendations. The annex contains the annual data tables from which the main text tables were built, with sources. The annex also contains GDP and population tables for mission host states, also with sources, and tables showing how the MSA and VLA used in the main annual data tables were calculated.

⁵ "The term 'golden hour,' borrowed from the medical literature, represents a crucial moment that could mean the difference between life and death for a critically ill patient. In the world of postwar transformation, there is also a golden hour when the international community and the affected country can act either to lay a foundation for a full recovery [or] . . . set the path for a recurrence of fighting." Johanna Mendelson-Forman and Merriam Mashatt, "Employment Generation and Economic Development in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations," S & R Series No. 6 (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, March 2007), 3.

Methodology

The approach taken here is comparative, primarily descriptive (although deriving the data for the description was a multi-step process), and modestly analytic. As described below, some key numbers were derived using relationships established in the original EIP study. These relationships within a given mission may have changed over time, as – indeed – several missions did so over time. Major missions, not including in the original EIP analysis, were assigned average numbers for percentages of local cash spending or procurement that may attribute to them greater or lesser economic impact than is actually the case, but short of going back to the mission records and pulling out the relevant data for each year since 2005, these estimates use the best available baselines on which to build mission impact numbers.

The chapter uses current US dollars throughout, rather than “international” or “purchasing power parity” dollars, although the latter may give a more realistic picture of the local purchasing power of cash pumped into a given economy by an operation. Current dollars are used partly to facilitate cross-country comparisons (since PPP dollars vary in value by economy) and partly because UN mission expenditures are invariably valued in current US dollars. GDP data are drawn from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook for April 2009. Population data are drawn from the online CIA World Factbook. Mission expenditure data are drawn from the annual financial performance reports submitted to the General Assembly by all UN peacekeeping operations, in the December-February timeframe, for their peacekeeping fiscal year that closed in the previous June. Data on total mission spending, on average staffing for the year in all categories of personnel, total mission costs for UN Volunteers, and costs of national staff are drawn directly from these reports and anchor the financial analysis in Annex tables A-1.1 through A-1.4, for peacekeeping years 2004-05 through 2007-08, respectively.

Although Table A-1.1 addresses the same fiscal year as the original EIP report, it uses different expenditure reporting. The analysis in EIP for

2004-05 was done using mission budgets – the UN’s best guess as to what the mission would spend during the year and how many people would be employed to spend it – rather than actual spending. The exceptions were the older missions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste, for which 2001-02 was judged the year of “peak” impact and more suited to the report’s goal of generating a snapshot of each mission’s maximum economic footprint. However, table A-1.1 instead uses 2004-05 expenditure data for all missions.

In several cases, the average number of personnel deployed in a mission was substantially lower than budgeted for; that is, “vacancy rates” in MSA-eligible mission posts were much higher than planned. Either the personnel could not be found to fill those posts or could not be found in a timely fashion to replace serving personnel whose contracts were ending. In 2004-05, vacancy rates ranged from 18 to 41 percent, with Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire showing the greatest discrepancy between budgeted and deployed numbers of personnel.

Forward-year estimates for percentages of MSA taken in cash and for the percentage of local content in mission procurement were based on the percentages reported in EIP; neither data element is featured in annual UN mission expenditure reporting (which is one reason why the EIP study was initially undertaken). The MSA cash spending percentages generated for Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste for 2001-02 were used to generate estimates of MSA cash spending and procurement in those missions for 2004-05 onward.

The EIP study showed average percentages of MSA taken in cash by eligible personnel in five of the eight missions that it studied. These percentages have been applied without change to subsequent years within the same mission and successor mission(s) in the same country, on the assumption that percentages taken in cash would remain steady because the local economy changes relatively slowly and MSA rates would adjust to changes in local cost of living. While this chapter uses the MSA (and procurement) breakdowns reported in EIP, it uses the MSA rates established for each mission in each year studied, drawn from

the UN's Office of Human Resources Management. (See Annex Table A-4 for calculation of annual MSA by mission.)

The UNV program covers its volunteers' costs of relocating to and living in the place where they are posted. Not all UNVs serve with peacekeeping operations, but a large number do (2,260 as of the end of May 2009).⁶ Mission expenditure reports include a separate reporting line for UNVs, and per capita costs track closely with average annual per capita costs in UNV program annual reports. However, the latter reports break out living allowances from other costs (e.g., transport to and from duty stations). Living allowances are most likely to be spent locally, but the non-allowance segment of UNV compensation includes a "settling-in grant" equal to the living allowances total for three months. That sum seemed likely to be spent locally, as well, and so is treated here as part of UNV local spending. (See Annex Tables A-3.1 and A-3.2 for calculation of the likely locally-spent fractions of UNV mission costs.)

EIP also reported results of Peace Dividend Trust spending surveys of hundreds of staff taken in the eight missions studied. The surveys queried personnel regarding their monthly costs for housing, food (restaurant and self-prepared), domestic help, and other living expenses. The average monthly amounts reported in the surveys were consistently higher than the amounts that mission documents indicated were being distributed to mission personnel in cash. The average monthly per capita spending indicated by the respective surveys was listed in EIP (table 4 in the shorter 2007 version published in *International Peacekeeping*) but the study did not make further use of the survey data, noting only that "[w]e do not as yet have a well-grounded explanation for these differences."⁷ This analysis, however, does use those survey data to see how much difference the higher spending rates would make in overall mission economic impact if they, and not the MSA percentage-in-cash,

⁶ UN DPKO, "Background Note: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," 31 May 2009, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>. (When this web page is updated with newer data, the May 2009 Note may be found at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/archive.htm>.)

⁷ Carnahan, Gilmore, and Durch, "New Data," p. 388.

were the better reflection of cash injection into the economy by mission staff.

MSA data in tables 1, 2, and 3 in the 2007 article also must be read in conjunction with the brief observation that “Separate project surveys asked mission personnel to estimate their spending at local-owned versus foreign-owned businesses and on locally-produced versus imported goods, to further refine the estimate of local impact of MSA spending.”⁸ Total MSA/VLA numbers given for each mission in table 3 are consistently far higher than the combined totals for “MSA banked” (outside the host state) in table 1 and “MSA spending” on the local economy in table 2. The difference between the latter combination and the totals cited in table 3 can be traced to spending of MSA taken in cash, but on imported goods. Mission commissaries, for example, may carry a wide range of goods, largely imported, from packaged and frozen foods to household capital goods, such as microwaves and small refrigerators. To take into account the spending of cashed MSA on imported goods, Annex Table A-1.1.1 calculates an imported goods discount for each mission based on the differences between EIP 2007 tables 1, 2, and 3 for each mission. The results generally track the capacities of the economies of the respective host states to provide goods and services of a quality sought by international staff. As little as 27 percent of MSA cash in 2005 (when all of these numbers were calculated) went to local content in economically ravaged Liberia, whereas 75 percent may have gone to local content in Kosovo.

National staff salaries present far fewer difficulties of presentation as the mission expenditure reports treat them as a separate reporting line, and it can be assumed that the salaries are spent primarily within the local economy.

The local value/content of mission procurement is the third major component of a mission’s economic impact. The United Nations procures goods and services for its peacekeeping operations through two channels: the procurement division at the Headquarters in New York,

⁸ Ibid., p. 388.

and procurement by the missions themselves; the latter purchases may be local or regional in reach. EIP gathered data on total mission procurement, on the percentage of procurement initiated by the mission itself, and on the percentage of local content in procurement by the mission. These percentages, which differed for each mission, were used as baselines from which to calculate forward years' local content of mission procurement, in two excursions. In the first, local content remained a fixed percentage of total mission procurement over time. In the second, local content was assumed to grow by 10 percent per year, to simulate learning behavior on the part of procurement officers and economic recovery on the part of host states. Finally, as noted, the chapter also examines the implications of using the higher self-reporting levels of staff spending uncovered by the Peace Dividend Trust's 2005 staff surveys.

Annex Tables A-1.1 through A-1.4 also estimate spending for the special political missions (SPMs) that succeeded three of the original operations analyzed by EIP (in Burundi, Sierra Leone, and briefly in Timor-Leste). SPM public expenditure reporting is less complete than that of complex operations, reporting, for example, on the number of UNVs on staff but not separating out their costs, leaving them to be estimated.

Finally, Quick Impact Project (QIP) spending was not assessed in EIP. Most mission budgets have these lines, which vary from \$100,000 to \$2 million per year and generally add 1 to 2 percent to overall mission local spending. We address them briefly in the findings section.

Findings

Table 1 summarizes data for all missions studied, from 2004-05 through 2007-08. Over that period, total MSA estimated to be drawn in cash and spent on local goods and services, together with local spending by UNVs, increased from roughly \$110 million to \$164 million (or from \$152 to \$223 million, crediting the PDT staff spending surveys). UNVs accounted for about one tenth of this spending, which is generally focused on personal well-being and security of staff and not on planned

recovery of the host state's economy. EIP found upward pressure on the cost of luxury housing in mission areas, as well as renovation activities to bring housing stock up to UN safety, security, and sanitation standards. Entrepreneurial local parties do see the mission coming, are aware that the staff have disposable cash, work to attract lessees, and set housing rents for what the market will bear. Since there are typically personnel from many international agencies and non-governmental organizations competing for available housing stock in a depleted post-war economy, the market may be geared to bear a lot. Staff may also increase their personal economic impact by hiring one or more local persons as domestic help, at prevailing wage rates. (In Freetown, Sierra Leone, in 2005 a living wage for a family of four was said to be around US \$150 per month, or \$1,800 per year. The GDP per capita of Sierra Leone in 2005 was about \$217; times four is \$868, or slightly less than half a living wage.)

National staff in the missions studied increased by 75 percent between 2005 and 2008, while national staff salaries increased by 118 percent. The total number of personnel in UN operations increased, over the same period, by roughly 30 percent.⁹ So national hires in UN operations are growing in numbers at rates much higher than the overall expansion in UN peacekeeping. The UN appears, then, not to have accepted the argument made in EIP that fewer local direct hires and more outsourcing to local companies hiring greater numbers of people at prevailing wage rates would spread the wealth around to a greater degree while at the same time lessening inflationary pressure on local wages and making it easier for government and private sector alike to find and retain skilled people. The job-creating impact of outsourcing would not be visible in mission expenditure reporting unless a new category were added to account for the numbers of jobs generated in the local economy indirectly as a result of mission action (i.e. persons hired locally by mission contractors). Without such reporting, any job creation that results from outsourcing locally would be invisible to UN Member States, whereas the numbers on national staff are quite visible, and a national staff position in mission A may be a resumé builder for a much

⁹ UN DPKO, "Background Note," archival notes for June 2005 and June 2008.

more (8 to 10 times more) lucrative international staff position in UN mission B elsewhere in the region.

There was no opportunity to re-validate specific conclusions in EIP about inflationary pressure on local wages. Macro-economic data from the missions studied show mixed results over time, as was the case when the EIP study looked at the issue. Figure 1 depicts overall inflation rates for the host countries in the present analysis, from 2001 through 2008.¹⁰ (The inflation rate segment in table A-2 indicates the starting year of each complex operation by showing that year's inflation number in boldface.)



Burundi's inflation rate oscillated between 3 and 13 percent while its UN mission was deployed, and jumped to 25 percent within two years of its departure, replaced by a much smaller SPM. DRC's inflation rate has bounced between 15 and 20 percent since the EIP study was completed; the operation there increased in size by more than half in the same time interval, as the eastern half of the country remained unstable. Côte d'Ivoire experienced a relatively steady 11 to 14 percent rate of inflation throughout the period of UNOCI's deployment. Haiti's rate dropped by more than half in the first three years after peacekeepers deployed but has begun to edge up again. Liberia's inflation rate dropped by two-thirds after UNMIL deployed in late 2003, to a low 3 percent in 2005, but has been steadily increasing since then, to 17 percent in 2008. Sierra Leone's experience with UNAMSIL was comparable. Sudan's rates were steady after deployment of UNMIS, and doubled only in 2008, but since the deployment of UNAMID into Darfur was so severely delayed, and since the missions' spending relative to Sudan's GDP is miniscule (about 0.1 percent), other factors were at work. Finally, Timor-Leste's inflation rates were low during the main period of UN presence through 2005, rising only after the instabilities of 2006, but leveling off thereafter without breaking into double digits.

¹⁰ For source data, see table A-2.

Table 1: Summary Data for All UN Operations Analyzed

	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08
International Personnel Eligible for MSA				
Military Observers, Advisers, Liaison Officers	1.514	1.871	1.901	1.857
UN Police not in formed units	4.275	4.096	4.957	6.032
International Staff	3.173	3.833	3.946	4.388
Total personnel eligible for MSA	8.962	9.800	10.803	12.277
Average MSA per capita, by mission (US \$)	\$43.236	\$43.940	\$43.308	\$45.810
Pct MSA taken in cash (EIP average)		53,7%		
Staff-surveyed cash spending (PDT 2005), as pct of MSA (US \$)		74,6%		
Estimated total MSA taken in cash (US \$m)	\$194,3	\$234	\$256,9	\$310,5
Estimated staff spending, based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$268,5	\$321	\$350,4	\$425,0
UN Volunteers	1.426	1.668	1.836	1.918
Total mission UNV expenditures (US \$m)	\$62,1	\$76	\$85,3	\$86,8
Mission UNV expenditure per capita (US \$)	\$43.622	\$45.072	\$44.748	\$45.405
Estimated UNV cash spending per capita (US \$)	\$22.193	\$23.534	\$20.706	\$19.160
Estimated UNV cash spending as pct total UNV costs	50,9%	51,8%	46,3%	42,0%
Estimated total UNV cash spending (US \$m)	\$31,5	\$41	\$37,8	\$36,2
Estimated MSA + UNVLA Local Spending				
Est'd cash spending, using mission expenditure reports (US \$m)	\$225,8	\$274	\$294,8	\$346,7
Pct of cash spending on local goods/services (see table A-1.1.1)		46,5%		
Net local MSA + UNVLA spending (US\$m)	\$110,2	\$134	\$139,7	\$163,8
Net local staff spending based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$151,8	\$182	\$189,0	\$223,3
National Staff	6.095	7.063	9.225	10.796
Salaries paid to national staff (US \$m)	\$94,4	\$119	\$160,3	\$206,5
Case 1: Steady Percentage Local Content of Mission Procurement Over Time				
Total procurement as pct of mission spending (EIP data)	36,0%	36,0%	36,0%	36,0%
Estimated total procurement for the mission (US \$m)	\$1.254,7	\$1.552	\$1.615,0	\$1.905,5
Local content as pct of mission procurement (EIP data)		6,1%		
Value of local content in mission procurement, case 1 (US \$m)	\$74,8	\$96	\$98,0	\$115,4
Total local impact, case1 (US \$m)	\$279,4	\$349	\$398,0	\$485,7
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 1 (US \$m)	\$321,0	\$397	\$447,3	\$545,2
Local impact as pct of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), case 1	2,1%	1,7%	1,5%	1,22%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 1	2,3%	1,9%	1,6%	1,38%
Case 2: Annual Percentage Growth in Local Content of Mission Procurement*				
Local content as pct of mission procurement, case 2	n/a	7,9%	8,1%	8,74%
Value of local content in mission procurement, case 2 (US \$m)	n/a	\$106	\$120,5	\$148,3
Total local impact, case 2 US \$m)	n/a	\$359	\$420,4	\$518,6
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 2 (US \$m)	n/a	\$407	\$469,7	\$577,7
Local impact as percent of GDP, case 2	n/a	1,7%	1,5%	1,29%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 2	n/a	1,9%	1,7%	1,44%
Increases in percent of local content in procurement annually, case 2:	n/a	10%	10%	10%

Sources: See notes for tables A-1.1 through A-4.



Just for comparison, figure 2 depicts inflation rates for five neighboring states, mostly in Africa, and one in the Pacific, that did not host UN operations in the same period. Three of these (Fiji, Senegal, and Tanzania) had relatively steady, single-digit rates of inflation that edged upward in 2007 and 2008. Ghana began the period with inflation over 30 percent and brought it down into the 10 percent range before rising above 16 percent in 2008. Guinea, a troubled neighbor to Sierra Leone,

Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire, experienced rising rates of inflation through 2007, peaking at 35 percent before dropping to about 23 percent in 2008.

The rising rates for 2007-08 seen in most of the host states studied are also reflected in most of the compared countries. The wage pressure phenomenon that EIP noted still does not seem to be enough to generate major inflationary pressures on these economies at large.

The value of local content in mission procurement – the third major component of peace operations' economic footprint – was projected forward for this study from the procurement fractions derived by EIP, which calculated procurement as a fraction of all mission-related spending, mission procurement as a fraction of total procurement, and local content as a fraction of mission procurement. Case 1 in table 1 uses linear projection of the local content percentage in procurement for each mission determined by EIP, applying an average local content figure to the new missions in Sudan. Using this steady-percentage model, missions pumped a growing amount of money into host state economies, with the total rising from roughly \$75 million in 2004-05 to \$115 million in 2007-08.

If one assumes that mission procurement officers become more familiar over time the goods and services available to be purchased on local markets, and that those markets gradually recover capacity as the war recedes over time (and, indeed, adapt to the needs of the mission), then the impact of mission procurement may be greater, as depicted in case 2, with the impact ranging from \$106 million in 2005-06 to \$148 million in 2007-08.

Overall, the UN missions studied here may have contributed \$1.5 to \$1.7 billion to host state economies over the 4 fiscal years studied, under steady state procurement assumptions, and between \$1.6 and \$1.8 billion under assumptions of learning and adaptation.

Economic Impact on DR Congo and Côte d'Ivoire

This section focuses on the five complex operations that were deployed consistently between 2004 and 2008. The first of these is MONUC, in the DRC (table 2), a very large country economy of which is affected only peripherally by the UN presence. MONUC contributes roughly 1 percent to GDP under steady-state procurement scenarios, and only 1.1 percent in the learning scenario. Roughly 90 percent of MONUC's manpower is ineligible for MSA in military contingents, the members of which do not have much disposable cash and live in self-contained housing, rather than on the commercial market. Their critical role is, rather, in the provision of safety and security for the population, especially in the volatile eastern provinces.

ONUCI in Côte d'Ivoire (table 3) functions in a fairly well-developed economy the GDP per capita of which is more than ten times that of the DRC. ONUCI's total local spending has an impact of no more than 0.1 percent of GDP. Its presence, therefore, is much more keyed to the maintenance of security and stability than to providing help with economic growth.

Table 2: Summary Data for Congo, DR (MONUC)				
	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08
Mission Subsistence Allowance				
Total personnel eligible for MSA	1598	1.779	1967	1.915
Estimated total MSA taken in cash (US \$m)	\$43,0	\$47,9	\$53,0	\$55,0
(US\$m)	\$60,4	\$67,3	\$74,4	\$77,3
UN Volunteers Living Allowance				
Total UNV deployed	425	466	624	562
Estimated total UNV local spending (US \$m)	\$10,1	\$12,8	\$12,9	\$10,9
Estimated MSA + UNVLA Local Spending				
Net local MSA + UNVLA spending (US\$m)	\$26,7	\$30,5	\$33,0	\$33,1
Net local staff spending based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$35,4	\$40,2	\$43,8	\$44,3
National Staff				
Total national staff	1137	1.279	1905	2063
Salaries paid to national staff (US \$m)	\$15,3	\$18,4	\$28,1	\$39,4
Case 1: Steady Percentage Local Content of Mission Procurement Over Time				
Local content as pct of mission procurement (EIP data)	7,4%			
\$m)	\$31,2	\$36,4	\$37,5	\$37,03
Total local impact, case1 (US \$m)	\$73,2	\$85,3	\$98,6	\$109,5
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 1 (US \$m)	\$81,9	\$95,0	\$109,4	\$120,7
Local impact as pct of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), case 1	1,1%	1,0%	1,0%	0,94%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 1	1,2%	1,1%	1,1%	1,04%
Case 2: Annual Percentage Growth in Local Content of Mission Procurement*				
Local content as pct of mission procurement, case 2	n/a	8,1%	8,9%	9,8%
\$m)	n/a	\$40,1	\$45,32	\$49,29
Total local impact, case 2 US \$m)	n/a	\$88,9	\$106,5	\$121,8
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 2 (US \$m)	n/a	\$98,6	\$117,2	\$132,9
Local impact as percent of GDP, case 2	n/a	1,0%	1,1%	1,05%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 2	n/a	1,1%	1,2%	1,15%
Sources: See notes for tables A-1.1 through A-4.				

Table 3: Summary Data for Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI)

	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08
Mission Subsistence Allowance				
Total personnel eligible for MSA	626	828	953	963
Estimated total MSA taken in cash (US \$m)	\$16,3	\$21,2	\$23,4	\$25,3
Estimated staff spending, based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$21,6	\$28,0	\$31,0	\$33,5
UN Volunteers Living Allowance				
Total UNV deployed	77	188	227	260
Estimated total UNV local spending (US \$m)	\$1,9	\$4,0	\$4,4	\$4,0
Estimated MSA + UNVLA Local Spending				
Net local MSA + UNVLA spending (US\$m)	\$9,1	\$12,6	\$13,9	\$14,6
Net local staff spending based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$11,8	\$16,0	\$17,7	\$18,7
National Staff				
Total national staff	271	433	530	571
Salaries paid to national staff (US \$m)	\$5,0	\$8,2	\$12,2	\$13,5
Case 1: Steady Percentage Local Content of Mission Procurement Over Time				
Local content as pct of mission procurement (EIP data)		3,2%		
Value of local content in mission procurement, case 1 (US \$m)	\$5,3	\$6,1	\$7,2	\$7,39
Total local impact, case 1 (US \$m)	\$19,5	\$26,9	\$33,2	\$35,5
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 1 (US \$m)	\$22,1	\$30,3	\$37,0	\$39,6
Local impact as pct of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), case 1	0,1%	0,2%	0,2%	0,15%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 1	0,1%	0,2%	0,2%	0,17%
Case 2: Annual Percentage Growth in Local Content of Mission Procurement*				
Local content as pct of mission procurement, case 2	n/a	3,5%	3,9%	4,3%
Value of local content in mission procurement, case 2 (US \$m)	n/a	\$6,7	\$8,67	\$9,84
Total local impact, case 2 US \$m)	n/a	\$27,5	\$34,7	\$38,0
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 2 (US \$m)	n/a	\$30,9	\$38,5	\$42,1
Local impact as percent of GDP, case 2	n/a	0,2%	0,2%	0,16%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 2	n/a	0,2%	0,2%	0,18%

Sources: See notes for tables A-1.1 through A-4.

Economic Impact on Haiti and Kosovo

The MSA-eligible staff of the fourth featured mission, MINUSTAH in Haiti, has grown by half since 2005 and its UNV contingent has more than doubled. Total local impact, on the order of \$64 to \$70 million annually, is roughly 1 percent of GDP. MINUSTAH's efforts to fight urban gangs and patrols to interdict drug smuggling demonstrate that its primary role is providing security and stability in collaboration with the host government.

The fifth stable mission is UNMIK, in Kosovo, which declared its independence over a year ago at the time when this paper was written, but then most of the countries where UN operations deploy are sovereign as well. For the UN, the issue is more how to step back gracefully from its executive responsibilities, a maneuver made a bit easier by the appearance of several over-lapping European Union missions, which has allowed UNMIK to cut its personnel by one-third since 2005. The economy remains sufficiently small, however, that even down-sizing UNMIK can account for 2.2 to 2.7 percent of the Kosovo economy (although down from nearly 4 percent a few years ago).

Table 4: Summary Data for Haiti (MINUSTAH)

	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08
Mission Subsistence Allowance				
Total personnel eligible for MSA	861	1.123	1156	1.339
Estimated total MSA taken in cash (US \$m)	\$25,2	\$32,3	\$32,0	\$37,8
Estimated staff spending, based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$33,0	\$42,2	\$41,9	\$49,4
UN Volunteers Living Allowance				
Total UNV deployed	99	170	177	196
Estimated total UNV local spending (US \$m)	\$2,5	\$4,2	\$4,1	\$4,6
Estimated MSA + UNVLA Local Spending				
Net local MSA + UNVLA spending (US\$m)	\$10,9	\$14,4	\$14,2	\$16,7
Net local staff spending based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$14,0	\$18,3	\$18,1	\$21,3
National Staff				
Total national staff	152	493	724	1113
Salaries paid to national staff (US \$m)	\$4,6	\$11,0	\$15,8	\$23,4
Case 1: Steady Percentage Local Content of Mission Procurement Over Time				
Local content as pct of mission procurement (EIP data)		10,6%		
Value of local content in mission procurement, case 1 (US \$m)	\$13,6	\$17,3	\$17,4	\$19,25
Total local impact, case1 (US \$m)	\$29,2	\$42,7	\$47,5	\$59,3
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 1 (US \$m)	\$32,2	\$46,6	\$51,4	\$63,9
Local impact as pct of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), case 1	0,7%	0,9%	0,8%	0,85%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 1	0,8%	1,0%	0,8%	0,92%
Case 2: Annual Percentage Growth in Local Content of Mission Procurement*				
Local content as pct of mission procurement, case 2	n/a	11,6%	12,8%	14,1%
Value of local content in mission procurement, case 2 (US \$m)	n/a	\$19,0	\$21,11	\$25,63
Total local impact, case 2 US \$m)	n/a	\$44,4	\$51,2	\$65,7
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 2 (US \$m)	n/a	\$48,3	\$55,1	\$70,3
Local impact as percent of GDP, case 2	n/a	0,9%	0,8%	0,94%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 2	n/a	1,0%	0,9%	1,01%

Sources: See notes for tables A-1.1 through A-4.

Table 5: Summary Data for Kosovo (UNMIK)

	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08
Mission Subsistence Allowance				
Total personnel eligible for MSA	3195	2.330	2002	1.976
Estimated total MSA taken in cash (US \$m)	\$43,7	\$45,1	\$37,9	\$42,2
Estimated staff spending, based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$70,4	\$72,6	\$61,1	\$67,9
UN Volunteers Living Allowance				
Total UNV deployed	207	191	144	131
Estimated total UNV local spending (US \$m)	\$3,2	\$5,4	\$2,6	\$2,2
Estimated MSA + UNVLA Local Spending				
Net local MSA + UNVLA spending (US\$m)	\$36,1	\$37,9	\$31,1	\$33,3
Net local staff spending based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$56,2	\$58,5	\$48,5	\$52,6
National Staff				
Total national staff	2692	2.276	1985	1900
Salaries paid to national staff (US \$m)	\$51,7	\$46,5	\$44,4	\$49,4
Case 1: Steady Percentage Local Content of Mission Procurement Over Time				
Local content as pct of mission procurement (EIP data)		12,7% (2001-02)		
Value of local content in mission procurement, case 1 (US \$m)	\$5,2	\$4,1	\$3,7	\$3,90
Total local impact, case1 (US \$m)	\$93,0	\$88,5	\$79,2	\$86,6
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 1 (US \$m)	\$113,0	\$109,2	\$96,6	\$105,9
Local impact as pct of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), case 1	3,0%	2,7%	2,1%	2,17%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 1	3,6%	3,3%	2,6%	2,66%
Case 2: Annual Percentage Growth in Local Content of Mission Procurement*				
Local content as pct of mission procurement, case 2	16,9%	18,6%	20,5%	22,5%
Value of local content in mission procurement, case 2 (US \$m)	\$6,9	\$6,0	\$5,98	\$6,90
Total local impact, case 2 US \$m)	\$94,7	\$90,4	\$81,4	\$89,6
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 2 (US \$m)	\$114,8	\$111,1	\$98,8	\$108,9
Local impact as percent of GDP, case 2	3,0%	2,7%	2,2%	2,25%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 2	3,7%	3,3%	2,6%	2,73%

Sources: See notes for tables A-1.1 through A-4.

Economic Impact on Liberia

Lastly, there is the mission in Liberia, with a steady-state presence of MSA-eligible personnel, steady MSA local spending of \$11 to \$12 million per year, but initially meager local procurement patterns in five-plus years of deployment. Best-case scenario has UN local procurement at not more than \$6 million per year, and total local impact at \$33 to \$34 million, yet Liberia's economy remains sufficiently shaky that this contribution is a significant 4 percent of total GDP.

Table 6: Summary Data for Liberia (UNMIL)

	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08
Mission Subsistence Allowance				
Total personnel eligible for MSA	1268	1.302	1312	1.266
Estimated total MSA taken in cash (US \$m)	\$37,6	\$38,1	\$37,5	\$36,6
Estimated staff spending, based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$40,5	\$41,1	\$40,4	\$39,5
UN Volunteers Living Allowance				
Total UNV deployed	309	337	240	237
Estimated total UNV local spending (US \$m)	\$6,1	\$7,1	\$4,7	\$4,7
Estimated MSA + UNVLA Local Spending				
Net local MSA + UNVLA spending (US\$m)	\$11,8	\$12,2	\$11,4	\$11,2
Net local staff spending based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$12,6	\$13,0	\$12,2	\$12,0
National Staff				
Total national staff	635	753	883	931
Salaries paid to national staff (US \$m)	\$8,8	\$11,5	\$14,4	\$15,9
Case 1: Steady Percentage Local Content of Mission Procurement Over Time				
Local content as pct of mission procurement (EIP data)		2,1%		
Value of local content in mission procurement, case 1 (US \$m)	\$5,1	\$4,9	\$4,7	\$4,53
Total local impact, case1 (US \$m)	\$25,7	\$28,7	\$30,5	\$31,6
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 1 (US \$m)	\$26,5	\$29,5	\$31,3	\$32,4
Local impact as pct of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), case 1	5,9%	4,7%	4,2%	3,79%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 1	6,1%	4,8%	4,3%	3,88%
Case 2: Annual Percentage Growth in Local Content of Mission Procurement*				
Local content as pct of mission procurement, case 2	n/a	2,3%	2,6%	2,8%
Value of local content in mission procurement, case 2 (US \$m)	n/a	\$5,4	\$5,71	\$6,03
Total local impact, case 2 US \$m)	n/a	\$29,1	\$31,5	\$33,1
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 2 (US \$m)	n/a	\$30,0	\$32,3	\$33,9
Local impact as percent of GDP, case 2	n/a	4,8%	4,3%	3,96%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 2	n/a	4,9%	4,4%	4,06%

Sources: See notes for tables A-1.1 through A-4.

Quick-Impact Projects

Finally, a word about QIPs, which are intended to provide fast-dispersing money for multiple, small projects and are the only line in peacekeeping mission budgets that can be directed outward from the mission to effect small infrastructure repairs, for example, rather than toward direct mission needs. Their value lies in their flexibility, and in the ability to provide services for the community that may increase or reinforce a mission's local legitimacy, while possibly doing some good. They are, however, an under-evaluated tool whose actual value is largely unknown. A subject search of the UN's extensive document repository turned up just two documents related to quick impact projects and a Pro-Quest abstract search turned up no work in the scholarly literature. Information provided in mission reporting does not always meet even the minimal reporting requirements of results-based-budgeting. Of the missions addressed here, MINUSTAH appears to have the best-organized QIPs program, judging by the quality and focus of its expenditure reporting for 2007-08. Yet this reporting is still skeletal at best:

Goal: 125 quick-impact projects in the areas of training/capacity building (35), infrastructure rehabilitation (40), public services (30) and social mobilization (20) for the benefit of elected officials and administrative staff and in anticipation of broader donor involvement.

Done: 176 quick-impact projects in training and capacity building (24), infrastructure rehabilitation (80), public services (56) and social mobilization (16).¹¹

In other words, MINUSTAH overachieved by about 40 percent; managed to spend all but 1.4 percent of the \$2 million in its 2007-08 budget for QIPs, with projects averaging \$11,200 each.

¹¹ United Nations, *Financial Performance Report of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008*, A/63/549, p. 46.

At the other end of the efficiency scale is UNMIL, with a \$1 million QIPs budget and nominally a high level of funding commitment, but most of its projects remained incomplete at the end of the fiscal year:

Goal: 11 quick-impact projects to enable the extension of State authority in the rural and vulnerable communities. Done: 8.

Goal: 17 quick-impact projects to ensure the sustainability of the return of internally displaced persons and refugees. Done: 12. Projects were approved to address shortfalls in the provision of basic social services in areas with a high concentration of returnees; the remaining 13 [sic] are to be completed in the first half of 2008/09 budget year.

Goal: 23 quick-impact projects to strengthen the rule of law. Done: 9 (of 19 approved; “the remaining are expected to be fully implemented”).

UNMIL’s reporting notes that, among its unplanned consultancies was one for evaluation of quick-impact projects.

Conclusions

UN peacekeeping operations are not the only, or even the sole, means by which the international community rallies resources to assist the recovery of war-torn states. Peacekeepers deploy to provide security and stability (with greater or less proficiency) as well as political and civil society support, electoral assistance, human rights monitoring and reporting, and security system reform and restructuring. They depend on other, bilateral and multilateral donors for counterpart contributions to infrastructure projects and host nation budget support. Their contributions to supporting the host state economy is largely incidental to doing their main job, yet what is incidental to them may be critical to those whose goods and services may be utilized by these sometimes-large civil-military operations. And the operations can, as argued in the original EIP report, more consciously design their initial field assessments, their procurement strategies, and their employment strategies to deploy their budgets in a manner designed to help the local economy regain its feet, rather than pull the rug out from under it by siphoning away its most skilled, educated, and English or French-speaking talent for relatively menial jobs that nonetheless command a salary that may be an order of magnitude greater than what can be found in the post-conflict economy at large. Missions can do a lot of economic good, but as argued in the original EIP study, being able to do good means planning to do good, and designing elements of the operation to fit those plans, and both mapping and nurturing the local capacities that could help a mission do elements of its job as well as an offshore contractor. In short, peacekeepers may be incidental economic peacebuilders, but incidental need not mean inadvertent.

Annex

The annex to this paper contains the four main data tables from which were derived the tables discussed in the main text. Also included are tables of national accounts data and tables detailing the calculation of Mission Subsistence Allowances and UNV Living Allowances.

Table A-1.1 – UN Mission Fiscal Year 2004-05

Table A-1.1.1 – Calculating Staff Cash Spending on Local Goods and Services

Table A-1.2 – UN Mission Fiscal Year 2005-06

Table A-1.3 – UN Mission Fiscal Year 2006-07

Table A-1.4 – UN Mission Fiscal Year 2007-08

Table A-2 – Economic and Demographic Data

Table A-3.1 – UN Volunteers, Part 1

Table A-3.2 – UN Volunteers, Part 2

Table A-4 – Mission Subsistence Allowance, UN Peacekeeping Fiscal Year Averages.

Table A-1.1: UN Mission FY 2004-2005

	Burundi ONUB	Congo, DR MONUC	Cote d'Ivoire ONUCI	Haiti MINUSTAH	Kosovo UNMIK	Liberia UNMIL	Sierra Leone UNAMSIL	Timor-Leste UNMISSET	Averages & Totals
GDP 2005 (US \$m)	\$765	\$5,689	\$16,591	\$3,955	\$3,133	\$426	\$1,215	\$332	
Population 2005 (m)	7.9	58.7	18.6	9.3	2.4	3.4	5.6	1.1	
GDP per capita (US \$)	\$97	\$114	\$893	\$426	\$1,293	\$127	\$217	\$311	
Total mission spending (US \$m)	\$303.8	\$904.0	\$336.9	\$377.2	\$294.5	\$741.1	\$264.5	\$81.6	
Years since initial EIP measurement, or mission start:	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	3	
International Personnel Eligible for MSA									
Military Observers, Advisers, Liaison Officers	175	725	169	--	37	201	168	39	1514
UN Police not in formed units	77	158	210	555	2440	599	94	142	4275
International Staff	279	715	247	718	306	468	253	167	3173
Total personnel eligible for MSA	531	1598	626	861	3195	1268	515	368	8962
MSA per capita, by mission (US \$)	\$43,080	\$53,100	\$48,540	\$54,480	\$6,240	\$24,040	\$40,250	\$35,050	\$43,235
Pct MSA taken in cash (EIP percent or average)	53.7%	50.7%	53.7%	53.7%	56.9%	62.6%	44.3%	54.1%	53.7%
PDT 2005 survey, staff spending as pct of MSA (US \$)	77.2%	71.2%	71.1%	70.3%	91.7%	67.5%	74.8%	72.6%	74.6%
Estimated total MSA taken in cash (US \$m)	\$12.3	\$43.0	\$16.3	\$25.2	\$43.7	\$37.6	\$9.2	\$7.0	\$194.3
Estimated staff spending, based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$17.7	\$60.4	\$21.6	\$33.0	\$70.4	\$40.5	\$15.5	\$9.4	\$268.5
UN Volunteers									
Total mission UNV expenditures (US \$m)	\$4.9	\$19.5	\$3.6	\$4.7	\$7.7	\$13.0	\$4.6	\$2.1	\$42.6
Mission UNV expenditure per capita (US \$)	\$45,449	\$45,948	\$46,831	\$47,758	\$37,589	\$41,958	\$40,122	\$43,319	\$43,622
Average UNV costs unrelated to living allowance (US \$)	\$16,229	\$15,887	\$15,806	\$16,112	\$16,218	\$15,994	\$15,970	\$16,014	
Annual UNV hazardous duty station supplement, (US\$m)	\$6,240	\$6,240	\$6,240	\$6,240	\$0	\$6,240	\$6,000	\$6,000	
Estimated UNV cash spending per capita (US \$)	\$22,979	\$22,821	\$24,785	\$25,406	\$21,371	\$19,724	\$18,151	\$21,306	\$22,193
Estimated UNV cash spending as pct total UNV costs	50.6%	51.8%	52.0%	53.2%	56.2%	47.0%	45.2%	49.2%	50.9%
Estimated total UNV cash spending (US \$m)	\$2.5	\$10.1	\$1.9	\$2.5	\$4.4	\$6.1	\$2.0	\$2.0	\$31.5
MSA+UNVLA local spending, EIP estimate (US \$m)									
Est'd cash spending, using mission expenditure reports (US \$m)	\$14.7	\$24.0	\$14.5	\$13.9	no EIP estimate	\$13.4	no EIP estimate	no EIP estimate	
Pct of cash spending on local goods/services (see table A-1.1)	53.0%	50.2%	50.0%	39.3%	75.0%	27.0%	40.1%	37.1%	\$25.8
Net local MSA + UNVLA spending (US\$m)	\$7.8	\$26.7	\$9.1	\$10.9	\$36.1	\$11.8	\$4.5	\$3.3	\$110.2
Net local staff spending based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$10.7	\$35.4	\$11.8	\$14.0	\$56.2	\$12.6	\$7.0	\$4.2	\$151.8
National Staff									
Average national salary (US \$)	196	1137	271	152	2692	635	506	506	6095
Salaries paid to national staff (US \$m)	\$17,116	\$13,441	\$18,546	\$30,516	\$19,195	\$13,791	\$6,896	\$5,210	\$84.4
Total procurement for the mission, from EIP, updated for 3 missions to 2004-05, (US \$m)									
Total procurement as pct of mission spending, from EIP	44.7%	46.6%	49.4%	34.1%	13.9%	32.7%	35.2%	31.0%	\$1,254.7
Procurement by the mission, as pct of total procurement, EIP	39.6%	35.3%	13.9%	51.6%	48.7%	12.1%	14.6%	5.2%	36.0%
Percent local content in procurement by the mission, EIP	20.8%	20.9%	23.1%	20.5%	26.1%	17.6%	20.4%	30.0%	22.4%
Local content as pct of total procurement, EIP	8.2%	7.4%	3.2%	10.6%	16.9%	2.1%	4.0%	2.1%	6.8%
Value of local procurement, from EIP except as noted (US \$m)	\$11.1	\$31.2	\$5.3	\$13.6	\$6.9	\$5.1	\$3.7	\$0.5	\$77.6
Total local impact (US \$m)	\$22.3	\$73.2	\$19.5	\$29.2	\$94.7	\$25.7	\$11.2	\$6.5	\$282.2
Total local impact using PDT survey data (US \$m)	\$26.2	\$81.9	\$22.1	\$32.2	\$114.8	\$26.5	\$13.7	\$7.4	\$323.7
Local impact as pct total mission spending	7.3%	8.1%	5.8%	7.7%	32.2%	3.5%	4.2%	7.9%	9.6%
Local impact as pct total mission spending, PDT survey data	8.3%	9.1%	6.5%	8.5%	38.0%	3.6%	5.2%	9.0%	11.2%
Local impact pct of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	2.9%	1.1%	0.1%	0.7%	3.0%	5.9%	0.9%	2.0%	2.1%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data	3.3%	1.2%	0.1%	0.8%	3.7%	6.1%	1.1%	2.2%	2.3%

Sources: For GDP and population data, see table A-2. For mission expenditure reporting and average numbers of personnel deployed per peacekeeping fiscal year, see United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Performance report on the budget ... for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 (ONUB, A/60/612, 21 December 2005; MONUC, A/60/609, 6 February 2006; ONUCI, A/60/630, 23 December 2005; MINUSTAH, A/60/645, 5 January 2006; UNMIL, A/60/637, 26 December 2005; UNMIK, A/60/645, 5 January 2006; Sierra Leone, A/60/631, 23 December 2005; and

Table A-1.1.1: Calculating Staff Cash Spending on Local Goods and Services	Burundi	Congo, DR	Cote d'Ivoire	Haiti	Kosovo	Liberia	Sierra Leone	Timor-Leste
MSA and UNVA from EIP 2007 (US\$ '000s)	2004-05	2004-05	2004-05	2004-05	2001-02	2004-05	2001-02	2001-02
Table 1: "MSA banked" (outside the local economy)	\$8,036	\$44,984	\$11,806	\$15,132	\$63,828	\$34,063	\$18,411	\$37,871
Table 2: "MSA spent" (on local economy)	\$14,671	\$23,956	\$14,453	\$13,876	\$50,181	\$13,414	\$5,255	\$17,765
Table 3: "Annual MSA and UNVA", (grand total)	\$35,700	\$92,700	\$40,700	\$50,400	\$130,700	\$83,700	\$31,500	\$95,800
Table 3 less Table 1+2 (defines staff spending on imports such as commissary goods)	\$12,993	\$23,760	\$14,441	\$21,392	\$16,691	\$36,223	\$7,834	\$30,164
Total staff MSA and UNVA cash spending (line above + Table 2)	\$27,664	\$47,716	\$28,694	\$35,288	\$66,872	\$49,637	\$13,089	\$47,929
Total cash spending as percentage of "Annual MSA and UNVA"	77.5%	51.5%	71.0%	70.0%	51.2%	59.3%	41.6%	55.9%
Table 4: average staff-reported monthly spending as percentage of monthly MSA (PDT survey, 2005)	77.2%	71.2%	71.1%	70.3%	91.7%	67.5%	74.8%	72.6%
Table 4: MSA "Percentage paid in cash" (mission documents)		50.7%			56.9%	62.6%	44.3%	54.1%
Local content of staff spending (Table 2) as percent of all staff MSA and UNVA cash spending	53.0%	50.2%	50.0%	39.3%	75.0%	27.0%	40.1%	37.1%

Table A-1.4: UN Mission FY 2007-2008

	Burundi	Compo. DR	Cote d'Ivoire	Haiti	Kosovo	Liberia	Sierra Leone	Sudan-South	Sudan-Darfur	Timor-Leste	Averages & Totals
	BINULI	MONUC	ONUCI	MINUSTAH	UNMIK	UNMIL	UNOSIL	UNMIS	UNAMID	UNMIT	
GDP 2008 est (US \$m)	\$1,097	\$11,589	\$23,608	\$6,952	\$3,986	\$836	\$1,955	\$57,911	\$57,911	\$499	
Population 2008 est. (m)	8.8	64.7	19.6	9.8	2.4	3.9	6.0	39.4	39.4	1.2	
GDP per capita (US \$)	\$124	\$179	\$1,199	\$713	\$1,649	\$215	\$324	\$1,470	\$1,470	\$413	
Total mission spending (US \$m)	\$29	\$1,076	\$653	\$534	\$220	\$650	\$26	\$820	\$1,056	\$163	
Years since initial EIP measurement, or mission start:	3	3	3	3	6	3	2	3	0	6	
International Personnel Eligible for MSA											
Military Observers, Advisers, Liaison Officers	7	719	189	0	39	203	9	579	79	33	1857
UN Police not in formed units	14	283	371	665	1481	562	371	19	650	833	6032
International Staff	141	913	403	474	456	501	86	802	289	323	4388
Total personnel eligible for MSA	162	1,915	963	1,339	1,976	1,266	114	2,031	1,201	1,310	12,777
MSA per capita, by mission (US \$)	\$43,985	\$56,690	\$48,880	\$50,525	\$37,480	\$46,200	\$40,250	\$45,630	\$51,400	\$36,080	\$45,610
Pct MSA taken in cash (EIP percent or average)	53.7%	50.7%	53.7%	53.7%	56.9%	62.6%	44.3%	53.7%	53.7%	54.1%	53.7%
Pct 2005 survey, staff spending as pct of MSA (US \$)	77.2%	71.2%	71.1%	70.3%	91.7%	67.5%	74.8%	74.6%	74.6%	72.6%	74.6%
Estimated total MSA taken in cash (US \$m)	\$9.8	\$65.0	\$36.3	\$37.8	\$42.2	\$36.6	\$20.0	\$49.8	\$33.2	\$24.8	\$310.5
Estimated staff spending, based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$6.6	\$77.3	\$39.5	\$49.4	\$67.9	\$39.5	\$3.4	\$69.1	\$46.0	\$33.3	\$429.0
UN Volunteers											
Total mission UNV expenditures (US \$m)	\$1	\$62	\$60	\$16	\$131	\$27	\$24	\$242	\$46	\$117	\$618
Mission UNV expenditures per capita (US \$)	\$0.22	\$25.9	\$10.9	\$9.9	\$4.9	\$11.1	\$1.09	\$6.9	\$4.6	\$5.1	\$86.8
Average UNV expenditure per capita (US \$)	\$45,405	\$46,157	\$42,002	\$50,303	\$37,441	\$46,968	\$45,405	\$41,070	\$47,099	\$52,220	\$45,405
Annual UNV costs unrelated to living allowance (US \$)	\$20,755	\$20,522	\$20,444	\$20,723	\$20,673	\$20,695	\$20,649	\$20,477	\$20,477	\$20,656	
Annual UNV hazardous duty station supplement, (US\$)	6,240	6,240	6,240	6,240	0	6,240	6,240	6,240	6,240	6,240	
Estimated UNV cash spending per capita (US \$)	\$18,372	\$19,375	\$15,318	\$23,340	\$16,558	\$20,033	\$18,516	\$14,363	\$20,362	\$25,346	\$19,160
Estimated UNV cash spending as pct total UNV costs	40.5%	42.0%	36.5%	46.4%	44.3%	42.7%	40.9%	34.9%	43.3%	48.5%	42.0%
Estimated total UNV cash spending (US \$m)	\$0.9	\$10.9	\$4.0	\$4.6	\$2.2	\$4.7	\$0.4	\$3.5	\$2.0	\$3.0	\$36.2
Estimated MSA + UNVLA Local Spending											
EIP'd cash spending, using mission expenditure reports (US \$m)	\$4.8	\$65.9	\$29.3	\$42.4	\$44.3	\$44.4	\$2.5	\$63.3	\$36.2	\$27.8	\$346.7
Pct of cash spending on local goods/services (see table A.1.1)	53.0%	50.2%	50.0%	39.3%	75.0%	27.0%	40.1%	46.5%	46.5%	37.1%	46.5%
Net local MSA + UNVLA spending (US\$m)	\$2.5	\$33.1	\$14.8	\$16.7	\$33.3	\$11.2	\$1.0	\$24.8	\$16.3	\$10.3	\$163.8
Net local staff spending based on PDT survey results (US\$m)	\$3.4	\$44.3	\$18.7	\$21.3	\$29.6	\$12.0	\$1.6	\$33.7	\$22.3	\$13.5	\$223.3
Average national salary (US \$)	\$19,089	\$19,089	\$23,622	\$21,029	\$26,006	\$17,117	\$17,117	\$18,137	\$12,373	\$6,760	\$107.96
Salaries paid to national staff (US \$m)	\$4.5	\$39.4	\$13.5	\$23.4	\$49.4	\$15.9	\$3.4	\$43.9	\$9.5	\$4.5	\$206.5
Case 1: Steady Percentage Local Content of Mission Procurement Over Time											
Total procurement as pct of mission spending (EIP data)	44.7%	46.6%	49.4%	34.1%	13.9%	32.7%	36.2%	36.0%	36.0%	31.0%	36.0%
Estimated total procurement for the mission (US \$m)	\$12.9	\$501.8	\$229.9	\$182.1	\$30.6	\$212.7	\$9.9	\$295.1	\$380.0	\$60.4	\$1,900.5
Local content as pct of mission procurement (EIP data)	8.2%	7.4%	3.2%	10.6%	12.7%	2.1%	3.0%	6.1%	6.1%	1.6%	6.1%
Value of local content in mission procurement, case 1 (US \$m)	\$1.06	\$37.03	\$7.39	\$19.25	\$3.90	\$4.53	\$0.30	\$17.99	\$23.17	\$0.79	\$115.4
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 1 (US \$m)	\$8.1	\$109.5	\$35.5	\$59.3	\$86.6	\$31.6	\$4.7	\$86.7	\$48.0	\$15.6	\$485.7
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 2 (US \$m)	\$9.0	\$120.7	\$39.6	\$63.9	\$105.9	\$32.4	\$5.3	\$95.7	\$54.0	\$18.8	\$494.2
Local impact as pct of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), case 1	0.74%	0.94%	0.15%	0.85%	2.17%	3.79%	0.24%	0.15%	0.08%	0.13%	1.22%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 1	0.82%	1.04%	0.17%	0.92%	2.66%	3.88%	0.27%	0.17%	0.09%	0.17%	1.38%
Case 2: Annual Percentage Growth in Local Content of Mission Procurement											
Local content as pct of mission procurement, case 2	13.3%	9.8%	4.3%	14.1%	22.5%	2.8%	3.6%	8.1%	6.1%	2.8%	8.74%
Value of local content in mission procurement, case 2 (US \$m)	\$1.72	\$49.29	\$9.84	\$25.63	\$6.80	\$6.03	\$0.36	\$23.94	\$23.17	\$1.39	\$148.3
Total local impact, case 2 (US \$m)	\$8.7	\$121.8	\$38.0	\$65.7	\$89.6	\$33.1	\$4.8	\$92.6	\$48.0	\$16.2	\$491.6
Total local impact, using PDT survey, case 2 (US \$m)	\$9.6	\$132.9	\$42.1	\$70.3	\$108.9	\$33.9	\$5.0	\$101.6	\$54.0	\$19.4	\$577.7
Local impact as percent of GDP, case 2	0.80%	1.05%	0.16%	0.94%	2.25%	3.96%	0.24%	0.16%	0.08%	0.25%	1.29%
Local impact as pct GDP, using PDT survey data, case 2	0.88%	1.15%	0.18%	1.01%	2.73%	4.06%	0.25%	0.18%	0.09%	0.25%	1.44%
Increases in pct of local content in procurement annually, case 2:											
Sources: For GDP and population data, see table A.2. For mission expenditure reporting and average numbers of personnel deployed per peacekeeping fiscal year, see United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Performance report on the Budget... for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 (MONUC, A/63/563, 21 November 2008; ONUCI, A/63/610, 15 December 2008; MINUSTAH, A/63/549, 17 November 2008; UNMIK, A/63/569, 25 November 2008; UNMIL, A/63/598, 4 December 2008; UNMIS, A/63/604, 12 December 2008; UNAMID, A/63/535, 10 November 2008; and UNMIT, A/63/607, 15 December 2008. Also United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Estimates in Respect of Special Political Missions											

Table A-2: Economic and Demographic Data		2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Gross Domestic Product, current US \$m									
Burundi		\$662	\$628	\$595	\$664	\$601	\$919	\$975	\$1,097
Congo, DR		\$5,155	\$5,539	\$5,681	\$6,561	\$7,223	\$8,786	\$9,969	\$11,569
Cote d'Ivoire		\$10,554	\$11,527	\$13,764	\$15,501	\$16,392	\$17,392	\$19,824	\$23,508
Haiti		\$3,593	\$3,472	\$2,962	\$3,538	\$4,311	\$4,836	\$6,137	\$6,962
Kosovo		\$2,418	\$2,647	\$3,019	\$3,242	\$3,133	\$3,336	\$3,779	\$3,966
Liberia		\$516	\$543	\$409	\$459	\$528	\$612	\$735	\$836
Sierra Leone		\$806	\$936	\$991	\$1,073	\$1,215	\$1,424	\$1,665	\$1,955
Sudan		\$13,360	\$14,976	\$17,780	\$21,686	\$27,366	\$36,401	\$46,531	\$57,911
Timor-Leste		\$277	\$284	\$298	\$309	\$332	\$327	\$338	\$499
Inflation, average consumer prices (annual percentage change)									
Burundi		9.255	-1.329	10.693	7.908	13.39	2.829	8.348	24.436
Congo, DR		25.316	12.817	12.817	4.001	21.394	13.211	16.713	17.966
Cote d'Ivoire		11.256	9.167	9.448	12.315	13.798	11.471	9.357	13.426
Haiti		16.5	9.3	26.7	28.3	16.8	14.227	9.048	14.4
Liberia		12.149	14.16	10.33	3.555	6.945	7.244	11.391	17.49
Sierra Leone		2.568	-3.659	7.546	14.247	12.05	9.544	11.651	14.836
Sudan		4.871	8.334	7.711	8.418	8.517	7.197	7.976	14.298
Timor-Leste		3.589	4.712	7.16	3.243	1.821	4.148	8.938	7.623
Fiji		4.273	0.8	4.2	2.8	2.4	2.49	4.8	8
Ghana		32.906	14.815	26.677	12.629	15.113	10.151	10.733	16.522
Guinea		6.766	5.377	2.96	11.036	17.463	31.368	34.702	22.861
Senegal		2.963	2.342	-0.038	0.508	1.714	2.107	5.867	5.759
Tanzania		5.147	4.555	4.429	4.138	4.359	7.251	7.028	10.276
Population, millions									
Burundi		6.84	7.05	7.29	7.57	7.86	8.17	8.51	8.85
Congo, DR		52.04	53.54	55.17	56.92	58.74	60.64	62.64	64.67
Cote d'Ivoire		17.38	17.69	17.98	18.28	18.58	18.91	19.26	19.60
Haiti		8.72	8.86	9.00	9.15	9.30	9.45	9.60	9.75
Kosovo		2.57	2.51	2.47	2.43	2.42	2.42	2.42	2.42
Liberia		3.18	3.25	3.29	3.35	3.44	3.58	3.75	3.89
Sierra Leone		4.70	4.92	5.16	5.39	5.59	5.74	5.87	6.03
Sudan		34.06	34.75	35.44	36.15	36.90	37.71	38.56	39.40
Timor-Leste		0.85	0.90	0.95	1.01	1.07	1.11	1.15	1.21
Percent population change, year to year		2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	3-yr moving average				
Burundi		3.9%	4.0%	4.1%	4.0%	Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2009 (GDP, Inflation), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/index.htm , US Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, 2009 (Population), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/			
Congo, DR		3.2%	3.2%	3.3%	3.2%				
Cote d'Ivoire		1.7%	1.8%	1.8%	1.8%				
Haiti		1.6%	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%				
Kosovo		-0.5%	-0.1%	0.1%	-0.2%				
Liberia		2.8%	4.0%	4.8%	3.9%				
Sierra Leone		3.6%	2.8%	2.1%	2.9%				
Sudan		2.1%	2.2%	2.3%	2.2%				
Timor-Leste		5.3%	4.4%	3.7%	4.5%				

Table A-3.1: International UN Volunteers, part	2004-2005	2005	2006	2007	2008
Base Monthly Living Allowance (MLA), US\$	\$820	\$820	\$820	\$900	\$900
Average annual costs unrelated to Volunteer Living Allowances	\$19,500	\$19,500	\$22,100	\$24,600	\$27,000
Annual Hazardous Duty Station Supplement	6,240	6,240	6,240	6,240	6,240
Post Adjustment Multipliers (PAM), by year					
Burundi	0.3295	0.3728	0.4648	0.41	0.4773
Congo, DR	0.4685	0.4933	0.5247	0.5103	0.556
Cote d'Ivoire	0.5017	0.5098	0.5104	0.5393	0.7092
Haiti	0.3773	0.3833	0.4122	0.436	0.5033
Kosovo	0.334	0.3467	0.3555	0.3802	0.516
Liberia	0.4252	0.4358	0.4503	0.4463	0.5037
Sierra Leone	0.4348	0.4478	0.4585	0.4633	0.508
Sudan		0.4183	0.518	0.5272	0.5465
Timor-Leste	0.4172	0.4565	0.4951	0.4685	0.4985
Estimated Post-adjusted monthly MLA (US\$)					
Burundi	\$1,090	\$1,126	\$1,201	\$1,269	\$1,330
Congo, DR	\$1,204	\$1,225	\$1,250	\$1,359	\$1,400
Cote d'Ivoire	\$1,231	\$1,238	\$1,239	\$1,385	\$1,538
Haiti	\$1,129	\$1,134	\$1,158	\$1,292	\$1,353
Kosovo	\$1,094	\$1,104	\$1,112	\$1,242	\$1,364
Liberia	\$1,169	\$1,177	\$1,189	\$1,302	\$1,353
Sierra Leone	\$1,177	\$1,187	\$1,196	\$1,317	\$1,357
Sudan		\$1,163	\$1,245	\$1,374	\$1,392
Timor-Leste	\$1,162	\$1,194	\$1,226	\$1,322	\$1,349
Annualized MLA					
Burundi	\$13,082	\$13,508	\$14,414	\$15,228	\$15,955
Congo, DR	\$14,450	\$14,694	\$15,003	\$16,311	\$16,805
Cote d'Ivoire	\$14,777	\$14,856	\$14,862	\$16,624	\$18,459
Haiti	\$13,553	\$13,612	\$13,896	\$15,509	\$16,236
Kosovo	\$13,127	\$13,252	\$13,338	\$14,906	\$16,373
Liberia	\$14,024	\$14,128	\$14,271	\$15,620	\$16,240
Sierra Leone	\$14,118	\$14,246	\$14,352	\$15,804	\$16,286
Sudan		\$13,956	\$14,937	\$16,494	\$16,702
Timor-Leste	\$13,945	\$14,332	\$14,712	\$15,860	\$16,184
Settling-in Grant (3 mos. post-adjusted MLA, US\$)					
Burundi	\$3,271	\$3,377	\$3,603	\$3,807	\$3,989
Congo, DR	\$3,613	\$3,674	\$3,751	\$4,078	\$4,201
Cote d'Ivoire	\$3,694	\$3,714	\$3,716	\$4,156	\$4,615
Haiti	\$3,388	\$3,403	\$3,474	\$3,877	\$4,059
Kosovo	\$3,282	\$3,313	\$3,335	\$3,727	\$4,093
Liberia	\$3,506	\$3,532	\$3,568	\$3,905	\$4,060
Sierra Leone	\$3,530	\$3,562	\$3,588	\$3,951	\$4,072
Sudan		\$3,489	\$3,734	\$4,123	\$4,176
Timor-Leste	\$3,486	\$3,583	\$3,678	\$3,965	\$4,046
Average annual costs unrelated to living allowances	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	
Burundi	\$16,229	\$16,123	\$18,497	\$20,793	
Congo, DR	\$15,887	\$15,826	\$18,349	\$20,522	\$22,799
Cote d'Ivoire	\$15,806	\$15,786	\$18,384	\$20,444	\$22,385
Haiti	\$16,112	\$16,097	\$18,626	\$20,723	\$22,941
Kosovo	\$16,218	\$16,187	\$18,765	\$20,873	\$22,907
Liberia	\$15,994	\$15,968	\$18,532	\$20,695	\$22,940
Sierra Leone	\$15,970	\$15,938	\$18,512	\$20,649	\$22,928
Sudan		\$16,011	\$18,366	\$20,477	\$22,824
Sudan-Darfur				\$20,477	\$22,824
Timor-Leste	\$16,014	\$15,917	\$18,422	\$20,635	\$22,954

Sources: UN Volunteers annual reports online, <http://www.unv.org/en/news-resources/archive/past-annual-reports.html>. MLA data from UNICEF/DHR, "UNV Specialists, Guidelines," CF/AI/2000-003, 10 April 2000, p. 14; and from "Conditions of Service for UNVs," August 2006, addendum (rates effective Feb. 2007). Post-adjustment multipliers from International Civil Service Commission online archives, <http://icsc.un.org/col-par.asp>, "PA history" link.

Table A-3.2: International UN Volunteers, part	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08
Average number of UNVs per mission				
Burundi-ONUB	107	141	72	
Burundi-BINUB			51	51
Congo, DR	425	466	624	562
Cote d'Ivoire	77	188	227	260
Haiti	99	170	177	196
Kosovo	207	191	144	131
Liberia	309	337	240	237
Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL	110	85		
Sierra Leone-UNIOSIL		24	24	24
Sudan-UNMIS		83	158	242
Sudan-UNAMID				98
Timor-Leste-UNTAET/UNMISSET	92			
Timor-Leste-UNIOITIL		37		
Timor-Leste-UNMIT			180	117
Total UNV expenditures per mission (US \$m)				
Burundi-ONUB	\$4,863,000	\$5,913,400	\$3,265,800	
Burundi-BINUB			spm	spm
Congo, DR	\$19,528,000	\$23,080,400	\$28,195,800	\$25,929,200
Cote d'Ivoire	\$3,606,000	\$8,179,400	\$9,953,400	\$10,920,600
Haiti	\$4,728,000	\$8,045,700	\$8,511,800	\$9,859,300
Kosovo	\$7,658,300	\$8,476,500	\$6,186,800	\$4,904,800
Liberia	\$12,965,000	\$14,594,800	\$10,638,300	\$11,131,500
Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL	\$4,561,000	\$2,146,500		
Sierra Leone-UNIOSIL		spm	spm	spm
Sudan-UNMIS		\$4,002,300	\$7,160,700	\$9,938,900
Sudan-UNAMID				\$4,615,700
Timor-Leste-UNTAET/UNMISSET	\$4,168,200			
Timor-Leste-UNIOITIL		\$833,800		
Timor-Leste-UNMIT			\$6,783,900	\$6,109,700
Per capita mission UNV costs (US \$)				
Burundi-ONUB	45,449	41,939	45,358	
Burundi-BINUB				spm
Congo, DR	45,948	49,529	45,186	46,137
Cote d'Ivoire	46,831	43,507	43,848	42,002
Haiti	47,758	47,328	48,089	50,303
Kosovo	36,997	44,380	42,964	37,441
Liberia	41,958	43,308	44,326	46,968
Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL	41,464	50,506		
Sierra Leone-UNIOSIL		spm	spm	spm
Sudan-UNMIS		48,220	45,321	41,070
Sudan-UNAMID				47,099
Timor-Leste-UNTAET/UNMISSET	45,307			
Timor-Leste-UNIOITIL		33,828		
Timor-Leste-UNMIT			44,549	52,220
Estimated UNV local spending (total per capita cost less non-VLA items)				
Burundi	22,979	18,389	19,474	spm
Congo, DR	23,821	26,201	19,510	18,237
Cote d'Ivoire	24,785	20,182	18,193	14,348
Haiti	25,406	23,726	22,175	22,231
Kosovo	20,778	26,903	23,144	15,551
Liberia	19,724	19,818	18,473	18,911
Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL	19,253	27,041	spm	spm
Sierra Leone-UNIOSIL				
Sudan-UNMIS		24,792	19,660	13,179
Sudan-UNAMID				19,208
Timor-Leste-UNTAET/UNMISSET	23,053			
Timor-Leste-UNIOITIL		spm		
Timor-Leste-UNMIT			18,780	24,185

Table A-4: Mission Subsistence Allowance, UN Peacekeeping Fiscal Year Averages	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	
Burundi	43,080	43,080	43,080	43,985	
Congo, DR	53,100	53,100	53,100	56,690	
Cote d'Ivoire	48,540	47,598	45,713	48,860	
Haiti	54,480	53,503	51,548	52,525	
Kosovo	33,240	33,993	33,278	37,490	
Liberia	47,350	46,785	45,655	46,220	
Sierra Leone	40,250	40,250	40,250	40,250	
Sudan	42,100	42,100	42,100	45,630	
Sudan-Darfur				51,400	
Timor-Leste	35,050	35,050	35,050	35,050	
MSA, calculated annual averages	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Burundi	43,080	43,080	43,080	43,080	44,890
Congo, DR	53,100	53,100	53,100	53,100	60,280
Cote d'Ivoire	48,540	48,540	46,655	44,770	52,950
Haiti	54,480	54,480	52,525	50,570	54,480
Kosovo	32,130	34,350	33,635	32,920	42,060
Liberia	47,350	47,350	46,220	45,090	47,350
Sierra Leone	40,250	40,250	40,250	40,250	40,250
Sudan	42,100	42,100	42,100	42,100	49,160
Sudan-Darfur					51,400
Timor-Leste	35,050	35,050	35,050	35,050	35,050
MSA first 30 days					
Burundi	156	156	156	156	163
Congo, DR	234	234	234	234	260
Cote d'Ivoire	210	210	200.5	191	229
Haiti	216	216	209.5	203	216
Kosovo	143	153	150.5	148	186
Liberia	213	213	202	191	213
Sierra Leone	115	115	115	115	115
Sudan		166	166	166	188
Sudan-Darfur					188
Timor-Leste	123	123	123	123	123
MSA day 31-plus					
Burundi	120	120	120	120	125
Congo, DR	144	144	144	144	164
Cote d'Ivoire	132	132	127	122	144
Haiti	150	150	144.5	139	150
Kosovo	87	93	91	89	114
Liberia	128	128	125.5	123	128
Sierra Leone	115	115	115	115	115
Sudan		116	116	116	136
Sudan-Darfur					143
Timor-Leste	98	98	98	98	98
			Assumed covered days in a year (after first 30	320	
Sources: Mission MSA for 2005 taken from <i>Economic Impact</i> (2007), table 4; Current MSA rates may be found online at the UN Office of Human Resources management, http://www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/allowances/msa.htm .					
Note: International mission personnel are entitled to 5-day R&R leave after 3 consecutive months of work without business travel or annual leave. However, MSA pays not just for work days but for weekends & holidays taken in or outside the mission, and for annual leave taken while on mission assignment. (www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/)					