PROMOTING MILITARY STABILITY AND SECURITY

Key findings and documents of the Intersessional Dialogue on Military Doctrines and the Breakout Workshops on CSBMs

Austrian OSCE Chairmanship 2017
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Austria assumed the Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2017 not only as an expression of the importance we attach to the organization, but also because Austria wanted to make a contribution to strengthening security in Europe. As a traditional bridge-builder and supporter of dialogue, Austria has historically sought to reconcile antagonisms between East and West and to promote an inclusive and co-operative security space. We are firmly committed to these goals also today.

Europe is confronted with a broad range of challenges to security and stability. Armed conflicts, in particular the crisis in and around Ukraine, the threat of violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, as well as violations of the organization’s principles and a loss of trust between States challenge the fundamental concept of co-operative security.

The consequences of insecurity and mistrust are felt by all people across the OSCE area – most acutely by civilians in conflict zones. It is clear that the challenges can only be overcome effectively through constructive international cooperation - and for this we need political will by the participating States. Only with a real commitment by the States can we begin the process of rebuilding trust and improve security and stability across its region in order to alleviate the lives of the affected people.

Fostering a genuine dialogue across all OSCE dimensions was thus one key priority of the Austrian Chairmanship. In the politico-military
dimension, open and constructive dialogue is a precondition for countering the erosion of the European security architecture. As integral parts of any inclusive, comprehensive and co-operative security system on our continent, the instruments of disarmament, arms control and confidence- and security-building must provide transparency, predictability and stability.

As Chairmanship we fostered such a dialogue through a number of events, to improve the implementation of our common commitments. We also aimed to better use the OSCE’s instruments, which should be enhanced to increase their effectiveness.

It has become clear that the complex nature of today’s challenges calls for a further adaptation of our politico-military toolbox. We must find ways to deal with the increasing number of military incidents and risk of escalation, the lack of proper communication channels and military transparency, as well as the rapid technological change shaping new military doctrines. Austria will continue to promote effective multilateral responses to these challenges in order to ensure political and military stability by supporting the full implementation and modernization of the “Vienna Document”, reinvigorating conventional arms control and fostering regular military-to-military exchanges.

The OSCE, with its structures, institutions and, in particular, its field operations, has a unique and comprehensive array of instruments at its disposal. This is the place to begin with rebuilding trust, resolving conflicts and enhancing comprehensive security in Europe. It is in our common interest to make full use of the organization’s potential.
The European security order has changed tremendously in the recent years. There is a wide range of new global challenges, risks and threats, like terrorism and radicalization, new technologies and developments in the cyber space or migration flows, which need to be dealt with in a cooperative manner. The security environment is more complex than ever, very dynamic and marked by great interrelations and unpredictability. Classical conventional military threats, which were thought to have been overcome for the most part in the OSCE area, have emerged again in new quality and created a climate of mistrust and fear. The aggravation of violent conflicts has already resulted in numerous victims in the recent years, displacements and destruction. Europe itself is confronted with the most serious security crisis since the end of the Cold War. Diverging assessments of the causes as well as contradicting threat perceptions have led to a situation in which existing OSCE norms and principles of a politico-military nature – as stabilizing factors and core pillars of the European security architecture – eroded over the years. Well-proved instruments and mechanisms of security cooperation have been put into question or have been paralyzed, inter alia, due to the lack of political will.

The Austrian OSCE-Chairmanship 2017 placed a main focus on addressing and countering these developments and on rebuilding trust. One of our key priorities was to strengthen Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in order to increase transparency and predictability with the ultimate aim to restore European security and stability. With the Declaration “From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration on the 20th anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms control” adopted at last year’s Ministerial Council the participating States have
committed themselves to explore “how the negative developments concerning the conventional arms control and CSBM architecture in Europe can be reversed”, in order to “enhance military and political stability within the OSCE area”. In this respect, we committed ourselves to launch a structured dialogue and to further develop military-to-military contacts with a focus on doctrines.

In light of the Hamburg mandate the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports contributed substantially to the OSCE chairmanship events and the recently launched Structured Dialogue in a coherent and complimentary manner. The three Breakout Workshops on CSBMs as well as the Intersessional OSCE Dialogue on Military Doctrines brought together delegates in Vienna as well as experts from the capitals of OSCE participating States to discuss the most urgent politico-military issues, challenges and opportunities for building transparency and confidence. It was our intention to provide a platform outside the regular structures of the OSCE to allow an informal debate on a more generic level but also to discuss short-, medium- and long-term approaches to respond to current challenges and risks.

In the course of the three Breakout Workshops we succeeded to break down the debate from a very generic level at the beginning to very concrete suggestions at the end. With regard to the Intersessional OSCE Dialogue on Military Doctrines the very lively discussion and positive feedback underlined the added value of such an event on a more regular basis.

The contributions and respective results show – despite of all differences – the interest of participating States to retain the dialogue. We very much appreciate the great support we received throughout this year.
Foreword by Thomas Greminger
OSCE Secretary General

Europe’s security architecture includes a web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments that has provided for military stability, predictability and confidence for decades. However, in recent years, confidence, trust and predictability have drastically diminished. Large-scale military activities near border areas, military incidents in the air and at sea, snap exercises and new deployments of armed forces have contributed to an atmosphere of distrust and uncertainty.

Arms control, including disarmament and confidence- and security-building, remains integral to the OSCE’s comprehensive and co-operative concept of security. The commitment of the OSCE participating States to full implementation of arms control agreements, as stated in the 2016 Hamburg Ministerial Council Declaration on the 20th Anniversary on Arms Control, is essential for enhancing military stability in the OSCE area.

There are widely divergent positions on the root causes of the challenges to the European security architecture and on the way forward. Diplomatic efforts are ongoing to reverse negative developments in the politico-military domain. However, we have to take active measures to bring us back to the concepts of co-operative and indivisible security. Discussions on threat perceptions, military doctrines and military force postures are necessary and should continue. Understanding the concerns of others is the first step to overcoming the differences.

However, we should not lose sight of the long-term objective of restoring trust and re-establishing an effective system of checks and balances ensuring lasting predictability and military stability. The Vienna
Document already offers a tool for targeted updates. Although its substantial modernization remains the ultimate goal, some parts of the Document where there is convergence of shared interests could be enhanced even today. The three Breakout Workshops on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures organized by the 2017 Austrian Chairmanship offered an informal environment for discussions on options for enhanced exchange of military information and closer military-to-military dialogue and an exchange of views on incident prevention and response mechanisms. Participants discussed prior notification of military activities, compliance and verification as well as risk reduction, among other issues.

All of these themes are closely linked with both the work routinely undertaken in the Forum for Security Co-operation and that of the Informal Working Group on the Structured Dialogue, which was launched at the Hamburg Ministerial Council in December 2016. The Structured Dialogue meetings, which have so far been held under the able leadership of Ambassador Eberhard Pohl of Germany, saw participating States engage in difficult but necessary discussions on threat perceptions, military doctrines and force postures in a constructive and sincere manner. Work on a mapping of military force postures and exercises, a first deliverable of this process, is to start before the end of 2017.

In the current circumstances, we should make full use of all OSCE dialogue platforms to identify areas of co-operation that may allow for incremental progress that can help rebuild trust and confidence and eventually reconsolidate co-operative security in Europe.
In line with last year’s Ministerial Council Declaration “From Lisbon to Hamburg”, the Austrian Chairmanship’s focus in the politico-military dimension was to support the establishment of more frequent military-to-military contacts. The most recent High-Level Military Doctrines Seminar took place in February 2016; one key outcome of this meeting was that more frequent military-to-military contacts are necessary. Since then, several OSCE participating States have pointed out the benefits of organising intersessional meetings on military doctrines at senior level on various occasions. In May 2017, Austria organised the first *Intersessional OSCE Dialogue on Military Doctrines*. Representatives from participating States as well as officials from international organisations attended the conference and had an extensive exchange on various issues such as threat assessments, new threats and drivers for new military doctrines. While supporting the Structured Dialogue in a coherent and complementary manner, this kind of military-to-military dialogue at senior level aimed at fostering transparency, openness and predictability in the OSCE participating States’ military sphere as such.

In light of the broad range of challenges to security and stability in the OSCE area and the Austrian Chairmanship’s overall objectives to rebuild trust and foster dialogue, emphasis was also put on the conceptual and technical strengthening of *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures* (CSBMs). Therefore, a sequence of three Breakout Workshops on CSBMs was organised throughout the year in order to provide a platform outside the regular structures of the OSCE to allow an informal discussion on a more generic level, to address current gaps and shortcomings of the existing CSBM-regime. The overall aim of the three events was to contribute to a greater understanding of military realities in the 21st century and pave the way to creating a solid common basis for strengthening trust, co-operation and, ultimately, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Ultimately, the above-mentioned events provided appropriate fora for open exchanges of perceptions and different approaches, visions and suggestions. This resulted not only in an excellent collection of different
views but also in common ground which could be built upon by subsequent Chairmanships.

The present compendium was prepared in order to ensure the continuity and sustainability of our work in the politico-military area. It contains all relevant documents of the Intersessional Dialogue on Military Doctrines and the three Breakout Workshops on CSBMs. It comprises introduction papers and summaries, preliminary conclusions as well as statements and presentations from the keynote speakers.¹

Without prejudice to the official decisions or declarations of the 2017 Vienna Ministerial Council, this compendium should serve as a valuable collection of ideas that will enrich and contribute to the discussions in the various fora of the OSCE.

Last but not least, the Austrian Chairmanship would like to take this opportunity to thank all the keynote speakers for their insightful contributions, which were greatly appreciated.

Special thanks go to Colonel (ret.) Wolfgang Richter, who supported the Austrian Chairmanship events of the politico-military dimension throughout 2017 in a highly professional and dedicated manner.

¹ The compendium contains only the contributions of those keynote speakers who explicitly consented to the publishing of their documents.
Introduction

The Vienna Document 2011 (VD 2011) encourages OSCE participating States to hold High-Level Military Doctrine Seminars (HLDMS) on a regular basis in order to improve mutual relations by fostering the process of transparency, openness and predictability. At the most recent HLDMS in February 2016 participating States pointed to the potential benefits of organizing more frequent meetings on military doctrines. Additionally, in line with the Ministerial Council Declaration “From Lisbon to Hamburg” in 2016, the Austrian Chairmanship’s focus in the politico-military dimension was on supporting the establishment of more frequent military-to-military contacts. Hence, the first Intersessional OSCE Dialogue on Military Doctrines was organized with the intention to contribute to the recently-launched Structured Dialogue on current and future challenges and risks for security in the OSCE area. Representatives from participating States as well as officials from international organisations were invited to this event and held an extensive exchange of views on various issues such as threat assessments, new threats and drivers for new military doctrines.
Meetings such as the HLMDS provide delegations with the opportunity to discuss different security and defence policies and their impact on armed forces, as well as to compare changes in national military doctrines.

At the 2016 Ministerial Council in Hamburg, the OSCE participating States (pS) welcomed steps to further develop military-to-military contacts in the OSCE, including the HLMDS. The last HLMDS took place in February 2016; since then, several OSCE pS have pointed to the potential benefits of organizing intersessional meetings on military doctrines at senior level.

The Intersessional Dialogue on Military Doctrines on 4-5 May intends to contribute to the recently launched Structured Dialogue on current and future challenges and risks for security in the OSCE area. It aims to foster a greater understanding on these issues that could serve as a common solid basis for a way forward, with a view to, ultimately, creating comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security in our region.

In view of the diverging assessments of security challenges we are currently facing, this event shall provide a forum for discussion on current and future risks to security in the OSCE area, the impact of threat perceptions on designing national military doctrines and their implications for shaping security and defence policies and force postures. The event aims to enable senior military and civilian experts from pS’ Defence Ministries to meet for discussion by using the OSCE as an inclusive, dedicated, and impartial platform for contacts and exchange of views. To that end, we intend to touch upon the differences in threat perceptions in general, focusing on military threat perceptions in particular, which seems to be one of the key factors for the current security situation in the OSCE region.

The participants of the meeting should look at military doctrines and their evolution. PS may develop them on a regular basis or because of the changing security environment. Doctrinal changes may arise because of a new political situation, the emergence of new technical
developments or tools, e.g. developments in cyber- and information space (CIS), new forms of conflicts (hybrid warfare), or as a combination of these elements. Discussions in this area could thus reinforce measures already prescribed in §15 of the VD11 on information exchange on defence planning.

For a structured analysis, it could be useful to distinguish between global security challenges that affect all pS and European risk scenarios that have developed during recent years and created new rifts between the pS. We might inquire into the merits of harmonizing global threat perceptions and coordinating respective responses. At the same time, it seems necessary to analyse differences in threat perceptions as to the security situation in Europe and address key problems such as:

- diverging assessments of political intentions in view of recent developments in Europe, in particular protracted conflicts, and possible future scenarios,
- the impact of changes to the agreed norms and security architecture in Europe,
- the impact of recent changes to force structures and new patterns of military activities,
- the impact of new military capabilities and the fielding of new technologies,
- the impact of new risks such as cyber-attacks and hybrid and information warfare,
- the dangers arising from unintended incidents which could lead to escalation,
- ways in which the OSCE could contribute to avoiding dangerous incidents and address new security risks, inter alia, through reinvigorating conventional arms control and modernizing CSBMs.

The meeting will be structured as follows: after the Opening Session and two keynote speeches to set the scene, Session I will deal with “Common versus diverging threat assessments in the OSCE region”; Session II poses the question, “How to address new threats?”; and Session III will focus on “Main drivers for new military doctrines”.

A summary of discussions and an outlook for a possible follow-up event will conclude the meeting.
The key questions below could serve as food-for-thought for fruitful discussions:

- Which developments, e.g. political, military or technical, have become challenges/risks and given impetus to the adaptation of military doctrines?
- To what extent have differences in threat perceptions in the OSCE area influenced the security situation in various regions or sub-regions?
- What is the general approach for the release of a new military doctrine? Periodic adjustment or short-term changes to the national security environment?
- Do risks which affect all pS, e.g. cyberattacks and terrorism, constitute an area for a common approach in the whole OSCE region?
- How could the adaptation of existing instruments like the Vienna Document help to reduce risks by strengthening transparency, predictability and stability?
- How could conventional arms control contribute to reducing risks and advancing comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security in the OSCE area? What does it mean for the development of force postures that are compatible with this objective?
- How could dangerous incidents be avoided in the future? What kind of risk reduction mechanisms could be applied (prior notification, limitation of unusual military activities in sensitive areas, improved liaison/communication lines, etc.)?
Agenda

Thursday, 4 May 2017

Opening Session
» BG Rene Ségur-Cabanac, Deputy Commandant of the National Defence Academy, Austria
» Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, Secretary General, OSCE
» Minister Plenipotentiary Gerhard Jandl, Representative CiO, Austria
» Mr. Andrei Vorobiev, FSC Chairperson, Russian Federation

Setting the Scene
» BG Wolfgang Wosolsobe, Defence Policy Director MoD, Austria
» Ambassador Eberhard Pohl, Germany

Session I: Common versus diverging threat assessments in the OSCE region
Moderator:
» Ambassador Marcel Pesko, Director of the CPC, OSCE Secretariat
Panellists:
» BG Michael Claesson, Sweden
» BG Lars-Olof Corneliussen, EEAS
» BG Philip Eder, Austria
» Col (ret.) Andrew Budd, NATO

Session II: How to address new threats
Moderator:
» BG Michael Claesson, Sweden
Panellists:
» Dr.sc.pol. Nora Vanaga, Latvia
» MG Claude Meier, Switzerland
» BG Peter Braunstein, Director of the Bundeswehr Verification Centre, Germany
Friday, 5 May 2017

Session III: Main drivers for new military doctrines
Moderator:
> Dr. Lars-Erik Lundin, SIPRI
Panellists:
> MG (ret.) Dr. Pavel Zolotarev, Russian Federation
> Col Han Bouwmeester, Netherlands
> Maj Lucas Kunce, United States

Summary of Discussions and Conclusion/Outlook for Follow-up Event
> BG Wolfgang Wosolsobe, Defence Policy Director MoD, Austria
> Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter, Researcher Int’l Security, Germany

Closing Remarks
> Ambassador Clemens Koja, Representative CiO, Austria
Setting the Scene

BG Wolfgang Wosolsobe
Defence Policy Director of the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports

Secretary General,
Excellencies,
Generals,
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure and honour for me to welcome all of you today to the “Intersessional OSCE Dialogue on Military Doctrines”. I am very pleased to share this session with Ambassador Eberhard Pohl, Chairperson of the Informal Working Group on Structured Dialogue, who will deliver insights from the first session of the Structured Dialogue, held here in Vienna on the 7th of April. This will help explain the close context between today’s intersessional dialogue and the Structured Dialogue. The context lies in the observation that threat perceptions, military doctrines and force posture are three building blocks of the military realm, essential for working towards a common understanding.

On this occasion, I would also like to highlight the schedule for the FSC, under Russian Chairmanship. The topics which are to be discussed there can provide useful insights to foster this common understanding.

The idea to convene more regularly for discussing new security challenges and their repercussions on military doctrines had its origin during the last High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar, which took place in February 2016. Since then, participating States have raised the benefits of organising intersessional meetings on military doctrines to sustain discussions: The Netherlands in their former capacity as Chair of the Forum for Security Co-operation and organiser of the last High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar issued follow-up options for seminars on a more regular basis. Taking note of the utmost relevance of this undertaking, participating States encouraged in their Declaration at the Ministerial Council in Hamburg to further develop military-to-military contacts.
In organising this Intersessional Dialogue on Military Doctrines the Austrian Chairmanship wants to live up to this Declaration and foster thereby the process of transparency, openness and predictability among participating States.

Ladies and gentlemen,

At the outset, I would like to touch upon two questions which from my point of view lie at the heart of our two-days meeting.

Firstly, what are the features of our current security situation that make more frequent military-to-military contacts especially in the field of military doctrines in the OSCE-area pertinent?

And secondly, what can, ultimately, be gained by that, in terms of mutual understanding and in terms of trust?

The last decades witnessed dramatic changes in Europe’s strategic landscape. Dividing lines vanished in the 90ies of the last century and left extended room for new forms of cooperation among former adversaries. In parallel, regional territorial conflicts erupted as results of political transformation processes, and kept on a low level without sustainable solutions. New forms of risks, such as terrorism or cyber-attacks, have emerged and to some extend replaced and/or aggravated old threats. As one result of the changing political landscape the evolution of security gained increasing momentum towards a multidimensional menace, blurring the line between internal and external security.

The OSCE and its institutions have accompanied these developments in various ways since the end of the Cold War. The CFE-Treaty created a reasonable balance of military forces with the ultimate aim to reduce the risk of an all-out war in Europe. The Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Document, which has been updated several times since 1990, fostered the process of confidence and security building. Other OSCE-documents, such as the Code of Conduct, complemented the web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments that were enshrined in the Lisbon Summit Declaration from 1996. Although there were always impediments to that process, for some years the challenge of creating mutual understanding in the
military sphere seemed to be accomplished or – at least – not defined as a major problem for cooperative security.

In the mid-2000s, first fissures appeared in the post-Cold War security architecture, accompanied by further deterioration of sentiments among states. The emergence of new crises in the OSCE area in the last 10 years can be seen as a game changer, because it led to a partial reversal of taken for granted developments. In a climate of distrust, the possibility of military confrontations, which we believed to be irrelevant today, has returned to the European stage and adversely affected relations between States. The OSCE responded to this by lying renewed emphasis on politico-military security and the wider politico-military context as stated by Dr. Ian Anthony from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in his food-for-thought paper for the Structured Dialogue.

The above mentioned aspects of security and the underlying trends have had obviously major implications for the military area. Scenarios, which prevailed during the Cold War, are no longer relevant for military activities nowadays. Technological changes and forms of hybrid conflicts have significantly added complexity to modern warfare. Caught between new risks and old threats, armed forces must adapt to this situation and define their most effective role in an ever changing security environment, comprised of confrontational and cooperative elements.

In my view, in this situation it is important to emphasize the need for more dialogue between the military. Changes in military activities and posture can always trigger misperception and even miscalculation, especially in times of increasing tension among states, partly materialized by large and very short notice field exercises. Hence, we need to find common ground to discuss our security concerns. Military doctrines – and I now come back to the question I raised at the outset – are a very reasonable entry point for doing so, because they contain strategic perception of security challenges and their translation into military structures and developments. Therefore, discussing military doctrines and their evolution provides the opportunity to exchange about common and diverging views as well as about intentions behind changing force postures.
Coming now to my second question on what can be gained by that undertaking. I believe the simple answer to that question is: improved mutual understanding. The intention sounds simple, but achievement will be a different kind of game. It will take the effort to listen to those things which are said by each other, while also taking the opportunity to enter into dialogue and discussion about controversial subjects. Providing a politically uncontroversial platform for “clarification, review and dialogue” as stated in Chapter 2 of the Vienna Document, is one of our primary aims for this Intersessional Dialogue. To make best use of this I would like to encourage all participants to actively engage in our discussions for the sake of enhanced mutual understanding.

A final benefit of more frequent military-to-military contacts is also important to state: the human dimension of such encounters. We should use the next two days not only to have discussions as experts, but also try to get known to each other in order to create lasting relations at a personal level.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Let me turn now to a brief overview of the program of this Intersessional Seminar on Military Doctrines. After my address I have the honour to give the floor to Ambassador Pohl, who will brief us on the outcomes of the first meeting of the Informal Working Group on Structured Dialogue.

After that, our first session deals with “Common versus diverging threat assessments in the OSCE region” and focusses upon the wide range of security narratives among participating States which are often seen as reasons for concern. The session looks at the origin of heterogeneous perceptions but also intends to find common ground for collective action based on shared assessments.

Session two tries to figure out “How to address new threats”. The session centres on options to mitigate different security challenges whether they arise out of new technologies, developments in the military sphere or have their origin elsewhere. Furthermore, already existing tools for risk reduction will be assessed in their effectivity.
Session three looks at “Main drivers for new military doctrines” and deals with patterns for changes in order to deepen our understanding of such practices. One emphasis will lie on concrete triggers for doctrinal change and their connection to a shifting security environment or technological developments.

In choosing these topics we tried to focus on areas that could provide common ground for our debate and may lead the way to future cooperative engagement.

Each session starts with a short introduction by the respective moderator. After that the floor will be given to the panellists, who will provide us with brief presentations that should serve as a basis for subsequent discussions. Our knowledgeable moderators will try to facilitate a lively and substantive debate among all participants. In that regard, I would like to reiterate that an active engagement is highly appreciated.

At the end of this Seminar there will be a wrap-up of our discussions as well as a brief outlook for possible further military-to-military contacts.
Session I: Common versus diverging threat assessments in the OSCE region

BG Michael Claesson
Deputy Head of the Policy- and Plans Department at the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Staff in Stockholm

In February 2016 at the High Level Military Doctrine Seminar, the Chief of the Swedish Defence Staff, outlined the Swedish military doctrine, last revised in 2016, from three perspectives:

1. The changed strategic environment;
2. The new Swedish defence policy, and as a consequence of both;
3. The key elements of the revised Swedish doctrine.

Since then the strategic environment has deteriorated even further. To the then existing threat perceptions we now add increased internal and external challenges to the cohesion of the European Union, the worsening military and humanitarian situation in Syria and the further spread of nationalistic movements throughout the OSCE region.

Furthermore, we all are deeply troubled by the scale, modus operandi, and sheer number of terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere.

In the 2015 Defence Bill, the Swedish Government decided that the Swedish Armed forces should focus more on territorial defense in a regional context. The decision was based on the assessment of the security situation in the vicinity of our own country with regard to both political and military developments.

The European security order and the relative stability of Europe that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War are now seriously challenged.

Small-scale provocations in our neighborhood continue to be likely, both in the shape of military posturing and disinformation campaigns.

The threat assessment underlying the 2015 Swedish Defence Bill remains the same.
1. Northern Europe will remain an area of possible political-military confrontation, including hybrid threats.
2. This entails that Northern Europe and Sweden’s vicinity will be an area of military positioning and posturing in the short to medium term, thus increasing the risk of incidents.
3. The military activity in the area will likely remain at levels seen in previous years, however with an increasing number of large scale exercises.
4. The use of a combination of conventional military force, long-range weapon systems as well as subversive/hybrid actions will constitute the dimensioning threat for the coming years.

The above mentioned factors continue to form the basis for doctrine development for Armed Forces.

Furthermore Sweden is in the process of strengthening its resilience and establishing structures that cater for seamless inter-agency cooperation in case of a crisis or conflict.

Against this background, it is also imperative to maintain and modernize existing arms-control regimes and confidence and security building measures.

Once more I’d like to underline the need to strengthen military transparency and predictability in Europe.

Risk reduction and further confidence building measures are natural starting points in this endeavour. We therefore very much welcome the structured dialogue and this seminar on military doctrines.

Among many things this is a valuable opportunity for us representatives of the armed forces to meet and enter into a dialogue on these matters.
The Austrian Security Strategy of 2013 states a list of comprehensive challenges, risks and threats for Austria.

Hybrid threats, triggered from domestic and regional conflicts or turmoil as well as the lawlessness of failed states, challenge our divided responsibilities in internal (police) and external (military) security affairs. In Austria the military can either act under the provision of national military defence or in assistance to the Ministry of Interior or other agencies to answer challenges like international terrorism, attacks on strategic infrastructure, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or cyberattacks.

To help in case of other challenges, risks and threats, like natural and man-made disaster, illegal migration or environmental damage as well as pandemics, the military can assist the Ministry of Interior or other agencies.
Together with international partners, soldiers of the Austrian Armed Forces serve in several operations outside of Austria to help stabilize our periphery and also to fight piracy and other threats to transport routes.

Other in the Austrian Security Strategy of 2013 identified strategic challenges, risks and threats like climate change, unsuccessful integration policy or corruption do not fall under military responsibility.

Current threats to Austrian security:

Austria is surrounded by NATO or neutral countries.

But outside these relative secure areas, there is a "ring of fire":

- Frozen conflicts in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia
- Tensions along the borders of Russia and NATO member states as well as the Caucasus area
- An unsuccessful uprising in Turkey led to inner instability
Session I: Common versus diverging threat assessments in the OSCE region

- Unstable conditions along the coast of North Africa
- A huge wave of illegal migration of people fleeing war areas as well as those parts of central Africa, effected by climate change and economic troubles
- Wars in Afghanistan, Libya and Syria
- Several terror attacks in different European countries
- Cyber-attacks around the globe
- Regional and major powers struggle to gain more and more influence in geopolitics

Future threats to the Austrian security:

New military and multipurpose means threaten our security, like:

- Automation and Robotics
- Autonomous Systems
- Artificial Intelligence
- Information Operations

Derived tasks of the Austrian Armed Forces:

The most important duty of the Armed Forces is the military defence of our country in line with Austria’s comprehensive and whole of government as well as whole of nation approach to national security.

The Armed Forces furthermore help to protect the constitutionally established institutions and the population’s democratic freedoms and maintain order and security inside the country.

Other tasks include providing humanitarian aid in case of natural catastrophes and disasters of exceptional magnitude.

Because of the need to stabilize areas around Austria, foreign assignments are of notable importance.
Session II: How to address new threats

Dr. Nora Vanaga
Senior Researcher National Defence Academy of Latvia

Since Ukraine crisis, the Baltic States have been feeling increasingly threatened, facing both military and non-military threats. The aim of the presentation is to describe the topical military and non-military threats of the Baltic States both from the official and public point of view. The official discourse of all three countries formulated in their latest defence strategy documents put on the military threats’ list the military build-up along their Eastern border and naval and air movements of Russian armed forces, and raising new threats such as terrorism and cyber. Among non-military threats in a broader perspective, Baltic States consider the rise of populist anti-European parties that can disunite EU and potentially decrease the prosperity of the Europe, including the Baltics. Besides the economic risks, additionally, there is a topical threat of propaganda in the information space and its ability to divide the societies.

In order to address these threats, the governments of the Baltic States have passed numerous policies. Firstly, all three countries have significantly increased their defence spending (up to 2 per cent from GDP by 2018), allocating main resources to the development of self-defence capabilities such as anti-tank, air defence, air surveillance, infantry mechanization, engineering, communications, and others. After the NATO Warsaw Summit when the decision to deploy multinational battalions in the region was passed, considerable investments have been directed to the military infrastructure in order to meet the host nation support requirements. In the case of Latvia and Lithuania, the options how to increase the manpower in the army have been discussed. Lithuania has even renewed the conscription system. Additionally, all three Baltic States are working on crisis management systems’ improvements. Hence the primary efforts are directed addressing the traditional military threats, by increasing investments in the defence and internal sectors.
Yet the threat perception of government and the societies differ substantially, as the latter emphasizes the non-military threats. There is a certain risk that if these concerns of society will not be addressed it can cause potential risks that undermine the societal resilience. According to the Eurobarometer data, it can be concluded that although the Baltic societies acknowledge such military threats as cyber, terrorism and war, the respondents that stress the socioeconomic problems are overwhelmingly dominating. They are the main vulnerabilities of all three countries, especially, Latvia and Lithuania. Functioning as pushing factors for migration, decreasing demography, and vulnerability to the corruption risk (See Figure 1).

Figure 1. Threat perception of the Baltic States’ societies (Source: EC, 2015, March)

Hence the policy-makers of the Baltic States are facing a twofold dilemma. The first dilemma is related to the limitations of the budgets and ability to address all wide spectrums of the military and non-military threats, supporting these policies with necessary funding. The second dilemma is the fact that the non-military threats such as socioeconomic issues that undermine the national security is certainly not solely the competence of defence and interior sectors, but includes numerous of other ministries.

To address these dilemmas, firstly, an intragovernmental comprehensive approach is necessary. Being three small states, the Baltic States need to have a comprehensive national security strategy
that foresees the holistic approach to the topical threats both military and non-military ones and which would help to coordinate and elaborate the most appropriate policies. That is especially important if one of the goals of national security is to provide societal resilience.

Secondly, regarding conventional threats an intergovernmental cooperation among Baltics and Baltic Sea region countries is needed. Although countries like Sweden and Finland have different institutional settings than the three Baltic States (they are not members of NATO), they share the same threat perception. Therefore, a bilateral approach could be a key how to involve both countries in the Baltic security affairs. Lastly, when it comes to addressing the non-military threats, the Baltic States need to be active also at the EU level as the latter has the capacity and the tools to deal with socioeconomic challenges. The societies of the Baltics have great expectations regarding EU’s potential role, but so far, according to the Eurobarometer data, they are critical about EU’s success in dealing with unemployment, terrorism, and migration (Figure 2). Hence, an intergovernmental cooperation within international organizations is necessary to address non-conventional threats (for instance EU-NATO; NATO-OSCE etc.). These platforms are also essential to fight propaganda and disinformation in the information space and cyber threats as they simultaneously can be perceived as military and non-military threats.

Figure 2. The assessment of the Baltic State’s societies how sufficient EU has been in dealing with the threats (Source: EP, 2016, June)
MG Claude Meier
Chief of the Swiss Armed Forces Staff

Security as a Foundation of Success

Fortunately, Switzerland has been spared from armed conflicts on its soil for over 160 years, has currently a low rate of criminality and is surrounded by friendly neighbors. Consequently, this high level of rule-based security is the foundation for political stability, democratic institutions, high standards of education and research as well as an attractive environment for economy.

To maintain this safe and secure environment, Switzerland has a network of instruments; amongst them, the Armed Forces is taking a relevant role as Switzerland’s only strategic reserve. In case of a local, regional or national crisis or disaster, the Swiss Armed Forces – constituted on the principle of universal conscription – has the legal foundation to be rapidly deployed and employed within the country on request of the civilian authorities.

Evolving Strategic Environment: Need for Action

The dynamic changes and development of the strategic and operational environment of the last few years created many new challenges and effects to cope with. A more fragmented international system, spill overs from regional conflicts and resource competition increase the potential for interstate and intrastate conflicts with major effects on the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian security environment and consequently also for Switzerland and has induced a transformation of the Swiss Armed Forces. In addition, the current transformation was also driven by national factors like demography, budget constraints and the availability of new or emerging technologies.

One further reason that raised the political will for a transformation of the Swiss Armed Forces and its operational capabilities was the emergence – or to be more accurate – "the new perception" of "contemporary" ways of warfare or threats – the so called "hybrid warfare or hybrid threats".
In the 2016 Swiss Security Policy Report, the term "hybrid warfare" was used for the first time in an official Swiss political document. One characteristic of hybrid threats is that they are not necessarily directed against the territorial integrity of a specific state, while it was the main cause of conventional military conflicts in the past. Instead, in hybrid warfare it is more about affecting the functioning of a state, namely its political structure, its economy and critical infrastructure, its society, its cyber space and communication channels. This is achieved with the deliberate and covert engagement of regular and irregular forces, covert influence in political developments or support of certain factions, direct and hidden economic pressure along with the use of disruptive technologies, disinflation and propaganda instead of or as precursor to an engagement of regular conventional forces and weapons systems in a symmetric confrontation.

The result is a combination of different forms of violence and actions involving unaccustomed, unconventional and covert activities in addition to the spectrum of conventional military conflicts. If violence against parts of the population and critical infrastructure grows out of
proportion, the consequences could well be compared to those of a classic military conflict. It might have even stronger repercussions on a state’s population and its cohesion than a conventional attack. Furthermore, the use and effect of conventional military tactics, equipment and armament in response to such actions might even not be adequate.

Consequently, the spectrum of threats resulting from "hybridity" cannot be opposed only by the Armed Forces. It requires a "whole-of-government" or a "comprehensive" approach, which takes into account the full spectrum of possible threats against a state and its society. A foremost concern for a state will be the issue how to determine when a combination of orchestrated threats becomes a "strategic threat" and to define specific criteria’s to initiate defense operations.

To put it in a nutshell: The "hybrid" world is VUCA, where this acronym (introduced by the U.S. Army War College) stands for volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. Therefore, decisions have to be made in a context where the situation is ambiguous, diffuse and uncertain. The well-known "fog of war" in reference to uncertainty makes it difficult to gain good situation awareness and renders the decision-making process even more complex.

**The Current Swiss Approach to Hybrid Threats**

The key characteristics of the current Swiss perception of hybrid threats can be described as follows:

- The number and variety of actors in a conflict is increasing. Thereby, non-state actors are getting more and more relevant.
- It may well be that one actor could act as the mastermind and coordinates all or a lot of the actions. It may also be that several individuals or factions are acting independently, but they are able to use the action of others with a dynamic integration of their effects (e.g. through the use of information/disinformation).
- It is assumed that the different conflict-actors are more likely to use covert, irregular and unconventional ways and means.
• Thereby a wide range of irregular and military power instruments are used simultaneously.

The actual approach to hybrid threat is still at a rather "tactical level" and focused on the Armed Forces, however, it creates an adequate foundation for further Armed Forces Development – it is all about developing a common understanding.

In addition, one can detect some trends aiming towards a "whole-of-government" approach because Switzerland extended its understanding of "Defense" to gain freedom of action at governmental level in order to gain options to engage the Swiss Armed Forces earlier in a potentially upcoming armed conflict or crisis. But in any case – the decision for the engagement of the Swiss Armed Forces remains always at the political level.

**Ongoing Transformation**

Currently, the Swiss Armed Forces are in the midst of the transformation from today’s Armed Forces to the so-called "Armed Forces Development" – short AFD.

The general conditions for the Armed Forces Development were defined by the Swiss Government and Parliament:

• Switzerland upholds its principle of universal conscription (what we call "militia").

• The formal size of the Armed Forces (military personnel) will be reduced from 200'000 (120'000 active / 80'000 reserve) to an authorized strength of 100'000. But note that the current strength is already below 150'000 and in the new structure we will have an effective strength of about 145'000 to ensure the alimentation of the formations. In fact, it is not a reduction – we will gain more quality with about the same quantity.

• The financial framework given by the politics reaches the total of 5 billion Swiss francs per year over a 4-year fiscal period (CHF 20 billion in 4 years).
At a glance, the focus of the AFD lies on five fundamental improvements:

1. Increased readiness: *A readiness system that enables – even in unexpected events – to immediately call up and rapidly deploy fully equipped troops, formerly known as mobilization, will be re-established. To achieve this, designated high readiness conscription units are created* with a high level of ambition: 8'000 military personnel in 24 – 96 hours / 35'000 military personnel within 10 days.

2. All operational units are fully equipped: In the past, a part of the operational units have not been fully equipped due to financial restrictions and the conceptual assumption of having time for "building-up" the operational capabilities in case of a looming crisis ("old idea of having a sufficient advance warning time").

3. The quality of the cadres will be improved – through more education and training: Basically, as it was the case in the past, they will come up "through-the-ranks" and thus gain the necessary technical and tactical capabilities and expertise with practical leadership experience at every level of command.

4. We create more forces with regional focus and regional roots: This facilitates civil-military cooperation, rapid engagement and situational awareness also in case of hybrid threats.

5. New Command and Control Structures: The new command and control structures will differentiate training and education from deployment and operations.

"**FIGHT – PROTECT – ASSIST**"

With the transformation of the Armed Forces we intend to achieve a growth in performance in case of combat operations (fight), crises (protect) and disasters (assist) and to fulfill the threefold mission of the Swiss Armed Forces which entails defense, support of civilian authorities (including disaster relief) and peace support (with up to 500 military personnel).
As mentioned before, the implementation phase will start on 1 January 2018. However, as Armed Forces Staff we already have to think far beyond that date, because today decisions will shape the Armed Forces of tomorrow. Therefore, we have to think NOW in what manner situational awareness, military doctrine, operational capabilities, and forces structures should look like in 2030+ to be ready to face future threats?

Basically, we need to draw today the long-term vision of the Swiss Armed Forces of 2030. We need to think beyond today by trying to anticipate the future and imagine what could be tomorrow in order to consequently develop the future armed forces according a capability based approach. In this regard, it is worth to mention that our considerations on long-term armed forces development actually exclude any alternative models to the militia system, as there is no political will for such a change at the moment.

"FIGHT – PROTECT – ASSIST"

Missions of the Swiss Armed Forces:

- Overall defence
- Support of civilian authorities
- Peace support
- Disaster Relief

New Approach: Swiss Armed Forces 2030+

To draw the "image" of the Swiss Armed Forces 2030+, we are using a six-step approach.
Last year (2016), we analyzed the strategic context (factors: politics, information, society, science/technology, environment and economy) and tried to identify future trends – in other words "the future strategic and operational environment" – in order to draw consequences for the future forces.

On the basis of this analysis different strategic military options were first developed. By choosing one of these strategic military options a rough target image is given (Ends – Ways – Means). Based on the chosen option, we develop capability based reference scenarios, meaning that we try to describe the effects from different types of actors (threats) and dangers (natural disasters, etc.) in all operational dimensions (e.g. Ground, Air, Cyber, Information, Space, Electromagnetic Spectrum, etc.). The resulting comprehensive model finally describes the full spectrum of opponents or actions and a wide range of capabilities, which can achieve effects not only against our Armed Forces, but also against all spheres of a state and its society.

Those reference scenarios and the strategic directive are the foundation to adjust military doctrine and to define the necessary operational capabilities, which will be analyzed through the examination in operational concepts and feasible options, both in operational and financial terms. In this step, different compositions of the whole system are examined – every option should fulfil the needs of the operational concepts. Thereby, the target image of the Swiss armed forces for the year 2030 will be refined.

Based on the resulting "target image" we will perform a variance analysis (comparison of what we have now and what we need in the future). The examination on the system level serves for a first cost estimates. With the limited resources in mind this step allows to prioritize the operational capabilities and their development. It is central to realize that particularly this step has to be conducted in an iterative manner. A particular gap in a specific operational capability leads to a potential adaptation of the operational concepts.

When the option for the development of the armed forces is defined, the progression of this development has to be set on a timeline – that is the formulation of – what we call "MASTERPLAN", which serves at the
same time as "Capability Management Tool". Based on this approach we strive to develop the Swiss Armed Forces as best in times of budgetary constraints.

**Considerations on Forces Transformation, Posture and Military Threat Perception**

Every transformation of a military organization, of any armed forces or even of a single component will inevitably have an impact on its posture. The overall objective of any force transformation is to get the forces better, stronger, with increased operational effectiveness, higher capacities and improved efficiency, capable of engaging more operational capabilities with an actualized doctrine and better tactics, techniques and procedures and of course to adapt – increase – their readiness. This has direct consequences on the military posture of a state and is likely to have a corresponding impact on perceptions of its neighboring states and states in its immediate region. Taking into account today's transregional or global geopolitical interdependency, force posture have even impact on perceptions of supra-regional and
global players in particular in their military context analysis in view of possible conflicting aspiration of their peer competitors.

Hence, even a small scale transformation like the one actually performed by the Swiss Armed Forces is likely to raise some questions – for example on the purpose of this transformation – by other states. Of course, history and the present diplomatic engagement show that it is highly unlikely that a small landlocked State like Switzerland with a long tradition of neutrality suddenly would have bellicose intent or martial objectives. Nevertheless some legitimate questions related to any forces transformation may arise and should be considered prior, during and after any transformation. For a specific state, what are the effects of any planned forces transformation on its own military posture? What can be their impact on the perception of a change in posture on other states, group of states, coalitions or alliances? How does a specific state communicate on an upcoming or ongoing forces transformation? What are the proactive confidence-building measures taken in order to mitigate any wrong perception by other states or military? How does a specific state communicate or notify on military activities, (major) military exercises, (major) military maneuvers or (major) military movements related to a coming or an ongoing forces transformation, which could give rise to apprehension? How can or how should be communicated or (pre)notified on operational readiness inspections or capability evaluations related to an ongoing or a performed forces transformation? How can or how are all these type of actions perceived by other actors on the international chess board? How can the existing confidence and security building measures be applied in its entirety or how should they possibly be adapted in order to promote mutual understanding and strengthen mutual trust?

When planning or undergoing forces transformation, raising and addressing these kind of questions and in particular trying to answer them could be a modest contribution in order to lessen tensions, reducing the dangers of misunderstanding, misinterpretation or miscalculation of military activities and eventually strengthen confidence among States and consequently contribute to increasing stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian community.
BG Peter Braunstein
Director of the Bundeswehr Verification Center

Let me first take the chance to appreciate the continuation of last year’s OSCE High Level Military Doctrine Seminar by this year’s Intersessional Dialogue. It is important to continue this exchange and I like to thank the Austrian OSCE chairmanship for preparing this event.

Last year, German Chief of Defence, General Volker Wieker, provided us with his views on the security situation in the OSCE area and operational trends. One of his key findings was that arms control and confidence building measures are still key requirements for military predictability, conflict prevention, and risk reduction.

Following these key findings, my approach today is to provide you with my view as head of the German verification center. How to address new threats? For me this means to explore, whether existing mechanisms of arms control and confidence building measures function, where those mechanisms need adjustment, and if we have to develop new mechanisms and agreements because the current security environment and new military threats cannot be dealt with by the existing regimes.

I would like to emphasize, right at the beginning of my statement, that arms control and confidence-building are still a significant pillar of the European security order. This applies in particular to the conventional arms control regime – the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Vienna Document and the Treaty on Open Skies. They do not only remain of central relevance to German foreign policy, but to all OSCE states as the current discussion in different formats and fora shows. I am convinced that the proven transparency-creating and confidence-building elements and mechanisms of these regimes continue to be of great significance, particularly in the current difficult European security situation.

The Vienna Document and the Treaty on Open Skies, for example, have provided us with important and reliable information about military activities in Ukraine during the past years of the crisis. Nevertheless, we also had to recognize that there are shortfalls with regard to their effectiveness and their implementation which we should address.
The current security crisis in Europe underlines that there is a pressing need for looking at the potential of all security policy instruments, in order to find a way back to cooperative security in the OSCE area. And this is why it makes sense to ask:

- How can the adaptation of existing instruments like the VD help to reduce risks by strengthening transparency, predictability and stability?
- How can conventional arms control contribute to reducing risk and advancing comprehensive and indivisible security in the OSCE area?
- How can dangerous incidents be avoided in the future? What kind of risk reduction mechanisms can be applied?

The discussion during the 1st session of the OSCE structured dialogue in April this year provided a useful framework for further assessment of these questions by looking at four clusters of threat perceptions: (1) Challenges to a rules-based European security order, (2) Transnational threats, (3) Interstate tension of politico-military nature, and (4) New instruments and trends that increase instability.

Let us keep this framework in mind during my following considerations.

Arms control and CSBMs do not exist in a political vacuum. The current situation in Europe is characterized by a continuing erosion of the rules-based European security order. We had to face a number of worrying developments and actions over the last years. This has contributed to the fact that the existing arms control and CSBMs architecture in Europe is in crisis, on the implementation as well as on the political level.

This also means that - confronted with an increasingly unstable security situation in Europe - there is an urgent need to re-establish military stability, reduce military risks, strengthen predictability and transparency.

Arms Control and CSBMs have a lot of instruments and mechanisms in their toolbox to assist and support the political processes that are
needed to overcome the current critical situation. Let me illustrate these important functions with some examples.

I am happy to announce that Germany will be able to strengthen the future implementation of the Open Skies treaty by providing a new and modern observation platform by the year 2020.

Equipped with a contemporary set of sensors in accordance with the treaty, this aircraft will contribute to the effectiveness of this important confidence-building regime. But we all have to invest in the future of Open Skies as a pillar of cooperative security in Europe. In order to re-establish mutual confidence in this field, current compliance issues should be solved in order to prevent further political damage to this treaty.

Concerning the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the situation is stuck. But there is some hope that the initiative started last year by German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier will promote a necessary discussion about the future of conventional arms control in Europe which has to take into account important developments in the military, technological and operational field.

Take for example higher mobility and flexibility of certain troop formations. This reduces the relevance of peace time locations and regional limitations to a certain extent. At the same time, regional military balances can be altered without prior notice.

Qualitative aspects of our military have become more important and will predominate over the debate about absolute numbers of personnel and equipment. A new approach on the basis of verifiable transparency could take these developments into account. Concerning the phenomenon of hybrid warfare, this approach could also help to counter false narratives about military postures and alleged hostile objectives.

Finally, in addition to the debate about conventional arms control in Europe, the modernization efforts on the Vienna Document do also provide evidence that we have to adapt our instruments to include new developments.
Today, for example, large scale and military SNAP exercises together with possible hazardous military incidents have escalatory potential and are substantial factors in certain threat perceptions. Therefore a substantial revision of Chapter III of the Vienna Document is urgently needed to strengthen our tool box for risk reduction in a crisis, for example by the appointment of a Special OSCE Representative for Risk Reduction and by conducting fact-finding missions in order to clarify a military incident, dispel concerns about military activities and clear out ambiguity.

I assume that there is still much work to be done in Vienna, as the individual proposals do not yet form a well-balanced package. In addition, more political will to modernize the Vienna Document is required.

Consider this: during this conference, we are discussing strategic and political questions of how to address new threats, but during the FSC discussions on modernizing the Vienna Document we have not been able to agree on the general use of digital cameras during inspections and evaluation visits – this is absurd!

In addition to the shortfalls of the existing regime of conventional arms control and CSBMs, we see new phenomena like Cyber or the challenge of terrorism and non-state actors that have to be dealt with. As head of a verification agency, I notice these trends with great concern, as for those challenges we cannot only stay with the methods that have been pursued in the past, but need new mechanism and probably agreements to address these security threats.

Concerning emerging cyber threats, the German Armed Forces launched a new cyber command in April this year. Regarding trust and confidence in cyber space, the OSCE is of great added value.

Therefore, Germany is fully committed to the OSCE´s ground-breaking confidence-building measures in the field of cyber, which were endorsed at the Ministerial Council in Hamburg last December.

In order to reduce the risk of conflict stemming in cyberspace, strengthening the implementation of those CBMs is of utmost importance in Germany´s Cyber Defense policy. Every year, the German
Armed Forces, for example, welcome OSCE partners to our international cybersecurity seminar to promote information sharing and cooperation amongst the nations.

Another example in the field of countering new or emerging threats is the security of military stockpiles against unauthorized access. The German Verification Center supports the OSCE in implementing projects on physical security and stockpile management as well as in ammunition inspection of SALW, for example, in Moldova and Serbia. With technical expertise, we contribute to prevent illegal proliferation of SALW/ammunition and it helps in mitigating the risk of unplanned explosions – although recent events showed that tragic accidents can happen.

Assessment visits and most of all the training of armed forces based on the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and International Small Arms Control Standards mirror the two main pillars of the support provided by the German Verification Center. Thus, the exchange with colleagues helps to build transparency and trust with regard to dealing with SALW.

Let me finish with three conclusions:

1. The existing norms and agreements can help us in the current situation, but only if we all commit ourselves to their principles and respect and observe them without restriction – not only on paper. But in addition to the need of intensified discussion on the core elements of co-operative security in Europe and the role of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures, we must also think beyond the framework of existing instruments.

2. Concerning threats and threat perceptions, elements of uncertainty exist not only because of lack of trust, but also because of lack of predictability and transparency with regard to new technologies, operational concepts and military capabilities. Here we need more exchange, more information, more discussion.

3. Finally: Renewing and reinforcing dialogue is key to overcoming the current crisis in European security. Here,
we need the military to engage in meaningful information, notification and cooperation within the regimes at hand.

Thank you very much for your attention. I am looking forward to the discussion and your views of the potential contributions of arms control and CSBM mechanisms to address threats and threat perceptions.
Session III: Main drivers for new military doctrines

Lars-Erik Lundin
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

This is the session where we should focus on the main drivers for new military doctrines. So rather than discussing what the new military doctrines mean in terms of force postures, et cetera, we are supposed to focus on what has brought about some of the most important developments in military doctrines and security and defence policies in recent years.

I’m sure that we are going to hear that doctrines are developed in an action-reaction pattern. One development in a military doctrine may influence developments in others and vice versa which of course brings back some of the issues that have been discussed in earlier sessions.

So it all comes together in the end around this action-reaction pattern. We may not be able to agree on who has started what change. That is of course, as always, partly a question of where you start your line of reasoning in time and space.

The fact that different analysts representing different countries often come to very different conclusions following on to very different points of departure is of course why you need a structured dialogue as initiated by the German and followed on by the Austrian Chair of the OSCE. To the greatest extent possible one should try to make sure that people talk about the same things thus zooming in on differences that possibly could be resolved through dialogue.

To focus on the same issues in a debate is not easy to do in a formal setting inside or outside the OSCE. I have been privileged to observe this over a period of more than 25 years of being a representative to the OSCE. Almost half of that period has been spent at negotiating tables starting with the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-building Measures and Disarmament from January 1984. That we sit here around the table discussing these matters is not self-evident. It was certainly not self-evident in the autumn of 1983 when
crises in Europe and in the world led to extremely hostile and frosty exchanges between foreign ministers at the Madrid follow-up meeting of the CSCE. Almost all negotiations were down, even bilateral formats between the superpowers on essential nuclear and other issues. There was little hope of improvement and many thought dialogue essentially to be useless. It took 18 months in Stockholm even to agree on the format for negotiations, to achieve a structured dialogue and negotiation. But once initial agreements had been reached in 1986, military exercises took place, which led to unprecedented possibilities for people-to-people contacts and dialogue. I was posted to Bonn in those years until the end of the Cold War and I witnessed officers for the first time visiting not only the other part of Europe but even the other part of Germany.

We are now again in the period where people often end discussions about security policy agreeing to disagree or even agreeing that no substantial dialogue seems to be possible.

Still we all know that this is not all true. Let’s look into the question provided by the organisers: which developments political, military or technical have become challenges/risks and given impetus to the adaptation of military doctrines?

To start with it should be possible to isolate those developments that constitute common challenges to participating states. I am of course referring to non-state actors and terrorism, organised crime, megatrends in terms of technological developments, demography, climate change, et cetera. The combination of these developments is no doubt increasingly affecting the stability of states inside and outside Europe. This in turn makes it ever more challenging to uphold respect for the OSCE commitments reaffirmed by all participating States as late as during the summit of Astana in 2010.

Secondly, it should be possible to do what was done for instance in the period before and after the October War 1973 namely to discuss how can risks for incidents be reduced?

Third, we should be able to discuss what is it that leads countries and to a certain extent international organisations to adopt ever more comprehensive approaches to security where even inside military
doctrines there are references to spheres of activity which employ non-
military capabilities, for instance in the area of information. Is it negative aspects of globalisation? Or is it a result of the enormous differentiation of the security discourse after the energy crisis in 1973? Or is it a result of the differentiation of power to new actors in the international community, which are not sitting around this table?

Can it be that the responses - potentially to be included in military doctrines - should be more interstate cooperation to meet these common challenges? How can we use the culture developed over many decades by our colleagues in the OSCE to arrive at an understanding of the potential for such future changes in military doctrines and in security and defence white papers. I assume that this is what lies behind the question from the organisers whether there are risks affecting all participating states for instance, cyber-attacks or terrorism that could constitute an area for a common approach in the whole of the OSCE region.

If we look back at European history from the early 1700s we find out that the continent very often has been at war. The political will to pursue dialogue has typically been mobilised after the end of wars. The most significant mobilisation of such political will took place after the Second World War with its enormous human toll. This political will led to the creation of the United Nations and then later to a number of regional cooperative structures including the CSCE turning into the OSCE.

This time, given the existence of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, there may be no opportunity to mobilise such an effort after a war and particularly not if military doctrines foresee the possible use of nuclear weapons at an early stage of a conflict. This puts a heavy responsibility on us all to find ways to develop formats for dialogue and cooperation.

If the OSCE didn’t exist it would have to be invented.
Session III: Main drivers for new military doctrines

Col Han Bouwmeester
Associate professor at NLDA and Vice Chairman of the Doctrine Committee for the Armed Forces in the Netherlands

This presentation will go into several aspects of Military Doctrine, from the perspective of the Netherlands. First, it will explain what doctrine is. Then it will talk about innovation and doctrine, and discuss the doctrine cycle. It will go into the use of doctrine, and lastly, it will discuss the challenges with doctrine.

There is no consensus on an exact definition of *doctrine*. Some say it is the use of current geopolitical and security issues, others say it is a rigid set of fundamental principles. According to the Netherlands, *doctrine* is a formal expression of military thinking, which is valid for a period of time; it uses a general approach, and it is descriptive rather than prescriptive; it defines and explains the foundation, starting points, and secondary conditions for military operations at different levels; and it is the connecting element to ensure unity of terms and concepts within the Armed Forces during planning and conduct of military operations.
The Dutch military doctrine has a certain hierarchy. At the highest, national, level, there is the *Netherlands Defence Doctrine*. Beneath this are the doctrine publications, that are either concerned with domain doctrine (Maritime, Land, Air & Space, and Information), or functional doctrine (Intel, C2, Logistics, etc.). Finally, at the level below that, the tactical level, there are a couple of handbooks. Every 5 year, a full revision of a doctrine publication takes place. There are several parties involved in the doctrine development process, including the Defense Staff, the Netherlands Defence Academy, in particular the Faculty of Military Sciences, the Maritime, Land and Air Warfare Centres. There are also other departments involved, such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Security, and Internal Affairs.

The Netherlands Defence Doctrine has a number of goals. First of all, it aims at consensus of opinion. It functions as a means for planning, preparation, and conduct of military operations. It is also a tool to contribute to transparency, and last but not least it is a mean for education. Military doctrine can be based on either recent experiences, older experiences that are translated to current means and appearance, and on new theoretical insights, although they have never been operationally tested.
All kinds of professionals and other people make use of doctrine, including military commanders, operational planners, educators and instructors, trainers, military students (such as cadets, midshipmen, and students at staff colleges), students of military history, policy makers, politicians, diplomats, police officers and law enforcement officials, members of the security services, and journalists.

There are also challenges to the military doctrine. First of all, a frequent issuing of a new doctrine does not improve the quality. Another pitfall might be that successful doctrine of the armed forces of a certain country might not work for the armed forces of another country. Third, doctrine might lead to routine thinking: the ‘the independent thinking soldier’ is not challenged. Fourth there might lead to rigidity, group thinking, and confirmation bias, and risk aversion. Fifth, there might be a lack of doctrinal enthusiasm on the higher level, which might have long detrimental effects on doctrine development and combat effectiveness. [Advice for implementation of new doctrine: find custodians in the Armed Forces].
Preliminary Conclusions

Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP); Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES)

Excellences, Generals, Ladies and Gentlemen, dear colleagues,

As the last speaker of this Intersessional OSCE Dialogue on Military Doctrines I have the honour and the challenging task to draw some preliminary conclusions as to the way forward and the suitability of available OSCE instruments in mitigating risk perceptions to which military doctrines attempt to respond. At the outset, I would like to stress that I fully subscribe to the findings presented by BG Wosolsobe.

Although there is no internationally agreed definition, military doctrines usually have their place between threat perceptions, guidance for military operations and developing force postures:

- Military doctrines usually define principles of warfighting and, more specifically, tasks and capabilities of national armed and security forces in order to cope with perceived threats, risks and challenges to national security. Such doctrines react on changes to the geopolitical, military and technological environment under the guidance of political objectives, budget constraints and, to different degrees, international agreements such as reliance on and contributions to collective defence alliances. In this context, also international obligations, in particular, international law, OSCE standards, arms control and CSBM instruments should be taken into account.

- Within the framework of such assumptions and criteria, military doctrines provide the normative basis for the design of national force postures which include troop structures, personnel strength, procurement of weapons end equipment, stationing and infrastructure as well as patterns of military training and activities. Where applicable, cooperation and integration of national capabilities in multilateral alliances and multinational
force structures are further elements that need to be considered.

Since such postures are developed in an action - reaction pattern, they can in themselves become sources for risk perceptions of other pS. It seems all the more important to understand – not necessarily to agree to – the underlying risk perceptions and the driving motives behind changes to military doctrines in order to avoid misperceptions and miscalculations. Such undertaking is enshrined in chapter II of the Vienna Document. An open and sober exchange of security concerns and rationales for developing military doctrines and force postures in itself is a confidence-building measure.

However, the lack of military-to-military contacts together with the political root causes of new tensions in Europa have led to growing suspicions, to a decrease of fact-based assessments and a failure to understand that own military measures – even if subjectively taken with a defensive purpose – can pose a risk to others. The narratives about the origins of the current crisis differ widely. Uncertainty about the intentions of neighbouring states is the consequence.

That development has been widely deplored also during this dialogue. Therefore, it seems an urgent task to restore military contacts on a regular basis. One meeting can only unfold the map of various – sometimes converging and often diverging – risk perceptions and deliver first indications why states have changed doctrines and adapted force structures. However, many questions remained unanswered and a more in-depth analysis is needed to discuss how to bridge divergent assessment and dispel concerns, e.g. by proper implementation of existing instruments or by adapting them in accordance with the needs of our time. The OSCE as an inclusive security organization is the best platform to discuss such issues. Therefore, I would encourage you, the OSCE pS, to continue military-to-military contacts more frequently to address urgent questions.
Diverging risk assessments - open questions for future deliberations

A number of those questions arose during the discussion, which obviously need further deepening and clarification. There is, e.g., the issue of figures in context with sub-regional, regional and global force balances. When it comes to force balances in Europe, it seems pertinent to draw relevant figures from official sources like CFE and VD exchange of information or GEMI that also provides some numbers for regional stationing. That could be compared to other official sources or authoritative academic sources such as publications by SIPRI or IISS.

However, as military experts know, figures have to be evaluated against an appropriate operational and strategic scenario. Certainly, one cannot ignore geographical advantages and disadvantages for quick concentration of forces in certain sub-regions. But one might also ask about the effects of a war involving alliances, with powerful conventional and nuclear forces, strategic mobility and far-reaching precise strike systems and then inquire which rationale could lead to launch sub-regional offensive operations that would certainly unleash an all-out war scenario. I understand that stressing the indivisible connection between sub-regional defence scenarios and overall strategic consequences was the signal NATO wanted to convey when deciding about a limited forward presence in certain sub-regions. Obviously, it intended to stay within the limits of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, namely not to station permanently additional substantial combat forces.

However, if pS agree that permanent *stationing or rapid deployment* of substantial combat forces could lead to a *destabilizing concentration of forces in sensitive areas*, they could look into well-proven arms control provisions that were used successfully in the past to avoid such scenarios. They could also, for exceptional cases, increase transparency and verification if certain thresholds in such areas were exceeded. For cooperative measures to be acceptable, one might also discuss certain conditions, e.g., a militarily meaningful geographical definition of such areas, measures that do not infringe in legitimate defence postures, but hamper capabilities for rapid cross-border offensive operations and are based on reciprocity of constraints.
If strategic and operational *mobility* of units that are deployed outside such sensitive zones is a matter of concern one could inquire to what extent increased transparency or certain limitations could help to dispel concerns. Similar considerations could pertain to *far-reaching precise strike systems*.

In the 1990s, the CFE Treaty and the VD deliberately excluded *air defence* units from inventories assessed essential for offensive operations. Today, such capabilities have been further developed to counter the threat posed by both ballistic missiles and far-reaching stand-off weapons delivered by aircraft at extended ranges. Also in this dialogue it became quite clear that such advanced capabilities are now seen by a number of pS as a threat providing area denial capabilities (A2/AD) while others are of the view that precise long-range stand-off weapons are in a position to overcome them. If such capabilities give reason for concerns, would it not be pertinent to consider CSBMs for both air /missile defence and long-range systems?

**Converging risk assessments?**

It seems also useful to discuss global threats that could become a challenge to all and have a potential for security cooperation. Common assessments on the nature of global threats such as proliferation of WMD, internationally acting terrorism and failing states, could unite us and allow for creating security identity in the OSCE. However, states might still disagree on measures and methods how to respond, e.g. to the missile threat originated from outside the OSCE area. This is particularly true if such response measures taken by some pS could have spill-over effects within the OSCE region, which are perceived by other pS as risks to own national security. Increasing awareness, restraint as to the technical and geographical design of counter-measures, adaptation to changing risks, utmost transparency, intrusive information and verification could be appropriate answers.

Let me add a note of caution on “*hybrid warfare*”. Several speakers noted that there is no consensus how to define it. Referring to elements like political and military support for insurgents, covert actions of special operation forces, “information operations” or propaganda stirring unrest among national or religious minorities etc., it was also
noted that there is nothing new about it. New is only the means of carrying out such operations by using the worldwide electronic communication web, the “cyber space”. We might also observe a certain convergence in reciprocal fears that potential opponents would interfere in the internal affairs of states by using such modern communication technologies. However, such descriptions contain elements that elude the domain of military doctrines. E.g., countering information operations by technical or political restrictions on media might infringe in the basic freedoms of our societies, which are certainly not subject to military regulations. Societal resilience grows from equal rights and participation of citizens, due integration of national and language minorities, democratic control, the freedom of the media and the independence of judiciary.

**Root causes of tensions and role of arms control / CSBM instruments**

The dialogue has shown that one should distinguish between the political root causes of new threat perceptions and new developments of force postures, patterns of military activities and military capabilities. The latter have become a source for concerns mainly against the political background, which was mentioned several times throughout the dialogue. Trust has been destroyed because the norms of the European security order as agreed in the 1990s, including its arms control pillar, have not or only selectively been implemented, and the use and threat of force have come back to Europe.

Therefore, no improvement of single CSBM provisions alone will heal the situation. Europe is in need of a political framework in which states can trust one another that they are committed to agreed rules of security cooperation, exercise geostrategic and military restraint, and provide for the highest possible transparency to enable new confidence. Key OSCE documents such as the Charter of Paris (1990), the Lisbon Framework for Arms Control (1996) and the European Security Charter (1999) provide relevant guidance. They aim at inclusive security cooperation without dividing lines in which no country and no organization strengthens its security at the expense of others, or regards any part of the OSCE area as a particular sphere of influence.
In this context, let us be clear about the nature of OSCE arms control and CSBM instruments: Rather than assessing political intentions, the Vienna Document, the Open Skies Treaty and the CFE Treaty tried to constrain military activities, capabilities and force postures or, at least, provide transparency to dispel concerns and avoid surprises. Regrettably, conventional arms control in Europe lies in ruins: The CFE Treaty of 1990 conceptually still focuses on a force balance between the two blocs of the time with its centre of gravity in Germany. In an enlarged alliance, it means that allies in Central Europe keep a balance of forces with each other while Kaliningrad belongs to another sub-region. In the Baltic region, however, the Treaty does not unfold any effect because the Baltic States are no State parties to the treaty, the CFE Adaptation Agreement signed almost 18 years ago was not ratified by the NATO member states and Russia left the CFE Treaty more than 9 years ago. A relaunch of conventional arms control is needed which takes into account today’s geopolitical and operational environment.

The Vienna Document also needs enhancement as to its scope, transparency and observation measures to cover new military capabilities and patterns of military activities. The document originated from the early CSBMS that were geared to assure that big exercises would not be used for launching cross-border offensive operations without early warning. Such purpose has become again of relevance to the present situation. Obviously, snap exercises that are not notified in advance appear to be a matter of particular concern. Consequently, one might discuss the question under which conditions formations and units could build up operational capabilities for cross-border operations, and how CSBMs could tackle respective risk perceptions. Should one distinguish between readiness tests inside peacetime locations (in-garrison activities) and snap exercises concentrating combat-ready formations in assembly areas and preparing for combined arms operations (out of-garrison activities)? Do military exercises in vicinity of border regions and areas in crisis need to be covered by more intrusive CSBMs? Do military exercises far away from international borders or areas in crisis require special attention if combined with assets providing operational and strategic mobility?

In any case, incident prevention is an urgent task as many speakers pointed out. We might inquire how the OSCE communication network
could be used better and how the procedures for handling hazardous incidents as enshrined in chapter III of the Vienna Document could be enhanced in order to avoid escalation. Many incidents take place in international sea areas and air space. Therefore, a clearer definition of sea areas adjacent to the European continent seems necessary that are part of the area of application of the Vienna Document but lack definition.

Certainly, these examples are indicative and there are more questions, to which modern CSBMs should respond. In conclusion, it seems to me that there is plenty of substance to be discussed at future occasions of military contacts, hopefully, in a not too far distant future.
1. **Background**

Tasked by the Declaration “From Lisbon to Hamburg: On the Twentieth Anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control”, which the Ministers of the OSCE participating States adopted at the last Ministerial Council, the Austrian Chairmanship-in-Office invited OSCE participating States to an Intersessional OSCE Dialogue on Military Doctrines on 4-5 May 2017. The meeting was a useful opportunity to further develop and thereby sustain the process of military-to-military contacts on a more regular basis, an idea, which was developed at the last High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar in February 2016.

Moreover, the Intersessional OSCE Dialogue on Military Doctrines was a substantive contribution to the on-going process of the structured dialogue on the current and future challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area pursuant to Ministerial Council Declaration MC.DOC/4/16. Following the first meeting of the informal working group (IWG) *Structured Dialogue*, the meeting was the second in an initial trilogy of meetings to be held in capitals format. It focused on military doctrines and their inter-linkage to threat perceptions and current trends in military force posture in the OSCE area.

2. **Summary of Discussions**

There was overall agreement that military doctrines provide a reasonable starting point for discussions. Doctrines contain strategic threat and risk perceptions and translate into military structures and developments. Hence, they also lay the ground for assessing intentions behind changing force postures. Based on this understanding, the respective sessions tried to cover a wide spectrum of security-related issues, including in-depth threat perceptions, areas and methods for cooperative engagement, and doctrinal changes in the context of the current security environment.

The three sessions that all included introductory panel presentations focused on the following main topics:
Threat perceptions and changes in military doctrines

Many participating States reflected on the major challenges to the rules-based and indivisible European security order and on a wide range of risks and tensions of a politico-military nature. They also addressed transnational and global threats and the increasingly complex challenges of new technological developments.

One main concern that participants expressed was the violation of basic principles and norms of European security, which has led to mistrust and instability in the OSCE area. Nevertheless, there seemed to be common understanding that, today, while (or even because) trust is lacking, there is an urgent need to engage and have meaningful dialogue, notwithstanding different perceptions of threats and risks.

In this context, several participants highlighted that snap exercises, large military build-up and military exercises, as well as the concentration of forces near borders have led to serious concerns by some participating States and more adequate and relevant information is needed to explain the intentions of such actions. There was widespread concern that such military activities increase instability, cause tensions and can even lead to a dangerous escalation.

Challenges emerging from hybrid warfare were raised. While participants agreed that hybrid tactics have been used in the past there was no mutual understanding on a precise definition of ‘hybrid warfare’ and how to counter this threat.

Participants also discussed global and transnational threats and challenges and agreed on their impact on the OSCE area. The most urgent threats were identified as terrorism and violent extremism, organized crime, large movements of people, the proliferation of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and the security of stockpiles. It was also pointed out that the OSCE with its comprehensive
concept of security has several on-going activities that address the latter challenges.

The point was made that it is useful to bring into the discussion the perspective of civil society that may differ from official national discourses. It was therefore suggested to also take a more comprehensive approach assessing and addressing threats.

The discussion demonstrated, moreover, that threat and risk perceptions were closely linked to geographic factors. For example, a particular focus was put on the Baltic region and sub-regions of Eastern Europe.

Over the course of the meeting the importance of direct and regular military-to-military contacts at all levels was stressed repeatedly. Such contacts are essential to better understand and cope with potential drivers for doctrinal changes like the changing political landscape, threat assessments and their influence on political will. Cyber and media influences were also highlighted as key shapers of perception and military doctrines.

It was pointed out that military doctrines are not developed in isolation: changes in the doctrine of one country or region may cause a reaction in others. Furthermore, solutions that benefit or serve the interests of one group of OSCE participating States may be perceived as a threat to others. Therefore, security is indivisible.

The role of the OSCE

It was pointed out that in addition to its convening power, the OSCE has a comprehensive toolbox including various instruments and mechanisms. This equips and positions the OSCE as a suitable platform to tackle new threats and challenges in the future. Action by and through the OSCE, among other actors, was cited as essential in order to slow down and ultimately reverse the current worrying trends that affect stability in the OSCE area.

It was recalled that the OSCE instruments and mechanisms had been developed and fine-tuned over the years in order to enable and create common responses. It was noted that common responses are needed
to common threats. It was also suggested that participating States should remain open to the possibility of developing new approaches to addressing politico-military and other transnational threats and challenges, whilst keeping conventional arms control and confidence and security building measures as the core focus.

Political will was often mentioned as the overall determining factor in shaping military doctrines and other policy considerations. It was concluded that developing a better common understanding can assist in creating this political will and moving forward.

3. Conclusions for the way ahead

The Intersessional OSCE Dialogue on Military Doctrines was a successful and highly constructive meeting as it demonstrated that the OSCE provides an appropriate forum for open and frank military-to-military dialogue among participating States.

Discussions were characterized by sincerity, respectfulness and openness despite differences in opinion, addressing current developments of security challenges, risks and threats, and their influence on military doctrines. Representatives of capitals showed a high degree of interest. A recurrent theme and widely shared view was that dialogue should be further strengthened, for example, to increase military transparency, jointly tackle hybrid threats, and address technological mega-trends.

Participants emphasized that direct military-to-military contact had been particularly helpful to carry out a constructive and open discussion, which is essential for developing a mutual understanding, increasing transparency and rebuilding trust among participating States. Against the background of last year’s Ministerial Council Declaration “From Lisbon to Hamburg”, OSCE participating States highlighted the added value of organizing more regularly direct military-to-military contacts for sincere and frank discussions.

Furthermore, Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter presented some thoughts and potential ways forward in his concluding summary remarks, which will be annexed to this perception paper at hand.
The meeting was an important complementary building block for the structured dialogue process in providing a clear link to the IWG meeting on threat perceptions on 7 April and the next meeting on 6 June chaired by Ambassador Eberhard Pohl. The June meeting will provide another opportunity to carry forward the dialogue in a coherent manner, based on threat perceptions and military doctrines, and look in more detail into current trends in military force posture.
Introduction

The current security crises, as well as a variety of challenges in and for our region, underline the significance of the OSCE politico-military toolbox. A comprehensive implementation of existing instruments is vital in times of severe tension, instability and unpredictability. In addition, the necessity of adapting these instruments to the military realities of the 21st century is widely recognized. CSBMs, especially the Vienna Document (VD), are indispensable for military transparency, predictability and stability in the OSCE area. As a vital pillar of the European security architecture, it is crucial to identify and address current gaps in and shortcomings of the existing CSBM-regime. The first “Breakout Workshop on CSBMs” provided members of delegations in Vienna, as well as experts from capitals, the opportunity to take a broad generic look and discuss existing loopholes of the VD in an open manner within working groups. Four topics were discussed within the workshop’s working groups: the scope of forces subject to the VD, the prior notification and observation of certain military activities, compliance and verification and risk reduction. The outcomes of these sessions were presented to the plenary.
Wednesday, 1 March 2017

Welcoming remarks
» BG Reinhard Trischak, Head of Military Policy Division, Austria

Thursday, 2 March 2017

Welcome Remarks
» Lt Gen Erich Csitkovits, Commandant of the National Defence Academy, Austria
» Ambassador Cristian Istrate, FSC Chairperson, Romania
» Ambassador Marcel Pesko, Director of the CPC, OSCE Secretariat
» Ambassador Christian Strohal, Representative CiO, Austria

Opening Session – Gap Analysis
The session discussed basic facts of the VD, like development, instruments and possibilities of the document, gaps and room for possible improvement and modernization.

Keynotes:
» Mr. Benno Laggner, FSC coordinator for the VD
» Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter, Researcher Int’l Security, Germany

Topic I: Scope of forces subject to the VD
This session discussed the current scope of force categories for information and notification, its limitations and implications for transparency and verification as well as options for extending the scope and the implications of technological developments.

Keynotes:
» Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter, Researcher Int’l Security, Germany
» BG Wolfgang Peischel, Chief Editor, Austrian Military Journal (ÖMZ), Austria
**Topic II: Prior notification and observation of certain military activities**
This lecture discussed the implications of current threshold values and constraining rules for transparency and predictability of military activities. Moreover, it also considered their implications in times of crisis.

**Keynotes:**
- Mr. Robin Mossinkoff, Senior FSC Support Officer, OSCE
- Mr. William Alberque, Head of Arms Control & Coordination Section, NATO

**Topic III: Compliance and Verification**
This lecture focused on implications of low quota for inspections and evaluations (linked to limited scope) and experiences made with the limited number of inspectors and their presence on the spot as well as possibilities to improve the mechanisms of verification.

**Keynotes:**
- BG Peter Braunstein, Director of the Bundeswehr Verification Centre, Germany
- Lt Col Péter Benei, Defence Policy Department/Arms Control Unit, Hungary

**Topic IV: Risk reduction**
This session dealt with the rationale behind frequent large-scale exercises close to international borders and how to react to these notified and observed activities after the assessments of other OSCE participating States.

**Keynotes:**
- Col (GS) Hans Lüber, Military Adviser, Switzerland
- Mr. Benno Laggner, FSC coordinator for the VD

**Friday, 3 March 2017**

**Closing Session**
- Mr. Benno Laggner, FSC coordinator for the VD
- Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter, Researcher Int’l Security, Germany
- BG Reinhard Trischak, Head of Military Policy Division, Austria
Distinguished participants, welcome to this first session which is intended to set the stage for our subsequent discussions.

Let me start by congratulating the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship on having taken the initiative to organize this Workshop. I have the honour to moderate this session and deliver some opening remarks. As mentioned in the programme, I am the current FSC Chair’s Coordinator on the Vienna Document, but I am speaking here in my personal capacity.

Let me first introduce my fellow panelist who is well known to most of you. Colonel Wolfgang Richter combines both the perspective of an academic and the rich experience of a practitioner.

He is a senior research associate in the International Security Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. His research areas cover the European security order, the role of the OSCE for security cooperation in Europe, NATO-Russia relations, military strategies, territorial conflicts and the role of arms control and CSBMs for stability in Europe. In his active service as a general staff officer, he was i.a. Head of the Military Section of the German Representation to the OSCE, Head of the European and Global Arms Control Department of the German Armed Forces Verification Centre and Senior Military Advisor of the German Representation to the CD in Geneva and the UN disarmament bodies in New York.

I would like to start by underlining the significance of the Vienna Document (VD) as part of the overall architecture of conventional arms control and CSBMs in Europe. It is a key pillar and the most important confidence- and security-building instrument in the OSCE’s politico-military dimension of security.
CSBMs can be considered part of the DNA of the former CSCE and now OSCE. The VD complements the two legally-binding regimes of the CFE (Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europa) and the Open Skies Treaty. These two treaties were negotiated among a limited number of participating States (pS) outside the OSCE framework. The comparative advantage of the politically-binding VD is that it is the only instrument to which all 57 pS belong.

In other words, all 57 OSCE pS not only have political ownership, but also a common responsibility to preserve the acquis of the VD, to implement it in good faith both according to the letter and to the spirit of its provisions and to ensure its effectiveness and relevance in a changing security environment.

The VD is often referred to as the “third generation” of CBMs/CSBMs, following the initial CBMs of the Helsinki Final Act and the second generation of CSBMs of the Stockholm Document. It has evolved from the VD90 to the VD11.

The VD is a living document that can and must be adapted to the current military and security realities. As you know, there is a mechanism that allows for continuous updating and modernization of the Document with the provisions for VD PLUS Decisions in accordance with Paragraph 151. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to adopt any VD PLUS Decision since July 2013.

A Special FSC Meeting on Reissuance of the VD was held on 9 November 2016 in accordance with paragraph 152 which calls for such a meeting at least every five years. However, no consensus could be reached on reissuing the Document. Reissuance would have had, especially in the prevailing tense security environment, a high symbolic value. But in practical terms, it wouldn’t have changed anything. VD11, as amended by the four VD PLUS Decisions adopted since November 2011, remains in force.

There is not a lack of proposals to update the Document. Currently, 16 proposals are under consideration on the agenda of the FSC’s Working Group A, some of which are cosponsored by a significant number of pS. In addition, 12 proposals have been distributed. And a further group of
Opening Session – Gap Analysis

8 proposals were submitted by one pS which has, however, subsequently withdrawn them.

Despite the obvious need to halt the further erosion of trust and restore a basic level of confidence, predictability and cooperation, there are no immediate prospects for reaching consensus on any of the proposals under discussion. This should, however, not stop us from further refining these proposals and from seeking to expand the level of support for them.

At the same time, we need to take a step back and engage in a more strategic discussion to determine what the most significant gaps are in order to better respond to the security concerns and threat perceptions of all pS.

In my view, some of the issues we need to address are extending the scope of the current provisions, the rapid development of military technology and new capabilities, structural and doctrinal changes in the armed forces, the changing nature of military activities and the consequences this also has for verification efforts, how to enhance and better operationalize risk reduction measures in order to respond more adequately to crisis situations, but also how to deal with the issue of armed non-state actors.

We also need to consider how we can generate the necessary political will to modernize the VD. This is a good moment to start this strategic reflection. The decision to launch a Structured Dialogue on the current and future challenges and risks for security in the OSCE area has put the issue of CSBMs again high on the political agenda.
Topic I: Scope of forces subject to the VD

Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter  
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP); Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES)

The scope of the VD mainly flows from Chapter I “Annual Exchanges of Military Information”. It covers formations (armies, corps, and divisions) and combat units (brigades, regiments/wings) of land forces, air forces, air defense aviation as well as naval aviation that is permanently based on land. It also specifies information on personnel strength as well as weapon and equipment systems under the control of these formations and units. They are largely identical with the armaments and equipment subject to the CFE Treaty (plus the explicit mentioning of anti-tank guided missile launchers permanently/integrally mounted on armored vehicles).

Chapter I requires information on active and non-active formations and combat units as well as on plans on temporary activation of non-active combat units if their activation exceeds 21 days. Other provisions of the VD such as Chapter IX Compliance and Verification only refer to active or temporarily activated units. Chapters V and VI on prior notification and observation of certain military activities refer to actual numbers of personnel as well as weapon and equipment systems held by formations and combat units participating in such activities. In any case, changing the scope of notifiable formations and units would have a bearing on other chapters as well. E.g. including other than combat units of land and air forces in the scope would make it more likely that certain military activities would exceed the personnel thresholds enshrined in chapters V and VI. Therefore, when updating the scope one might look at the net-effects regarding other VD provisions.

On substance, one might ask whether the current scope does sufficiently represent current force structures and modern force capabilities such as long-range precise strike options and rapid force concentrations over large distances. Thus, the build-up of potentials for cross-border operations does not only depend on traditional active
combat and combat support units as covered by the VD. They also rely on advanced force multipliers, logistics, CCC as well as operational and strategic mobility, maritime capabilities, short-range ballistic missile systems and area denial capabilities. In this context, also multilateral cooperation providing for enlarged potentials, synergetic effects, and enhanced capabilities should be taken into account.

Furthermore, in current conflicts *internal security forces, special operation forces* and non-active units outside regular land forces that can be mobilized shortly play a significant role.

For the purpose of preventing surprises and dispelling concerns about imminent large-scale troop movements, enhanced transparency of the activities of CCC- and logistic units might provide important indicators given their crucial role in preparing such action – together with reconnaissance.

Regarding long-term predictability, one might note that in some states logistical depots harbor as many major weapon systems as active units. Information on and regular visits to such depots would ensure transparency of long-term force planning and indicate imminent changes.

Against this backdrop, participants could look into possibilities to enlarge the scope of the VD as defined in Chapter I together with its implications for other provisions of the document.

**Taking into account modern military capabilities**

Let me add some thoughts on modern operational capabilities and new weapons systems. Occasionally, it is suggested that modern military capabilities, e.g. net-centric operations, cyber war and advanced weapons systems such as combat drones (UCAV), make “traditional” armaments and equipment defined in the CFE Treaty and covered by the VD irrelevant. Analysis of current conflicts and defense planning does not support such view. Such armaments are still used as the central elements of combined arms warfare which are able to seize and hold terrain, delay enemy advances, secure wide areas or carry out stabilizing operations in low-intensity conflicts.
So far, **combat drones** were used in asymmetric and low-intensity warfare scenarios in which no strong air defense hampered their operations. In high intensity warfare, however, which is the assumed scenario necessitating conventional arms control regulations, combat drones would not have such freedom of operation. Instead, they would have to be integrated in combined arms operations including suppression of enemy air defense in order to have a notable military effect. For such cases, the inclusion of combat drones in conventional arms control instruments might be technically feasible if one agrees that they fit in the CFE definition of combat aircraft though being unmanned and remotely piloted. However, long-range hyper-sonic combat drones used for global strategic purposes might not be reasonably dealt with in European regional scenarios only but rather belong to the category of strategic arms control.

As electronic warfare did already in the past, also **cyber operations** might hamper command and control systems. However, they are subject to precautionary resilience and technical counter-measures and by no means do they replace force movement and firepower on the ground, in the air or at sea. Furthermore, such multi-purpose and genuinely dual-use software technologies with wide-spread and predominantly civil application largely escape negotiable and verifiable military restrictions. Therefore, it seems highly questionable whether conventional arms control and CSBMs are suited to curtail cyber operations. Instead, specific instruments such as agreements on general rules or codes of conduct for activities in the internet might be required.

Modern **net-centric warfare** capabilities do not rely on a significantly higher firepower of small units as such; they rather enable smaller forces compared to Cold War postures to carry out their missions with the fire or air support of long-range and precise strike potentials located far outside the combat zone. Such capabilities evolve from **satellite-based** reconnaissance, positioning and communications, **advanced sensors** and modern **computer software**, rather than new hardware, and tend to elude meaningful and acceptable transparency and verification. Thus, qualitative arms control and CSBMs on space-based CCC-systems will have to be considered, but obviously need to be subject to compromises.
Rapid deployment capabilities which allow swift concentration of forces in sub-regions of concern and precise, long-range strike capabilities of modern weapon systems, which are deployed far outside such regions, have significantly improved current force postures. Therefore, they should be taken into account when considering extending the scope of the VD. To that end, air mobility and air transport as well as far-reaching strike systems in Europe – no matter in which sub-regions or littoral waters they are deployed – could and should become subject to information obligations and on-base verification rights. And they should be fielded in line with the principle of sufficiency to meet legitimate defense requirements.
BG Wolfgang Peischel
Chief Editor of the Austrian Military Journal (ÖMZ)

Strategic assessment before deducing armed forces-development trends

When I prepared my presentation for the Breakout Workshop on CSBMs, I came across the commonly held hypothesis that transparency is what has primarily to be striven for, i.e. the open-hearted willingness of each OSCE-member to let its armed forces be counted according to the acknowledged main categories of the Vienna Document whereas neither a threat analysis, a thorough strategic assessment nor an evaluation of new capabilities, procedures, systems would be of overriding substantial importance.

I will try to start from the assumption that this one-dimensional approach might be too short sighted. Transparency as an end in itself, i.e. without exact knowledge about what has to be made transparent in order to allow for a reliable assessment of the threat potential, might fall short. Counting only for counting’s sake that means without having deduced what has to be counted and for what logical reason, might lead to a treacherous perception of actual capabilities and thus turn out a rope of sand. An alternative approach could lie with a comprehensive assessment of the global strategic situation and of the specific interests of political players, which would lead to armed forces’ structures, procedures and development trends needed to pursue those defined strategic interests. Therefrom could be deduced, which capabilities, factors, weapon systems, in which weighting among one another, were constitutive for success in the respective operational procedures – and this deduction could shine a light ahead on the question of what to count in a potentially further developed Vienna Document.

The terminology of Warfighting Functions (Mission Command, Intelligence, Movement and Maneuver, Fires, Protection and Sustainment), the US-army headquarters’ department uses for the armed forces’ conventional warfare doctrines, gives one out of a

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2 The following text is a summary of BG Peischel’s keynote speeches at both the first and the second Breakout Workshop on CSBMs.
number of examples of how much more significant certain capability categories can be for the actual combat power than mere numbers of main weapon systems. How useful is a comparison of 500 main battle tanks of opponent A and 700 main battle tanks of opponent B that neglects the fact that A has Cyber superiority, which allows for paralyzing adversary’s mission command and thus the latter’s capability to engage bigger tank units successfully?

Above that, it seems to turn out an indispensable precondition for a valid strategic assessment, to differentiate between potentials and threats. The term threat implies an offensive, aggressive intention and thus sets a potential opponent under suspicion – which is definitely nothing, by which mutual trust can be fostered. However, to close our eyes in front of the consequences that might emerge from the potential opponent’s capabilities, in case he would be driven by a hostile intention, wouldn’t get us anywhere either. The following approach might offer an escape from this dilemma. It suggests counting the counterpart’s potentials, but without imputing hostile intentions to him from the beginning (at least without accusing him of such) and subsequently to counter-balance by an equal set of capabilities and systems – wherefrom the potential opponent, for his part, must not deduce a hostile intention either. Both sides must understand that existing potentials (in particular capabilities, procedures, systems and resources) have to be counter-balanced regardless of a factual hostile intention – counter-balancing does not necessarily mean to impute such an intention to the other side, it rather has to be understood as getting oneself prepared in case, there is an offensive tendency. Of course, it could be seducing to abnegate any offensive intention as counting only systems would allow for lower defence budgets, justified by the excuse that there would be time enough for counter-balancing as soon as the first indicators of aggressive behaviour become visible. The current political situation shows that this, in most cases, only turns out wishful thinking. The much more probable consequence of offering an inferior force-saturation, or in other words a conventional power vacuum, is that the other side gets incited to offensive strategic goals. Against the backdrop of this rationale, it is not so much unilateral rearming that causes substantial security risks, but rather ruling out even the possibility of offensive intentions to legitimize a downsizing of defence budgets, that creates severe imbalances and eventually leads
to destabilization and mistrust. A thorough and deep discussion of the above approach and its underlying rationale might lead to a completely new interpretation of the conflicting interests of the EU and of Russia – and it might ease the confrontative rhetoric, both actors currently apply.

I was asked to elaborate on the operational level of foreseeable trends of European armed forces development, however, as I tried to show in the above deduction, any operational assessment without an evaluation of the underlying strategic logic, must fall short. Thus, I will start from a rough analysis of the current global, strategic situation and distill respectively deduce armed forces development trends accordingly, afterwards.

A very brief assessment of the global strategic situation

The US still dominate and substantially drive the global strategic development. For the first time in history, they face the paramount challenge of two emerging super-powers at the same time, on the same continent. As a consequence, they partially withdraw from Europe and rebalance their strategic main effort towards the Pacific region. They will have to try to make Europe assume more responsibility for its security. The RAND-study tackling a hypothetic surprise attack of Russia against the Baltic states, the support for the 2% GDP-goal, decided upon at the Wales summit and the line of arguments that the Mediterranean counter-coast, and thus the root cause of the current migration crisis, lies South of Europe and not South of the USA, might be recognized as indicators for the above approach. The relief which could be achieved by a Europe that takes over a fair share of security-political responsibility would provide more leeway to reinforce their Navy (in particular the carrier-fleet) and to counter China’s A2/AD strategy. On the other hand, the current US-administration will probably strive for a harmonization of relations with Russia in order to prevent a closer cooperation between Russia and China with regard to the latter’s mining rights in the Arctic region, to exerting political influence on Greenland and Iceland and to options that might arise from the opening of the north-west-passage. If this hypothesis proves true, there will also be political support for a kind of political reconciliation between Western, Central and Eastern European states on the one hand and Russia on the other, which eventually might lead to a
partial lifting of sanctions. The approach to let Russia gradually become rather a strategic partner than an adversary, is not a big risk for the US as – apart from their nuclear options – their naval forces benefit from the geo-strategic advantage that they can operate opposite to Russia on the “inner line”, whereas the 3 Russian fleets, that are relevant for Europe (Northern, Baltic and Black Sea-Fleet) have to operate from geographically separated areas which makes any kind of operational interaction extremely difficult. With regard to the economic perspective, the US are torn between two diametrically opposed approaches. Whereas they need Europe to take over more security-political responsibility in order to free resources, which are needed for rebalancing to the Pacific region, they are heavily competing with Europe in economic respect. They challenge the European economy, in particular the Euro, by an intensified shale-gas production and by regimes like TTIP or TPP and they indirectly even benefit from the negative outcome of the migration crisis, the side-effects for Europe that result from the sanctions against Russia or the VW-scandal. All these factors lead – without imputing any intention to the US-administration – to the almost paradoxical result that America has to motivate Europe to invest more into conventional defence and at the same time indirectly benefits from the reduced economic performance, which results from spending more money on security. Of course, it also can be argued that the hitherto economic success of Europe was, among other factors, achieved by saving the budgetary means, it would have had to spend on security and that the US actually had invested in defence over the last decades.

Australia’s decision in favour of the French assault submarine can be interpreted as supporting US strategic interests in the South Chinese Sea – on the contrary to the German boat, the French one offers a nuclear propulsion option and this option only makes sense, if long-distance missions are envisaged.

Western European, including Central and Eastern European states had admitted the emergence of a conventional power vacuum, particularly in their most eastern regions over the past decades. A substantial paradigm-shift has taken place from the imperative to calm crises where they occur, before their negative outcome spills over to Europe, towards something that resembles a kind of fortress Europe, which guarantees
security simply by pulling up the draw-bridges. It was clear from the beginning that this idea cannot work in the longer run – now Europe learns that it doesn’t even succeed in the present.

Europe faces a wide scope of new security-political challenges. First of all it will have to fill the conventional power vacuum, it had allowed to emerge and at the same time to withstand the growing economic competition from the side of the US. It has to deal with and to solve the dilemma between the dependence on Russian resources (in particular oil/gas and the chances the Russian market offers for European merchandise) and its commitment towards a solidary action, by sustaining the sanctions on Russia. The EU will have to find a cure against its internal erosion-process and prevent members from following the example of the UK. In order to calm the migration crisis and to solve its root causes already in countries of origin, Europe will have to take preemptive action towards the Mediterranean counter-coast. It will parallelly have to perpetuate and to intensify its action against any kind of Islamic fundamentalism that tries to project an offensive and anti-democratic attitude towards Europe. Uncontrolled Chinese land-grabbing in Africa might turn out counter-productive to European approaches to improve living conditions in countries of origin of the migration crisis and should therefore be prevented. European states will have to prepare against possible internal unrest in the wake of insufficiently treated migration-problems and in particular against Cyber-threats by which internal instability can be triggered and fueled.

As 70% of container traffic to and from Europe and 30% of the raw-oil for Europe are shipped via the Suez-Canal, securing trade routes by naval forces will turn out a substantial challenge for future strategic planners, particularly when the US continue to shift their strategic interests to the Pacific region.

**Cornerstones of a possible European answer to the strategic challenges outlined above**

In order to fill the forces-vacuum Europe has allowed to emerge, it will have to raise the average defence-expenditures to the level, decided upon during the Wales-summit, and to rebuild conventional capabilities to an extent that makes it a credible and calculable political player
Towards Russia, a partner rather than an opponent that communicates on equal terms – at eye level. Such a communication on equal conventional terms will – contrary to what some “experts” prognosticate – produce a deescalating effect instead of an escalating one.

Furthermore, Europe will have to build up conventional capabilities which enable intervention forces to conduct boots on the ground missions, needed for preemptive action south of the Mediterranean, in order to treat the causes for large scale migration movements and to fight the spill-over from democracy imperiling, offensive Islamic fundamentalism.

European states will have to support the maritime capabilities of those nations, who provide naval power projection, for the above-mentioned operations (preemptive action south of the Mediterranean and fight against offensive, anti-democratic Islamic fundamentalism) and for securing vital maritime trade routes.

An approach that follows that logic would avoid any idea to compensate conventional inferiority with smart, precision guided nuclear weapons, which would be a real escalating factor and indeed could lead to legitimate mistrust and a new arms race, and therefore should be avoided at any rate.

The US wouldn’t be annoyed by that approach – they would on the contrary support it, as it would free resources and allow for a rapprochement of Western, Central and Eastern European states towards Russia, thus for restarting negotiations – and subsequently even for a stepwise lifting of sanctions (as a precondition for the supply with Russian oil and gas and for unhindered access to the Russian market). That way, also a closer US-Russian cooperation could be achieved, which aims at fending off Chinese claims in the Arctic Region, in the South Chinese Sea and in Africa.

**Major armed forces development trends and their VD-relevance**

So far, I have tried to give a general survey and analysis of the current global strategic situation from a European viewpoint and to deduce cornerstones of a possible answer to the strategic challenges, deriving therefrom. Once they are defined, it can be analyzed which armed
forces development trends should be followed and supported in order to enable Europe to cope properly with the deduced strategic challenges.

The degree to which armed forces align with those major development trends that enable them to cope with the analyzed strategic challenges, could be suggested as replenishment for the Vienna Document – as they might help to identify true combat power that cannot be concluded alone from the mere number of the hitherto defined main weapon systems.

The main weapon systems contained in the Vienna Document had lost importance during the phase of the CRO-paradigm after 1991, as high intensity conventional warfare in and around Europe could be ruled out to a relatively high degree of probability – but meanwhile they are absolutely applicable again. However, if transparency and trust building is the envisaged ultimate goal, they might have to be replenished by the following factors/indicators that should be communicated ostentatiously. For the sake of factual transparency, it even might be suggested to include them into an updated Vienna Document.

It is not only the number of forces deployed in defined areas anymore that counts – much rather it becomes increasingly significant which capabilities/capacities armed forces develop to redeploy over operational and strategic distances within given timeframes. Already the ZAPAD-series showed that there were severe miscalculations from the European perspective and that the Russian redeployment capability was heavily underestimated. The fact that the question of redeployment-capabilities in an operational/strategic scale is now researched anew and discussed thoroughly proves it to be one of the major future development trends.

True operational jointness and highly mobile counter-concentration were the imperatives of NATO defence concepts short before the fall of the Iron Curtain. Although worked out theoretically and tested in principle, there was not enough time left to train and exercise them sufficiently in practice. As the RAND study showed, conventional, highly mobile mechanized warfare based upon truly joint operations-
capability including a higher-resolution\(^3\) Air-Land-Battle-Concept (i.e. harmonization of air and ground forces operations already on small unit-level) will mark another major development trend.

Apart from the need for highly mobile mechanized forces, there will probably emerge a trend towards mechanized infantry for higher intensive missions than the hitherto CROs. Calming crises in countries of origin of migration movements or boots on the ground missions against offensive fundamentalist regimes that are about to spill over their anti-democratic effects to Europe, will require a big number of ground-forces employed at the same time and over a longer duration, the latter force-category regularly in an intensity that equals missions according to Chapter VII of the UN-Charta.

The demand for a third force-capability category will result from growing internal unrest due to unsolved migration problems or a worsening of the social situation within the state.

All four of the above force categories, highly mobile conventional, primarily mechanized defence forces, mechanized infantry for lower intensity CRO, robust mechanized or air-mobile infantry for intensive boots on the ground-intervention missions as well as units for the support of police forces in case of large scale internal unrest, go hand in hand with a long duration of the missions and will thus require a substantial reserve-component, which can easier be achieved under a conscription-system. Approaches like the extension of conscription on females in Norway, the reinvention of conscription in Sweden and the lack of young-blood in some countries that might affect the combat

\(^3\) The FOFA-concept as well as the Airland-Battle doctrine showed in principle awareness of the necessity of harmonized operations, in particular between air and ground forces – on operational and higher tactical level. The surprising result, the RAND-computer simulation brought, was that delaying mechanized forces were not able to slow the adversary down to the required maximum speed without air-support and that the fighter aircraft didn’t hit their targets unless the ground forces succeeded in limiting the enemy’s thrust-speed. So what results from this new quality of mutual dependence between air and ground forces, is a completely new perception of the Airland-Battle concept – one that focusses on a continuous air-ground forces harmonization and combined-arms understanding already on the lower tactical levels.
power of an entire service, corroborate the growing importance of conscription/recruitment-systems.

Due to restricted defence-budgets, a stronger emphasis will have to be put on the capabilities of educating and training military leaders/personnel. Questions like “how long does it take to train e.g. NCOs, commanders capable of combined/joint operations at brigade level and above” will probably gain higher importance than they have at the moment – thus becoming a significant factor of actual combat-power.

Maritime capabilities, in particular those supporting land operations over long distances and securing trade routes will turn out an indispensable precondition for European security, particularly when the US shift their strategic focus to the Pacific region (there is an example which shows, that maritime capabilities can gain strategic importance even if there is no aircraft carrier available – Russia supported the anti-IS-campaign with guided missiles from vessels of the Black Sea Fleet).

The so called Global Commons (Space, Sea, Cyber) will substantially drive the international strategic development, particularly because they are not subdued to specific national spheres of interest and on the contrary offer options to gain and exert political and military power to anyone who recognizes these options fast enough and is willing to invest the monetary means needed for such an approach. Capabilities to gain C4ISR-superiority, Cyber/Anti-Cyber capabilities, EW-capabilities in general will become strategic key factors of success. Cyber capabilities will no longer be David’s slingshot against Goliath that inevitably leads to vulnerability vis a vis terrorist attacks – Cyber-technologies, thoroughly researched and developed on a reasonable budgetary basis, can just as well result in the possibility to “switch off” low-tech adversaries, like states that support offensive anti-democratic fundamentalist organisations.

The more demanding future operations will become, and the more robust engaged forces will have to be, the more necessary it will be to reconsider the divisional organization for the highest intensive missions. Past years have shown that a clear classification of the “brigade-equivalent” particularly of the Russian forces was difficult. Should it be
considered a reinforced regimental-task force or rather a division that compensates lower personnel numbers by overwhelming firepower, new weapons technology and the biggest deal of previous division’s combat fire support? Apart from the fact that this is a crucial factor for the brigade-based comparison of combat power and can easily lead to severe misperceptions, the resulting lesson learned is that Russia considers returning to a divisional organization, where particularly high intensive operations over longer distances are envisaged and where a deeper coordination with combat air support planning cycles is required. As Europe needs to cope with Russian capabilities and because the operational logic behind their and the European logic of force organisation should be the same, certain aspects of the division-idea, at least for highest intensity operations should be taken into consideration again.

**Conclusion**

What should concern Western, Central and Eastern European States is not so much an assumed or suspected hostile intention, but rather a kind of guilty conscience for lacking sufficient conventional armed forces to counter-balance even any hypothetic challenge, for which no opponent can be blamed but Europe itself.

The military required to answer that challenge properly would be a conventional, relatively cheap and easily *countable* one (no deep air-strike capabilities, no long range deployability, no nuclear component, no SEAD, no long range maritime power projection etc.) and above all, it would not develop an offensive orientation. Provided that there are credible capabilities, it would be effective already by its mere presence.

So, what seems a paradox at first sight is in fact no paradox at all: A conventional force-balance would deescalate and support trust and confidence-building instead of having an escalating effect, as some false prophets want to make us believe?

Since 1991 it was, a little similar to what Rupert Smith writes in his book “Utility of Force”, a widely held belief that it would be more economic to develop primarily all necessary capabilities for CRO in low intensity conflicts and to spare the budgetary means for more robust operations intermediately. Now it turns out that it is very difficult to develop robust
defence-capabilities out of low intensity conflict-skills. Therefore European armed forces should start to develop robust, conventional defence-capabilities and let low intensity capabilities grow out of the more intensive ones. These capabilities would have to be transformed into categories which allow for transparent counting. Such categories could start from the well-proven main weapon systems of the Vienna Document but should be enhanced by additional parameters that result from the above analysis of force-development trends (like deployment capability, Cyber-capability, C4ISTAR-capability, Global Commons-capacities, Jointness also on higher tactical level, education system, force-organization, capabilities of specific force-categories etc.).
In addition to the general reduction in the armed forces of the participating States and the related decrease in evaluation visit quotas, more and more major weapon and equipment systems are deployed outside of notified combat units and are thus no longer subject to verification.

In most cases, the quantitative reductions of the armed forces have resulted in a concentration on the armed forces’ qualitative capabilities, which are currently not covered by arms control measures.

The exercise activities of the armed forces have changed, thresholds are no longer reached, multinational participation in exercises increases, and new forms of exercises, like command post or computer-assisted exercises, are conducted.

Today, due to technological advances, new weapon systems are available which are not covered by the Vienna Document but which certainly have an offensive potential.

Some tasks of the armed forces have been transferred to civilian or non-governmental areas. Some participating States possess semi-official or paramilitary forces. The number of areas with “frozen conflicts” increases continuously.

All of these examples show that there is a clear negative trend regarding the transparency of the armed forces and that measures are required to restore or enhance that transparency.

This slide presents the overall holdings of major weapon and equipment systems of the Bundeswehr as well as the holdings of formations and units which are notified under the Vienna Document.
The example demonstrates that it is necessary to enhance transparency within the scope of the exchange of military information. The objective should be to include these non-VD units with their sometimes considerable holdings in the exchange of military information pursuant to Chapter I, thus making them subject to verification. In addition to logistics units, training facilities should be covered where a substantial part of the training activities takes place. Examples of such facilities in the Bundeswehr are the Training Center at Munster, the Infantry Training Center at Hammelburg, the German Army Combat Training Center at Letzlinger Heide and the German Army Warfighting Simulation Center at Wildflecken.

In our opinion, an increase in transparency must lead to so-called “transparent armed forces” through the disclosure of all relevant information on the armed forces of a participating State. The first step would be a revision of the exchange of military information. The short-term objective is to cover the entire armed forces of a participating State. Subsequently, we should also discuss the inclusion of semi-official or private armed elements, for example private security companies. Other military activities of the armed forces should be
covered by the VD 11 as well in view of the long-term goal to include all military activities exceeding a certain threshold. Ultimately, the qualitative capabilities of the armed forces should be the focus of our efforts, for example deployment or air transport capabilities, logistic capabilities or the capability to conduct military training activities. This goal could be achieved by a threefold approach of exchanging information – conducting on-site visits – asking detailed questions, which would culminate in the assessment of the respective capability.

The developments in the armed forces in recent years have also affected the conduct of verification measures. Nowadays, hardly any military activities are taking place which could be the target of an inspection. In some participating States, the organizational structure of the armed forces no longer reaches the level of brigade/regiment. The nature of military activities is changing, and the number of computer-assisted or command-post exercises without full-strength forces increases. Furthermore, some participating States no longer provide aircraft for an overflight during an inspection, for various reasons. All these changes limit the value of an inspection as a means of verification. A large number of participating States thus employs inspections as an opportunity to visit the units deployed within the specified area rather than verify notifiable military activities. This approach is a response to the changes in the general conditions, and while it does not correspond with the objective of an inspection, it can definitely enhance the transparency of the armed forces of the affected participating State.

How can we react to the problems I have just described?

First of all, we should concentrate on new types of military activities. In a first step, such activities could become subject to notification and observation. In our view, they should comprise computer-assisted exercises, command post exercises, multinational exercises and exercises involving personnel from non-OSCE participating States. Since most of the training activities are nowadays being conducted at training areas, we should consider whether it would be useful to include the training areas of a participating State in the exchange of military information. Thus, participating States could plan their inspections and specified areas in a more effective manner. In our view, another long-
term option should be that all kinds of training activities would be verifiable within the scope of an inspection. This approach should also include visits to military facilities which presently cannot be verified within the framework of an inspection.

Let me illustrate this point with an overview of the major training areas in Germany. Currently, the Bundeswehr and NATO partner states use 26 major training areas which are distributed over the entire German territory (red stars). In addition, smaller training areas are located at many garrisons of the combat units and their subordinated units; they are also used for training purposes. Furthermore, the Bundeswehr has a number of fixed training units and facilities. I have already mentioned some of them. The former large-scale free-play exercises of the Bundeswehr are no longer being conducted. As a result, the Bundeswehr training activities are concentrated at training areas and stationary simulation facilities. The planning of an inspection could be facilitated by information on the location of such training areas, including the geographical coordinates.

We all know how the reorganization of our armed forces has affected the VD 11 quota issue. In addition to the continuing reorganization of armed forces, the deployment of units over large areas and the decreasing number of notifiable military activities, there is the “quota race” which also represents a significant problem. To solve this problem, we can either continue on the traditional path of increasing the number of quotas, which is preferred by many participating States, or we could look for new solution approaches. One option is the coordination of quotas among all participating States, which has been proposed by us several times already, or we could create a new system for the calculation of quotas for inspections and evaluations.

Participating States have already submitted several proposals on how to increase quota numbers. These proposals differ only with respect to the
calculation basis (number of units per quota) and will not be discussed here. For us, it is particularly important to ensure that the available quotas are used more effectively. The example shown on the slide illustrates the quota race problem, highlighting the need to coordinate the currently available quotas.

In recent years, the “quota race” has considerably accelerated in several participating States. In Russia, for example, all available quotas had again been utilized by the first week of February 2017. As a result of the lack of available quotas, hardly any or no verification activities can be conducted in some participating States in the second half of a given year. In our opinion, this situation defeats the purpose of an inspection as an instrument of verification.

During the AIAM in 2002, Germany submitted a proposal on the coordination of inspection quotas. This proposal referred to a coordination process to be conducted in Working Group A of the FSC. The quotas requested by participating States for the following year should be allocated through a coordination procedure by December. At

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Overview of utilized quotas of selected countries as of 01 April of each year (Note: In 2012, implementation of the VD 11 in Russia started only on 01 June.)
the same time, guest inspector missions should be coordinated in this forum as well.

In 2007, other ideas were discussed. A proposal was tabled to postpone the start of IP quota implementation to 01 April of each year and to allow participating States to conduct just one inspection in a given participating State per quarter of the year. The aim was to shift the utilization of IP quotas to that time of the year when military activities are conducted in general. In 2008, as a voluntary measure, Germany, Norway and Sweden started their verification activities on 15 March (Norway, Sweden) and 01 March (Germany), respectively. However, there have been no further efforts regarding this issue.

From our point of view, a combination of these two proposals would serve as a good basis for further discussions on the coordination of currently available quotas.

A significant increase in the flexibility of verification measures could be achieved by combining the inspection and evaluation quotas to create one “CSBM quota.” The requesting participating State then decides for which purpose the quota shall be utilized; however, no more than three missions of the same kind (inspections or evaluations) may be conducted in a participating State in one year. This “CSBM quota” would have to be defined in quantitative terms. It should at least equal the current aggregate number of quotas (four to five, depending on the participating State). A moderate increase in quota numbers should be discussed. The number of missions of the same kind that may be conducted should then be increased as well. By introducing a “CSBM quota,” the “quota race” for evaluations could be decelerated on the one hand, while on the other hand the participating States would be able to react in a flexible way to increased exercise activities of participating States within the zone of application of CSBM and to conduct inspections. From our point of view another example could be the flexible adaptation of IP quotas.

The exchange of military information with the data on personnel strengths and holdings of major weapon and equipment systems, which is submitted by every participating State, and defined multipliers, which are determined based on the size of a participating State, form the
basis for calculating annual “credits” for personnel and major weapon and equipment systems in the various categories. These credits are available for the planned military activities of a participating State.

In the course of an implementation year, the number of soldiers and major weapon and equipment systems participating in each military activity will be deducted from the “credits.” To this end, a reasonable lower organizational threshold shall be established which takes the armed forces of all participating States, particularly those of smaller States, into account. However, the organizational threshold shall reflect the current organizational structure of the armed forces, and it should rather not take the form of inflexible thresholds. When a participating State has used up its annual “credits” in a category, it has to provide additional passive inspection quotas, the number of which will have to be determined. As a regulatory element that is designed to promote transparency and confidence building, positive/negative multipliers will be proposed which would affect the increase or decrease in the “credits” for military activities. Thus, by carrying out transparency-inhibiting or transparency-promoting measures, a participating State would have the opportunity to postpone the deadline for the provision of additional inspection quotas.

An advantage of the proposed approach would be that the participating States will maintain full military flexibility while taking the principle of mutual confidence into consideration. Neither increased military training activities nor exercises in border areas or alert exercises are generally prohibited. However, such activities will have to include compensatory measures to promote confidence, if any other participating State so wishes. Moreover, it will be less likely that participating States with a large territory will have to make additional quotas available, not least due to the possibility to conduct additional transparency measures. Thus, this approach will eventually lead to a dynamic and flexible regime that can automatically be adapted to future changes in the armed forces because no fixed thresholds are stipulated. Besides the problems connected to implementation mentioned above, we must all be aware that this approach would probably be realized only as part of a new arms control regime that would be created in future.
It is often not possible to verify the data submitted in the exchange of information on military forces in a comprehensive and effective manner by means of evaluations pursuant to Chapter IX of the VD. This problem could be solved by introducing a system of “hierarchical verification”.

The evaluation would commence with a briefing at the next higher level of command of the selected unit or formation. It would then be continued at the unit or formation to be evaluated according to current practice and end with a visit to one or all of the subordinated elements of the unit or formation in question. In this context, it would probably be necessary to extend the duration of the evaluation. Thus, it would be possible to evaluate a much larger part of the armed forces of a participating State in the course of a single evaluation and with just one quota. Along with a possible additional increase in the number of available quotas, the transparency of the armed forces of the participating States in the OSCE area could be considerably enhanced.

Our goal is to find a compromise solution for an extension of the evaluation visit duration. Therefore, the focus should shift from a general extension to a selective one that applies to specific cases. Under such an approach, each participating State would have to indicate which units of its land forces would be subject to an extension of the evaluation visit duration (air forces are not concerned). This would normally apply only to those units that are deployed over so large an area that a complete evaluation of the data submitted in the information exchange in the course of one working day with 12 hours can no longer be guaranteed. At the same time, such an approach would be flexible and allow changes to reflect the relevant situation/structural changes that may occur over the years in the armed forces of the participating States concerned. Moreover, the visiting participating State may not use the option to extend the duration (which would have to be indicated in the request). The standard question of who would pay the costs of additional measures also needs to be considered. For this problem, too, a solution could be found (e.g. that the requesting State bears the additional costs incurred for the second day). That way, a relatively high degree of flexibility in the execution of evaluation visits could be achieved with relatively little organizational effort.
Let me illustrate this point with the current deployment of the German Army units shown on this slide.

In some cases, the locations of the units are so far apart that a complete evaluation within the 12-hour timeframe is rather difficult. The deployment of 41 Mechanized Infantry Brigade (shown in white) in the north of Germany is a very good example.

Particularly with regard to my earlier remarks about “hierarchical verification” and its possible implementation, any kind of extension of the evaluation visit duration would create the necessary conditions for a comprehensive verification measure and make a useful contribution to greater transparency.
This presentation focuses on the implications of low quota for inspections and evaluations (linked to limited scope) and experiences made with the limited number of inspectors and their presence on the spot as well as possibilities to improve mechanisms of verification.

But before all these topics, I want to remind the audience, what the Vienna Document Inspections (VDI) and Vienna Document Evaluation Visits (VDE) can and cannot be used for. The following list is far from being exhaustive, of course.

**What the VDI can be used for?**

- To observe exercises under the notification threshold, but this requires some kind of prior information on the planned exercises either from voluntary notifications, or from open source/media releases, or reliable intelligence.
- To conduct a series of mini-evaluation visits. According to some participating States’ (pS) national policy, allowing this is the sign of openness and transparency, showing that the military personnel and the Major Weapon and Equipment Systems (MWES) are in their peace-time locations, thus not participating in any notifiable military activities.

**What the VDI cannot be used for?**

- To count the reported/briefed MWES. It is NOT the aim of the mission, and what is more, there is no time to do it.
- To observe the “grey” areas, where the safety/security of the Inspection/Evaluation Teams cannot be guaranteed, or the pS has no jurisdiction at all due to various reasons.
- To get briefings from Air Defence/Naval units just to name a few type of units not covered by the Vienna Document (VD).

**What the VDE can be used for?**

- To get an overall impression about the evaluated unit’s MWES, personnel, training system, daily routine. This can be the result
of the briefings, the visit of the barracks, facilities, and the talk with the personnel.

**What the VDE cannot be used for?**

- To count all the MWES as during the CFE inspection (not the same aim!).
- Once again, to observe the “grey” areas.
- To visit “non-combat” units as they are not covered in the Annual Exchange of Military Information (AEMI).
- To visit separate/independent combat battalions (not in the AEMI).
- To visit Air Defence/Naval units (not in the AEMI).

**The implications of low quota for inspections (VDI):**

As experts in this field the participants of this workshop are all aware of the fact, that the number of passive inspection quota for all pS is the same, namely 3 inspections per year (para 76 of the VD 2011). This is universal for all, regardless of the size of their armed forces and/or the number of exercises (notifiable or otherwise) conducted in any given calendar year.

On one hand, it is a good thing to treat every pS as equal, but in reality one cannot deny the observable imbalance with regards to the inspection quota in comparison to the size of the participating State’s armed forces and the number of exercises it may conduct annually.

One can observe a so-called quota rush in the beginning of the year, especially to the Russian Federation. By the third week January 2017 all VDI quota for the Russian Federation was exhausted. What it means in practice is that later on during the year there is no chance to inspect large scale (but under the notification/observation threshold) and/or “snap” exercises. I would not like to delve into the question about what the inspection teams could observe in the Russian Federation during the first weeks of January. We could all read their respective mission reports on the OSCE Communications Network.
The implications of low quota for evaluations linked to limited scope (VDE):

Limited scope in this regard refers to the type and size of units in the AEMI, plus the time-limitation for these visits.

Why is there low quota for the evaluation visits? According to the Vienna Document’s para 109, each pS is obliged to accept a quota of one evaluation visit per calendar year for every sixty units, or portion thereof, reported in the AEMI. Bear in mind, that the Vienna Document AEMI is more restricted than the CFE data exchange, covering only formations and combat units down to the level of regiments, plus the air formations and air combat units down to wing/air regiment level. As a result of this, one can observe a disparity with regards to the evaluation visit quota in comparison to the size of the pS’s armed forces. In other words, a pS has one passive evaluation quota if it has 6 units or 59 units reported.

What is the aim of the Evaluation Visits (para 107)? Information provided under the provisions on Information on Military Forces and on Information on Plans for the Deployment of Major Weapon and Equipment Systems will be subject to evaluation.

The question is: How to evaluate the AEMI based on only one or two (FR, GR), maximum three (RU) visits? How does this one or two evaluation visit relate to the other units’/formations’ data?

The matter is further complicated in the case of evaluation of units with several, separately located subunits. According to para 127.3 “In the case of a visit to a unit, the receiving State will provide the possibility to see the personnel and the major weapon and equipment systems of the unit reported under paragraph (10) in their normal locations”. There can be a difficulty to see all MWES of such subordinates because of the distances between the subunits and the HQ, and because of the time limitation (12 hrs).
Experiences made with the limited number of inspectors and their presence on the spot (VDI):

Para 80 of the VD states, that “...The specified area ...will not exceed that required for an army level military activity”. It is not the topic of this presentation to argue about the exact size of this area. Suffice to say, that it is fairly large, somewhere around 20,000 km², give or take a few thousand according to national interpretation. We can easily agree upon the fact that it is difficult to cover the whole specified area to see/observe/verify the presence of any military activities. Bearing in mind that large formations or concentrations of forces not necessarily can be found along the high-ways, so finding/visiting them takes time. The matter is even more complicated or more difficult for the inspection team, when there is no possibility for the Inspection Team (IT) to split into two sub-teams, land and air (as permitted by para 83), or there is no chance – for whatever reason – for an overflight of the area. If the IT would be larger with the possibility to split into more than two sub-teams, the specified area could be better covered.

The duration of these inspections is 48 hours, but in reality the briefers are usually available during the normal working hours. So unless the unit/formation representatives are concentrated into a few briefing places, it is difficult to get a briefing from all of them. Of course there is no provision on where the briefings should take place: officers’ clubs, civilian briefing halls, in a tent in the field, at the units’/formations’ HQs etc., anything is possible. In this case, we only speak about the briefings, the content of which is problematic to verify. One solution for this is to organise the briefings in the units’/formations’ HQ, followed by a short visit of the unit, presenting that the MWES are at “home”, and/or in the training fields/firing ranges showing that the personnel is taking part in normal training activities, followed by and over-flight.

It is for now more of a theoretical question, but with the ever shrinking arms control organisations, and with those less-and-less trained personnel capable of speaking the official (OSCE) inspection languages, in some cases it is possible to encounter linguistic problems, if the IT is divided into sub-teams. Of course it is the responsibility and the interest of the participating States to maintain their pool of linguists.
Experiences made with the limited number of inspectors and their presence on the spot (VDE):

In case of an evaluation of a unit with several, separately located subunits, there can be a difficulty to see all MWES of such subordinates because of the distances between the subordinates and the HQ, and because of the Evaluation Team (ET) cannot split into sub-teams to better cover the subordinates.

If a pS decides to interpret the “evaluation” of the provided information as being able to count the reported MWES, then in the case of larger units it takes longer time to accomplish this, especially if the subordinates are located in several garrisons.

Possibilities to improve mechanisms of verification:

Should inspections and evaluations in the light of actual practices be fundamentally reconsidered? Is there a real need to raise quotas for inspections or to raise the number of inspectors? Coming from an arms control unit merely executing these measures and not defining them, I may be not the best person to answer this rhetorical question. All I can say is that the system we have raises many questions. These questions are the results of many things that have changed since these provisions came to practice many years, decades ago. They represent some of the building blocks we call CSBMs. But in my opinion, with years of practice we realise the shortcomings and limitations of them, so therein lays the need to rethink, or if you like, update these measures to better suit the needs of the participating States.

There are many tabled Vienna Document proposals with regards to Compliance and Verification. Among many other subjects, they touch upon the size of the teams, in all cases bigger is better for the new proposals: better coverage, extra auxiliary personnel (linguists).

The calculation of the quota – especially for the evaluation visits is also a hot topic. If we lower the ratio from one per sixty, it will result in more possibilities. The question is: what ratio/quota calculation is acceptable/desired and financially bearable by a pS and how this is measured against the greater number of active quota?
The duration of the inspections/visits is also considered by many as insufficient; therefore they want to prolong them.

The possibility of “paid”, extra inspections has also come to the spotlight to counter financial burden of the inspected pS.

Should there be additional, event driven inspections? The immediate answer for many of the pS would be in my opinion “Yes”! But then, the devil is in the details as the proverb says. How to find a definition acceptable for all of such an event that requires an extra inspection? Some can say that all the possibilities for the exercises are already covered by the existing CSBMs. The question of financing is of paramount importance for especially the inspected pS in this case.

With regards to the earlier mentioned “quota rush” a question comes to mind: can a fixed distribution of quota throughout the year guarantee a higher consistency of inspections? Well, with the current number of inspections – in my estimate – it would only result in three mini, even fiercer quota rushes, repeating the situation three times at the beginning of the three semesters. So, unless there are a higher number of quotas, not much will change. To paraphrase the great Hungarian writer, Imre Madách’s line from The Tragedy of Man: “… There are many Eskimos and few seals to hunt…”

Until the Vienna Document’s provisions are updated, we must not forget about a very important tool in our hands to somewhat improve the existing mechanisms: the bilateral agreements, co-operations based on Chapter X between not only neighbouring pS. This Chapter gives us the possibility to conduct extra visits, inspections, enlarge the team sizes, to lower the notification and observation thresholds. Many countries have established bilateral agreements, showing an example for the others in the OSCE Community.
Topic IV: Risk reduction

Benno Laggner
FSC-Chair’s Coordinator for the Vienna Document

Risk reduction was included as a new item in the Vienna Document 1990. Two mechanisms were included there:

- a mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities (now paragraph 16) and
- a procedure for cooperation as regards hazardous incidents of a military nature (now paragraph 17).

In 1992, the risk reduction chapter was supplemented with an additional mechanism on the voluntary hosting of visits in order to dispel concerns about military activities (now paragraph 18).

How have these mechanisms been used?

- The mechanism for consultation in the case of unusual military activities was invoked three times during the Yugoslav crisis of 1991-1992. From then for the next 15 years, the absence of any formal recourse to risk reduction mechanisms was taken as a sign of a stable security situation in the OSCE area. In 2008, the mechanism was invoked again twice in the context of the conflict between Russia and Georgia. In 2014 in the context of the Ukraine crisis, 21 requests for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities were made and 4 Joint FSC/PC meetings were held. In 2015, there were 5 requests in the framework of this mechanism; in 2016 none.

- The procedure concerning hazardous incidents was invoked only once in 1992. Now the issue of hazardous incidents is high on the agenda and there is renewed interest in this mechanism.

- In 2011, there was one voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities; in 2014 in the context of the Ukraine crisis there were two such visits.
If one leaves aside the relatively frequent use of para 16 in 2014, there is a paradoxical situation regarding the implementation of these instruments. On the one hand, there appears to be general agreement that the risk reduction mechanisms should be used more frequently and efficiently. But on the other hand, the provisions are still overall rarely used.

**Proposals to update Chapter III of the Vienna Document**

Let me just mention for the sake of comprehensiveness that there are: on para 16, two proposals (US, Germany) for consideration on the agenda of the FSC’s Working Group A; on para 17, one proposal submitted by Poland and a group of cosponsors; and on para 18 no proposal.

In addition, three further proposals have been circulated: a proposal by Greece to establish an Informal Group of Experts “Friends of VD Chapter III”; a proposal put forward by the Netherlands and a group of cosponsors at the 2011 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting for an OSCE inspection; and a Russian proposal on para 16 which also contained the idea of a special OSCE inspection, but was subsequently withdrawn.

**What are some of the problems that have hindered implementation?**

- Certain terms lack a clear definition. For instance, how to define “unusual military activities”?
- Consensus as a rule for decision-making.
- The lack of enforcement capabilities. What do you do if an involved participating State does not want to play by the book (e.g. doesn’t show up at a Joint FSC/PC)?

As it has been mentioned several times, the idea of this session is not to discuss the already well-known concrete proposals that have been tabled and just mentioned. But rather to approach this topic from a more strategic angle. I would suggest to discuss the following generic issues:
- Effective implementation vs. consent required by all.

- Besides involvement of participating States, is there a general role for the Chairmanship-in-Office (CiO), a Special Representative of the CiO, the Secretary General or the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) to act as a honest/neutral broker?

- Is there a role for impartial fact-finding ("OSCE inspection")? On whose initiative? On whose decision (FSC, PC, CiO)? In a consensual manner (i.e. with the consent of the responding / receiving participating State) or on a non-consensual basis? Who should lead such an independent fact-finding mission (FFM): a lead nation, the CPC, a Special Representative? Practical challenges?

- What should be the objective and outcome of a FFM? A report or other action?

- How do we address the lack of clarity in terms of definitions?
Benno Laggner  
FSC-Chair’s Coordinator for the Vienna Document

Let me start by thanking the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship, the Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports and the National Defence Academy for organizing and hosting this Workshop.

I would like to limit myself to three points:

- This Workshop was, in my view, very useful and valuable. It allowed us to “break out” of our usual setting in the Hofburg. We witnessed a new quality and level of informal discussion and interaction. We also had the opportunity for a more detailed discussion with a good mix of presentations and working groups. And we had a good mix of participants from the Missions and capitals.

- I think that we, secondly, gained a better understanding of the value and significance of the Vienna Document as well as of its limitations. The Workshop provided an opportunity to have a more strategic view.

- Finally, what does this mean for the way ahead? The Structured Dialogue will allow to address the bigger picture. This should also highlight the need to adapt the VD to today’s security environment. We should furthermore make better use of the informal meetings organized by the VD Coordinator to continue our discussions. Here the Coordinator is in the hands of Delegations. And we need to continue work on concrete proposals even if no immediate decisions are possible. The key to unlocking the lock is not in Vienna. In closing, let me add that in all of this we need to find the right balance between desirability and feasibility.
Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter  
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP); Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES)

I. Purpose and methodology

Expert discussion in view of the political context

The informal breakout workshop organized by the Austrian OSCE chairmanship on OSCE CSBMs with a focus on the Vienna Document (VD) discussed the question whether and to what extent the OSCE instruments, and in particular the Vienna Document’s CSBMs, are still suited to contribute to security and stability in the OSCE space, and where they need modernization and adaptation to ensure military predictability and rebuilding confidence.

There was a widely shared view that the breakout workshop came at the right time as the OSCE faces new security challenges, uncertainties as to the future of the European security order and conflicts inside and outside Europe. Participants were aware that OSCE efforts on enhancing CSBMs do not take place in a vacuum but have to take into account this political context and the various linkages to the security situation in Europe, in particular, military interventions and protracted territorial conflicts, the unresolved issue of pan-European conventional arms control, new military doctrines and changing force postures as well as fielding of advanced weapon systems that might generate new operational or even strategic capabilities.

Participants were also conscious about the fact that no technical solution alone would be sufficient to overcome the current political rift in the Transatlantic-Eurasian security space and that the re-establishment of a common political framework would be needed in which states can trust one another that they are committed to agreed rules of security cooperation, exercise geostrategic and military restraint and allow for utmost transparency to enable rebuilding confidence. However, rather than tackling all associated political problems the workshop focused on a conceptual and technical discussion of areas where the VD 11 needs modernization and, once common ground has
been found, how this could be done if and when an improved political atmosphere allows participating States to move forward.

Participants understood, however, that decision-oriented discussion on concrete changes to the text of the Document is the task of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and that the workshop did not intend to pre-empt the outcome of such deliberations. Its intent was rather to take a strategic view and explore the intentions pursued by these proposals in a more generic way rather than discussing each and every proposal one by one. This approach permitted participants to look from an expert point of view at the objectives and provisions of the Vienna Document and their suitability to serve military stability in our time. In such a non-committal framework a frank and open exchange of views was possible and progress was made in search for common ground and identifying issues for further examination.

Risk perceptions, security concerns and interests behind national positions

Against this background, participants recognized the importance of differentiating between formal state positions expressed by proposals on textual changes to the Vienna Document and the basic security concerns and national interests behind such suggestions. A proper understanding of such risk perceptions and objectives associated with particular proposals will help the OSCE community to find common ground in alleviating security concerns of participating States (pS), inter alia by concrete enhancement of OSCE CSBMs. At the same time, such understanding could help in merging similar proposals addressing the same issues in order to facilitate a focused, structured and result-oriented discussion in the FSC at a later stage.

Four clusters to structure a generic discussion on main topics

Since the issuance of the Vienna Document 2011 a large number of concrete proposals (about 100) to change the current text were made by delegations concerning almost all its chapters. Most dealt with risk reduction (chapter III), thresholds for and exemptions from notification and observation of certain military activities (chapter (V, VI), compliance and verification (chapter IX), and the scope of information on military forces as well as data and plans on major weapon and equipment
systems (chapter I). Therefore, the discussion concentrated on four clusters of topics that allowed for a focused debate on suggested changes to the text of the Vienna Document which pursue similar objectives:

(1) Scope of forces subject to the VD
(2) Prior notification and observation of certain military activities
(3) Compliance and Verification
(4) Risk Reduction

II. Assessment criteria: principles, military relevance and risk scenarios

In considering how to evaluate the effectiveness of the Vienna Document and national proposals aiming at its modernization under current and foreseeable security conditions participants took note of the OSCE’s guiding principles on arms control and CSBMs, the objectives of the Vienna Document and existing threat perceptions.

**Principles**

The workshop recalled the *OSCE Framework for Arms Control* (Lisbon 1996) and the *Charter for European Security* (Istanbul 1999). Accordingly, arms control incl. CSBMs should, *inter alia*:

- contribute to developing a common and indivisible OSCE security space and
- enhance security partnership among participating States,
- pursue a comprehensive security approach,
- create a web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control commitments and
- ensure structural coherence between all existing and future arms control agreements.

Regarding guidelines for negotiations the Lisbon Document enumerates four principles:

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(1) **Sufficiency**  
Participating States shall maintain only such military capabilities as are commensurate with legitimate individual and collective defense requirements.

(2) **Transparency**  
Participating States shall ensure transparency through complete, accurate and timely exchange of relevant information, including the size, structure, location, military doctrine and activities of forces.

(3) **Verification**  
Verification of agreed measures shall be commensurate with their substance and significance and be sufficiently intrusive to permit assessment of information exchanged and implementation of agreed measures to enhance confidence.

(4) **Limitations**  
Forces shall be subject to limitations and, where necessary reductions, as well as other constraining provisions and CSBMs to reach security and stability at lower levels.

**Principal risks and challenges to security**

Referring to principal challenges and risks to security the Lisbon framework document describes certain issues that should be addressed, *inter alia*:

- military imbalances that might contribute to instabilities,
- inter-state tensions and conflicts, in particular in border areas, that affect military security,
- internal disputes that could lead to military tensions and conflicts between States,
- enhancing transparency and predictability as regards the military intentions of States,
- democratic control and guidance of military, paramilitary and (internal) security forces by the constitutionally established rule of law,
- ensuring that the evolution of multinational military and political organizations is fully compatible with the OSCE’s comprehensive and co-operative concept of security and consistent with the arms control goals,
- ensuring that no participating State, organization or grouping strengthens its security at the expense of the security of others, or regards any part of the OSCE area as a particular sphere of influence,
- host nation consent to the presence of foreign troops on the territory of a pS,
- implementation of arms control agreements at all times, including in times of crisis,
- regular review to ensure that arms control agreements continue to respond to the security needs in the OSCE area.

Objectives of the Vienna Document and military relevance of its provisions

The workshop recalled the general purpose of the Vienna Document as enshrined in its preamble paragraph (2). Accordingly, the aim of the CSCE/OSCE efforts on CSBMs is

“to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of the participating States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations as well as in their international relations in general.”

In view of this objective, participants widely agreed that CSBMs have their role in supporting a cooperative security order in Europe and that they must be militarily meaningful. To that end, they are designed to fulfill three basic tasks that were defined during the Helsinki and Stockholm conferences and pursued throughout all reissues of the Vienna Document:

(1) ensuring early warning to prevent large military exercises and unusual activities from being turned into surprise attacks;

(2) increasing transparency and long-term predictability of force postures and defense planning in order to create trust in the peaceful intentions of states or else, providing for early recognition of a major force build-up which is designed and could be used for large-scale offensive operations; and
(3) on this basis of enhanced security, establish military-to-military contacts to improve mutual understanding, prevent misperceptions of intentions behind military doctrines, force postures and military activities and create links and opportunities for professional military personnel to deepen trust and friendly relations.

**Threat perceptions and risk scenarios**

Most participants regarded sober risk assessments an essential condition for evaluating the Vienna Document’s suitability to fulfill such tasks today. Without pre-empting the results of the “Structured Dialogue” agreed upon during the Hamburg OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting in December 2016, participants took account of four military risk scenarios in Europe:

1. Deliberate Cold War-style major offensive operations in Europe involving alliances and nuclear powers.
2. Interference by states in the internal affairs of other states or promotion of anti-government activities, *inter alia*, by hybrid warfare activities (such as providing military assistance to insurgents), or by threatening military intervention in support of break-away entities through concentration of forces in the vicinity of international borders.
3. Hazardous incidents and unintended escalation in consequence of changes to military force postures and increased military activities, including large-scale exercises close to international borders or in and above international waters, accompanied by dangerous brinkmanship which can spin out of control.
4. New or extended military capabilities resulting from the use of advanced technologies, such as precise long-range weapons, or from high mobility and reactivity and the effects of multinational cooperation.
III. Findings

1. Incentives for proposals to modernize the Vienna Document 2011

The discussion showed that it was not always clear what the driving motives were behind concrete proposals to change the text of the Vienna Document.

a. Some participants underlined that the political culture of confidence-building in a cooperative security environment and the principles of transparency and predictability of military capabilities and force postures in themselves require the document to fully and comprehensively cover all combat capabilities.

b. Others stressed that any changes must respond to actual security needs and be based on a sober gap analysis, i.e. an assessment whether the VD is still suitable – or needs to be adapted – to alleviate security concerns, address potential risks and threat perceptions and provide more military stability and predictability. Changes should flow from concrete scenarios and can only be justified if they are militarily meaningful.

c. It was generally recognized that the Vienna Document did not fully reflect current force postures, newly developed military capabilities and patterns of training and certain military activities. In conclusion, an adaptation of a number of VD 11 provisions would be required.

2. Scenarios

(1) A deliberate major aggression in Europe involving alliances and nuclear powers was assessed an unrealistic scenario. It would have strategic implications which no side would be prepared to cope with. Furthermore, doubt was voiced whether sufficient forces are available to carry out such large-scale offensive operations. In any case, such a scenario would require a major and long-term force build-up which would exceed by far current Vienna Document thresholds for notification and observation of certain military activities.
(2) Interference by states in the internal affairs of other states which are engaged in internal tensions and conflict between governments and anti-government forces was assessed a realistic scenario. In this context, a flexible, short-term and temporary force build-up in the vicinity of international borders and crisis areas was regarded highly relevant, since it could be used for intimidating governments and providing political and military assistance to insurgents.

Such military activities might escape VD 11 transparency or observation provisions if the exceptions enshrined in the Document are exploited. Therefore, participants were of the view that the use of exceptional rules for certain military activities – particularly in the vicinity of international borders or areas in crisis – need to be curtailed in order to avoid misjudgements of intentions.

In contrast, participants regarded so-called “hybrid warfare” activities without conventional back-up forces, such as cyberattacks, propaganda, arms transfers to non-state actors and the (covert) deployment of special operation forces, internal security units or irregular forces, less relevant and suitable to be dealt with by means of the Vienna Document.

(3) Participants recognized the dangers resulting from increased military activities and troop deployments, including large-scale exercises close to international borders, or in and above international waters, as highly relevant. Hazardous incidents and unintended escalation might occur in context with reconnaissance and show of force accompanied by dangerous brinkmanship which can spin out of control. The fact that military-to-military contacts have been reduced significantly has worsened the situation.

Participants concluded that possibilities should be explored how the Vienna Document could contribute to constraining unusual military activities, particularly in border areas, increasing their transparency and predictability and establishing reliable military-to-military contacts to prevent or deescalate hazardous incidents.

(4) There was a unanimous view that new or extended military capabilities resulting from changing force structures and the use of advanced technologies, such as precise long-range weapons, high
mobility and reactivity, also in combination with multinational cooperation, should be accounted for by relevant CSBMs. Consequently, participants advised to adapt the Vienna Document accordingly.

3. Scope of forces subject to the VD (Chapter I a. o.)

a. Discussing the driving motives behind proposals to extend the scope of the VD 11 the working group agreed that responding to concrete risks and threat perceptions would coincide with implementing agreed principles. They require:

   - full transparency of current force structures,
   - predictability of the development of military capabilities and
   - promoting confidence building and security cooperation

   with a view to creating a common and undivided OSCE security space.

b. As to scenarios and risk perceptions, the point was made that the rationale for CSBMs should flow from a sober assessment of military potentials and capabilities rather than from speculations on political intentions behind military developments. Therefore, CSBMs should aim at:

   - reflecting modern technologies
   - preventing surprises
   - preventing arms races and
   - ensuring fact based decision making.

c. The group concluded that the current scope of the VD does not sufficiently represent modern force capabilities and current force structures, which have changed significantly since the inception of the VD. The group was also aware that any changes that would increase the number of notifiable units would have an effect on other chapters of the VD, e.g. raising the quota for evaluation visits and pushing the number of personnel engaged in certain military activities above thresholds.

d. There was general agreement that future deliberations should take a more in-depth look at the following areas worth of exploring:
(1) Given the changes of force structures and capabilities at the brigade and battalion level one might consider redefining formations of land forces (so far armies, corps, divisions) to include brigades, and combat units (so far brigades, regiments) to cover also battalions.

(2) It seems reasonable for the VD to cover command, control and communication (CCC) and logistic units down to the battalion level since they are essential components of operational capabilities. Furthermore, their activities are strong indicators for any switches from peacetime to wartime operations.

(3) Operational and strategic (air) mobility provides the capability to shift and concentrate troops over large distances in a short time. Such assets are of crucial importance in most scenarios and might be included in the VD if they are controlled by active units and can react in a short period of time. However, civil aviation that could be activated for such purposes after a longer time of preparation should not be covered.

(4) In this context, also multilateral cooperation providing for enlarged potentials, synergetic effects, and enhanced capabilities should be taken into account.

(5) There was also principal agreement that the inclusion of long-range precise strike options in the VD should be considered. However, a reservation was voiced as to sea-based potentials.

(6) Combat drones (UCAV = Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles) should be considered remotely-piloted aircraft if they fit CFE definitions. So far, they were used in asymmetric and low-intensity warfare scenarios in which no strong air defense hampered their operations. In high intensity warfare, combat drones would have to be integrated in combined arms operations including suppression of enemy air defense in order to have a notable military effect. However, long-range hyper-sonic combat drones used for global strategic purposes might not be reasonably dealt with in context with regional scenarios only but rather belong to the category of strategic arms control.

e. The military relevance of the following cluster of proposals was recognized as well but provoked reservation by some participants:
(1) Although there was general acceptance that naval fire support for land operations could have significant impact on land battles some participants found it difficult to define the adjoining sea areas at the European periphery (see VD 11 Annex I). If the range of Sea-launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM) is taken as a measurement such sea areas would cover a distance of about 1,000 nautical miles (1,800 km) to coast lines which would provoke objection by sea powers and pose new challenges to verification.

(2) Although there was agreement that it would be pertinent to include naval infantry in the scope of the VD there was a lack of clarity whether such units were included anyway by the term “amphibious” units. However, only chapter V and VI refer to naval forces.

(3) The significance of operational capabilities associated with Short-Range Ballistic Missile systems (SRBM) and area denial (A2/AD) capacities was recognized; but doubts were voiced whether inclusion of such potentials in the VD was politically feasible as SRBM are held only by a small number of states, and air defense units were excluded from the beginning of CSBM negotiations for principal reasons. Today, however, the contested issue of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) might become subject to transparency if there is a political will to do so.

(4) The discussion on the inclusion in the VD of Electronic Warfare and SEAD capabilities remained inconclusive due to questions of practicability and national reservations.

f. The following cluster of proposals was rejected because of different reasons such as lack of relevance, technical feasibility or national reservations:

(1) Special operation forces carry out pin-point actions and support or fight irregular forces but are not alone capable of launching large-scale conventional offensive operations.

(2) Regarding internal security forces participants observed that they have to fulfil special tasks mainly inside countries but are generally not foreseen for major offensive operations abroad. However, the contrasting approach of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) was mentioned that accounts for all TLE
(with some exceptions for ACV) including those that are controlled by internal security forces.

(3) To reflect current force potentials the VD could also cover material depots. There, large amounts of major weapon and equipment systems are stored which do not belong to combat units but could be mobilized, some even on short notice. However, in a number of countries national defense to a large extent depends on mobilization capabilities. Therefore, they would voice strong reservations.

(4) The group agreed that conventional arms control and CSBMs are not suited to curtail cyber operations although they might hamper command and control systems. Such multi-purpose and genuinely dual-use software technologies with wide-spread and predominantly civil application largely escape negotiable and verifiable military restrictions. Furthermore, cyberattacks are subject to precautionary resilience and technical counter-measures. Also, the problem of undisputable attribution has not been resolved yet. Specific instruments such as agreements on general rules or codes of conduct for activities in the internet are required. (See OSCE cyber CSBMs.)

(5) Modern net-centric warfare capabilities do not rely on a significantly higher firepower of small units as such; they rather enable smaller forces compared to Cold War postures to carry out their missions with the fire or air support of long-range and precise strike potentials located far outside the combat zone. Such capabilities evolve from satellite-based reconnaissance, positioning and communications, advanced sensors and modern computer software, rather than new conventional hardware, and tend to elude meaningful and acceptable transparency and verification. Therefore, qualitative arms control and CSBMs on space-based CCC-systems will have to be considered as a context; but their inclusion into VD provisions seems less feasible.

4. Prior notification and observation of certain military activities (VD, Chapters V, VI)

a. While current VD thresholds for notification and observation of certain military activities might be suited to address a major offensive scenario, a short-term and temporary force build-up could play a
significant role in context with scenario 2. The problem is aggravated by
the narrow scope of the VD, that excludes CCC-units and logistics, and
by certain provisions enshrined in VD chapter V and VI that allow
exceptions from notification and observation obligations. In particular,
the “single command”-rule, the provision requiring a common
operational purpose and the rule to exempt snap exercises with a
duration below 72 hours\(^5\) enable states to avoid notification or
observation and to compartmentalize parallel exercise activities.

b. More thoughts have to be given to the question under which
conditions formations and units can build up operational capabilities
that could be used for cross-border operations. The following criteria
should be taken into account:

(1) Readiness tests of units in peacetime locations are less relevant
than concentrating combat-ready formations in assembly areas
and preparing for combined arms operations. Therefore,
exemptions for snap exercises might be limited to those units
that do not leave peacetime locations and carry out in-garrison
activities.

(2) For out of-garrison operations, readiness of headquarters and
CCC-units as well as logistical preparations are significant
indicators. Their inclusion in the scope of the VD and the
thresholds indicated by chapters V and VI should be
considered.

(3) Military exercises in far distance from international borders are
less relevant than accumulation of forces in border regions and
areas in crisis. Since the latter are prone to misjudgements
increased transparency and special constraining provisions for
such regions might be considered to avoid destabilizing effects
and escalatory reaction.

(4) Also far distant force accumulations out of garrison could be
used for quick concentration of forces in sensitive areas if they
are combined with the activation of strategic and operational
air lift capabilities. Therefore, their inclusion in the scope of the
VD and the thresholds indicated under chapters V and VI
should be considered.

\(^5\) VD, Chapter V, No. (40.1), (40.3), (41), (44.1); Chapter V, No. (47.1), (58) a. o.
c. The group also explored further possibilities to increase transparency in regard of large-scale and snap exercises such as

(1) adding an extra inspection quota for every large-scale exercise which exceeds thresholds but escapes observation due to a duration of less than 72 hours,
(2) using military-to-military contacts more often,
(3) requesting more rigorous briefings in the FSC before an exercise and holding pS accountable for large-scale exercises exempted from notification and observation,
(4) making use of bilateral and regional voluntary measures,
(5) linking verification to other transparency and observation instruments such as the CFE Treaty and the Treaty on Open Skies.

d. Furthermore, the group discussed the possibility of notification and observation of command-post and computer-assisted exercises (CPX/CAX). It noted that all changes would be subject to reciprocity and that national reservations might limit such options.

e. The group underlined the necessity for exchange between national verification centres, MODs, MFAs and the OSCE Secretariat in order to share experience, build national capacities to analyse annual information exchanges and develop best practice guides to improve overall levels of implementation and accountability.

5. Compliance and Verification (VD, Chapter IX)

The group’s deliberations on compliance and verification were guided by the views of practitioners and the wish to enable verification teams to carry out their tasks more efficiently in accordance with the objectives of the VD. Based on lessons learned from practical experiences the following amendments of the VD were considered:

a. Changes to the VD should be driven by security concerns and focus on large-scale exercises, particularly in border areas, new force structures and the fielding of new major weapon and equipment systems (MWES).
b. The Vienna Document could be restructured to bring it in a logical order. Also terminology should be reconsidered, verification terms unified and provisions streamlined to make them more practicable for the end user. Best practices should be collected and used as guidance.

c. For calculating quotas for evaluation visits the annual exchange of information should cover all units that control MWES. As a consequence, higher quota for evaluations were expected. However, no consensus was achieved to merge inspection and evaluation quota.

d. To avoid a run on limited quota at the beginning of the year and ensure more flexibility and quota availability throughout the calendar year, a quota distribution system similar to that of the OSCC or Dayton Accord Article-IV processes should be explored.

e. All verification measures – including risk reduction, observation of certain military activities, inspections and evaluations – should be conducted on behalf of the OSCE. While inspections and evaluations should remain national responsibilities, for risk reduction measures the creation of multinational OSCE stand-by teams, a multinational OSCE stand-by panel and the participation of non-OSCE states could be considered to ensure impartial and objective investigation of emerging crises and unusual military activities.

f. An increase of team sizes and longer duration of verification measures on the spot should be considered to reflect new force structures and allow for splitting into sub-teams in order to evaluate separately located battalions or inspect distantly deployed units in large manoeuvre areas.

g. As to new verification technologies the use of digital cameras (basic models) and of national global positioning systems (alternative to NAVSTAR GPS) was regarded suitable for verification missions. No consensus was achieved, however, on using national Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for VD inspections, evaluations or observations.

h. The group stressed the human dimension of verification activities. Frequent contacts of professional personnel are needed to enhance mutual understanding and build confidence.


6. Risk Reduction (VD, Chapter III)

a. Existing risk reduction mechanisms (para 16) to provide further information in the FSC/PC on unusual military activities were assessed an important tool to clarify and deescalate the situation. In contrast, the group deplored the absence of any mechanism that would ensure the participation of all participating States concerned. While the implementation in good faith was stressed no proposal was made to introduce more binding rules for participation.

However, the links to other verification instruments such as the CFE Treaty and the Treaty on Open Skies were mentioned and using their results for discussion was advised.

b. Also the use of para 17 on hazardous incidents of a military nature was regarded a significant element to prevent misinterpretation and avoid further escalation. It was noted, however, that para 17 was used only once since the existence of the Vienna Document. As this multilateral instrument does not compete with but complements bilateral risk reduction agreements, the group wondered whether this was a question of political will or lack of awareness. In light of the current risk assessments the group called upon pS to make better use of this tool. It was also noted that military activities in and above international waters are partially not included in the scope of the VD or not unambiguously covered by its area of application (Annex I).

c. The value of voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities in accordance with para 18 was stressed. It was noted, however, that implementation was dependent on the political will of pS.

In addition, the point was made that the use of para 18 is meant to dispel concerns of third states about military activities on the territory of the inviting state. It would not be suited, however, to address irregular forces in internal conflict which would endanger the security of inspectors as proven in May 2014. International agreements are concluded between recognized states and cannot be carried out by insurgents and break-away regions. Therefore, international law requires third states to refrain from conducting observations in such areas even if de facto regimes accept under the condition that they fulfil state functions themselves. Instead, status-neutral approaches focusing
on ceasefire-agreements and local Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) are needed during and after conflicts.

d. As an additional risk reduction measure the role of impartial fact finding missions was considered positively. However, the question arose which mechanisms should be applied to ensure agreement on such missions. Three options were discussed: (1) consensus by all pS; (2) consensus minus one; (3) authorization of the OSCE Chair in Office or Secretary General to dispatch an expert mission on short notice once substantial information has been received and host nation consent has been granted. Imposing a fact finding mission was found unacceptable and host nation consent regarded a minimum requirement for such missions.

The need for such a fact-finding mission to operate impartially – preferably under a neutral head – was stressed. Preparedness of the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) to organize such a mission on short notice was seen a precondition for a swift dispatch. That would require states to nominate potential team members to the OSCE – preferably internationally recognized experts – and hold them available for a fixed period of time. In an emerging crisis, the CPC could choose suited inspectors or observers from such a personnel roster.

e. The role of the OSCE Secretariat, in particular the CPC, in information gathering and organizing risk reduction activities was underlined and the appointment of a Special OSCE Representative for Risk Reduction discussed.

f. The point was made that the definition of the term “unusual military activities” was not clearly defined and might be worth exploring. Several criteria were mentioned such as:

- unscheduled activities outside exercise plans,
- unusual activities outside stated defense planning,
- scope, location, timing and direction of military operations, etc.

7. General remarks and follow-up activities

a. Participants understood that deliberations on enhancing the Vienna Document would not replace the need to revitalize conventional arms
control in Europe and to move forward on a structured dialogue as agreed in the Hamburg OSCE Ministerial Meeting in December 2016.

b. Participants were aware of the fact that any deliberations on changes to particular provisions of the VD 11 would have to consider the net-effects on other chapters of the Document.

c. Participants were of the view that the workshop helped in analysing current gaps of the VD and that a number of problems indicated in the findings above deserves further exploration.
Introduction

The second “Breakout Workshop on CSBMs” was a follow-up to the outcomes of the March event. Again, the overall aim was to contribute to a greater understanding and developing a common solid basis for strengthening trust, cooperation and, ultimately, security in the OSCE region. Based on the findings of the first workshop and with the aim to support the Structured Dialogue in a coherent and complementary manner, during the second workshop the topics were narrowed and focused on force postures and certain military activities, the scope of forces subject to the VD, and discussions on how to strengthen risk reduction mechanisms. Regarding the modalities, the second workshop was arranged in three panel discussions flanked by opening and closing sessions.
The first Breakout Workshop on CSBMs held in Vienna on 1 – 3 March 2017 inquired to what extent the Vienna Document 2011 reflects new security challenges and uncertainties in its area of application and where it needs to be revised in order to keep relevance. Participants referred to political developments, military interventions and protracted conflicts, new military doctrines and changing force postures, the fielding of advanced weapon systems and new patterns of military activities. Rather than tackling all associated political problems the workshop focused on a conceptual and technical discussion of areas where the VD 11 needs modernization and, once common ground has been found, how this could be done if and when an improved political atmosphere allows participants to move forward.

The workshop concluded that both responding to risk perceptions and implementing agreed principles require full transparency of current force structures and military activities, predictability of the development of military capabilities and promoting confidence building and security cooperation with a view to creating a common and undivided OSCE security space. Rather than evaluating political intentions behind military developments the rationale for CSBM should flow from a sober assessment of current and evolving military potentials and capabilities. Therefore, CSBMs should aim at reflecting modern technologies and force postures, preventing surprises and arms races and ensuring fact based decision making.

Against this backdrop, participants considered four areas of CSBMs contained in the Vienna Document for possible future modernization pending suitable political conditions:

1. Scope of forces subject to the VD
2. Prior notification and observation of certain military activities
3. Compliance and verification
4. Risk reduction

While there was widespread conviction that compliance and verification need to be improved to build confidence it became also clear that further deliberations were necessary to take a more in-depth look at
selected areas worth of exploring. They pertain to the scope of forces subject to the VD, the military significance of certain military activities and new ideas how to improve the risk reduction mechanism.

The Breakout Workshop 2 on CSBMs to be held in Vienna on 12 – 13 June 2017 intends to provide an opportunity to discuss such issues. The agenda is structured accordingly with three session devoted to

I. Reflection of force postures and certain military activities
   
II. Relevance of adapting the scope of forces and its impact on information and verification

III. Strengthening risk reduction mechanisms

The following questions are meant to inspire – not to limit – the discussion:

I. Reflection of force postures and certain military activities

(1) Under which conditions can formations and units build up operational capabilities that could be used for cross-border operations and how should the VD reflect such options (e.g. scope, geography, thresholds)?

(2) Does stationing of combat forces close to international borders and areas in crisis require more intrusive information and verification measures?

(3) Should the VD distinguish between readiness tests inside peacetime locations (in-garrison activities) and snap exercises concentrating combat-ready formations in assembly areas and preparing for combined arms operations (out of-garrison activities)?

(4) Do military exercises in the vicinity of border regions and areas in crisis need to be covered by special VD rules as to notification, observation and limitation (threshold numbers, duration)?

(5) Do military exercises far away from international borders or areas in crisis require special attention if combined with assets providing operational and strategic mobility? How should the VD take this into account?
II. Relevance of adapting the scope of forces and its impact on information and verification

(1) What is the operational impact of command, control and communication (CCC) and logistic units and should the scope of the VD include them?

(2) What is the operational or strategic impact of air and sea mobility and should the scope of the VD reflect units providing such capabilities?

(3) What operational effects do long-range precise strike potentials (e.g. ALCM, SLCM, SRBM) – including those stationed outside the VD area of application (AoA) – have on conventional warfare inside the AoA and how should they be accounted for in the scope of the VD?

(4) What operational impact do new weapon systems such as UCAV have on conventional warfare and how should the VD scope reflect them?

(5) Does the transformation of traditional air defence into area denial (A2/AD) and missile defence capabilities require their inclusion in the scope of the VD?

(6) In which way does multilateral cooperation and integration provide for enlarged potentials, synergetic effects and enhanced capabilities and how should the VD reflect such assets?

(7) Is it necessary to redefine formations of land forces (so far armies, corps, divisions) to include brigades, and combat units (so far brigades, regiments) to cover also battalions to reflect improved capabilities at lower levels?

(8) What would the enlargement of the scope imply for the VD information and verification regime?

III. Strengthening risk reduction mechanisms

(1) How could the VD tools for clarifying unusual military activities which give reason to concerns be enhanced?

(2) Does the term “unusual military activities” need to be clarified as to their scope, location, timing, and direction of operations or consistency with plans provided through VD information and notification?
(3) How could the procedures for consultations about unusual military activities (chapter III, no. 16) be improved to encourage participation of all pS concerned and ensure a focused, productive discussion with a view to de-escalation and dispelling concerns (e.g. by taking in due account the results of other verification instruments such as the Open Skies Treaty, CFE-Treaty, special OSCE missions)?

(4) How can the use of VD procedures for handling hazardous incidents (chapter III, no. 17) be enhanced?

(5) What are the requirements, opportunities and limits of voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities in accordance with chapter III, no. 18?

(6) Should verification procedures for special OSCE monitoring missions dealing with internal and protracted conflicts be anchored in VD provisions?

How can adaptations of VD chapter III contribute to strengthening the capabilities of the OSCE to dispatch an impartial fact finding mission on short notice once sufficient indications of an emerging crises and host nation consent are available?
Monday, 12 June 2017

Welcome Remarks
» Ambassador Christian Strohal, Representative CiO, Austria
» Mr. Andrey Vorobiev, FSC Chairperson, Russian Federation
» BG Wolfgang Wosolsobe, Defence Policy Director MoD, Austria
» Ambassador Marcel Pesko, Director of the CPC, OSCE Secretariat

Opening Session/Introduction
» Information on the status of the Structured dialogue: Ambassador Eberhard Pohl, Chair of the IWG on the SD, Germany
» Findings 1st Breakout Workshop (2 - 3 March 2017): Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter, Researcher Int’l Security, Germany

Session I: Reflection of force postures and certain military activities
Keynote:
» Col (GS) Hans Lüber, FSC coordinator for the VD
Moderator:
» BG Wolfgang Peischel, Chief Editor, Austrian Military Journal (ÖMZ), Austria

Tuesday, 13 June 2017

Session II: Relevance of adapting the scope of forces and its impact on information and verification
Keynotes:
» Col Prasenjit Chaudhuri, Head of Verification Unit, Switzerland
» Lt Col Péter Benei, Defence Policy Department/Arms Control Unit, Hungary
Moderator:
» Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter, Researcher Int’l Security, Germany
Session III: Strengthening risk reduction mechanisms

Keynotes:
- Col Zbigniew Zielinski, Counsellor Senior Military Adviser, Poland
- Mr. Olaf Pöschke, Germany

Moderator:
- Mr. Robin Mossinkoff, Senior FSC Support Officer, OSCE

Discussant:
- Mr. Walter Kemp, Austria

Summary and preliminary conclusions
- Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter, Researcher Int’l Security, Germany

Closing and Way-ahead
- BG Wolfgang Wosolsobe, Defence Policy Director MoD, Austria
Session I: Reflection of force postures and certain military activities

Col (GS) Hans Lüber
FSC-Chair’s Coordinator for the Vienna Document, Military Adviser
Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the OSCE

Mr. Moderator, excellences, generals, distinguished delegates, dear colleagues,

I am honoured to have the opportunity to present you today some reflections on force postures and certain military activities. Last Tuesday, 6th of June, the second session of the IWG Structured Dialogue discussed already “Trends in Military Force Posture”. My thoughts will refer to and, in some extend, follow-up on last week’s findings. One of last week’s messages was that there are no quick and easy answers. To get closer to commonly acceptable solutions, we have to develop first a common understanding of the problem and agree on a method of tackling it. In this sense, I will also formulate some open questions, intended to give you food for thought for an interactive, frank and open discussion.

(I) Intro

I want to start with one of the findings of the successful 1st Breakout Workshop on 1st – 3rd March where we recognized that the OSCE efforts to enhance CSBMs do not take place in a vacuum but have to take into account the dynamic political context in the OSCE area and the resulting evolving security situation in Europe. There was a widely shared view that: “amongst others, changing force postures as well as fielding of advanced weapon systems might generate new operational or even strategic capabilities”. These “game-changers” have the potential to be subjects of serious security concerns.

Every Armed Force does exercise and has the right to do so. Every Armed Force chooses themes and scenarios in order to make these exercises meaningful and relevant. A required higher readiness level, modern technology of armament, a new and more complex environment and the need for a greater integration with other agencies are some of the
determining factors for exercise design. As a consequence we see more “snap-exercises” without prior announcement and more exercises other than classical ones in the scope of traditional CSBMs. This is again of concerns for the participating States.

We have to ask ourselves what generates these concerns. How could they be dispelled? To answer these questions it is not sufficient to map only new arms and systems, new organizational or Command- and Control structures and – as far as possible – qualitative aspects of a force posture. We also have to discuss intentions and perceptions.

(II) The security scene

Let us briefly have a look at the actual threats. The landscape of threats has become increasingly complex. Aside the traditional threats stemming from classical state-actors we face a whole variety of new forms of security issues, like failed states, organised crime, cyber-crime, the increasing activities of non-state actors and the whole spectrum of what we call the hybrid-type threats, just to name some of them. Different forms of threats are applied in combination, in sequence or in parallel. Modern conflicts are increasingly fluid, flexible and unpredictable and they have the potential to rapidly transform, spread out and shift between the civil and the military spheres. The line between peace and war appears more and more blurred.

Furthermore, the rapid development of new technology and its utilization for modern weapon systems create new military capabilities. Higher speed, longer ranges, enhanced accuracy of weapon systems are the result. States or non-state actors may use new capabilities like cyber to support and sharpen older, more classical strategies, such as influence operations, or might simultaneously employ non-traditional forces alongside – or in place of – regular forces. In this context, I would like to quote James Hackett, who stated in his academic paper for the 2nd IWG Structured Dialogue: “While it is true to say that the use of traditional military capability remains a principal way of exerting force, it is not the only way.”

(III) New force postures

Looking closer to actual force postures we recognize that the new features and new domains mentioned above consequently lead to new ways of thinking and planning and to new postures of armed forces. Higher
Responsiveness, smaller and fitter, smarter, more precise, better equipped are the arguments we can read in white-books or hear from defence ministries of many participating States to explain their recent reforms of their respective armed forces. In a period of increased instability and eroded confidence in Europe we need effective tools to enhance predictability and transparency. In other words, we urgently need new CSBMs to insure their relevance and efficiency.

One of the suggestions to tackle this subject was to do an independent mapping of the actual force postures in order to have a commonly agreed basis of information. What could be the elements and the criteria of such a mapping? One of them must be a listing of new capabilities gained by technological progress. More complex armament systems require more skilled troops to operate them. How can the level of expertise of such troops be measured? Furthermore, considerations on what constitutes military capability have changed considerably. New military-relevant capabilities like cyber and specialist information and influence elements have to be included in such a mapping.

There must be a number of elements in such a mapping that are more of qualitative than quantitative nature. It is not the first time in the history of Arms Control and CSBMs that we try to measure quality. So far, no system has been really convincing. We tried for example to give points for qualitative combat-power of battle tanks and compare them with battle tanks from potential adverse forces. It was recognized that such comparisons were incomplete and probably inadequate. The new force postures make such a measurement exercise even more complicated. Some participating States utilize matrix-presentations for their qualitative approach to force posture. We could in the OSCE-fora discuss and compare such approaches from different participating States and agree on common criteria for a common qualitative approach to assess force postures. The aim remains the classical: improve transparency to enhance predictability which helps to regain mutual trust amongst participating states.

(IV) Certain military activities

Along with new threat assessment and new doctrinal development come new military training and activities. New technology alone does not
improve military capabilities. There is always a human factor. The modern military exercises work with actual scenarios and methods. Mainly exercises of rapid-reaction and high-readiness formations, combined with a high mobility can be of concern.

Exercises can be executed in combination of military forces with other actors in the security sector of a state with non-traditional tasks (for example counter-terrorism) and therefore be misperceived as not military relevant even if they are significant.

There is an obvious need to review the reporting and information tools in order to improve transparency and trust.

V) Outro

In this period of questioning and doubting the existing CSBMs, I want to remind you – in my capacity as the FSC Chair’s Coordinator for the VD – of the value of this acquis, the important knowledge and experience of the verification and implementation units and their network. This and other military-to-military contacts are strong and effective tools for a better mutual understanding – not only of the factual aspects of military force posture but also of their intentions. A more complete understanding of a force posture can contribute to avoid misperceptions and misinterpretations.

After all, I want to remind you here that the CSCE and later the OSCE managed during the Cold War – a period of much higher and more imminent threats than today – to develop and agree on a set of CSBMs that were relevant at that time. I invite you to recall the spirit of those days as a motivation for our present work. I have no doubt, that sooner or later the participating States will be able to successfully generate the political predisposition for a constructive approach to our actual challenges. In the meantime we have to do the preparatory groundwork.

I thank you very much for your attention and look forward to a lively debate.
Session II: Relevance of adapting the scope of forces and its impact on information and verification

Col Prasenjit Chaudhuri
Head of Swiss Verification Unit and Deputy Head of the Euro-Atlantic Security Cooperation Division

Mr. Moderator, excellences, generals, distinguished delegates, dear colleagues

I have the honour and the opportunity to talk about the relevance of adapting the scope of forces and its possible impact on verification. In this context, I would like to look at the current situation together with today’s military posture and technological developments with a focus on the need for information and transparency. In a second part, I would like to map the arms control instruments along with the confidence and security building measures at hand in order to evaluate their possible application but also to identify their limitations and shortcomings in the context of verifiable transparency. Finally, I would like to reflect on further possibilities to fill the so-called transparency gaps and also briefly look at new, emerging and future technologies. With this broad spectrum in front of us and so many unanswered questions, let us “[…]
boldly go where no one has gone before”.

The current geopolitical and security situations, together with the contemporary politico-military environments, have significantly changed. With their multipolar nature they are more interlinked and complex, and hence less predictable. New security threats together with the re-emergence of conventional conflicts in Europe have a significant impact on perceptions, military doctrines and most notably on deterrent postures of conventional military forces, as recently discussed in different occasions within the structured dialogue and breakout workshops.

At the same time we witness technological and structural developments of armed forces with a broadening of military capacities, with network-centric operational capabilities, with new military platforms and
doctrinal adaptations. We also note a changing military rational along with an increase of combined and joint operations, with enhanced command, control and communication, with higher significance and involvement of logistics and other non-combat forces enabling faster mobilization and deployment of armed forces.

New, emerging and future technologies will further change the traditional structures and posture of armed forces with trend towards greater automation, unmanned weapon platforms, military application of artificial intelligence and systems for human enhancement. Cyber-attacks as well as information and disinformation campaigns are already a regular part of current military operations and hybrid warfare.

Military platforms together with highly accurate target acquisition and long-range strike potentials, missile based air defense along with the increased air and sea mobility not only act as force multipliers, but also allow faster changes from defensive to offensive postures. This not only increases the risks of hazardous incidents of a military nature (Vienna Document Para 17) and the potential of military escalation but also makes force posture in military trends more complex and thus more unpredictable. The same can be noted in view of military exercises preparing for this kind of missions: they are also more complex and more frequent; they integrate combat and non-combat forces and thereby involving a greater number of personnel, equipment and systems.

These evolutions in military affairs, as it was formerly called, also have an impact on perceptions and / or misperceptions, increase national concerns and thus also the need for security, transparency, early warning and conflict prevention. In an environment of undivided security this should translate in stabilizing arms control measures along with adequate intrusive regimes of information exchange and verification together with consulting procedures and conflict management mechanisms. Having said that, let us have a quick look at the existing regimes of confidence and security building measures along with their principle purpose and arms control rationale:

The provisions of the 2011 Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures or CSBMs as we call it, were aimed at the
prevention of misinterpretation of military activities and thus focused on quantitative aspects of offensive major weapon systems and combat units and formations.

The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), which has been suspended since the end of 2007, was designed to ensure the military power balance between two military blocks and the disengagement of opposing forces in Europe of the 1990s. Its objects of verification included treaty limited equipment, again categories of offensive systems which were subjected to limitations and reduction.

The Treaty on Open Skies with its concept of mutual aerial observation over the entire territory of its participants is aimed towards openness and transparency of military forces and large scale military activities.

Furthermore, we have a set of information exchanges related to the Vienna Document such as the Annual Exchange on Military Information (AEMI) and the Annual Exchange on Defense Planning along with information on military spending, budget and finance plans. Finally, we have the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI) which is also annually submitted. Currently, all information exchanges, especially the AEMI and GEMI, focus on traditional elements of armed forces such as the number of personnel and major weapon systems. The Annual Exchange on Defense Planning has more possibilities to address other elements of armed forces and their posture.

Going back to today's military realities and the arising security needs, we identify significant gaps in military stability, challenges to the principles of a norm based security order, deficits in information exchange and transparency, and predominantly, the lack of adequate verification instruments and thus also confidence building measures.

This widening gap is the predominant root cause of a growing discomfort and increasing lack of trust and confidence in the OSCE region. Hence, we must address the sum of all perceptions, interpretations and national concerns as a starting point and as the smallest common denominator. Consequently, we also need to reach the common understanding among all OSCE participating States that
the majority of the traditional CSBMs are in need of adaptations and revisions.

At the same time we should uphold the acquis of the current CSBMs and remind our-selves of the principal guidelines for negotiations of the Lisbon Document: Sufficiency, Transparency, Verification and Limitations. Let us also take into account the expertise and the existing networks of the verification centers along with the confidence and personal friendship between verification personnel built and maintained during the last forty years. This invaluable basis must be seriously taken into account when modernizing and even extending the current set of CSBMs and other arms control measures.

To identify the gaps and deficits of the existing CSBMs in general, we must bring to mind the change of paradigm from quantitative to qualitative aspects of armed forces and operational capabilities together with the requirements for transparency, predictability and confidence building. Since these breakout workshops focus particularly on the modernization of the Vienna Document, let us have a closer look at its possibilities and limitations.

First, let us continue to verify what is verifiable. Meaning not only uphold the acquis of the Vienna Document but to gradually use the existing instruments and measures to cover the broader aspects of armed forces as illustrated in the first part. We may broaden and adapt the scope of forces with new categories of forces by including command control and communication, logistics, strategic air and sea transport, ground based air defense and air denial units and formations. We may even include naval forces or at least subject those naval units and formations in the adjoining sea area to information exchange. This would not only contribute to a higher level of transparency but would also increase the number of total units subjected to verification and would thus also augment the quota. Furthermore, this would also contribute towards more observations of military activities (Vienna Document Para 47) since the increased number of units subjected to the Vienna Document would more often exceed the current threshold of 13'000 troops. We may even discuss a further lowering of all thresholds for the numbers of weapon systems and personnel
subjected to notifications as well as also redefine the minimal duration of temporary activations.

Also recognizing that today smaller units have higher operational capabilities and impact, we may discuss and refine the definitions of units and formations which currently cover divisions of land forces and regiments of combat units in view of a possible inclusion of brigades and battalions respectively. Adapting the scope of forces may also result in the inclusion of new types of weapon systems, equipment and platforms, especially game changers and force multipliers but also new system which are regularly used today such as unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Broadening the scope may also lead to enlargement of the area of application of the Vienna Document from currently the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains to all the territories of the OSCE participating States with their adjoining sea area.

We may expand military contacts and increase military dialogue with events on security policy, military doctrine, operational planning, operational capabilities, budgeting and other relevant qualitative aspects of armed forces aiming directly at senior military leadership. We may think about visits to peace time locations of military headquarters with briefings on these very subjects.

Among the significant number of proposals which are on the table, some focus on increasing the existing measures by increasing quota, increasing the number of inspectors or visitors or increasing the duration of verification activities. Here and also with all other proposals, we must reflect and validate the investments in view of the significance of their impact on prevention, security and stability. Also, to be effective and relevant, but predominantly to avoid another transparency gap, the Vienna Document and its CSBM toolbox must regularly be updated and continuously adapted to the politico-military realities.

Secondly, we should reflect on procedures and mechanism to map and verify what is (yet) unverifiable. How to verify qualitative aspects, operational capabilities, network-based capabilities, readiness and deployability, long-range target acquisition, strike potential etc. Here we can clearly identify the need to extend the measures of the Vienna Document and even the need to introduce new criteria for verification.
activities such as capability-based quota or variable quota based on the number of exercises conducted below the thresholds or based on those below the minimum duration of temporary activation. When talking about quota, we should also renew the discussions on an additional quota at the disposal of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre or at the discretion of the Secretary General for risk reduction purposes as well as possibilities and limitations of status-neutral approach and third party verification. Finally, we should continue to use regional measures according to chapter X of the Vienna Document to include new elements to satisfy additional security needs such as the Naval CSBMs in the Black Sea region.

Last but not least, looking at emerging and future technologies, a great number of far-reaching scientific breakthroughs are now being achieved in areas such as IT and communications ('big data'), mechanical engineering and robotics, nanotechnology, materials science, neuro- and cognitive sciences (artificial intelligence), biochemistry and genetics. This science and technology wave is of course not happening in a vacuum, but in a particular global context. It comes at a time of a changing international security context. We see global power shifts, geopolitical tensions, regional instabilities and the emergence of new actors. We also witness horizontal and vertical proliferation of systems and capabilities. In such a context, it could be attractive for some actors to introduce novel weapon technologies. Whether covertly, in small-scale operations, where such use would be hard to attribute, or overtly, on unprepared adversaries in conflicts where they may significantly complement or even augment classical military means. To subject these elements to CSBMs and verifiable transparency will be very difficult and challenging.

To sum up, many elements of what is verifiable are already on the table as existing tools or as proposals for their extension. Some elements of what is not yet verifiable and future science need some creativity and thinking out of the box. What we lack is the political will to address these elements with a systematic and structured approach.

Mr. Moderator, this concludes my inputs for this working session II and we hope that the ideas and proposals presented may contribute to open discussions and exchange of thoughts. Thank you very much.
This presentation focuses on the relevance of adapting the scope of forces and the impact of this adaptation on the information exchange regime. My aim is to introduce the audience to the topic, to provide them with some food for the discussions later on.

In order to understand what we are talking about, I wanted to summarize the information exchange in accordance with the Vienna Document (VD) 2011’s provisions.

We exchange information on the command organization of our armed forces’ formations and units, but only about the so called combat units. The VD 2011 defines what formations and units are, and what constitute as combat units (see the examples on the slide). For these formations and units we have to report their Major Weapon and Equipment Systems (MWES, also listed on the slide).
The significance of this exchange – apart from the actual transparency and confidence building – is that it is also affecting the verification side of the VD 2011: the number of units contained in the charts is the basis for counting the evaluation visit quotas, and the information itself is being “evaluated” during the visits. During the VD 2011 inspections, the inspectors are entitled to request and to receive briefings at agreed times by military representatives of the receiving State or other participating States (pS) whose military formations and units are deployed in the specified area.

It is important to note that contrary to the Global Exchange of Information (GEMI) which is also an OSCE data exchange, this annual exchange of military information (AEMI) covers only the Zone of Application of the Confidence- and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), and not the whole territory of the participating States!

MWES

Before continuing, let us stay a bit longer on the question of MWES. The slide shows all the categories of equipment we have to report (see the examples on the slide). I have a few “rhetorical” questions. Where do we find the definitions for the categories? What is a battle tank or an armoured personnel carrier (APC) for the VD 2011? Do we follow the CFE Treaties definitions? Do we need to? Should we follow National Policies?

Threat perception

The topic of this presentation is the adaptation of the VD 2011 Information Exchange, but you may ask, why do we need to adapt it at all? Well, the answer lies in the notion of threat perception. Many different fora have dealt with this topic already, and many of the participants of this meeting contributed to the different workshops’ efforts. On the next slide I wanted to summarize, or to picture the source, or the elements of the capabilities that may represent a threat to a participating State. Some more details will follow later on.
Session II: Relevance of adapting the scope of forces and its impact on information and verification

**Information Exchange**

What happens – from an information exchange point of view – if we decide and start adapting, expanding the scope of forces covered in the AEMI?

From a technical point of view, out of the 57 participating States of the OSCE, originally 30 are States Parties to the CFE Treaty, and 4 are of the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (Dayton Peace Accords), altogether 33 pS are already, or have been preparing a much more detailed data exchange according to their respective Treaties. In other words, for more than half of the pS it would not be an extra burden.

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**Extended Information – Level**

From the point of view of the AEMI’s content, the picture is more complicated and provides at least three approach-vectors.

The first one is the level of units contained in the AEMI. If we would redefine formations and units, the latter to include (in many cases separately located) battalions as well, then we would have greater
transparency and we would satisfy the need to better reflect the improved capabilities at lower levels than before.

**Extended Information – Type**

The second vector – which might be the most significant change – is about the type of units contained in the AEMI. Ever since the VD 1990, when this type of information exchange was introduced, we have focused on combat units. This was a great step forward taken by our predecessors, but we are all aware of the fact that combat units do not operate alone in a vacuum.

The threat perceptions were mentioned earlier. In order to alleviate the mentioned perceptions and to provide a better, clearer picture about the capabilities of a pS’s armed forces, some say we should also include units that command and support the combat units. This could – among others – include command, control and communication (C3), logistic, transport and storage units, as well. In other words, it is not just the hardware that constitutes the perceived threat, but also the ability to control it, and the way, the speed it is deployed and sustained.

If we are willing to speak about the expansion of the scope of units contained in the AEMI, we could include air and missile defence units as well. This would represent the second tier of the paradigm change.

The real leap would arrive with the inclusion of naval units in the AEMI. The technical details are really complicated if we do not want to simply repeat the GEMI exchange. Some examples to consider: what type of units/vessels and/or naval bases are to be included and where? This leads to the question or possibility of expanding the Zone of Application of the CSBMs...

The last type of units to consider – at least for now – is the different battle-groups/task forces and/or international co-operation units. An example of the latter is the so called Heavy Airlift Wing, deployed in Hungary, which is the embodiment of the co-operation of 12 Nations providing personnel and the finances for this unit. This wing was created to satisfy the Strategic Airlift Capability needs of 12 Nations. The question is: who is to report about such units, battle-groups? These units, task-groups are created to provide capabilities otherwise missing
in individual pS, thus they may contribute to the already mentioned threat perception of the others.

**Extended Information – MWES**

The third approach vector – which is in a way related to the expansion of the units included in the AEMI – is the question of the MWES. The technological changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War are not reflected in the information exchange.

The appearance, proliferation and impact of the so called Unmanned (Combat) Aerial Vehicles – U(C)AV, or better known as combat drones is undeniable. We all know the examples from Afghanistan, Syria and Ukraine, just to name a few theatres. Could they be included in the category of combat aircraft? Could we expand the – in the VD 2011 non-existing – definition of combat aircraft with cruise missiles, as well? The same question can be asked about the category of artillery: why not include the short range ballistic missiles (SRBM)? They all are part of the modern doctrines, capable of precision strikes.

Last, but not least, the ability of strategic transport of the combat troops should also be reflected in the data exchange in the form of the inclusion of transport aircraft. Once again, all these “new” MWES do contribute to the threat perception of others.

**Example – the structure of the HDF**

Let me illustrate the impact of changing the scope (that is: the size and type) of units in the AEMI through the example of the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF).

The first slide shows the structure of the HDF based on the information available on the official website of the HDF. I have included the subordinated battalions of the brigades (also available on the website).
The next slide shows the units covered by the current VD 2011 info exchange obligations.
Session II: Relevance of adapting the scope of forces and its impact on information and verification

The following slide shows the units covered by the CFE Treaty’s info exchange obligations.

The next slide shows the units that would be covered by the expanded VD 2011 info exchange obligations, well at least one version or interpretation I presented here earlier.
The last slide in this series shows a summary or fusion of the units of the HDF and what information is provided or available about them in the different info exchange obligations.

In order to achieve the expanded VD 2011 information exchange we have to include a lot of new information. The question is how to do this. The very first requirement is of course the positive, supporting political will from the pS. If and when we have that from all pS, then the process of negotiation and adoption of the relevant proposals that would become VD Plus decisions can start. This is of course only one way to do it. We have to also consider the relationship between the different proposals: do we select a few or go for the whole package, step-by-step or in huge leaps? This naturally is the responsibility of the delegations in Vienna.

Questions

We are all aware of the proverb “Trust but verify” usually attached to the CFE Treaty. One of the questions is: what will we do with the extended information exchange? Do we attach new verification
measures as well? With the possible inclusion of new MWES, do we need to have a huge number of Demonstrations?

Another question is what we would do with this extra information? Would the greater transparency (i.e. more information) appease or aggravate the mentioned threat perception of the pS? Some might say that the current info exchange was sufficient in the 90’s, when we had larger armed forces. Why bother sharing more information on far smaller armed forces? Well, in my opinion, it is an evolution, the way forward.
Session III: Strengthening risk reduction mechanisms

Col Zbigniew Zielinski
Counsellor Senior Military Adviser

Dear Colleagues,

The risk reduction CSBMs are particularly important and useful in challenging times, when matters are not managed “as usual business” and tension regretfully prevails.

Poland as well as many other pS attaches equally high importance to all three paragraphs contained in Chapter III of the VD, namely paragraphs 16-18. However we have decided to concentrate our efforts at the strengthening of the cooperation mechanism on hazardous incidents of a military nature, it means at para.17 of the VD.

Why?

First of all, we were and are still concerned about the increasing number of dangerous military incidents which have occurred in the last 3 years. At least some of them were identified as very dangerous with a potential to generate more escalation and even an unintended conflict.

Secondly, reviewing the existing provisions of para.17 of the VD, we have realized that the mechanism of cooperation and consultation regarding a hazardous military incident contained in them is rather weak, not effective and not very attractive for participating States. That was one of the main reasons why participating States invoked para.17 of the VD only once since the first version of the VD entered into force in 1990.

Thus, in our proposal, in which para.17 has been expanded substantially, we have consequently decided to significantly strengthen this mechanism correcting unclear provisions and terms by providing short deadlines for different actions, expanding procedure by supplementing it with two new phases (research by the CPC and establishment of a special information gathering mission if needed).
The only aim of this action is to present a better, more resolute, concise and effective CSBM for all participating States. In other words, the main purpose of the proposal is to strengthen existing provisions of para.17 which, as I said, in the opinion of many states, are rather weak and not effective so far.

Of course, as provided by the original para.17, all other channels to deal with dangerous military incidents remain to be at full disposal of States up to their choice, in particular those based on bilateral arrangements and commitments.

As far as the proposal is concerned, it should be noted that now there is a growing number of participating States co-sponsoring the Polish proposal on para.17 of the VD. Lastly, on May 10, the proposal was co-sponsored by France as 22nd sponsoring state. We expect that other pS would consider their co-sponsoring too.

The Security Dialogue at the FSC on 24 May was devoted to the prevention of military incidents. We are grateful to the Russian FSC Chairmanship for bringing this issue to the Security Dialogue. However, the focus of the Security Dialogue topic was directed at bilateral agreements and prevention. It should be pointed out in this context that only a limited number of pS have bilateral commitments with other states on military incidents.

That’s why, once again, what we are doing is improving a multilateral tool applicable to 57 pS. So, they are able to utilize a tool which is in para.17 VD to this end.

And, furthermore, bilateral agreements are concentrating in the first instance on prevention. Para.17 of the VD is mainly devoted to managing the incidents which have already happened (ex-post tool).

As we pointed out already several times, we are convinced that our proposal is effective, politically neutral and objectively valuable.

We are very grateful to all co-sponsors as well as to a number of other Delegations for their valuable contributions aimed at improving the text of our joint proposal and make it more pragmatic and more acceptable.
As it was stated many times during this breakout workshop, we are aware that nowadays there is still not enough favorable general political environment for speedily proceeding with updating and modernizing the VD 2011. However, we encourage once again all Delegations to take a closer look at the modified version of Para.17 and discover the impartial, fully neutral and based only on substance approach we have adopted in our work on this task.

Summarizing, I would like to emphasize that the VD is a mutually beneficial political commitment and CSBM. Thus, we have to keep its unique nature and, having our lessons learnt, gradually improve it by filling gaps, redrafting vague formulas and introducing new elements in order to better reflect the current pol-mil reality.

I thank you for your attention.
Summary and preliminary conclusions

Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter
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Similar to the first Breakout Workshop on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) held in Vienna on 1 – 3 March 2017 also the second Breakout Workshop inquired to what extent the Vienna Document 2011 (VD11) reflects new security challenges and uncertainties in its area of application and where it needs to be revised in order to keep relevance. Participants referred to political developments, military interventions and protracted conflicts, new military doctrines and changing force postures, the fielding of advanced weapon systems and new patterns of military activities. In sum, the discussion revealed a profound lack of trust. However, rather than tackling all associated political problems, the workshop focused on a conceptual and technical discussion of areas where the VD 11 needs modernization and, once common ground has been found, how this could be done if and when an improved political atmosphere allows participating States (pS) to move forward.

The workshop reiterated that both responding to risk perceptions and implementing agreed principles require full transparency of current force structures and military activities, predictability of the development of military capabilities and promoting confidence building and security cooperation with a view to creating a common and undivided OSCE security space. Rather than evaluating political intentions behind military developments the rationale for CSBM should flow from a sober assessment of current and evolving military potentials and capabilities. Therefore, CSBMs should aim at preventing surprises and arms races, ensuring fact based decision making, particularly in crises, and reflecting modern technologies and force postures, including qualitative aspects.

Based on the findings of the first Breakout Workshop that dealt with:

(1) The scope of forces subject to the VD
Participants of the second Breakout Workshop considered three selected areas of CSBMs contained in the Vienna Document which were identified worth of exploring in more depth. The agenda was structured accordingly with three session devoted to:

I. Reflection of force postures and certain military activities
II. Relevance of adapting the scope of forces and its impact on information and verification
III. Strengthening risk reduction mechanisms

A number of questions were attached to the invitation which was meant to inspire the discussion. I will now try to reflect what has been discussed and, thereby, refer to those questions as structuring elements.

I. Reflection of force postures and certain military activities

There was a broad discussion about mapping force postures (personnel, equipment, capabilities and locations) which would deepen the discussions in the Structured Dialogue framework and provide a basis for further deliberations on CSBMs and conventional arms control. The discussion also extended to finding relevant criteria for assessing force postures including quantitative and qualitative elements of assets as well as doctrines, training, leadership skills, command, control and communication, logistics, intelligence, mobility, preparedness and reactivity, and, last but not least, the political intentions behind a force build-up. During these discussion it was also referred to the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI) as an existing information exchange format and, if enlarged, of its possible potential for greater military transparency.

However, the discussion also made clear that a large portion of qualitative criteria escape suitable scales for objective evaluation which would be needed to translate them in meaningful verification or
limitations. Nevertheless, the point was made that creative thinking might be required to develop CSBMs that include qualitative aspects.

Although there was the feeling that the synergetic effects of force multipliers such as command, control and communication (CCC), leadership skills, electronic warfare capabilities, training or net-based operations, should be taken into account and somehow be reflected in pertinent CSBMs, participants also acknowledged that they cannot replace the firepower at the end of the command and control chain which is needed to exert force. Current high intensity conflicts are fought with traditional Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) / Major Weapon and Equipment Systems (MWES) and current defence plans aim at increasing numbers of TLE / MWES while at the same time, investing in force multipliers to enhance overall military capabilities. In any case, concepts of modernizing CSBMs need to answer the question to what extent new or enhanced military capabilities can be reflected. That requires concrete answers to questions asked on extending the scope of the VD to include new capabilities and new MWES.

Regarding the role of national intelligence as opposed to CSBMs, it was mentioned that the purpose of cooperative CSBMs is to place assessments and relevant discussions in multilateral fora on a common factual basis which is subject to mutual information and verification.

Since any national assessment of force postures of other states contains elements of subjective threat perceptions it became also clear that the existence of security cannot be defined in absolute terms but to a large extent remains a question of perception. That applies certainly on political intentions behind force postures. While they can be misjudged and change in a short period of time, transparent and restrained military capabilities could limit any political ambitions and provide a clear picture of available military options. In a multilateral setting, it seems important to strive for a compromise which takes into account the threat perceptions and security interests of all participants and provides for utmost restraint in order to alleviate mutual concerns. Furthermore, the need for a multilateral instrument to work on the basis of reciprocity and accountability requires quantifiable measures.
As to specific questions asked to structure the panel discussions, implicitly snap exercises were addressed which are a particular cause for concerns:

1. The questions under which conditions formations and units can build up operational capabilities that could be used for cross-border operations and how the VD should reflect such options (e.g. scope, geography and thresholds) remained open and might need further examination.

2. Also the discussion on whether stationing of combat forces close to international borders and areas in crisis require more intrusive information and verification measures remained inconclusive. Some participants were of the view that in light of modern air mobility distances to borderlines are no significant obstacles for offensive cross-border operations. Others underlined, that air mobility alone has limited capacity to shift heavy equipment and build-up logistics over large distances which would be needed to sustain large-scale offensive operations. I.e., the build-up of logistics in frontline positions would be a warning signal that has to be taken into account when conceptualizing new CSBMs.

3. Should the VD distinguish between readiness tests inside peacetime locations (in-garrison activities) and snap exercises concentrating combat-ready formations in assembly areas and preparing for combined arms operations (out of-garrison activities)?

4. The question was addressed by one participant who argued that in-garrison activities which are held in peacetime locations and do not concentrate combat-ready formations in assembly areas close to border regions are not relevant for early warning against potential cross-border operations. Pertinent information might alleviate security concerns.

5. On the question whether military exercises in the vicinity of border regions and areas in crisis need to be covered by special VD rules including notification, observation and limitation (threshold numbers, duration) the point was made that militarily meaningful geographical restraints were not feasible due to the geographical disparities of
countries. While such limitations would cover only a portion of big countries they could apply on the whole territory of other countries. Thus, the reciprocity of measures could not be assured.

(6) On the other hand, while geographical disparities cannot be negotiated away, in the past CSBMs and arms control instruments found ways to cope with such problems of geo-graphical disparities, inter alia, by defining reciprocal geographical zones with collective ceilings, by territorial ceilings for every participating state (respectively CFE State Party) or by voluntary regional measures contained in VD chapter X. It expressively recommends special measures particularly in border areas. The question is what States deem politically feasible and militarily meaningful. Certainly, compromises can be found if there is a political will.

(7) The question whether military exercises far away from international borders or areas in crisis require special attention if combined with assets providing operational and strategic mobility was answered positively. However, there was no unanimous view how the VD should take this into account.

II. Relevance of adapting the scope of forces and its impact on information and verification

Like the Breakout Workshop 1 also the second workshop concluded that the current scope of the VD does not sufficiently represent modern force capabilities and current force structures, which have changed significantly since the inception of the VD. The panel was also aware that any changes that would increase the number of notifiable units would have an effect on other chapters of the VD, e.g. raising the quota for evaluation visits and pushing the number of personnel engaged in certain military activities above thresholds for notification and observation.

Against this background, panel 2 took an in-depth look into certain areas indicated in the findings of the first Breakout Workshop and tackled questions of widening the scope to include:
Given the operational (or even strategic) impact of such capabilities no reservation was voiced against their inclusions in the scope of the VD and many speakers expressed strong support for respective changes of the VD. Speakers also suggested redefining formations of land forces (so far armies, corps, divisions) to include brigades, and combat units (so far brigades, regiments) to cover also battalions in order to reflect improved capabilities at lower levels.

The panel recognized the difficulties for CSBMs to account for Electronic Warfare, cyber operations and net-centric warfare capabilities which are connected to satellite-based recon-naissance, positioning and communications, advanced sensors and modern computer software. Although such capabilities tend to elude traditional transparency and verification, they were not regarded entirely unsuitable to be dealt with by the Vienna Document. In this context, visits to higher echelon HQ or even to the MoDs were encouraged to regularly exchange information on such and other capabilities as well as on associated doctrines.

**III. Strengthening risk reduction mechanisms**

Strengthening risk reduction mechanisms was regarded as a matter of urgency given the volatile political and military environment. The panel dealt with the question how the VD tools for clarifying unusual military activities could be enhanced which give reason to concerns. To that end, it discussed concrete proposals:
(1) The view was expressed that the procedures for consultations about unusual military activities (chapter III, no. 16) need to be improved to encourage participation in good faith of all parties concerned. It was mentioned that in order to ensure a focused, productive discussion with a view to de-escalation and dispelling concerns also the results of other verification instruments such as the Open Skies Treaty, CFE-Treaty or special OSCE missions should be taken into account.

(2) The panel also discussed the requirements, opportunities and limits of voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities in accordance with chapter III, no. 18. It inquired how adaptations of VD chapter III could contribute to strengthening the capabilities of the OSCE to dispatch an impartial fact finding mission on short notice once sufficient indications of an emerging crises and host nation consent are available. A concrete proposal focused on the appointment of a Special Representative for risk reduction, keeping a personnel roster of experts in the CPC, defining more clearly consultation obligations in the FSC/PC, reports by the Special Representative on unusual military activities and, in context with para 18, impartial on-site inspections by the OSCE. To ensure legitimacy they should be based on host nation consent as a minimum requirement and be subject to clear rules on the observation procedures. Any ideas of enforcement of fact-finding missions were regarded unfeasible.

(3) Hazardous incidents were regarded a particularly urgent issue the OSCE parties should deal with given their potentially escalatory implications and the high number of incidents, particularly in and above international waters. The view was expressed that the use of VD procedures for handling hazardous incidents (chapter III, no. 17) so far was less than satisfying. Participants discussed inconclusively whether that was due to a lack of awareness, of political will or simply because multilateral instruments are not suited for the necessary quick reaction. Current provisions to manage incidents were assessed too weak. Concrete proposals were
made as to shortening deadlines for responses, information gathering by CPC and fact-finding missions.
Furthermore, it was felt that the OSCE could focus on preventive measures rather than trying to manage incidents that had happened. Harmonizing international flight procedures and rules of engagement could be considered. To increase quick reaction, the need to establish military-to-military contacts was stressed. In this regard, the use of VD Chapter X Regional Measures might be another venue to tackle the problem.
Since most of the incidents take place in or above international waters, the question was discussed whether a clearer definition of the VD area of application, in particular, the term “adjoining sea areas” (Annex I) could help to make para 17 more relevant.
Finally, the point was made that the use of an inter-state agreement such as the Vienna Document cannot be applied in internal conflicts in which non-state actors are involved. However, a status-neutral approach might be advised which is tailor-made for every particular conflict area and linked to ceasefire agreements or particular Incident Prevention Mechanisms. However, one could look into the possibility of anchoring in VD provisions general verification procedures for special OSCE monitoring missions which deal with internal and protracted conflicts. In this context, reference was made also to the CSCE Document “Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations” as of 25 November 1993.

**General Remarks**

Participants underscored that modernizing the Vienna Document is feasible only if there is a political will. On the other hand, the point was made that the development of viable concepts needs to be done in advance and by military experts so that the OSCE community can react quickly if and when the time is ripe and the political will has developed to improve the security and military stability in Europe. To that end, it was stressed several times that a systematic and structured analysis is
needed and that qualitative aspects must be taken into account which requires creative thinking.

As a matter of priority, the need to reduce risks and deescalate hazardous incidents was underlined. To that end, also multilateral instruments such as VD III para 17 should be used more often. However, since most incidents take place in or above international waters a clearer definition of the VD term “adjoining sea areas” or enlarging the VD area of application to include European littoral seas might be required.

Since there was a sense of urgency attached to avoiding and deescalating hazardous incidents and risk reduction and in light of the current blockade of the VD modernization process the proposal was made to deal with such issues by establishing a stand-alone provision and, to that end, promoting a Ministerial Council decision. Furthermore other existing information exchanges (e.g. GEMI) could, if extended, contribute to more military transparency.

Finally, it was mentioned that a parallel approach towards modernizing the VD and reinvigorating conventional arms control would be helpful to overcome political blockades. In this context, let me recall that discussions in the framework of Breakout Workshops serve as a contribution to the OSCE Structured Dialogue with a focus on VD CSBM.

In conclusion, there seem to be many issues on the table, particularly in regard of force postures reflected in the scope of the VD and the urgently needed risk reduction mechanisms, which require further examination, probably in a third Breakout Workshop in October.
3rd Breakout Workshop on Confidence and Security Building Measures
19 – 20 October 2017
Maria Theresa Barracks, Vienna

Introduction

The third and final “Breakout Workshop on CSBMs” again provided a forum for members of delegations in Vienna as well as experts from capitals had the opportunity to exchange views and develop a better common understanding on the challenges and opportunities for the current CSBM-regime. Experts held in-depth discussions on how to reduce uncertainty and unpredictability by strengthening CSBMs and thereby support the Structured Dialogue in a coherent and complementary manner. This workshop addressed three specific key issues of politico-military security- and confidence-building: enhanced transparency regarding information exchange instruments and military activities, as well as incident prevention and response mechanisms. Similar to the first workshop, after the introduction of the topics, the participants split up into three working groups and elaborated on the above-mentioned areas. The outcomes of the group discussions were presented to the plenary. With regard to the mil-to-mil dialogue, information was provided on the outcome of the Intersessional Dialogue on Military Doctrines and a possible way ahead.
Rebuilding trust is one of the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship priorities. Therefore, Austria has focused on how to increase military transparency, predictability and stability in the OSCE area by strengthening Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs). The Chairmanship has organized Breakout Workshops to provide opportunities for informal exchange at expert level on today’s challenges to existing CSBMs, identifying opportunities to enhance military transparency and predictability, and adapting the politico-military tools to the current security realities. Moreover, the discussions support and contribute the Structured Dialogue in a coherent and complementary manner.

During two Breakout Workshops in March and June 2017, participants regularly emphasized the need to further strengthen dialogue on CSBMs in order to increase military transparency and restore trust, for example by minimizing risks from unintended military incidents and developing de-escalation measures. Incident prevention, fact-finding, transparency measures and military-to-military dialogue were frequently mentioned in meetings in the context of the “Structured Dialogue” as urgent and necessary steps. In an unstable and unpredictable security environment, these measures could contribute to responding to current security risks and thus reducing tensions between OSCE participating States. Due to their potential to enhance predictability and constrain the escalation of risks, they were, amongst others, identified as building blocks for enhanced multilateral strategic stability.

This October Breakout Workshop aims to further deepen the informal discussion on urgently to be dealt with issues. It will start with an opening followed by two thematic sessions. The first session will discuss the way ahead after the Intersessional OSCE Dialogue on Military Doctrines (4-5 May 2017) and how to further enhance military-to-military dialogue. In the second session keynote speakers will introduce three topics: Enhanced Transparency regarding Information Exchange Instruments, Enhanced Transparency regarding Military Activities, and Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms. Subsequently, participants will split up in working groups (according to their
preferences indicated in the registration form). A presentation on the outcomes of the respective group discussions will be held on the next day, followed by a closing session that will summarize the key elements of the discussions and results.

**Preparing the three Working Groups – elements for discussion**

**Topic 1**

Military transparency is one of the four fundamental principles the OSCE Framework for Arms Control (Lisbon 1996) has established regarding guidelines for negotiating and implementing arms control and CSBMs. Accordingly, OSCE participating States are required to ensure transparency through complete, accurate and timely exchange of relevant information, including the size, structure, location, military doctrine and activities of forces. In contrast, during the first two Breakout Workshops on CSBMs, participants concluded that both new force structures and advanced military capabilities are not fully covered by the Vienna Document and thus pose a challenge to existing transparency regimes.

Against this background, Working Group I of this Breakout Workshop is to discuss which OSCE instruments are suitable as to their substance and political accessibility for further development in order to close this gap. Thereby, special attention should be given to the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI).

**Topic 2**

Regarding risks and challenges to security in the OSCE area the Lisbon framework document described certain issues that should be addressed, such as military imbalances that might contribute to instabilities, or inter-state tensions and conflicts, particularly in border areas, that affect military security. The Lisbon document also requires participating States to implement arms control agreements at all times, including in times of crisis, and regularly review existing instruments to ensure that they continue to respond to the security needs in the OSCE area. Since their inception OSCE CSBMs have aimed at transparency of large-scale exercises in order to build confidence that they are not intended to be used for preparing cross-border offensive operations.
However, during the two previous Breakout Workshops participants concluded that the introduction of new advanced military technologies, changes to force structures and peacetime stationing as well as new patterns of military training activities, particularly in border areas, could have destabilizing effects and potentially lead to escalatory developments. In this context, Working Group II of the third Breakout Workshop is to discuss which measures – within or beyond existing instruments – could be taken to assure that the objective of transparency of military activities is met at all times and under all circumstances.

**Topic 3**

Against the background of the current crisis in politico-military relations in the OSCE area hazardous incidents are widely regarded a serious source of instability and potential escalatory developments. Therefore, the second Breakout Workshop underlined that OSCE participating States should take measures, as a matter of priority, to reduce risks that could lead to hazardous incidents and deescalate the situation once they have occurred.

To that end, Working Group III of the third Breakout Workshop is to inquire which measures could be taken in order to prevent the occurrence of hazardous incidents, particularly in border regions and in and above international waters, and to strengthen existing instruments or promote new measures to deescalate the situation once incidents have occurred. The discussion might include but is not limited to direct military-to-military contacts, the use of the OSCE communication network, OSCE consultation mechanisms and ways to enable the dispatch of multilateral and impartial fact-finding missions.
3rd Breakout Workshop on CSBMs

Agenda

Wednesday, 18 October

Ice-Breaker

» Amb Florian Raunig, Representative CiO, Austria
» Representative MoD, Austria
» Werner Fasslabend, President of AIES
» Alain Déletroz, Executive in Residence, GCSP

Thursday, 19 October

Welcome Remarks

» Amb Clemens Koja, Representative CiO, Austria
» Amb Roksanda Nincic, FSC Chair, Serbia
» Amb Thomas Greminger, Secretary General, OSCE

Opening Session/Introduction

» BG Reinhard Trischak, Head of Military Policy Division, Austria
» Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter, Researcher Int’l Security, Germany


» BG Reinhard Trischak, Head of Military Policy Division, Austria
» BG Giuseppe Gimondo, Senior Military Adviser, Italy
» Col (GS) Hans Lüber, FSC coordinator for the VD

Session II

Topic 1: Enhanced Transparency regarding Information Exchange Instruments

» Col Axel Schneider, Bundeswehr Verification Centre, Germany
» Lt Col Péter Benei, Deputy Head of Military Advisory Group, Hungary

Topic 2: Enhanced Transparency regarding Military Activities

» Edward Read, Foreign Office/MoD Joint unit on Euro-Atlantic Security Policy, United Kingdom
Agenda

» William Alberque, Director of the Arms Control, Disarmament and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre, NATO

**Topic 3: Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms**

» Col Johan Huovinen, Military Adviser, Sweden
» Robin Mossinkoff, Senior FSC Support Officer, OSCE
» Robert Ierubino, Senior Communications Network Officer, OSCE

**Friday, 20 October**

**Closing session – the way ahead**

» Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter, Researcher Int’l Security, Germany
» BG Reinhard Trischak, Head of Military Policy Division, Austria
Opening Session / Introduction

Col (ret.) Wolfgang Richter
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP); Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES)

The first and second Breakout Workshops on CSBMs were held in Vienna on 1-3 March and 12-13 June on the initiative of the Austrian OSCE Chair 2017. Both Workshops inquired to what extent the Vienna Document 2011 reflects new security challenges and uncertainties in its area of application and where it needs to be revised in order to keep relevance. Participants referred to political developments, military interventions and protracted conflicts, new military doctrines and changing force postures, the fielding of advanced weapon systems and new patterns of military activities. In sum, the discussions revealed a profound lack of trust. While not neglecting associated political problems, both workshops focused on conceptual and technical issues. In particular, they dealt with those areas of the VD 11 that were deemed to be in need of modernization and, once common ground has been found, how this could be done if and when an improved political atmosphere allows P&S to move forward.

The workshops confirmed that both responding to risk perceptions and implementing agreed principles require full transparency of current force structures and military activities, predictability of the development of military capabilities and promoting confidence building and security cooperation with a view to creating a common and undivided OSCE security space. Rather than evaluating political intentions behind military developments the rationale for CSBMs should flow from a sober assessment of current and evolving military potentials and capabilities. Therefore, CSBMs should aim at preventing surprises and arms races, ensuring fact based decision making, particularly in crises, and reflecting modern technologies and force postures, including qualitative aspects.

The first Breakout Workshop dealt with

(1) The scope of forces subject to the VD
Based on the findings of the first workshop, participants of the second Breakout Workshop focused on three selected areas of CSBMs contained in the Vienna Document which were identified worth of exploring in more depth:

I. Reflection of force postures and certain military activities
II. Relevance of adapting the scope of forces and its impact on information and verification
III. Strengthening risk reduction mechanisms

Let me now try to reflect what has been discussed:

I. Reflection of force postures and certain military activities

There was a broad discussion about truly reflecting current force postures (personnel, equipment, capabilities, and locations) in order to provide a solid basis for further deliberations on CSBMs and conventional arms control. Participants considered which criteria were relevant for assessing force postures including quantitative and qualitative elements of assets as well as doctrines, training, leadership skills, command, control and communication, logistics, intelligence, mobility, preparedness, reactivity, and the political intentions behind a force build-up.

A number of participants expressed the view that CSBMs should reflect qualitative aspects and synergetic effects of force multipliers or net-based operations. However, the discussion also made clear that a large portion of qualitative criteria escape suitable scales for objective evaluation which meaningful verification or limitations could build on. So, creative thinking was required to develop qualitative CSBMs. Furthermore, it was also acknowledged that such new elements cannot replace firepower at the end of the command and control chain. For high intensity conflicts traditional Major Weapon and Equipment Systems (MWES) still play a crucial role and current defence plans aim at increasing their numbers while investing in force multipliers in
parallel. In consequence, concepts for modernizing the Vienna Document need to envisage realistic ideas how new or enhanced military capabilities can be reflected by extending its scope.

Regarding the role of national intelligence as opposed to CSBMs, it was mentioned that the purpose of cooperative CSBMs is to place assessments and discussions in multilateral fora on a common factual basis which evolves from mutual information and rule-based verification.

Since any national assessment of force postures of other states contains elements of subjective threat perceptions it became also clear that the existence of security cannot be defined in absolute terms but to a large extent remains a question of perception. That applies certainly on political intentions behind force postures. While they can be misjudged and change in a short period of time, transparent and restrained military capabilities could limit political ambitions and provide a clear picture of available military options. In order to alleviate mutual concerns, in a multilateral setting a compromise should be aimed at which takes into account threat perceptions and security interests of all participants and provides for utmost restraint on the basis of reciprocity and accountability. To that end, quantifiable measures will be needed.

In the panel discussions, snap exercises were addressed which caused concerns:

(1) The questions under which conditions formations and units can build up operational capabilities for cross-border operations and how the VD should reflect such options (e.g. scope, geography, and thresholds) remained open and might need further examination.

(2) In this context, the discussion on whether stationing of combat forces close to international borders and areas in crisis require more intrusive information and verification measures remained also inconclusive. Some participants were of the view that in light of modern air mobility distances to borderlines are no significant obstacles for offensive cross-border operations. Others underlined, that air mobility alone has limited capacity to shift heavy equipment and build-up
logistics over large distances which would be needed to sustain large-scale offensive operations. Thus, the build-up of logistics in frontline positions would be a warning signal to be reflected by new CSBMs.

(3) The argument was made that in-garrison activities which are conducted in peacetime locations and do not concentrate combat-ready formations in assembly areas close to border regions are not relevant for early warning against potential cross-border operations. Consequently, the VD should distinguish between these two options and concentrate information on operational activities in border regions to alleviate concerns.

(4) On the question whether military exercises in the vicinity of border regions and areas in crisis need to be covered by special VD rules including notification, observation and limitation (threshold numbers, duration) the point was made that militarily meaningful geographical restraints were not feasible due to geographical disparities of countries. While such limitations would cover only a portion of big countries they could apply on the whole territory of others. Thus, reciprocity could not be assured.

On the other hand, while geographical disparities exist, in the past CSBM and arms control instruments found ways to cope with such problems, inter alia, by defining reciprocal depths of geographical zones with collective ceilings, by territorial ceilings for every participating state (respectively CFE State Party) or by voluntary regional measures contained in VD chapter X. It expressively recommends special measures in border areas. The question is what States deem politically feasible and militarily meaningful.

(5) The question whether military exercises far away from international borders or areas in crisis require special attention if combined with assets providing operational and strategic mobility was answered positively. However, there was no unanimous view in which way the VD should take this into account.
II. Relevance of adapting the scope of forces and its impact on information and verification

Like the Breakout Workshop 1 also the second workshop concluded that modern force capabilities and force structures have changed significantly since the inception of the VD but are not sufficiently represented in its current scope. Participants were aware, however, that any changes that would increase the number of notifiable units would have an effect on other chapters of the VD, e.g. raising the quota for evaluation visits and pushing the number of personnel engaged in certain military activities above thresholds for notification and observation.

Against this background, one panel took an in-depth look into certain areas indicated in the findings of the first Breakout Workshop with a view to widening the VD scope, *inter alia*

(1) command, control, communication (CCC) and logistic units;
(2) air and sea mobility;
(3) long-range precise strike potentials (e.g. ALCM, SLCM, SRBM) which might require enlarging the VD Area of Application or clarifying the term “adjoining sea areas”;
(4) new Major Weapon and Equipment Systems (MWES) such as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV, “combat drones”);
(5) modern air defence potentials providing for extended anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) and missile defence capabilities;
(6) multilateral cooperation units which provide for enlarged potentials, synergetic effects and enhanced capabilities.

Given the operational (or even strategic) impact of such capabilities no reservation was voiced against their inclusions in the scope of the VD and many speakers expressed strong support for respective changes. A number of participants also suggested redefining formations of land forces (so far armies, corps, divisions) to include brigades, and combat units (so far brigades, regiments) to cover also battalions in order to reflect improved capabilities at lower levels.

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A LCM Air-launched Cruise Missiles; SLCM Sea-launched Cruise Missiles; SRBM Short-range Ballistic Missiles
Similar to the previous discussion, the panel recognized the difficulties for CSBMs to account for Electronic Warfare, cyber operations and net-centric warfare capabilities which are connected to satellite-based reconnaissance, positioning and communications, advanced sensors and modern computer software. Although such capabilities tend to elude traditional transparency and verification, they were not regarded entirely unsuitable to be dealt with by CSBMs. To that end, visits to higher echelon headquarters or MoDs were encouraged to regularly exchange information on such capabilities and associated doctrines.

III. Strengthening risk reduction mechanisms

Strengthening risk reduction mechanisms was regarded a matter of urgency given the volatile political and military environment. One panel considered the question how the VD tools for clarifying unusual military activities that give reason for concerns could be enhanced. To that end, the following concrete proposals were discussed:

(1) The view was expressed that the procedures for consultations about unusual military activities (chapter III, no. 16) need to be improved to encourage participation in good faith of all PS concerned. It was mentioned that in order to ensure a focused, productive discussion with a view to de-escalation and dispelling concerns also the results of other verification instruments such as the Open Skies Treaty, CFE-Treaty or special OSCE missions should be taken into account.

(2) The panel also discussed the requirements, opportunities and limits of voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities in accordance with VD chapter III, no. 18. It inquired whether adaptations of chapter III could contribute to strengthening OSCE capabilities to dispatch impartial fact finding missions on short notice once sufficient indications of an emerging crisis and host nation consent are available.

A concrete proposal focused on the appointment of a Special Representative for risk reduction, keeping a personnel roster of experts in the CPC, defining more clearly consultation obligations in the FSC/PC, reports by a Special Representative on unusual military activities and, in context with para 18, impartial on-site inspections by the OSCE.
To ensure legitimacy, such fact finding missions should be based on host nation consent as a minimum requirement and be subject to clear rules as to observation procedures. In contrast, any ideas of enforcement of fact-finding missions were regarded unfeasible.

(3) The first breakout workshop had already found that the term “unusual military activities” needs to be clarified as to their scope, location, timing, direction of operations or consistency with plans provided through VD information and notification. The second workshop did not address this issue again.

(4) Hazardous incidents were regarded a particularly urgent issue the OSCE pS should deal with given their potentially escalatory implications and the high number of incidents, particularly in and above international waters. The view was expressed that the use of VD procedures for handling hazardous incidents (chapter III, no. 17) so far was less than satisfying. Participants discussed inconclusively whether that was due to a lack of awareness, of political will or simply because multilateral instruments are not suited for the necessary quick reaction. Current provisions to “manage” incidents were assessed too weak. Concrete proposals were made as to shortening deadlines for responses, information gathering by the CPC, and dispatching impartial fact-finding missions.

Furthermore, it was felt that the OSCE could focus on preventive measures rather than trying to “manage” incidents that had happened. Harmonizing international flight procedures and rules of engagement could be considered. To increase quick reaction, the need to establish military-to-military contacts was stressed and the use of the OSCE communication network encouraged. The use of VD Chapter X Regional Measures might be another venue to tackle the problem.

Since most of the incidents take place in or above international waters, the question was discussed whether a clearer definition of the VD area of application, in particular, the term “adjoining sea areas” (Annex I) could help to make para 17 more relevant.
(5) Finally, the point was made that the use of an inter-state agreement such as the Vienna Document cannot be applied in internal conflicts in which non-state actors are involved. In such cases, a status-neutral approach might be advised which is tailor-made for every particular conflict area and linked to ceasefire agreements or particular Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRM). However, one could look into the possibility of anchoring in VD provisions general verification procedures for special OSCE monitoring missions which deal with internal and protracted conflicts.

**General Remarks**

Referring to the difficult political context, the point was made that the development of viable CSBM concepts needs to be done in advance and by military experts so that the OSCE community can react quickly if and when the time is ripe and the political will has developed to improve the security and military stability in Europe. To that end, a systematic and structured analysis is needed which also takes into account qualitative aspects.

As a matter of priority, the need to reduce risks and deescalate hazardous incidents was underlined. To that end, also a multilateral instrument such as VD chapter III para 17 merits further development and use. However, since most incidents take place in or above international waters a clearer definition of the VD term “adjoining sea areas” or enlarging the VD area of application to include European littoral seas might be required.

Since there was a sense of urgency attached to avoiding and deescalating hazardous incidents and risk reduction and in light of the current blockade of the VD modernization process the proposal was made to deal with such issues by establishing a stand-alone provision and, to that end, work towards a Ministerial Council decision.

Finally, it was mentioned that a parallel approach towards modernizing the VD and reinvigorating conventional arms control would be helpful to overcome political blockades. Against this backdrop, the point was made that the OSCE Structured Dialogue and the expert discussion on
VD CSBMs were complementary and have a mutually reinforcing potential.

In light of the findings of previous Breakout Workshops, and having in mind the current political difficulties to adapt the Vienna Document, the third Breakout Workshop intents to take a deeper look into four areas that might be feasible to promote military stability in the OSCE area:

1. Enhancing Military-to-Military Dialogue through establishing military-to-military contacts on a more frequent basis that might consider all issues of relevance to promote military stability and predictability
2. Enhancing Transparency regarding (complementary) Information Exchange Instruments, *inter alia*, the Global Exchange of Information or relevant FSC decisions
3. Enhancing Transparency regarding Military Activities taking into account potential measures also beyond VD chapter V and VI provisions, *inter alia*, relevant FSC decisions, regional and voluntary measures
4. Preventing incidents and reducing risks of military escalation taking into account proposals made during previous workshops on enhancing military-to-military contacts, multilateralizing rules of engagement, use of the OSCE communication network, OSCE consultation mechanisms, dispatching impartial OSCE fact finding missions, as well as restraint in and utmost transparency of conducting large-scale exercises, particularly in border areas, including at and above High Sea.

BG Reinhard Trischak
Head of Military Policy Division of the Austrian MoD

Dear Colleagues,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am very pleased to speak to you in the course of this session “Way ahead: Enhancing Military-to-military Dialogue” and I am happy to address this subject together with my esteemed colleagues from Italy and Switzerland. It is my intention to deliver insights and thoughts on military-to-military contacts, which have been identified as key findings during the Austrian Chairmanships events in the political-military dimension. Further I would also use this opportunity to share with you our ideas in that regard, not least in light of the upcoming Ministerial Council this December.

We all know by now that the project of a comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security, lying at the heart of OSCE’s endeavours, is severely hampered. This became very evident in the course of discussions among 57 participating States and at the Austrian Chairmanships events this year, such as the Intersessional OSCE Dialogue on Military Doctrines, as well as during discussions of the Informal Working Group Structured Dialogue.

In the last years we witnessed the return of classical conventional military threats, which we thought to have overcome for the most part in the OSCE area. In our discussions we identified numerous challenges ranging from changes in force postures, complex military activities in border regions or hazardous incidents, just to name a few. Taking into account all these factors, we may come to the conclusion that the current situation resembles what is often called a “security dilemma”. When trust is low, activities which are intended to have a defensive character might be perceived as offensive by concerned states – we have observed this trend quite often in recent times. An action–reaction
pattern leading to an arms race or worrisome force postures can be the direct results of this loss of trust.

We may differ about the time when the deterioration process started, what actions were decisive or who can be seen as mainly responsible, but what we all share is the conviction that the situation needs to be changed and calls for enhanced common efforts. Trust must be rebuilt among participating States in order to stop escalatory dynamics.

Although strained by the aforementioned developments, our common OSCE politico-military toolbox still offers a wide range of instruments that could be used to improve the current state of affairs. One of these highly valuable tools and mechanisms are the periodic High-level Military Doctrine Seminars as stipulated in chapter 2 of the Vienna Document. Participating States have so far met in this format usually every five years. These high level military talks were seen as vital opportunities for open and frank exchange on challenges for our common security. Furthermore, the High-level Seminars were not only used as platforms for dialogue but also as chances to create lasting contacts at a personal level between military officials.

In this regard, the 2016 High-level Military Doctrine Seminar can be seen as a good example for the added value of such encounters. High-ranking representatives of the military, including various CHODS and vice-CHODS, met and discussed emerging challenges and patterns of doctrinal changes as well as their implications for the European security architecture. Despite the dire security situation open and frank talks contributed to a better understanding of the changes introduced to military doctrines.

One key outcome of the 2016 High-level Military Doctrine Seminar was that military contacts at shorter intervals are pertinent. A reason for that assessment can be identified – and I want to quote the statement of the Austrian CHOD, General Othmar COMMENDA, made during the 2016 High-level Seminar: “In a rapidly changing security environment, politicians and the military are both faced with challenges of dealing with current threats and continuously adapting their basic guidelines, such as strategies and doctrines”. Taking this observation as a starting point, General COMMENDA raised the question “whether the interval of five years should be reconsidered and high-level military contacts and

talks planned at shorter intervals”. To put it succinctly: a constantly evolving security landscape necessitates more frequent military-to-military contacts to keep up with relevant developments in the political-military sphere.

As a consequence of this finding to convene more often in order to discuss security issues, the Netherlands in their former capacity as Chair of the FSC issued follow-up options. One of these options proposed to convene on appropriate level between the five-year periods of the High-level Seminars. Taking note of the utmost relevance of this undertaking, ministers of the participating States endorsed further military-to-military contacts in their last year’s ministerial declaration “From Lisbon to Hamburg”.

In line with this Ministerial Council declaration, Austria organised the first Intersessional OSCE Dialogue on Military Doctrines in May this year. 160 participants from 45 states as well as officials from international organisations took part in this event and had an extensive exchange on issues such as threat assessments, new threats and drivers for military doctrines.

Ladies and gentlemen,

From the Austrian point of view a key finding of this meeting was that the speed and complexity of developments in the political-military sphere is striking. That basically corroborates former analysis of the situation. But the consequences of these processes for our common security architecture still need to be assessed in a holistic manner.

What became also obvious in the course of the Intersessional Dialogue is that doctrines serve as an excellent basis for comprehensive assessments. In their intermediate function between threat perceptions and subsequent translation into force postures military doctrines cover a wide range of security relevant aspects. They provide a unique opportunity not only to discuss structural developments like technological progress or changing capabilities of armed forces but also political motives that account for evolving force postures. Concerns regarding the appraisal of intentions behind relevant actions can be addressed during an open dialogue on the basis of military doctrines.
Referring to the aforementioned point, one participant in the Intersessional Dialogue stated that this kind of meeting can be seen as a confidence and security building measure per se.

We fully share this view.

Just like the year before in the course of the High-level Military Doctrine Seminar participants in the Intersessional Dialogue valued direct face-to-face contacts and even argued for further opportunities to exchange opinions and ideas.

In that regard, we think that this positive momentum, which has been generated, needs to be preserved. The will of participating States to enter into substantive exchange as well as the exigency of promoting such encounters in order to enhance common security make it reasonable to carry on this vital process of more frequent military-to-military contacts in the future. Furthermore, this envisaged process would also reflect the renewed relevance given to intensified contacts among military representatives in other respective fora.

Due to the rapidly changing and tense security environment, such mil-to-mil meetings can provide a necessary link between the regular High-level Military Doctrine Seminars. Encounters on an annual basis seem to be an appropriate period for conducting these intersessional events. The level of participants as well as the precise thematic focus of upcoming meetings might be adjusted in a flexible way according to the most relevant security needs in times to come. As I pointed out earlier, discussions on the basis of military doctrines seem to be a reasonable way-ahead to structure military-to-military contacts over the next few years, taking into account the current security environment. A wider range of relevant political-military issues could also be considered in order to live up to dynamic changes in the future.

The results of these intersessional military-to-military contacts should not be seen as isolated findings but rather feed into evolving OSCE dialogue systematically, first and foremost the Forum for Security Cooperation, Annual Security Review Conference, and meetings within the framework of the Structured Dialogue. Moreover, the outcome of
respective meetings may be compiled for further discussions in the course of the High-level Military Doctrine Seminars. By doing so, a continuous work throughout these meetings can be ensured even in light of their five year’s interval.

To this end, the upcoming Ministerial Council could be an opportunity to endorse support for more frequent military-to-military contacts. We think that they have proven their value in the past and we firmly believe that they will be vital instruments in the future.

As stated at the outset, some features of the current security situation are deeply worrisome. It is my firm believe that together we can rebuild security and stability. Let us encounter the tendencies of a security dilemma also by more frequent military-to-military contacts for the sake of common, cooperative and indivisible security in the OSCE region.

I thank you very much.
Col (GS) Hans Lüber  
FSC-Chair’s Coordinator for the Vienna Document, Military Adviser  
Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the OSCE

Dear Chairperson, Ladies and Gentlemen, dear Colleagues

I have the privilege to address this distinguishes audience in my capacity as FSC-Chairs Coordinator for the Vienna Document. I will therefore put a certain accent on the link of the topic to the Vienna Document and its chapters and provisions.

Since the last High Level Military Doctrine Seminar in Vienna Mil-to-mil Contacts and dialogues are often brought forward as possible means to contribute to a way-out of the political deadlock of the discussions on CSBMs and Conventional Arms Control and to a reduction of risks stemming from miscalculation or misinterpretation with a potential of unwanted military escalation. So for example last week at the 4th meeting of the IWG Structures Dialogue, where the scope and potential of Mil-to-mil contacts and cooperation were assessed.

Obviously, the military representatives of participating States – even political adversaries - are considered able and cooperative interlocutors in difficult situations. This is a call for action!

What makes this particular quality?

First the military expertise: when we talk about perception of military threats, military doctrine and military force posture and when we start to map military postures and military snap- and other exercises military personnel is obviously well positioned to give a professionally sound opinion.

Second the military culture: Military education has developed over centuries and led to a particular culture, interaction and language which is in all military forces very similar: It can be characterized as respectful, calm, concise and precise, non-politicized and target oriented. Other than diplomats, the military might appear less polite and mire frank but he is certainly concentrated on the topic, which guarantees a focused and efficient discussion. Military communication and interaction are
designed to work in crisis situation, when imminent questions of life or death can be on the agenda.

**Can the military contribute to the solution of the “dead-lock” problem of CSBM debate?**

The crisis we are facing is first of all a political one. The lack of political will is deplored. The military is one of the political means of a state to exercise its monopoly of power. We see the politico-democratic control of the armed and security forces as a major achievement of the OSCE. The representative of the Netherlands said in his statement last week very correctly that Mil-to-Mil contacts must remain under political guidance. Mil-to-mil Dialogue does not operate in a vacuum. The military interlocutors are tasked to defend interest – political interest. Enhancing Mil-to-mil dialogue, we are therefore well advised to keep realistic expectations.

**How could enhanced mil-to-mil dialogue look like?**

We can distinguish mil-to-mil dialogue in regular and in crisis situation.

The regular implementation activities of participating states' verification centers and the various mil-to-mil contacts going alongside with them have created a whole network of military specialists. The potential of the accumulated knowledge of this pool of experts is impressive. Such subject-matter experts are well positioned to assess compliance issues of implementation of the CSBMs. Fora like the AIAM and the annual HoV meeting could be better used to deal with them. Enhanced mil-to-mil dialogue would contribute to a better preparation and execution of these regular OSCE-events.

But we could also develop innovative ideas: Switzerland suggested earlier this months the establishment of a distinct Working Group of the FSC as a standing body for more structured mil-to-mil contacts and in-depth discussion at expert-level - based on mutual respect - on how to reduce uncertainty and unpredictability by strengthening CSBMs. The unique setting of the OSCE, bringing together representatives of 57 participating States from Vancouver to Vladivostok could in some extend complement mil-to-mil dialogue that is stalling in other institutions. This new working group could for example use the
impressive amount of available military information we exchange on a regular basis (GEMI, AEMI etc.) in a more result-oriented and more cooperative manner. I remind you that the CPC cannot assess exchanged information in a qualitative manner. However, this new body could do this more enhanced analyses, as the Secretary General mentioned it just before. A better qualitative assessment would lead to more transparency and predictability, which are urgently needed in the present period of eroding confidence among participating States. The recently discussed mapping study of force postures and certain military activities could be a working method of such a new body. And it could contribute to the “ground work in developing CSBMs further to be ready when the political window of opportunity for consensus opens” to refer to Col. Wolfgang Richter.

Furthermore, the WD offers us a range of possibilities to enhance mil-to-mil dialogue and cooperation. I remind you here of the mil-to-mil contact- and cooperation offered by chapter IV of the VD, in particular paras 30.1 and following. Switzerland is exploring the possibility to host next year a mil-to-mil symposium according to para 30.1.7 VD hosted by Switzerland on the topic of doctrinal developments.

Not only chapter IV bears the potential for enhanced mil-to-mil dialogue and cooperation. I invite participating States to further utilize the regional measures offered by chapter X to increase transparency and confidence. Such measures can complement existing CSBMs or arms control agreements.

In crisis situation mil-to-mil contacts, ad hoc or institutionalized, are crucial to prevent incidents or escalation due to misperceptions or miscalculation. Enhanced mil-to-mil communication can contribute to close perception-gaps – or “lift the fog of perception” to speak with the Secretary Generals words - and lower risks. The bilaterally concluded agreements are complementary to multilateral and regional risk reduction measures as offered by VD chapters III and X. However, the recent history has shown us that we need a lessons learned process to assess the effectivity of the VD risk reduction toolbox and probably modifications and modernization of the said tools and means. Enhanced mil-to-mil dialogue is again required to do so. Hot Lines or
similar means of communication are the result of enhanced mil-to-mil contacts and not their cause.

To conclude, I want to underline that enhanced mil-to-mil dialogue is useful on all levels: strategic, operational and tactical ones. Each level addresses particular topics, which have their specific influence on predictability and transparency. I am looking forward to the syndicate discussions this afternoon developing this further.

Thank you very much for your attention.
**Topic 1: Enhanced Transparency regarding Information Exchange Instruments**

**Lt Col Péter Benei**
Assistant Military Advisor at the Permanent Mission of Hungary to the UN, OSCE and other International Organisations in Vienna

This presentation’s aim is to provide an overview of the main information exchange regimes in the OSCE area, highlighting the differences and identifying some gaps, and to go into more details about the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI) with an outlook to its modernisation possibilities. My intention is to establish a basis for the audience, to provide them with some food for thought for the discussions later on.

**Threat perception**

One of the results of the 1st Informal Working Group on the Structured
Dialogue was the establishment of clusters of the factors contributing to the participating States’ (pS) threat perception. Out of the four clusters identified, the third deals with politico-military issues (see the details on the slide). The information exchange regimes available to the pS can provide answers or at least some information to many of these issues.

**Information exchange table**

Before going into details about the comparison of the exchanges, I wanted to illustrate the available and provided information in the OSCE area. One may observe that more than half of the pS with exchanges share detailed information (both VD 2011 and CFE), while some pS do the same on a regional basis (“Dayton” exchanges). Kazakhstan is striped, because only its European territory is covered by the CFE exchange. The Russian Federation is represented with gradient colours because it suspended the implementation of the CFE Treaty’s obligations, but used to do it before 2007. All this is important to see when we discuss about the availability and comparison of all data.
Information exchange comparison 1

On the next four slides I have compared the available information from the CFE Treaty, the VD 2011, the GEMI and where possible, from the SALW/UNROCA. These are the main sources of information shared and available to most of the pS. The first slide shows the information available on the structure of the conventional armed forces. The most detailed information is available from the CFE exchange going down to independent battalion level. The VD 2011 exchange is less detailed, going down to only regiment or equivalent level, but only for the so-called combat units! The GEMI provides information only down to formation level, but does it at a global scale, not just the OSCE area.
Information exchange comparison 2

The next slide shows what branches of the conventional armed forces are included in the different exchanges. The list is far from being complete and serves just as an illustration. Once again, the most detailed information is available from the CFE exchange’s Chart one – but only if that branch is represented by at least an independent battalion. The VD 2011 exchange is restricted to the land and air combat units defined by the Document. The GEMI provides information again on formations, so in theory not just the combat formations can be represented, but others, such as Air Defence too.
Information exchange comparison 3

The following slide shows what Major Weapon and Equipment Systems (MWES) are included in the different exchanges. This time, the least detailed information is available from the CFE exchange, covering only the five main limited categories, plus the AVLBs and the so-called look-alikes. The VD 2011 exchange adds the category of anti-tank weapons mounted on an ACV chassis, but still, only for the combat units. The GEMI provides the widest range of aggregate information (detailed at formation level), expanding it with primary trainer aircraft, military transport aircraft, warships and submarines. Once again, all this on a global scale! The SALW and UNROCA exchanges provide us with some aggregate information on MANPADS and other missile systems.
Information exchange comparison 4

The following slide shows what other information, especially relevant to the threat perception topic is available. I have included here the information related to doctrines, training, budget, location, new MWES, and foreign missions. The CFE exchange provides detailed information on the location of the units, and through the notification system on the new MWES and the peace-support missions as well (TLE outside of the Zone of Application). In this cluster, the VD 2011 exchange provides the most information, from a certain point of view. The annual exchange gives us some information of the location of the combat units. The Defence Planning is a rich source of detailed information on the doctrines, training (with extra information provided in accordance with Chapters V-VIII on different level of exercises), budgetary matters and missions abroad. The Document also requires information on and demonstration of new MWES. The GEMI also provides information on new MWES and more detailed information on missions abroad.
What is missing? Conclusions

As it was mentioned earlier, a wide range of information is available to the pS, but not to all. The information is mainly qualitative and is partially verifiable through the inspection regimes. The information on some type of units – mainly combat support and combat service support units – is missing, as is the representation of new categories of MWES.

Update…?

In order to fill in the identified gaps first of all we need the political will of all pS. Is it possible to update the different regimes? Concerning the CFE Treaty, we can say that we tried in 1999, but the Adapted CFE Treaty never came into force, so no possibility there. There are many proposals to modernise the VD 2011, but the lack of political will stalls the progress. What about the GEMI? The GEMI came to life as a result of the 1992 Helsinki Summit that initiated the Programme for Immediate Action. One of the programmes called for additional and global information exchange on the conventional armed forces, without any limitation or verification possibilities. During the next eight slides I
illustrated the current GEMI exchange with some possibilities for the modernisation.

Chart 2 (information on command organisation) is the first where any extra information could be inserted, but only if we include not only the formations, but maybe lower, even battalion level units. Chart 3 contains information on the personnel. Currently it involves data on personnel serving under UN or OSCE mandate: could we include other missions as well? Chart 4 deals with aggregate number of MWES: could we expand the chart with new technologies? Chart 5-6 deal also with MWES at the services’ formations: could we go to lower levels and expand the MWES categories? The expanded MWES categories could be also represented in Charts 7-8. Of course, these are just examples. The valid question remains: how to update the GEMI? First of all, we need the political will to reach the consensus at a Ministerial Council meeting or maybe at a new Summit (as it was the case in 1992). If we have this, we could expand, modify the original GEMI (there is nothing against it), or we could create a GEMI 2 or GEMI Plus exchange covering the extra information deemed important, necessary and useful by all pS. An extreme option is to create something completely new...
### Chart 2: Information on the Command Organization of the Conventional Armed Forces, Provided in Accordance with Paragraph 2.2 and 4.1 of the Document on Global Exchange of Military Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line No.</th>
<th>Designation of formation</th>
<th>First level of Subordination</th>
<th>Normal permanent location of headquarters specifying the exact geographic terms and/or co-ordinates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1.1</td>
<td>JOINT FORCES COMMAND (JFC)</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>ALDERAN 42°17'20” N 01°22'50” E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*First higher echelon

**UPDATE...?**

Include also unit (down to bn level) info...???

### Chart 3: Information on Total Personnel of Conventional Armed Forces, Provided in Accordance with Paragraph 2.3.3 of the Document on Global Exchange of Military Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total authorized conscripts</th>
<th>Total authorized professional officers/enlisted</th>
<th>Total personnel on active duty by rank*</th>
<th>Total personnel in reserve status who have completed their initial military service or training and who have been called up or have reported voluntarily for military service or training since the last exchange of information</th>
<th>Total military personnel serving under the command of the United Nations or under a mandate of the OSCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>(e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Generals and equivalents</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Colonels and equivalents</td>
<td>290</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lieutenant Colonels and equivalents</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Majors and equivalents</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lieutenants and equivalents</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. First Lieutenants and equivalents</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Lieutenants and equivalents</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Filled in with due account to national practice

**UPDATE...?**

Include other missions...?
Topic 1: Enhanced Transparency regarding Information Exchange Instruments

### Chart 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>3.1</th>
<th>3.2</th>
<th>3.3</th>
<th>3.4</th>
<th>3.5</th>
<th>3.6</th>
<th>3.7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-propelled and</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>towed artillery (305</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mm caliber or larger)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Include new MWES: LAL, UAV, SRBM, ALCM, SLCM, ...

### Chart 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line No.</th>
<th>Designation of formation</th>
<th>Line of battle personnel strength</th>
<th>ACV</th>
<th>AFV</th>
<th>NACV</th>
<th>Self-propelled and towed artillery (305 mm caliber or larger)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Include also formation and/or unit (down to bn lvl) info with extended MWES...???
Include also formation and/or unit (down to bn lvl) info with extended MWES...???

Include info on unit level plus extended info on M W E S...???
Include info on extended MWES...???
Topic 2: Enhanced Transparency regarding Military Activities

Edward Read
United Kingdom Foreign Office/MoD Joint unit on Euro-Atlantic Security Policy

Introduction and scope

Dear colleagues.

I am honoured to be invited by our Austrian hosts to speak to you today about how we can enhance the transparency of military activities. In an increasingly complex global security environment, seeking to enhance transparency could add a very useful tool to supplement traditional diplomacy. It could aid in avoiding misunderstanding, miscalculation, and unintended escalation, and increase predictability. The size of the military exercises that we’ve seen across multiple States over the last few months shows the relevance and timeliness of this discussion.

The guidance I was presented with for this session highlighted how, since their inception, OSCE Confidence- and Security-Building Measures have aimed at transparency of large-scale exercises to build confidence that they are not intended to be used for preparing cross-border offensive operations.

However, I understand that during the two previous breakout workshops participants concluded that the introduction of new advanced military technologies, changes to force structures and peacetime stationing as well as new patterns of military training activities, particularly in border areas, means that there may be a requirement for us to re-examine the tools that we have to ensure that they can help address States’ current security concerns.

Over the next ten minutes, I’d like to explore this issue in a more fundamental way. I’d like to briefly explore why we think enhancing military transparency is important and what we are trying to achieve.
Then I will discuss the ways that military transparency supports this goal and some of the principles that might need to be in place for it to be successful. And finally, to the main focus of this workshop, the mechanisms that exist – or should exist – to support our goal. In true military fashion, I’ve structured this as the Ends, Ways, and Means. The presentation that I’m about to deliver does not represent national policy or a UK position. It is instead designed with this workshop in mind: to facilitate debate and discussion on this important issue.

The End

So first to the End: Why is this important to us? And what are we trying to achieve? I would hope that here we share a common understanding: military transparency done well can contribute directly to Euro-Atlantic Security.

Academics argue that it can help increase regional stability: as there is less chance of a strategic shock if States understand the military context that they operate in and can make informed decisions based on that information.

There is also a lower likelihood of conflict: as military encounters may be averted through advanced notice of military activity and an exploration of differing threat perceptions of military activity before a situation escalates.

But in the event that an unintended conflict does occur then transparency has the potential to reduce the damage as the channels of communication and trust generated through this activity may be able to resolve a crisis quicker than would be possible if we had not done this work during times of stability.

Transparency of military activity can also promote the responsible use of arms. It provides an opportunity to exchange views on activities, on operations, exercises, and on doctrine. Through these discussions, we can establish the accepted international norms of behaviour. And have the opportunity to discuss occurrences when States deviate from these positions. Collectively seeking to articulate what military activity we find mutually acceptable and where concerns exist, so that we can take the necessary actions to adjust and correct accordingly.
Finally, and as demonstrated by today’s workshop, military transparency provides an avenue for dialogue. It provides forums for politicians, diplomats, and military and civilian experts to gather to exchange information related to their security. Done correctly this also provides an opportunity to build relationships, increase understanding, and correct misconceptions.

**The Way**

Turning to the way in which enhancing transparency of military activity achieves these aims. I pick out five key themes that emerge from the discussion thus far. Enhancing transparency can help to increase understanding, correct misconceptions, provide avenues for dialogue, build relationships and help to prevent shocks to the Euro-Atlantic Security system.

But for this to be successful, there are a number of key principles that must be incorporated within any transparency architecture.

First of all, transparency must be based on a shared interest. For an exchange to be valuable, all participants must want to be transparent about their military activity and agree that it is in their interests to be so. Without this political and military will, then no matter how good the transparency regime looks on paper it will not deliver confidence or security.

Second, there must be an element of reciprocity. This may not necessarily be symmetrical reciprocity, if both sides do not share exactly the same perception of threat. But both sides must consider that they get something from the exchange. If this is not the case, then it is likely that any transparency measure will fail as one participant will likely feel aggrieved for giving something but getting nothing in return, with a likely corresponding lack of will or commitment.

Third, it must be based on honesty. The information provided on military activities must accurately reflect what is happening in the real world, otherwise people will not trust the provided data and it will be worse than useless. Worse than useless because inaccurate data rather than building trust introduces an area of doubt: was the mistake deliberate or accidental? If deliberate, what is the other party trying to
hide? Or what are they about to do? Participants must be willing to give an explanation for any discrepancy. Deeds must match words.

Fourthly, the transparency must be in accordance with international laws and obligations. I think this point should be obvious, but we must, of course, ensure that any transparency arrangement is in keeping with the principles of international law and consistent and coherent with existing treaties and agreements.

And finally, I would argue that successful transparency must still consider the third parties in a region, who may not be part of the agreement. You should not be giving away information that does not relate to your military and which through divulging it you may be harming a neutral State’s security.

**The Means**

So lofty ambitions: but with much to gain if successfully delivered. To understand how this transparency may be delivered and what it could look like in practice, I suggest that we conduct a quick review of the specific means of military-to-military communication that we have available to us.
The diagram presents some of the channels that we have available to us to enable transparency about military activities. Some of these are existing tools that are operating either in the OSCE or bilaterally between States. Others may be new. I do not contend that this is a complete list and I hope that in our discussion later that we’re able to collectively add some more ideas to the chart.

So what have we got so far? I’ve grouped the tools roughly under the objectives that they can contribute towards, but I acknowledge that most of these can deliver more than one effect and that there will likely be spill over between the categories.

To prevent surprises and shocks to the system it makes sense to notify others in advance of large scale military activity that is due to take place and to provide details of it. The Vienna Document provides us with a framework to do this but, as we have seen in a number of the modernisation proposals put forward, it needs updating to reflect the more modern military employment in terms of thresholds. I also believe that a public notification in a set format only provides a limited perspective on the activity. For this reason, I commend those participating States that have conducted voluntary briefings on their exercises in the OSCE this year. Having the chance to hear more detail about an exercise and provides a valuable opportunity to understand the intent and detail of a particular activity – and therefore potentially be more forgiving of it when you see it occurring later in the year. But there may be room to expanding the scope of these sessions further to provide a forum for other participating States to ask questions about the activity being presented, rather than just being presentations, to further enhance their value.

Military activity does not exist in a vacuum however, and so we need to increase our understanding of the context that it is operating within. Here the OSCE has a number of existing tools that can aid this challenge. We exchange information not only on forces but also on policy. The OSCE runs a number of security dialogues, which can be used to provide a more in-depth discussion on specific areas of security concern. And they hold a number of military seminars, including the doctrine seminar that we talked about earlier today. This sharing of doctrine is important. Having open, accessible, information on your
approach as contained within doctrine can help people understand why you are conducting certain military activity thereby potentially preventing accidental escalation caused by people misinterpreting actions that you may consider routine. And by having them in a seminar format, military experts get the chance to explore these issues face to face and then relay the messages directly back into the political and military decision making systems. These doctrine seminars are a good start but I challenge you to consider how we could improve on them? Should we be considering more ‘expert’ level events on particular issues of common security concern to keep the communication going in between the five-yearly events?

This sharing of information goes some way to potentially correct misconceptions that States may have about each other’s activity. But in the event of a misunderstanding developing we need ways of providing sufficient transparency to correct this perception before it goes too far. This is where the chance to urgently ask questions is important. As long as you get an honest, full, answer that is. To be able to ask these questions we need transparency mechanisms that facilitate this type of dialogue. Bilateral hotlines provide one way of direct communication to help achieve this. The OSCE to a certain extent offers another. It does this through the FSC – though I think few would argue that there is room for improvement here - and the Vienna Document risk reduction and observation mechanisms.

All of these are about having avenues for dialogue and building relationships that allow you to trust your counterpart when the security situation is not as ideal as you might like. Agreeing to regular military-to-military contact and meetings at the correct levels therefore, while not a formal military transparency mechanism, do help enhance transparency about military activity through providing the chance to exchange information that you think is relevant to the other or to challenge activity that concerns you.

And finally, I highlight the role that the established verification mechanisms can contribute to transparency of military activities: we are all familiar with the provisions for inspection, evaluation and observation under the Vienna Document, as well as the transparency benefits that we can derive from Open Skies. In my view, the efforts that
are currently ongoing within the FSC and OSCC to modernise these instruments, and ensure that they address participating States' concerns, is critical. The work ongoing on thresholds and risk reduction (under chapter 3) would directly help to address the topic that we are discussing today. And we have also seen new proposals for State neutral mechanisms that would further enhance military transparency. Voluntary transparency, while welcome, is no substitute for the safety net provided by the mandatory transparency available under these instruments. We should all feel obligated to fully implement the letter and spirit of these vital military transparency mechanisms.

Based on this analysis, I believe there is scope for us all to communicate better in some very practical ways. Our goal should be to develop the means to allow dialogue to occur, for questions or clarifications to be asked and answered and for any misunderstandings to be addressed and resolved quickly before they turn into bigger problems. It could be as simple as an explanation of a word in a statement of speech. Building these relationships should be a steady-state activity; they would not necessarily be used only in crisis situations or just when large scale military activity is planned.

**Conclusions and areas for discussion**

So the initial question posed by our hosts asked whether the introduction of new advanced military technologies, changes to force structures and peacetime stationing, and new patterns of military training activities, particularly in border areas, requires us to re-examine the tools that we have to ensure that they can help address States' current security concerns. I think it does. However, it is only one element of the challenge. There are multiple ways of enhancing military transparency, not just through the instruments we already have. If we can agree an expanded toolbox – or a robust framework – for the transparency of military activity then it will not only help us address these issues but also contribute to the wider Euro-Atlantic security architecture and provide us with the ability to address new challenges as they arise.

Transparency of military activities is a key way of helping to ensure Euro-Atlantic security through enhancing predictability and reducing
the risk of military miscalculation. It can help to prevent problems from developing and to resolve them should they arise. But because of this broad remit, it cannot be delivered through any one tool alone. There are multiple methods available to us and we should be looking to make best use of all of them. And because of its unique construct, there is definitely a continuing role for the OSCE to assist us all.

I leave you with four questions for discussion in this afternoon’s breakout session:

- Do you agree with the aim of military transparency that I have outlined and the principles that need to be followed?
- What tools exist to allow us to achieve this aim?
- Where can we improve the existing mechanisms?
- What more could we do within the OSCE?

Thank you for your time and I look forward to discussing this with you during the rest of the workshop.
Good morning everyone. Thanks to the Austrian Chairman-in-Office for inviting me back to Vienna. It is always a great pleasure and honor such a room full of distinguished colleagues from the OSCE participating States.

And thank you to Ed for giving us an excellent overview of the need for – the reasons for military transparency in the OSCE context. I intend to delve a little bit deeper into the question during my brief presentation. Of course, the session is intended to cover: “new patterns of military training activities but would also consider the fielding and stationing of advanced military technologies as well as changes to force structures.”

It covers a series of questions, including:

- Which kind of military activities below the threshold of notification raise concerns and what could be undertaken to ease those concerns?
- What kind of newly created units, structures and basis not subject to current CSBM instruments should be notified and when, especially taking into account stated timelines and the scope of force?
- Should existing thresholds to notify or observe military activities be lowered or should the threshold be lowered only for a specific kind of military exercises?
- What kind of transparency measures could be established to accommodate concerns when conducting military activities or stationing military deployments in the immediate vicinity of borders or crisis areas?

However, I think it is worth challenging the assumptions behind these questions and answer more directly: what are we seeing in terms of forces and exercises across the Zone of Application, and is the Vienna Document capturing that information accurately in a way that facilitates dialogue which can lead to decreased risk of conflict and increased trust, peace and stability?
I had the privilege of addressing the March Breakout Workshop on CSBM, where Robin Mossinkoff of the OSCE and I gave a presentation together, about Prior Notification and Observation of Military Activities. I'll note that in our briefing, we were able to demonstrate that OSCE notifications were providing a great deal of information about exercises, but that a great deal of information was missing, and that observation thresholds had not captured a single Russian exercise since the Cold War.

So, today let me start by recapping what the Vienna Document currently provides regarding transparency over certain military activities.

Okay, so I hope we all know exactly what the requirements are for transparency contained in the VD. First, under Chapter V, Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities, we have the requirements to notify on the annual calendar, and 42 days in advance, any single activity, single operational command/land, air, naval components, of 9,000 troops, 250 MBTs, 500 ACVs, 250 ARTY, or air forces with 200 sorties, excluding helicopters, or 3,000 amphibious/heliborne/parachute assault troops, or if they are engaged in a transfer in the Zone of Application. And then the Chapter VI, Observation of Certain Military Activities, with a single activity, single operational command/land, air, naval components of 13,000 troops, 300 MBTS, 500 ACVS, 250 ARTY, or air forces of 250 sorties, excluding helicopters, or amphibious/heliborne/parachute assault troops of 3,500, with modalities conformed to Annex IV. All of the foregoing with the “Snap Exercise” Loophole: if the exercise is conducted without advance notice to the troops involved – no requirement for 42 days in advance, and notification at the moment the troops are informed, and no observation if it drops below 13,000 troops before 72 hours elapsed. And nations must notify at least one military activity per year, even if it is below threshold (per the Russian proposal).

The thresholds have evolved over time, and there is a long track record of compliance back from 1975 to 1986 (for the Helsinki Final Act notification regime), and 1987-1990 (for the Stockholm Document), with a huge drop-off in activity coincident with the lower thresholds of the Vienna Document 1990 due to the end of the Cold War and the
focus on counter-terror in the early 2000s. Now, we have a return to larger-scale activity, meaning we have a return to mandatory observations of activity. Note that there have been no Russian mandatory observations of exercises since the Cold War – an unbroken streak of 27 years. But exercise activity has increased year on year since 2008. The scale of activities shows very large scale Russian exercises – all self-exempted from observation for various reasons. NATO Allies, in the meantime, are declaring even very small exercises, far below the notification threshold, both because of the one-activity-per PS requirement, as well as just higher levels of transparency overall.

But are there “new forces and new military structures” that were not previously foreseen by VD?

Most forces in the Cold War in the ZOA were much higher readiness than forces today. So is there anything new in a “Rapid Reaction Force” other than that it now seems significant that forces have higher readiness than in 2000? Is there a difference between a military that can send 30,000 troops 3,000 kilometers in 72 hours and a VJTF other than the size, scale, and name? Are Special Forces any different? What are little Green Men but unmarked SOF? Are snap exercises really new? The facts remain the facts:

However, all of these notifiable large-scale military activities share common denominators. They still involve the main equipment types – main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. They still look similar to invasion forces, especially if not notified or observed, and surprise attack requires very large amounts of armor and air support. Indeed, we have recent examples of this. But what is more likely to lead to confidence? New types of arms control and transparency? Or good old-fashioned full implementation and continued strengthening of existing agreements? To me, dialogue based on existing agreements – and, in particular, military-to-military dialogue in the OSCE – can be an important building block for rebuilding peace and security in the ZOA.
This presentation will serve as an example on how the Swedish Armed Forces have been actively working with incident prevention and establishing a response mechanism in order to be able to rapidly react and de-escalate any situation occurring during the exercise Aurora 17.

The general scenario for Aurora 17 was based on an escalating armed conflict in our region where Sweden was under attack with limited political and military-strategic objectives and limited geographical scope.

The exercise is a milestone in the Swedish Armed Forces reform work and has been serving to develop the Swedish Armed Forces operational capability and build its capability to conduct joint operations. The exercise was also an important signal to the outside world that we are prepared to defend Sweden.

During the preparations for the exercise Aurora it was found out that other exercises were to be conducted in more or less the same time as exercise Aurora. This information about other exercises was received through the Vienna Document 2011 (Chapter V) but also through other channels since some of them are not covered by the VD 11.

On the map NOCO, DRAGON and ZAPAD are mentioned. These exercises were more or less running at the same time as Aurora. However, Aurora was strictly a Swedish national exercise without any intentions to increase the tension in the area!

Sweden will exercise! Sweden chooses when, where and with whom!
In order to have transparency Sweden chose to invite a limited number of participating states to an “under threshold observation” according to the VD11 (Chapter IV).

An important tool to show openness was our military strategic communication strategy!

The exercise was conducted in the air, on land and at the sea.

Units from all over Sweden were involved, but the main exercise areas were the Mälardalen and Stockholm areas, on and around Gotland, and the Gothenburg area.

Aurora started with a preparation phase from 11-17 September. The main effort during this phase was to establish operational C2. A HNS moment in Gothenburg started the exercise with RSOM process (reception, staging and onward movement) when the French and the US air defense units arrived.

The next phase, called Shaping, was conducted between 18-23 September. Main efforts were a reinforcement operation of Gotland, secure SLOC and a joint operation with purpose to avoid an airborne assault operation. During this phase Sweden was attacked, a pre-assault and an airborne assault on the mainland (Arlanda) took place. A joint operation with air and land components defeated this air assault.
Finally, during the joint operation phase, 24-27 September, an offensive joint operation took place in order to defeat a coastal/air landing on the mainland.

During the exercise there were 19 500 Swedish personnel involved, but not more than 15 500 simultaneously. Additional approximately 2000 international soldiers and 150 representatives from civil authorities also participated in the exercise.

In order to have as good exercise as possible, other nations were invited to AURORA 17 so that we could build security, and exercise in collaboration with others in order to strengthen the defence of Sweden. The exercise was historic in the way that we had international troops on Swedish territory in the context of a high conflict scenario. On the slide all participating countries are depicted with their national flags.

This participation gave us the possibility to exercise Sweden’s defence capability against a larger, sophisticated opponent!

Participation with international units really helped the Swedish armed forces to fulfil our training objectives.

When it comes to incident prevention Sweden concentrated on information by using the military contact network that exists - Mil2Mil.
As mentioned earlier, there were 19,500 Swedish personnel involved in the exercise but still less than 13,000 covered by the VD 11. Since the exercise included more than 9,000 troops covered by the VD 11 it was notified more than 42 days ahead.

A briefing was held in the FSC in June 2017 explaining the exercise. An important step of voluntarily information and action to prevent any incidents.

At the briefing held in the FSC in June 2017 Sweden also informed that an "under threshold observation" was to be conducted. Countries were invited.

Sweden also conducted liaison with the other countries (exercises) in order to prevent incidents. Bi-lateral information was given to participating states in the exercise.

Which are the response mechanisms that Sweden has been using?

Sweden has military liaison officers in several military HQ in Europe which have been informing about the exercise but they can also act if any incident seems to be evolving.

Sweden also has military diplomatic representation in several countries which also can act if any incident is occurring.

The problem with both military liaison officers and defense attaches is that they are not serving 24/7, not having a current operational understanding/picture of the situation and possibly not the proper communication facilities.

Ahead of the exercise Aurora 17 Sweden and the Russian Federation agreed upon establishing a direct communication link between its Armed Forces. The link can be seen as a response mechanism and finds support in the VD 11 (Chapter X). The link should be seen as a Mil2Mil contact.

Thank you!
Robin Mossinkoff  
Senior FSC Support Officer, OSCE

The current politico-military environment is characterized by rising tensions of politico-military nature. As long as trust and confidence remain low, the escalatory potential from misunderstanding or miscalculation is of high risk. Therefore, risk reduction measures are of particular importance. I intend to walk us through various incident prevention and risk reduction mechanisms as well as discuss possibilities for increasing their effectiveness.

**Incidents at Sea/Air**

Increased numbers of military exercises, often in sensitive areas of the Baltic Sea and Black Sea, have led to the increased number of military incidents. European Leadership Network registered over a dozen various air incidents, involving military aircraft, especially since 2014. While the NATO-Russia cooperation has been frozen, including practical initiatives to promote confidence and transparency between NATO and Russia on air activities, such as Cooperative Airspace Initiatives (CAI), the bilateral agreements to prevent such incidents and their escalation are still in place.

There are over 15 various INCSEA and Dangerous Military Accidents (DMA) agreements among OSCE countries. However, given the rising number of incidents, discussions have been launched on how these could be made more effective.

Other efforts include the joint initiative by the International Civil Aviation Organization and NATO Staffs, together with the European Air Safety Agency and EUROCONTROL, continued under Finnish chairmanship, as a result of which a series of jointly agreed measures to enhance air safety, including definition of new routes by Russian military aircraft to/from Kaliningrad, review of the issue of transponders etc.

Let us now look at the OSCE mechanisms and examine their effectiveness as regards risk reduction.
OSCE mechanisms for Risk Reduction under VD Chapter 3

4. Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities is an instrument of crisis prevention in the event of a threat perceived by the AF of another State, to be used in unusual and unscheduled activities outside their normal peacetime locations which are militarily significant.

- The mechanism has been activated seven times before the eruption of the crisis in and around Ukraine.

In addition, since the eruption of the crisis in and around Ukraine, 21 requests for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities were made under the Vienna Document. These request led into four joint meetings of the Forum for Security Cooperation and of the Permanent Council. It should be noted that all these requests have been made during the period of February 2014 - June 2015.

5. Measures Regarding Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature

- Activation to date: There are no documented activations of this Mechanism.

6. Voluntary Hosting of Visits to Dispel Concerns about Military Activities

- Activation to date: Ukraine (2014)

7. Fostering the Role of the OSCE as a Forum for Political Dialogue

Another measure for risk reduction was adopted at the Ministerial Council in Bucharest in 2001. Ministerial Council Decision No 3 (Fostering the Role of the OSCE as a Forum for Political Dialogue) contains, amongst others, a specific paragraph (para 8) on improving the dialogue of the Organization through further inclusion of the FSC. According to this paragraph, the FSC, as the OSCE body for reviewing the implementation of OSCE commitments in the fields of arms control and CSBMs and for negotiating measures in these fields, should be more closely connected with the overall OSCE work on current security issues.
To this end, it was decided that the FSC would make available its expert advice on issues of a politico military nature, at the request of the PC. Activation to date: In April 2008, the Chairmanship tabled a Draft Decision on the Permanent Council’s request to the FSC for its expert advice on the politico-military issues with regard to the UAV incident over Abkhazia. However, consensus was not reached. On 29 April 2008, Georgia and, on 30 April 2008, the Chairperson of the PC requested the FSC to provide its expert advice with regard to the same incident. The issue was discussed at various FSC and joint FSC/PC meetings.

Looking into the Future...

The OSCE has an established and a well-functioning verification mechanism that is enshrined in the Vienna Document 2011 (VD11). VD11, CFE Treaty and OS Treaty constitute the web of interlocking and mutually reinforcing arms control obligations and commitments. The value and the utility of these instruments have been proved by their continuous application and the significant success achieved through the application.

Despite the extensive use of the VD11 in Ukraine, the results of the application of the VD11’s risk reduction measures (Chapter III), verification measures (Chapter IX) and regional measures (Chapter X) in resolving the situation were modest. What are the limitations of the current risk reduction measures that prevent them from being used effectively before tensions escalate?

- **Not timely:** some measures require a lengthy process thus not allowing for timely response in a contentious situation of an escalatory nature.
- **Data not acceptable to all pS:** due to the fact that under the current mechanisms the reports are provided by individual pS (although not always), they may be contested by other pS. This speaks for the necessity of a neutral body for fact-finding.
- **Host Nation Consent:** VD verification measures rest on the agreement of the receiving side. Given the contentious nature of the military incidents/activities under Chapter 3, host nation consent, which is paramount for the OSCE principle of cooperative
security, prolongs if not prevents possible verification activities under Chapter 3.

- **No political will:** the implementation of Chapter III measures is largely voluntary and rests on good will of States to prevent instability and avoid misperceptions. The current pol-mil climate is not conducive to acts of good will, thus leaving the impetus to utilizing Ch.3 measures out of reach.

A number of proposals to enhance Chapter III of the VD11 have been made to improve their effectiveness.

**Current FFT/Proposals on Chapter 3**

**Enhanced measures on hazardous incidents**

A food-for-thought paper has been submitted for the consideration of the FSC to strengthen the provisions of this instrument. Building on the existing measures foreseen under paras 17-17.4, the proposal suggests that the requesting State may request appropriate action by the CiO in case the concerns remain after the request for clarification has been sent and responded to. The CiO would then task the CPC to research the incident and possibly establish a mission to this end.

**Proposals regarding unusual military activities**

Three FfT papers have been submitted to the discussion on the FSC. The purpose of the suggestions is to strengthen the Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities and provide enhanced verification opportunities under Chapter III. The proposals have a different approach to the trigger mechanism. One proposal suggests that following the request the CiO would appoint a lead nation. The second proposal stipulates that a fact-finding mission could be launched by a request of at least nine pS if all other measures failed. The third proposal suggests appointing a Special Rep on risk reduction measures who could suggest the OSCE to take a decision on an inspection.

The proposals also provide different suggestions on the number of inspectors (from 6 to 10, or leaving it to the discretion of the Special Rep). Also, the duration of the inspection could take 48 hours as in the
VD11 as suggested by the 1st proposal, up to nine days as suggested in the other two proposals in order to allow for the sufficient collection of information, including interviews. It should be noted that all three suggest that such inspections would be conducted beyond the national quota. One proposal in this regard stipulates that no more than three such inspections can be conducted in one State in a year.

3rd Party Verification

A number of pS have proposed to enhance the risk reduction and crisis management function of the VD11 by enhancing verification and providing for institutionalized, objective and timely 3rd party verification by the OSCE and thus permitting effective, rapidly deployable, flexible, and independent verification in times of crises. The CPC has developed a technical concept outlining various options. The concept was already presented to the pS about a year ago. At the 4th meeting of the IWG Structured Dialogue, the SG suggested to launch a conceptual discussion on 3rd party verification.

It needs to discuss a number of key aspects, including trigger mechanism, composition of the team, verification procedures and reporting.

Trigger mechanism

An endorsement mechanism, such would imply a stronger crisis management mandate of the OSCE/FSC Chairmanship/executive structures. If a green or red trigger7 mechanism is the preferred option, a silence procedure adopting a decision on an inspection could be considered.

As an alternative, a consultative approach could be used where the receiving State would be consulted and the general support of the receiving State for resolving any potential grievances would be sought. This approach would allow for a more flexible application of the mechanism and a more timely initiation of an inspection.

7 Most international treaties require a body to approve or at least not to oppose a request for an inspection. “Red light” system implies that an inspection will proceed unless a treaty body votes to stop. “Green light” procedure requires a positive endorsement before the inspection can be launched.
The concept has to consider the right to deny an inspection as well as the issue of quotas. Following the line of other proposals made at the OSCE by pS, it is advisable that such inspections are carried out beyond national quotas stipulated in the VD11, and pS cannot deny the inspection.

**Objectives**

For the OSCE 3rd party verification to be effective clear objectives need to be established. Such activities can be aimed at verifying:

1. VD11 compliance in accordance with Chapter III. Such verification missions would aim at dispelling concerns about military activities in the zone of application of CSBMs in the areas, in which there may be cause for such concerns. Also under this Chapter hazardous military activities could be further investigated.
2. Compliance with other agreements where the OSCE is assigned a verification role (such as Minsk agreements). The purpose of such inspections would depend on the mandate of the OSCE verification and could include monitoring ceasefire violations, verification of absence of military equipment and military activity in the controlled areas, verification of destruction of major weapon systems, inspection and certification of declared sites with major weapon systems, routine inspections to verify holdings of major weapon systems and others. The inspections would be ad hoc and would exclude permanent monitoring.

**Type of verification**

The mandate would have to allow for an all-encompassing approach to fit a wide variety of situations. Since OSCE 3rd party verification would have a similar approach as defined within the Vienna Document, the zone of application agreed under the VD11 is recommended.

**Arrangements for OSCE inspectors**

The choice of the model for maintaining the OSCE inspectors would very much depend on the mandate given to the OSCE inspections. Under assumption that the OSCE inspections would be considered more of a challenge type inspections (regardless of the formal term to
be agreed) and would be conducted on short-notice and be of a short duration, it would be advisable to follow CTBTO model of a roster of State-seconded inspectors. The size of the roster could be determined following the number of technical inspectors’ profiles determined as necessary. In general, it is suggested that the roster includes 250 inspectors to allow each pS to nominate approximately four inspectors.

Provided that different type of inspection missions would require different type of expertise, the selection of the inspection team members would rest on the mission mandate and the established objectives of the inspections. It would therefore be necessary that the OSCE roster of inspectors would include different categories of expertise that could be required on a mission. The certified OSCE inspectors would be categorized depending on their skills and expertise.

**Inspection conduct**

The inspection team size should have an inverse correlation to the agreed duration of the inspection. Both should allow for the sufficient inspection of the inspection area. In the case, shorter inspection duration is foreseen, a larger inspection team should be allowed. Furthermore, the rules for engagement of the inspection team, particularly splitting the team, should be discussed in order to maximize effective use of the duration of the inspection. Additionally, the issue of observers from the requesting pS should be discussed.

Considering the fact that a system is already in place for providing a timely exchange of notifications, it is suggested that INA notification formats for inspection notification, response and report are developed by the CPC for the approval of pS as part of the trigger mechanism.

For the purposes of OSCE inspections, it is suggested that the standard list of equipment as listed in the VD11 paragraph 95 is used.

**Reporting**

Finally, the issue of factual and objective reporting has to be addressed. Particularly, there should be guidance elaborated on the format of the report as well as a procedure for consulting the report with the
receiving State. Additionally, SOPs would be necessary for the collection and recording of evidence material as well as timing and the form of presenting the report.
Robert Ierubino  
Senior Communications Network Officer

The OSCE Communications Network is a Confidence and Security Building Measure in its own right. The Charter of Paris had the forethought to understand the future technological importance to communications and, specifically, those of a diplomatic nature. The Communications Network was one of the first elements identified as mandatory in the newly created Conflict Prevention Centre of the CSCE. By placing the Communications Network within the CPC, the importance to the Arms Control community was clear. This was a tool to be used for achieving the end goal of a more secure Europe.

As the 1990s went by and Y2K came and went, the Communications Network was an expensive and awkward tool to maintain - as its solitary goal was just to basically exchange Microsoft Word documents. With the introduction of Vienna Document 1999, the FSC described messages sent via the Network as complementary to diplomatic channels - a virtual equivalent to a Note Verbale – and official, State-sponsored correspondence. And, over the next several years, technology has changed to the point where using the Communications Network is not only safe, secure and reliable, but also extremely affordable. The capabilities of the Network are comparable to a large water main pipe: it can handle an awful lot of water. Unfortunately, we are only using it to send drops of water at a time. We should take more advantage of what this tool has to offer and put it to better use in order to reduce the risk of conflict.

As true security can only be achieved by preventing conflict, the CPC was the ideal place for the Communications Network. While technical in nature, the importance of facilitating these treaties and agreements cemented the need for its support team to work side-by-side with colleagues performing the normative work of Arms Control. And, over the next several years, this became an indispensable communication channel to support transparency, increase predictability of actions and trust between participating States. Of course, the political will of pS has waxed and waned over the years, Arms Control became less attractive to policy makers, and in times of turmoil, people asked if Arms Control
is only useful during peace-time. As an engineer, my response to this may be different from the military or political scientists in the room. I will add a twist to it – you may not wish to reduce the number of arms you have during times of trouble, but you should still strive to achieve predictability and trust. And these elements sit smack in the middle of achieving security in Europe. In fact, the Communications Network has demonstrated its value to supporting diplomatic efforts – especially in 2014 as the crisis in Ukraine stemmed a significant increase of traffic and, therefore, reliance of the pS on this tool.

In the OSCE, there are many channels for communication. I would like to put them into three categories:

- Forums for Dialogue
- Formal Reporting
- And, Electronic

In the first channel, we see decision-making bodies and working groups where delegations get together in formal settings like this to discuss the topics specific to their mandates. In this group, we can also place bi- and multi-lateral meetings and contacts.

Within Formal Reporting, we have items that can be described as commitments of the participating States. This channel may include formal reports (such as Annual Exchanges, Defense Planning, and Arms Registers and Transfers, etc.), but may also include official diplomatic correspondence - like a Note Verbale.

And lastly, we find the electronic communication channel. This can be as simple as an unclassified email between technical experts or the more formal exchange through pre-formatted notifications – which is how we describe information exchanged via the Communications Network.

Remember, the Communications Network is merely a tool – a conduit for distributing information between participating States. In “good” times, the sharing of information clearly aids transparency, predictability and trust. But when relations are tougher, that is when the political will
to be more transparent is needed most. Unfortunately, we often see the opposite.

The Draft Concept for this workshop noted “Against the background of the current crisis in politico-military relations in the OSCE area, hazardous incidents are widely regarded a serious source of instability and potential escalatory developments.” I interpret this as meaning – we reduce what we share, we become less transparent, less predictable, and, therefore, trust less.

As the Secretary General expressed earlier, the political powers need to reinvigorate their involvement in the Arms Control arena. He also asked about the frequency and effectiveness of the contacts between military verification centres and the political individuals negotiating on their behalf. The political will must be in place in order to move toward the goal of stability we all seek. This is one area where the Communications Network can help. That is, by facilitating dialogue within a State should the technological resources not be available.

So, what more can we do? In my opinion, a threat is a threat is a threat, and any threat can become a potentially hazardous incident – if and when communication fails.

We’ve heard that the use of the Communications Network is encouraged... but how? Let’s take the example of Snap Exercises. Today, we see more frequently the occurrence of unplanned Snap Exercises that are below threshold and, therefore, not notifiable and, typically, invitations for observation are not offered. There is nothing but the political will to not disclose that stops communicating details of such activities. Full details could be provided when they are known. Observation of the entire event could be granted and not just the staged presentations designed to impress or intimidate. Any and all communications – including requests for clarification or statements of objection – could be transmitted via the Communication Network.

I also believe that the Communications Network would serve the OSCE pS better if it were expanded for use beyond the first dimension. Sure, subject matter expertise in these areas is a necessity, but the communication channels remain unchanged and the synergies created
will help prevent hazardous incidents or deescalate the situation wherever or however they have occurred.

It does not matter if the threat is caused by traditional military activity, cyber-attacks, flow of water, flow of refugees or act of terror. In today’s world, nearly anything can create a hazardous incident... It feels like one is perpetually imminent.

Increase exchanges between each other – information and personnel exchanges beyond military contacts, include differing entities including internal security forces. Find areas that will help the return to transparency, predictability and trust across the board.

Finally, don’t give up on those problem areas. In fact, expand your communications – especially when trust is low. Share military activities that are below threshold and extend invitations, even when it is not necessary.

So far, we have heard about the need to be more transparent. But, in order to overcome the ever-increasing security challenges, there must be an attempt by participating States to actually be more transparent and not just state that it is needed.
In light of the findings of previous Breakout Workshops, and having in mind the current political difficulties to modernize the Vienna Document (VD), the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship held the third Breakout Workshop on CSBMs on 18 - 20 October, 2017 in Vienna, Austria. It intended to take a deeper look into four areas in which adaptation and improvement might be both necessary and feasible to promote military stability in the OSCE area:

1. Enhancing Military-to-Military Dialogue through establishing direct contacts on a more frequent basis that could consider all issues of relevance to promote military stability and predictability
2. Enhancing Transparency regarding (complementary) Information Exchange Instruments, inter alia, the Global Exchange of Information or relevant FSC decisions
3. Enhancing Transparency regarding Military Activities taking into account potential measures also beyond VD chapter V and VI provisions, inter alia, relevant FSC decisions, regional and voluntary measures
4. Preventing incidents and reducing risks of military escalation taking into account proposals made during previous workshops on enhancing military-to-military contacts, multilateralized rules of engagement, better use of the OSCE communication network, improving OSCE consultation mechanisms, dispatching impartial OSCE fact finding missions, as well as restraint in and utmost transparency of conducting large-scale exercises, particularly in border areas, including at and above High Sea.
To that end, two substantial sessions were held, – one on strengthening military-to-military dialogue and one on adapting CSBMS with a focus on enhanced transparency regarding information exchange instruments and military activities, as well as preventing incidents and reducing risks of military escalation. These three topics were dealt with by three parallel panels.

The following summary of discussions contains preliminary findings and emerging trends rather than claiming to give a complete account of all thoughts uttered.

Military-to-Military Contacts

The value of direct military-to-military contacts was confirmed and its important role in times of crisis underlined. Though contacts exist through various liaisons, inspections, evaluation visits and observations, their frequency has been reduced due to the smaller number of quota, the suspension of the CFE Treaty by one State Party and the suspension of NATO-Russia expert meetings. Although the development of doctrines usually covers periods of more than one year, underlying risk perceptions, subsequent defence plans, force postures and military activities have been changing in shorter sequences pending the development of the politico-military landscape and emerging crises. In light of the current European security crisis, the particular value of military-to-military dialogue was stressed and more frequent direct military contacts were advised.

Enhanced Transparency regarding Information Exchange Instruments

A panel tackled the questions whether the existing military information exchanges provide enough details for a profound assessment of the military situation, which kind of more detailed information in addition to existing CSBMs would have an added value for enhancing transparency, and how this additional information could be used in context with existing CSBMs.
Two speakers introduced the array of information exchanges and the particular information contained in available OSCE instruments such as the Vienna Document, the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI), the CFE-Treaty, the OSCE Documents on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Stockpiles on Conventional Ammunition and Principles governing Conventional Arms Transfers as well as the OSCE Code of Conduct (CoC). They pointed out the differences in scope and intrusiveness of such information.

The panel broadly agreed on the gap analysis which was also identified in previous workshops. Although a vast amount of information was already available, it was not the same for all pS given that only GEMI and VD information exchanges were obligatory for all pS while participation in the CFE Treaty, the Treaty on Open Skies and the Dayton IV Agreement to the Dayton Peace Accord differed. Although information on defence planning as well as notifications and observations of military activities were available, it was felt that information on military capabilities and exercises was incomplete. Furthermore, changes to military doctrines were only reflected to some extent in national government websites or High Level Military Doctrine Seminars (HLMDS) which usually take place every fifth year only.

While the panel agreed that full analysis of available information was not done yet, some participants voiced concern that some states might not have the capability to properly assess the available and even less additional information. In this context, the option of an impartial third party assessment was mentioned, e.g. by the OSCE or a “neutral” think tank.

The group advised to identify gaps, keep flexibility as to the details of additional information, and restart modernizing the Vienna Document. Though it broadly agreed that additional information should address qualitative criteria there was some uncertainty how to address quality versus quantity as no agreed formula existed yet how to reflect such complex aspects. While Special Operation Forces and cyber capabilities were not suited to be covered by the scope of the Vienna Document other elements might be included in future deliberations on widening its scope. But the point was also made that states should seek first to use the full potential of available instruments.
In this context, it was also mentioned that no definitions existed in common OSCE documents and that the tacitly accepted use of CFE terminology might be a source for ambiguity. Terms such as “battlegroup” or “task force” to a large extent had replaced the terms “regiment” or “brigade”, in particular in a multinational framework. The question was asked who would be responsible for reporting on multinational formations and units.

At the same time, some participants voiced doubts whether more information would produce more trust. The panel underscored that all military information disclosed can only be exchanged on the condition of reciprocity. Thus, the political will must be in place before the OSCE was able to move forward.

The importance of basing situation assessments on facts was underlined. Therefore, in addition to modernizing available information exchanges, high value was attached to the “Mapping Exercise” in the framework of the OSCE “Structured Dialogue” with a view to enable a fact based analysis. The potential convergence of both processes was considered although the point was made that “Mapping” referred to threat perceptions in a broader sense which also included the behavior of states.

**Enhanced Transparency regarding Military Activities**

Another panel discussed to what extent enhanced transparency of military activities would help to promote overall stability and national security and how far, therefore, pS were seeking to enhance transparency. The discussion made clear that an acceptable level of transparency will vary between pS based on subjective threat perceptions in relation to different definitions and types of military activities. Also the notion of symmetry was rather subjective and depended on the assessment of every single pS. That means that no one single solution will fit all national needs and, therefore, CSBMs must have the potential to be applied flexibly.

While some concerns focused on traditional warfare methodologies others touched on newer capabilities such as cyber warfare. Others argued that, in principle, there were no new types of warfare and that the fundamental underpinning threats remained the same while the
tools may have changed. So, the approach was not significantly different. Also in the past, there were types of deniable warfare such as sabotage, espionage or propaganda which was certainly the case at the time that the current CSBM instruments and arms control architecture were being developed.

As no single area could be identified which was of predominant security interest to all and thus could enjoy unanimous support, no single easy solution appeared to enhance transparency. But there were some common themes that arose:

1. On the traditional side, there was discussion about the level of forces that constituted a threat and, therefore, should determine Vienna Document thresholds for notification and observation of certain military activities. The panel did not discuss in detail which kind of military activities, including below the threshold for notification, raises concerns (e.g. geographical location, build-up of operational capabilities, also in context with geographical disparities) but observed that new patterns of drills could indicate a lasting trend, e.g. snap exercises. It recalled that the purpose of transparency of military activities was to provide early warning against potential offensive cross-border operations.

2. In most areas discussed, views expressed and suggestions made related to ways and means how to implement existing transparency regimes and increase contact and dialogue in order to provide more information or understand available information better.

But there was also recognition that not all of the OSCE tools will work in every situation as most were designed to prevent conflict. Therefore, they did not operate well after conflict had started or when one party was determined to seek conflict.

The panel highlighted the wide variety of fora for dialogue as well as CSBM and conventional arms control instruments available in the OSCE, including the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document, and the Treaty on Open Skies. All of these should be used to enhance military transparency and base security dialogue on the results of verification as
no single tool provided all the needed transparency. Therefore, it seemed necessary to understand the whole array of available measures which could be used but were currently not employed to generate transparency. The reasons for that should be analyzed in order to identify what needs to be done.

The point was made that one could use modern technology to facilitate such understanding, e.g., by advanced visualization techniques to present data in a more user friendly manner or automatically mapping data and hosting interactive software on the OSCE systems. The question was asked whether this would encourage greater use of the data as it would be more easily accessible to both experts and generalists.

One participant stated that in context with the latest large-scale exercises the host state had invited neighbouring states for observations based on regional agreements. But the point was made, too, that voluntary measures cannot substitute for mandatory ones. At the same time, reciprocity of information and observation was an indispensable precondition for own transparency.

The group confirmed the important role of the OSCE in confidence-building as it is the only multilateral dialogue forum where politico-military and security issues are discussed, and the only home to multilateral transparency measures covering the entire Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area.

It was also highlighted that the forthcoming Structured Dialogue Mapping Exercise presented the OSCE with an opportunity to take an in-depth look at the transparency information that are available. This may enable experts to identify both trends in military activities and better understanding threat perceptions of neighbors.

**Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM)**

The third panel confirmed the role of the OSCE in conflict and incident prevention and underlined that pertinent instruments were available, in particular chapter III VD (risk reduction). It reviewed paragraph 16 on consultations and cooperation in regard of unusual military activities and paragraph 18 on voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns.
about military activities. In regard of paragraph 17 on hazardous incidents the panel noted that this mechanism had not been activated so far.

Further detailing risk reduction, the panel distinguished between prevention and response orientated measures, examined the various natures of incidents as well as the question what tools and information are in place and possibly required in addition. Against this backdrop, the panel considered elements needed for adequate response.

As an example for preventive risk reduction measures the precautionary efforts imbedding the Swedish exercise AURORA were introduced. With approx. 10,500 VD-related troops and the participation of 2,000 foreign forces the exercise did not exceed the VD-thresholds for observation. However, organizers were aware of several other exercises conducted in the region in parallel including ZAPAD 2017. Besides keeping geographical distance, direct telephone lines between Sweden and Russia as well as military-diplomatic links in Russia and European headquarters were used as incident prevention mechanism while Military Attaché links were assessed unsuitable for operational purposes.

The group was also aware of standing bilateral prevention and de-escalation mechanisms and noted the existence of over 15 bilateral Agreements on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (INCSEA) or the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (DMA). It also took note of other fora dealing with incident prevention and management such as the Joint initiative by ICAO/EASA/EUROCONTROL and littoral states of the Baltic Sea region with a Code of Conduct in preparation. It would include state aircraft. In contrast, NATO’s Cooperative Air Space Initiative was suspended in 2014 in reaction to the Ukraine crisis.

Despite such parallel efforts, the panel stressed the role of the OSCE as a multilateral arrangement as existing bilateral agreements and ad-hoc agreements also affect third parties. In this context, the panel recalled the mechanisms enshrined in Chapter III of the Vienna Document and noted that the OSCE/CPC Communications Net was in place connecting all pS. It has flexibility to accommodate more end user groups outside
verification units and MFA and has the mandate to serve as an IPRM conduit.

The panel recalled the different nature of provisions contained in VD Chapter III: While para 16 and 18 tackle consultation and cooperation in regard of unusual military activities or voluntary hosting to dispel concerns about such activities, paragraph 17 deals with hazardous incidents. It stipulates that pS will cooperate, report and clarify such incidents occurring within the Zone of Application in order to prevent misunderstanding and to mitigate effects on other pS. To this end, every pS will designate a Point of Contact (PoC) and inform all other pS. The Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) is to keep lists of PoCs.

Participating States whose military forces are involved are to provide information to all other pS expeditiously. Furthermore, every pS affected may request clarification and will receive prompt response. Such information may be discussed by pS in the FSC or at the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM). At the same time, such channels are not exclusive and do not hamper other rights and obligations of states.

The panel pointed out that Chapter III provisions were not timely for incident response and that data and information to be provided were not accepted by all pS. In particular, consent for entry in receiving or affected countries seemed to be a major issue as no scenario and no detailed mechanism were enshrined in the VD. Everything depended on the political will to act.

The group also referred to several Food-for-Thought papers and concrete proposals made in the FSC regarding the request for and initiation of Fact Finding Teams under the responsibility of a lead nation or a Special Representative. Proposals related to the mandate, in particular the question of consensus respectively consent, as well as to the modalities, possibly in line with Chapter IX provisions. In this context, the duration, costs and team size of fact finding missions as well as the reporting procedures were discussed.

The following initial thoughts were uttered:
An Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) includes both elements, prevention and response, and is intended for de-escalation. If the incident is of an unintentional nature, a quick reaction mechanism is required that assures consensus.

In case of intentional incidents, the OSCE is faced with a political crisis and no CSBM instrument would work. In so far, the Vienna Document is a good weather instrument for conflict prevention, not conflict management. However, in order to avoid spill-over effects, mechanisms are required to prevent further escalation.

Another question referred to the nature of incidents. Even explosions of ammunition depots could trigger suspicion of sabotage by another pS and might require clarification and validation by the state under accusation.

Since no modalities are defined in paras 16-18, the panel inquired to what extent additional tools are required. As to the question which added value a multinational agreement would have the group noted that the bilateral INCSEA / DMA agreements are limited in time and space with only a limited number of pS involved. The question was asked, however, whether a “neutral” approach as to fact finding or the involvement of third pS for mediation could bring advantages assuming that the reports will be politicized anyway.

Another question was whether an objective quality of assembled intelligence can be established. But also the opinion was voiced that the multilateral process as such could be more relevant than its outcome and that it was better to use existing information exchanges to raise situational awareness. The panel also highlighted the importance of regional measures in regard of risk reduction (chapter X, no. 144.2). Another proposal recommended establishing a list of potential risks as a framework for quick response and, to that end, to use the list of threat perceptions established at the OSCE Structured Dialogue.

The panel discussed also how to deal with “non-state actors” as the VD is an interstate agreement. References were made to a status-neutral approach, existing IPRMs and the OSCE Document on Stabilizing Measures in Local Crisis Situations (1993).
Furthermore, the proposal was made to analyse past incidents and the reasons why para 17 was not activated in order to guide enhancement of provisions and their better use. In this context, the panel concentrated on the questions, for which type of incidents a mechanism was required, whether the OSCE should focus on prevention or response, which additional information was needed for both, and which modalities should apply for responsive measures.

The group believed that an IPRM was required to respond to incidents that occur unintentionally, or if more PS are involved or accused and if military or hybrid equipment or personnel are used (dual use). Also buzzing and near misses or incidents that are limited in time and space but can have escalatory effects might warrant quick response.

As to preventive measures the group recalled that large-scale military exercises require notification and disclosure of details of activities such as phases, geographical areas covered as well as movements by land forces and sorties flown by combat aircraft. However, there are limits to transparency and the assumption was that all sides have to show political will. Thus, reciprocity is an indispensable precondition to disclose military information.

As to concrete measures the panel advised to rediscover para 17.1 referring to Points of Contact (PoCs). As they are part of the existing VD acquis no change to the VD was required. However, there might be a need for a FSC decision to establish an annual information exchange to regularly update the list of PoCs. Furthermore, the establishment of Standing Operational Procedures (SOP) for PoCs seems to be required. Their regular training, including by simulation exercises, as to Rules of Procedure (ROEs) and Codes of Conduct was advised.

Furthermore, the use of the OSCE Communication Net was recommended for regular and ad hoc information exchange. As the net is flexible it allows for setting up new user groups, connecting more end stations and for transmitting EUS / SMS alert messages.

Regarding response modalities, the panel recalled the concepts of an Institutionalized OSCE Verification Capability as considered during the OSCE Security Days in November 2016. It discussed the trigger mechanisms, the right to deny access, types of inspection, the Zone of
Application and the lead responsibility which might rest either on a pS or a Special Representative. The group also considered which type of inspectors will be required for various cases, which training and certification they would need and under which legal umbrella they would operate. Finally, questions of resource and equipment requirements as well as rules for the conduct of inspections including reporting were tackled.

**General remarks**

As previous Breakout Workshops on CSBMs also the third one provided an excellent opportunity for frank, open and rich discussion among pS on the potential and the gaps of available OSCE instruments and for developing ideas how to enhance transparency, risk reduction and conflict prevention measures in times of crises. Without neglecting the political nature of current conflicts and blockades which hamper efforts to enhance OSCE tools, participants focused on a sober analysis of what is available, what is needed in addition and which changes might be feasible in order to adapt OSCE instruments to the security needs of our times.

While the point was made repeatedly that pS should use the available information better for a fact-based situation assessment, also in context with the FSC security dialogue, the following areas were identified as most urgent for modernization in order to keep the relevance of OSCE tools, – however, on the condition that reciprocity of measures is assured:

- There seems to be a need and a preparedness to widen the scope of the Vienna Document and other OSCE instruments to account for new force capabilities based on advanced technologies and force structures, and to enhance the quality of information.
- Full and enhanced transparency of military activities was advised, particularly in crises.
- A sense of urgency was attached to improving OSCE risk reduction and incident prevention and response mechanisms, including the use of PoCs, the OSCE communication net and third party fact-finding.
The need to enhance military-to-military dialogue, particularly in times of crises, was underlined and more frequent direct contacts advised.
**William Alberque** has worked on arms control, non-proliferation, and safeguards since 1994. He began as a safeguards analyst, tasked with improving the security of Russian facilities that held weapons-useable nuclear material. He joined DTRA in 2000, focusing on arms control and SALW as an inspector, and then served in DoD as the Treaty Manager for arms control, before moving to the State Department for the 2010 NPT RevCon. He returned to the Pentagon as director of European security and arms control policy, including BTWC, CTBT, and IAEA safeguards. He began working at NATO in 2012 and currently serves as the Director of the Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre. His recent publications include “The NPT and the Origins of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements,” Proliferation Papers, No. 57, Ifri, February 2017, and “Substantial Combat Forces in the Context of NATO-Russia Relations,” Research Paper, No. 131, NATO Defense College, June 2016.

**Lt Col Péter Benei** started his military career as a fire-control system engineer in 1997 and subsequently became operations officer. From 2002 to July 2017 he held various positions in Hungarian Defence Forces and MoD organisations. Since 15 July 2017 he is the Deputy Military Adviser of the Permanent Mission of Hungary to the UN, OSCE and other International Organisations in Vienna. Mr. Benei graduated from the Bolyai János Military Technical College in Budapest and took courses at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and the École de Guerre in Paris.

**Col Han Bouwmeester** serves currently as a lecturer in Military Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy. He is also the Vice Chairman of Doctrine Committee for the Armed Forces in the Netherlands. During his career, Col Bouwmeester fulfilled several command positions in the Royal Netherlands Army, including battalion commander, regimental commander of the Netherlands Horse Artillery and commander of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Uruzgan (Afghanistan). His academic record includes an MA in Political Science, an MSc in Administrative Science (both University of Amsterdam), and a Master in Military Arts and Sciences (MMAS) from the US School of
Advanced Studies (SAMS). Col Bouwmeester is a graduate of the Netherlands Defence College as well as the US Army Command and General Staff College.

**BG Peter Braunstein** entered the German Bundeswehr in 1977. After he had completed a supply officer training in 1978, he graduated in economics and organizational sciences at the Bundeswehr University in Hamburg. During his military career he has been appointed, inter alia, Senior Military Assistant to the Federal Minister of Defense (2006-2009) and Director of Berlin Garrison Affairs (2013-02/2015). From August 2014 until January 2015 he was also Director of the NATO Liaison and Advisory Team in Kosovo. Since March 2015 he has been the Director of the Bundeswehr Verification Center.

**Col Prasenjit Chaudhuri** is heading the Swiss Verification Unit since 2005 and is Deputy Head of the Euro-Atlantic Security Cooperation Division in the Department of Defence since 2008. He holds the rank of a Colonel in the Swiss Armed Forces and a degree in political science and history from the University of Zurich (lic. phil.). During Switzerland’s OSCE Chairmanship 2014 and the Troika Years 2013–2015 he was also the Project Leader of the Swiss Armed Forces for politico-military issues and projects. Previously, from January to October 2012, he was in charge as acting Chief of the Euro-Atlantic Security Cooperation Division. In his military career, he was the Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces Staff Element 154 (Arms Control) from 2006 until 2011. As of January 2012, after reorganisation and restructuring of the Armed Forces Staff Elements, he holds the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Arms Control.

**BG Michael Claesson** serves since March 2015 as the Deputy Head of the Policy- and Plans Department at the Swedish Armed Forces Joint Staff in Stockholm. Previous assignments include, inter alia, Senior Military Adviser at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Commanding Officer SWECOM ISAF and Commanding Officer Task Force Northern Lights as well as Military Adviser and Swedish Deputy Military Representative to NATO. He completed numerous courses including the German General Staff Course at the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg, as the first Swedish Officer ever.
**BG Philipp Eder** is currently the Head of the Military Strategy Division in the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports. Commissioned as Lieutenant into a Mechanized infantry Battalion his previous assignments include Austrian National Contingent Commander & Head of the Planning Cell in the Kabul Multinational Brigade of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan; Commanding Officer of an Austrian Mechanized Infantry Battalion and Director of the Higher Officer’s Training Institute of the Austrian National Defence Academy in Vienna. He is a graduate of the General Staff Officers Course at the Austrian National Defence Academy as well as the U.S. Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia.

**Col (GS) Johan Huovinen** is a graduate from the General Staff Academy of the Russian Federation in 2009. He has served as Swedish Military attaché in Moscow (RF) with a side accreditation to Belarus in 2009-2012. From 2014-2017 he was serving as the European Union Military Adviser in Ukraine. Colonel Huovinen is currently serving as Military Adviser at the Permanent Delegation of Sweden to the OSCE.

**Robert Ierubino** holds a degree in Computer Engineering from Syracuse University. Mr. Ierubino has been working in the Arms Control and International Relations arena since 1992 when he engineered the initial applications used by States Parties of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the participating States of the Vienna Document to produce their officially exchanged annual reports. In the subsequent 25 years, Mr. Ierubino founded two successful US-based consulting companies supporting the private, public and international sectors prior to joining the OSCE in 2012 as the Head of the OSCE Communications Network.

**Amb. Benno Laggner** is currently the Deputy Head of Delegation for Security Policy Issues at the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the OSCE. From September 2016 to April 2017, he was the FSC Chair’s Coordinator on the Vienna Document. Benno Laggner is also currently the Chair of the Nuclear Suppliers Group with the title of Ambassador. Before his current posting to Vienna, his previous position was Head of the Division for Security Policy (Assistant State Secretary) at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. Earlier postings included serving as Deputy Chef de Cabinet of the President of the 65th session of the
Col (GS) Hans Lüber is since April 2012 the Military Adviser of the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the OSCE in Vienna. In this function he was part of the Swiss OSCE-Chairmanship team in 2014. Hans Lüber is currently also the FSC Chair’s Coordinator for the Vienna Document. Prior to his transfer to Vienna, he worked for four years in Berne at the Swiss Armed Forces Joint Staff as Head of Internal Training Operations and Responsible for the Armed Forces Lessons Learned Process. Before joining the Public Administration, Hans Lüber made a career in the Swiss Banking and Finance-Industry for 15 years in Zurich and Geneva. He holds a Master Degree in Law from the University of Berne and an Attorney-at-Law qualification as well as an executive Master of Business Administration Degree from IMD. Parallel to his civil professional assignments, Hans Lüber made a military career as a General Staff promoted reserve officer. He held commands from Company- up to Regiment level from the Swiss Armed Forces Mountain Infantry Troops. Hans Lüber currently holds the rank of Colonel (GS).

Lars-Erik Lundin holds a PhD in political science and international relations. He served as a Swedish diplomat from 1976-1996, including as a delegate to the Stockholm Conference on CSBM’s and disarmament 1986-89 and during the Swedish Chair period in CSCE/OSCE. He also served in the European Commission from 1996-2009 and as EU Ambassador to the International organizations in Vienna. Currently he is Distinguished Associate Fellow at SIPRI, specializing on European security policy. He is an elected member of the Swedish Royal Academy of War Sciences.

MG Claude Meier serves as Chief of the Swiss Armed Forces Staff and is a member of the armed forces command. At the interface between the political and operational-tactical levels, he is in charge of concepts and forces development, forces and procurement planning, resource allocation and steering as well as international relations, which includes bi- and multilateral safeguarding of military interests. In 1985 Maj Gen Meier graduated from pilot school as a fighter pilot. Later he has
commanded Fighter Squadron 17. In 2003 he graduated from the French Joint Defense College in Paris and earned a Postgraduate Degree in Historical Science from the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris. Maj Gen Meier served then as Chief of the Air Combat Standardization Section, as Head of Air Force Staff Training and later in the Armed Forces Staff as Chief of Doctrine Research and Development. In 2013 he earned on-the-job a Master of Advanced Studies in Security Policy and Crisis Management from the ETH Zurich. Previous to his current position, Maj Gen Meier served from December 2011 to June 2015 as Chief of Operations and Plans in the Air Force Staff.

Robin Mossinkoff is since January 2016 Head of the Support Section for the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). He has been an officer in the Royal Netherlands Air Force for the most part of his professional career. He held several staff assignments at the Air Force Headquarters in The Hague, and served as Air Defence Representative to the Permanent Delegation of the Netherlands to NATO, at NATO HQ, Brussels. Operational assignments include serving as a United Nations Military Observer during the UN Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia in 1993-1994. In 2006 he commanded the Deployment Task Force Air in Kandahar, preparing the deployments of the Dutch Task Forces Urugzgan in NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. In 2011 he returned to Kandahar Air Field to act as Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff of NATO’s Base Command. His last military position from 2012-2015 was Defence Attaché in Austria, Hungary and Slovakia, and Senior Military Adviser to the OSCE in the permanent mission of NLD in Vienna. Mr. Mossinkoff’s further education includes Air Force Staff College, General Staff College, and the Advanced Defence Course. He holds a Master of Arts degree in Public Administration (University of Leiden).

BG Wolfgang Peischel is since 2009 Editor in Chief of the Austrian Military Journal. He graduated from the military academy in Wiener Neustadt in 1985. From 1991 to 1994 BG Peischel went through the General Staff Course at the National Defence Academy in Vienna, which he completed with a Master of Higher Military Leadership. In 1997 he also obtained a master’s degree in political science at the University of Vienna. Since 2015 BG Peischel holds a PhD in Military Sciences from the National University of Public Services in Budapest. Between 1994
and 1999 he worked in the Department of Military Strategy in the Austrian Ministry of Defense. In 2001 he served as Commander of the Infantry Regiment Vienna. From 2001 to 2009 BG Peischel was Director of Force Planning in the General Staff. In 2016 he was the Head of the annual “Vienna Conference on Strategy”.

**Edward Read** is the policy lead on Conventional Arms Control within the joint Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) unit for Euro-Atlantic Security Policy. After graduating from university, Ed joined the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Service – one of the five fighting arms of the Royal Navy – in 2003 as a Logistics Supply Officer. He subsequently transferred to the mainstream UK Civil Service, where he was responsible for managing the relationship between the MOD and the Foreign Defence / Naval Attachés accredited to the Court of St James’s (the UK). He assumed his current role in 2016.

**Col (ret) Wolfgang Richter** is Fellow at the International Security Division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin. His previous assignments include, inter alia, Head of the military section of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, and to Disarmament fora of the United Nations, New York (1995-1999); Head of Department (global and European arms control), Federal Armed Forces Centre for Verification Tasks (1999-2005); and Head of the military section of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the OSCE, Vienna.

**BG Reinhard Trischak** graduated from the Military Academy in 1985 and was commissioned into the Infantry Regiment, where he served as Company Commander. Subsequently, he commenced a 12 month tour as Duty Officer at UNDOF AUSBATT and UNDOF HQ on the Golan Heights. In 1996 he participated in a postgraduate study at the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes International in Geneva. On his return in 1997 he took over an appointment at the Military Policy Division, covering the fields of bilateral cooperation and cooperation with OSCE. From 2000 to 2002 he worked with the EU Military Staff in Brussels, focusing on all aspects of force development. 2003 he moved back to the Military Policy Division as Branch Chief EU. In January 2005 he was appointed to Deputy Commander & Chief of Staff in the Austrian
Military Representation Brussels. In October 2006 he took over the appointment of Director Concepts and Capabilities Directorate at EU Military Staff, mainly focussing on policy and plans, doctrine and concepts and military capability development. After his return in December 2008 he was appointed to the position of Director at the Military Policy Division, the position he is still holding today.

**Dr. Nora Vanaga** works as a senior researcher at the Centre for Security and Strategic Research at the National Defence Academy of Latvia. She was also a director of the Master Programme “Military Leadeareship and Security” 2014–2017. She got her Ph.D. in 2015 in the field of international relations at the University of Latvia, defending doctoral thesis “Political will to strengthen human security in foreign policy: case study of Latvia”. She is a lecturer at the National Defence Academy, University of Latvia, Baltic Defence College and the Military College of Ireland. She has written a number of articles and book chapters on Latvia’s defence policy, military cooperation of the Baltic States, European Union security policy, and human security. Her current research interests are on small states defence strategies, deterrence, the military cooperation of the Baltic States, defence policy of Belarus, and conflicts.

**BG Wolfgang Wosolsobe** started his military career in 1974. After several assignments as an infantry officer he attended the General Staff Officers Course of the Austrian Armed Forces (1982-1985) followed by a post as defence planner. He completed his education at France’s École Supérieure de Guerre Interarmées. In 1991, he joined the Austrian Diplomatic Mission in Geneva as a military adviser on disarmament. His international career continued with his assignment as Defence Attaché to France from 1992 to 1997. After a command period he went to deal with military policy, which led him to the post of Defence Policy Director in 2006. From there, he joined Brussels as Austrian Military Representative in 2007. In 2012, he was elected to the post of Director General of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) where he was active from 2013 to 2016.

**Col Zbigniew Zielinski** was Senior Military Adviser of the Permanent Mission of Poland to the OSCE from 2013 to 2017. Before, he was Senior Expert and Deputy Head of the Polish Verification Unit (1997-
2013) and Senior Expert in the Topographic branch (1995-1997). He holds a Master’s degree in Engineering in Military Geodesy and completed postgraduate studies in Foreign Service.
### List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2/AD</td>
<td>Anti-Access/Area Denial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACV</td>
<td>Armored Combat Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEMI</td>
<td>Annual Exchange of Military Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>Armed Forces Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIAM</td>
<td>Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIES</td>
<td>Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCM</td>
<td>Air-launched Cruise Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>AoA</td>
<td>Area of Application</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Armoured Personnel Carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVLB</td>
<td>Armoured vehicle-launched bridge</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAI</td>
<td>Cooperative Airspace Initiatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAX</td>
<td>Computer Assisted Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Command, Control and Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFE (Treaty)</td>
<td>(Treaty on) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHOD</td>
<td>Chief of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CiO</td>
<td>Chairperson in Office</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Cyber- and Information Space</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Centre</td>
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<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>Crisis Response Operations</td>
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<td>CSBM</td>
<td>Confidence and Security Building Measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTBTO</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMA</td>
<td>Dangerous Military Accidents</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASA</td>
<td>European Aviation Safety Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASP</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>ET</td>
<td>Evaluation Team</td>
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<td>FFM</td>
<td>Fact-Finding Mission</td>
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<td>FSC</td>
<td>Forum for Security Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCSP</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEMI</td>
<td>Global Exchange of Military Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLMDS</td>
<td>High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>HoV</td>
<td>Heads of Verification</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarter</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
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<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>INCSEA</td>
<td>Incidents at Sea</td>
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<td>IPRM</td>
<td>Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Inspection Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MANPADS</td>
<td>Man Portable Air Defence System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>Main Battle Tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWES</td>
<td>Major Weapon and Equipment Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>OS (Treaty)</td>
<td>Open Skies (Treaty)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Permanent Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PoC</td>
<td>Point of Contact</td>
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<tr>
<td>pS</td>
<td>participating States</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSOM</td>
<td>Reception, Staging and Onward Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAD</td>
<td>Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLCM</td>
<td>Sea-launched Cruise Missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea Lines of Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standing Operational Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>Short-Range Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWP</td>
<td>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLE</td>
<td>Treaty Limited Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>U(C)AV</td>
<td>Unmanned (Combat) Aerial Vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNROCA</td>
<td>United Nations Register of Conventional Arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD</td>
<td>Vienna Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDE</td>
<td>Vienna Document Evaluation Visits</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDI</td>
<td>Vienna Document Inspections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VJTV</td>
<td>Very High Readiness Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOA</td>
<td>Zone of Application</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
» Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
  http://www.osce.org/library/14108?download=true

» Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community
  http://www.osce.org/mc/74985?download=true

» Forum for Security Co-operation Decision No. 1/10: Establishing a procedure for incorporating relevant FSC decisions into the Vienna Document
  http://www.osce.org/fsc/68695?download=true

» From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration on the Twentieth Anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control
  http://www.osce.org/cio/289496?download=true

» Global Exchange of Military Information
  http://www.osce.org/fsc/41384?download=true

» Helsinki Final Act
  http://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act?download=true

» Lisbon Document
  http://www.osce.org/mc/39539?download=true

» Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
  http://www.osce.org/library/14087?download=true

» Treaty on Open Skies
  http://www.osce.org/library/14127?download=true

» Vienna Document 2011
  http://www.osce.org/fsc/86597?download=true