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SECURITY SECTOR EXPERT FORMATION: ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS IN UKRAINE

1.9 Assessment of Security Sector Expert Formation

1.9.1 Introduction

The current level of expertise within the security sector of Ukraine is an evolutionary product of eleven years of independent development formed under the influence of three main factors: the heritage of the Soviet past, the security environment in independent Ukraine (internal factor), as well as the influences of regional and global security developments (external factor).

Naturally, these factors are often of a contradictory nature and time has proven that eleven years of independence has not been enough to overcome all challenges, and to form a high-quality, truly national security sector expert community which meets the needs of the country.

In terms of structure, the most illustrative achievements in the Ukrainian security sector expert formation can be found in the military sector, while the non-military sector still remains in great need of improvement. Regarding expertise itself, Ukraine's security experts have demonstrated their still prevailing incongruencies. They are more proficient in issues of the national system on a general and conceptual level. Concerning the level of practical and specific substantiation, planning and execution, they are better versed in some of the narrower sectors, often unable to integrate those under the general conceptual framework (platform requires the package of services etc.).

In general, despite many evident achievements in form of institutionalisation and pure functioning, the Ukrainian security sector expert community still undergoes certain forms of transition, in need of

the eradication of visible disproportions in both its structure and functioning. First, the state needs to develop an effective institute of civilian service in the security structures.

1.9.2 General Factors

(a) *The Heritage of the Soviet Past*

On the one hand, after the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine inherited an extremely high number of Soviet scientific and educational systems. In 1991, some 150 colleges and universities were located within Ukraine. One-third were military counterparts. At the same time, a total of over 300 specifically military oriented research institutions and design bureaus existed as well in Ukraine. According to statistical data, a total of 1344⁵⁴ scientific and educational centres carried out military-oriented research work. During the time of the USSR, Ukraine comprised a 17 per cent share in the military-industrial complex output, while 1840 enterprises and research centres employed 2.7 million people on a permanent basis.⁵⁵

On the other hand, all the above mentioned potential was oriented towards servicing the security interests of a larger totalitarian state. It was fractional in form and unsystematic in substance. Therefore, when Ukraine gained its independence, there was no National Security and Defence Council, no Ministry of Defence, no General Staff of the Armed Forces, and no Armed Forces themselves, along with other military formations. Further, Ukraine did not have a scientific and analytical infrastructure within the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) and lacked a government to support strategic planning mechanisms. Ukraine's military-industrial complex simply presented an imitative element of the USSR complex. For 96 per cent, the complex was dependent on supply parts from abroad. The capabilities of the Ministry

⁵⁴ See: 'Problems of the Armed Forces and the Military-Industrial Complex of Ukraine and Civil Control over their Activities' – Analytical report of Ukrainian Centre for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies. Kyiv, 1996.

⁵⁵ V. Shekhovtsov and R. Bodnarchuk. 'Ukraine's Defence Industry Complex: Status and Prospects of Development', *Stratehichna Panorama*, No. 3-4, 1998, p. 138.

of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Security Service of Ukraine were limited, given their republican subordination (within the USSR). Another discouraging aspect was the constant migration of the best security experts to Moscow.

The security structures, even at the republican level, lacked an institute for civil servants with important positions. Civilians in the security structures, especially the military, were only employed for unimportant servicing functions.

(b) *The Internal Security Environment in Independent Ukraine*

During the first years of independence, the military sector remained a main priority of the country. Later, due to the absence of a direct military threat, the political, economic, social and energy sectors gained more attention among authorities and the public. Public opinion polls have showed that since 1995, problems such as personal welfare (76%), food prices (39%) and unemployment (22%), have been the most pressing issues. Citizens were no longer concerned about the defence potential of the state. The issue of defence ranked second last and was considered of importance by only 1 per cent of respondents.⁵⁶

The economic crises of the 1990s aggravated the situation due to lack of managerial experience. The growth of corruption also negatively contributed to the neglect of security issues. For instance, in 1992, almost 72 per cent of expenditures on defence research and development were channelled towards fundamental research, but in the years 1999–2002, this figure dropped to 0.01–0.02%. In 1995, only 133 research and design bureaus worked on the orders of the military-industrial complex.⁵⁷ This number had experienced a great decrease from a total of 300 in the year 1991. Towards the end of the century only 20 research establishments were still in existence. As a result, tens of

⁵⁶ Ukrainian Political and Economic Index (June 1995, p. 1; December 1995, p. 1).

⁵⁷ See V. Badrak. 'The Magnificence and Misery of the Defence Sector', *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 17 July 1999, p. 4.

thousands of talented managers and specialists left the security sector in search of a better future abroad, or in private businesses.

For years, the power branches of Ukraine struggled to establish their authority and only focused on the constitutional processes. The reform of the security sector and the level of its expert proficiency were not among the main priorities in the struggle of a new power system. Ongoing activities mainly focused on the subordination of security structures and the reduction of the Armed Forces. The continuous distrust and occasional hostility between the legislative and executive power branches presented another political factor, which hampered security sector reform. Until recently, the Verkhovna Rada was excluded from the security sector reform process. Each security structure developed its own concepts and programmes, limiting governmental involvement to a minimum. On the level of national security policy formulation, the laws, concepts and programmes were often too generic in nature, lacking proper financial and resource substantiation, as well as specific plans for implementation.

After time, the levers of presidential control became much stronger than the levers of influence on security structures on part of the Cabinet of Ministers, or the Verkhovna Rada. The civil society, among the three, had the least influence on the process. In 2002, the best available strategic and international security studies institutions were almost exclusively working for the executive branch of power. The role of the Parliament was mainly confined to the formal approval of the defence and law enforcement budgets, and the review of bills concerning security structure operations. In result, the military was reduced by its size and became three times smaller than it was in 1992. At the same time, the overall size of the police structures (Ministry of Interior, Security Service, Border Troops and Tax Police etc.) grew steadily and is currently twice as large as the still over-manned military.

On the other hand, by the end of the last decade, the regulatory-legal basis was formed, which governs different aspects of security sector activities. The cooperation of different authorities regarding matters pertaining to the formation of the defence budget and the development of state programmes in the security sector, is slowly improving.

Ukraine has managed to numerically retain and even increase its system of higher education. The number of institutions of higher education has more than doubled, which in 2002 constitutes over 300⁵⁸. Ukraine has successfully adapted the system of military education⁵⁹ to the uniform standards, which are compatible with the civilian ones.

Even in the absence of a system of goal-oriented training of civilian specialists for executive positions within the security structures of Ukraine, the number of experts that could occupy such positions is still rising. Time has done its work. Dozens of civilian specialists (diplomats, economists, lawyers) from different governmental bodies, who were involved in relevant activities within the framework of formulating the state-level programmes, now present the cadre reserves that over time can reinforce security structures and strengthen the civilian component in their management. The cadre reserve could incorporate civil servants who acquired experience in the resolution of defence issues in the Presidential Administration, the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Verkhovna Rada, the National Security and Defence Council Staff, the State Export Control Service, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Further, experience can be obtained in economy, world of finance, judicial system, educational department and/or science components. The security sector can also employ Ukraine's former parliamentarians, who previously worked on Verkhovna Rada committees, dealing with national security, defence and legislative support for law enforcement.

However, today, the potential of employing former governmental officials and military leaders – those who quit the civil (military) service and possess the knowledge, experience and desire to work – has not become reality in many cases. Another major factor that negatively impacts the security sector expert formation should also be noted: most experts working in governmental structures and in parliamentary

⁵⁸ See 'The System of Education in Ukraine: the State and Prospects of Development', Analytical report of Razumkov Centre, *National Security and Defence*, No. 4, 2002.

⁵⁹ Ukraine's system of military education currently includes 3 senior level academies, 5 military institutes, 6 military institutes within civilian universities, 4 military faculties at civilian universities, 30 reserve officer training departments at civilian universities and colleagues.

secretariats have received humiliatingly low levels of social benefits and incentives.

(c) *The Influences of Regional and Global Security Developments*

Towards the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were quite a number of important security developments taking place within and outside of Ukraine. Some external projects were located in the Kosovo, Chechnya, USA (after September 11) and NATO as well as the EU. Ukraine's military leaders no longer hesitated to mention foreign military threats close to the Ukrainian borders. 'The probability of the state's participation in low and medium intensity conflicts remains realistic. This is conditioned by the existence of territorial claims to Ukraine on the part of certain circles of some neighbouring states.'⁶⁰

Regarding the previous statement, Ukraine's society, or at least its security expert community, started to think about defence and security once again. However, so far it has not taken any chances to initiate the much needed radical security sector reforms and to go beyond the modest pay increases of security sector personnel. The evident revival of attention towards security matters was made clear to all after September 11 and, indeed, after Ukraine's 'own' catastrophes. First, the downing of the Russian passenger airliner by a Ukrainian missile over the Black Sea on 4 October 2001, and, secondly, the crash of a fighter aircraft into a crowd of spectators during an air show in Lviv on 27 July 2002. Immediately after these events, politicians called for a strengthening of security and an increase in security-related expenditures on the level of intelligence and defence. However, a few months later, Ukrainian parliamentarians passed a defence budget for the 2002 fiscal year that did not even satisfy the minimum (critical) requirements for the Armed Forces. The same happened one year later. In that case, it was unrealistic to expect a meaningful increase in expenditure for defence and foreign intelligence, if the importance of the foreign threat oriented segment of the security sector still remained at such a low level.

⁶⁰ M. Palchuk. Some views of the prospects of further development of Armed Forces of Ukraine. *Nauka i Oborona*, 2001, No. 4, p. 29.

1.9.3 Expert Preparedness for Tasks and Assignments

(a) *Ukrainian Parliament and Parliamentary Staff*

As far as the Ukrainian Parliament and parliamentary staff is concerned, a shared opinion is held about the current insufficient level of expertise among the members of the Verkhovna Rada in security matters. Few of them have the required necessary personal experience on security issues, and equally few have experienced personal aids that are qualified to work on security related legislations.

According to some unofficial estimates, the majority of parliamentarians neither have a conceptual understanding of the country's security sector problems, nor do they have any personal incentives to get engaged in the process of resolution. Even for democratic countries, traditional parliamentary hearings on security matters are a rare and generally random occurrence. In addition, the Ukrainian Parliament does not benefit from the formal support of a single research institution.

The parliamentary staff generally possesses a necessary expertise, but their effectiveness is objectively limited by significant impediments. In particular, the mere number of qualified personnel within the Verkhovna Rada Staff is insufficient to perform all assigned tasks at the required level of quality. In addition, the staff members are only equipped with the necessary information, materials and analytical tools. Occasionally, they do not even possess a personal computer, which prevents them from receiving required literature or from requesting necessary information on security structures.

The training of parliamentary staff is still unsystematic and generally left to their own consideration. Episodically, they participate in expert conferences via their personal contacts, rather than through programmes of cooperation or training plans.

(b) *Political Secretariats of the Ministries of Defence, the Interior and Justice (Possibly Others)*

The first and most dangerous defining feature for all security structures (Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Security Service, Ministry of Emergency, Border Troops and others) in terms of expert preparedness, is the virtual absence of the institution of civilian servants within key positions of every security establishment. Thus, Ukraine still has no mechanism of direct control, and no responsibility towards its civilians. As a result, the key sectors, which in democratic countries are traditionally controlled by civilians (oversight of the implementation of policy, logistics, maintenance, personnel education and training, international cooperation, legislative activity, relations with higher authorities etc.), are in Ukraine governed by uniformed officers. Therefore, Ukraine's security structures went through several years of crisis.

An important element of the system, which provides control from the inside to the military and to other security structures, has yet to be established. For example, the institution of civil servants at responsible posts (including political secretariats). A positive step can be considered the appointment of a civilian executive (former mid-level official of the Administration of the President of Ukraine, Alexander Oliynyk) in January 2002.

The institution of State Secretaries (supposedly civil servants) was introduced into the security structures in 2001. Their offices were recently filled, along with the development of relevant regulations and procedures for their operability. At the same time, State Secretaries, as well as other top leaders of the security structures, continued to be supported primarily by already existing, so-called Information-Analytical Sections (IAS). The Information-Analytical Sections were introduced into all security structures in 1997.

These structures serve a typical mission for the collection and analysis of information on the state of readiness of subordinate units and their problems. They could also be asked to provide relevant proposals for the improvement of a subordinate unit's effectiveness. The most

sophisticated network of IAS was created in the Armed Forces, where they exist in each service and are coordinated by the Information-Analytical Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

While the average level of professional expertise in the IAS could be assessed as satisfactory, the still prevalent and widespread shortcomings should be noted. These deficiencies include a lack of theoretical knowledge and practical experience in defence and security resource management. Another widespread problem is posed by low level salaries and other social benefits, which prevents the department from attracting and retaining qualified personnel in order to produce quality products. Further, the IAS budget is scarce and does not allow the purchasing of necessary equipment and software, as well as subscription to national as well as foreign literature.

The above-mentioned problems are similar in specialised defence research institutions, which should provide expert advice, such as for example the Ministry of Defence's major research structures: the Central Research Institute of the Armed Forces, the Central Research Institute of Armaments, the National Research Centre of Defence Technologies and Military Security etc.

In all security structures, the expert community includes the instructing staff of educational establishments, especially those of senior level academies. Their average level of expertise can also be considered satisfactory. Recently, especially in the Ministry of Defence, intensive efforts have been undertaken to improve the inside structures, programmes and curricula in accordance with the new requirements posed by internal, regional and global security developments. However, as minister, General Volodymyr Shkidchenko recently indicated in his speech to the students of the National Defence Academy of Ukraine⁶¹ that significant obstacles still need to be removed. One of those obstacles is the lack of practice in organising joint peacekeeping operations, stereotypes of the past, lack of initiative etc. The Minister was

⁶¹ See K. Bekeshchenko. 'Ukraine needs Officers of New Formation', *Narodna Armiya*, 4 September 2002.

particularly disturbed by the low number of students training at senior academic (operational strategic) level.

It should also be noted that in comparison with similar senior level military and security colleges in the West, Ukrainian curricula, despite all efforts, still lag behind and do not benefit from the most advanced developments in subject studies related to the fundamentals of national and international security, theories in international relations and conflict studies. This is related to the fact that Soviet scientific schools, which were inherited by the Ukrainian senior level educational system, were rather weak and highly politicised on the strategic name of security. Ukraine, throughout its process of independence, has had little time to develop and establish its own security strategy.

(c) *Other Leading Representatives of the Executive*

The category of other leading representatives of the executive includes the Administration of the President of Ukraine, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDC) and its staff members, and the Cabinet of Ministers. While the first two representatives of the executive – the Presidential Administration and NSDC Staff – primarily exercise the overall (often overlapping) functions of coordination and control over the security sector in Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers is mainly responsible for the everyday material and financial support.

A uniquely Ukrainian phenomenon is that both the Administration of the President and the NSDC Staff formally exist outside the executive branch of power. According to the constitution, it should be under the Cabinet. However, in reality and in essence they form the executive and exert major influence on security structures. Both political bodies structurally contain operational and research segments, and employ the best experts available in the governmental service. However, in most cases these experts are over the age of 50. On the one hand, they possess professional and life experience, but on the other hand, a ‘respectable’ age naturally limits an expert's ability to learn, risk and improve.

The Administration of the President consists of two subdivisions that deal with security-related aspects. Operational support for the President of Ukraine on security related issues is provided by the Administration's Main Department for Activities of Military Formations, Law Enforcement Structures and Judicial Reform. This department focuses on the general presidential oversight of Ukraine's security structures. The department primarily employs retired military and law-enforcement personnel, as well as retired generals and senior officers. Due to the non-accessible and rather closed nature of work, it is difficult to assess their level of professionalism. However, some indicators suggest that the level is satisfactory.

Basically, the same is true regarding another Administration's subdivision – the National Institute for Strategic Studies, which provides analytical support to the activities of the Administration. It consists of several regional branches and possesses the overall capability of producing quality analyses of security issues.

The Staff of Ukraine's NSDC specifically focuses on security related coordination and analytical activity. It renders everyday information and provides analytical and organisational support for Ukraine's NSDC. It employs mostly civilian experts, though there are many retired servicemen too. The NSDC Staff operates a specialised Department on Defence Security Planning whose competence encompasses issues of defence and military-industrial policy. The NSDC's analytical efforts are supported by subordinate research institutions such as: the National Institute for International Security Problems and the Ukrainian Institute of Environmental and Resources Studies. In comparison with a similar research branch of the Administration of the President (National Institute for Strategic Studies), it should be noted that research institutions under the auspices of NSDC generally have more acute personnel problems and receive less language training.

The Cabinet of Ministers exercises everyday support of the security structure's activity, and drafts their budgets consequently, in order to be submitted for the Parliament's consideration and approval. The former exercise is rather technical and rarely evokes complaints, as opposed to the latter, which is prepared primarily by the Ministry of Finance under

the oversight of the Cabinet's Committees. In case of security related expenses, it is overseen by the Committee of Defence, Defence-Industrial Complex and Law-Enforcement Activity.

Every year, the budgeting process provokes sharp discussions and severe criticism. Every security structure complains about financial shortages. However, almost all complaints subside with the exception of the most unsatisfied, which usually tends to be the Ministry of Defence. The reasons for this problem are the inability of the state to support a still rather large military and a deficient overall defence budgeting process. Defence expenditures are only planned for the following year, without any meaningful long-term arrangements. The limitations of an annual plan and practice have long proven ineffective.

The procedure of defence budget formation and substantiation requires serious changes, whereas the level of planner's expertise demands serious improvement concerning their competence. The world experience offers rational approaches to the defence budget drafting and approval. As a rule, they are based on the cyclical (one cycle being equal to two or three years) goal-oriented planning method of 'planning – programming – budgeting'. This process is based on long-term development plans, which undergo adjustments every year. Nevertheless, the transition from a year-long term to a cyclical approach in defence planning in Ukraine is still far from becoming reality.⁶² The lack of necessary expert knowledge and practice with regard to different levels of the defence budgeting process could be one of the many reasons for this problem.

⁶² Time limitation is not the only problem of the budget process. No less important are the frequent changes in tax legislation, a significant 'shadow' sector of economy, and the non-functional character of the budget. These factors complicate both the collection of budget revenues and the effective use of the allocated funds. Meanwhile, without resolving those issues one can hardly hope for a stable funding of security structures, the transition from 'fight for survival' to development, and drawing closer to the standards of developed democratic countries. Here, the role of parliamentary control (in the broad sense) over the security sector could be stronger.

(d) *Representatives of the Civil Society*

The academic segment of Ukraine's security sector expert community is represented by three major branches: research institutions under the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; the design bureau of the defence industry; and emerging security studies centres, which belong to some of the most advanced higher educational establishments. The first two categories often stagnate because of general financial problems, ageing of personnel, lack of orders, lack of language training, outflow of the most qualified personnel to private businesses abroad, etc. Only a smaller part manage to transform.

Within the apparatus of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine there exists a specific security research coordination body, called the Section of Applied Problems. The section's main objective is to provide expert assessment and coordination of academic studies in the interest of national security and defence. So far, the significance of this structure has been rather limited due to financial constraints, but the Section is expected to play a more prominent role if the attention to security sector applied research continues growing.

The situation in the third category is rather different. The practice of having security study centres within universities had not been known in Ukraine before. But today, they are steadily growing in number, and reasons exist to expect that they will grow in substance too. This natural process is supported both from within and from without. Support from foreign structures in the form of grants, along with natural demands by a developing civil society in Ukraine, will surely bring those young centres, at some point in the future, to a mature condition. This tendency will further promote an expert development process, which is already common among developed democracies.

Currently, however, neither the state, nor Ukraine's local authorities provide meaningful support for university research centres. Therefore, they primarily rely on financial grants from abroad. For instance, by the end of 2002, well over 600 Ukrainian researchers received grants from the NATO, and from the beginning of Ukraine-NATO cooperative

programmes in 1994, over 1000 Ukrainian scholars were granted financial assistance for seminar participation and other events.

(e) *The Role of Journalists*

The role of journalists as security experts is generally growing in Ukraine, though this is more true regarding defence issues, than areas of law-enforcement, arms trade and intelligence activity. On the one hand, the declared course towards building the fundamentals of democracy in Ukraine had steadily brought more and more positive effects on the consolidation of mass media positions regarding the treatment of military subjects. The number of institutions that have dealt with military issues over the last few years has risen significantly. The range of defence-related issues covered by the press has clearly expanded. As a result, the authorities' and society's attention can be drawn to a wider range of defence problems.

However, the situation of publication for non-military security structures is completely different. Few journalists dare to publish openly about law enforcement or special service body activities, especially if the topic concerns their involvement with corrupt officials or the criminal world. However, there are still those who pursue this path and bring with them the spirit of hope.

There are some important restrictions to Ukraine's media coverage that need to be mentioned: First, limited freedom of press in general, and secondly, uneven distribution of writing and/or broadcasting rights of different media segments on security matters. The distribution primarily depends on the cost of the media outlet. The higher the costs, for instance in the case of TV, the less freedom there is, and consequently, the lower the journalist expertise. The least expensive and least 'harnessed' by authorities is the electronic media, which is currently the most advanced on security issues. The print media holds the intermediary position. There are only a few authoritative and open publications. So, the level of expertise of journalists regarding Ukraine's security matters can be considered a victim of an unfriendly attitude on behalf of security structures towards themselves, or an inability of their

personnel to communicate with the press. Overall, problems can be related to the generally limited freedom of the press in the country.

(f) *Non-Governmental Experts Working in NGOs*

As far as non-governmental experts working in NGOs are concerned, a tendency of quality improvements and a growing role in the security sector reform can be noted. From being mainly enthusiastic amateur organisations during the early 1990s, they grew and evolved into hundreds of different types of NGOs, including several influential ‘think tanks’, which are capable of producing first-rate policy studies, independent research, substantiated proposals, as well as hosting international conferences. They are most active in foreign policy and military spheres. The centres include Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov (Razumkov Centre); the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy; the Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies; the Ukrainian Independent Centre for Political Studies; the Centre for Non-proliferation Studies; the Centre for European and International Studies; the Atlantic Council of Ukraine; Kyiv’s Centre of East-West Institute; the Europe XXI Foundation and a few others.

Due to the help and support of Western grant-giving organisations and progressively minded businesses in Ukraine, the network of non-governmental research and public organisations is currently expanding. The non-governmental research centres in Ukraine have accumulated significant and active intellectual potential. The above mentioned ‘think tanks’ issue regular (monthly or quarterly) analytical publications. Also, their leading experts rank among the most frequent commentators on TV, in the printed press and the electronic editions. Many of them, such as the Razumkov Centre and the Centre for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies have created highly developed websites.

Over the last few years, both the Ukrainian Parliament and government started to pay more attention to the use of this potential. Often, this attention is still declarative, just to show the democratic character of the authorities, but in many cases it is indeed mutually beneficial. The

advantage of strong non-governmental analytical centres is found in their independent, alternative and unbiased view of urgent problems that need to be resolved. Furthermore, they employ charitable funds, sponsor funds or their own assets for such research rather than limited budgetary resources.

There exist various ways of how official structures interact with NGOs. For example, the establishment of the NGO Advisory Board by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the minister's auspices, looks very promising. A second example shows how each member of the Parliament receives a free copy of the Razumkov Centre's monthly magazine, *National Security & Defence*, and many experts of the Razumkov Centre possess the status of freelance consultants for various parliamentary committees. Until recently, the Razumkov Centre and some other NGOs regularly got invited to contribute their analysis to the yearly Presidential address to the Parliament. As witnessed by foreign observers: 'An impressive feature of the seminar and conference scene in the Ukraine shows that, even if attendance is restricted to small numbers and very senior official participants, representatives of the more prominent NGOs now tend to be invited as a matter of course.'⁶³

However, there are two very strong limitations to the activities of the Ukrainian think tanks. First, the majority of the really influential think tanks are located in the capital city of Kyiv. Secondly, they are not yet strong enough to touch on very politically sensitive areas of law-enforcement and intelligence activities. Further, it is not at all easy for an independent NGO to conduct research in the current environment of Ukraine, when being independent and open often means to step on someone's toes. As far as the area of non-military security activities is concerned, Ukrainian think tanks play a very marginal role. As rightly

⁶³ 'Although this still cannot be said of the news media, here too, shyness and hostility are disappearing. Western activity and presence by means of NATO and bilateral training programmes and the funding of NGOs has reached significant levels. A number of foreign specialists now regularly collaborate with official structures as well as NGOs on defence reform and other issues relevant to Ukraine's national security. This activity has played an instrumental role in breaking down barriers in Ukraine.' See J. Sherr, 'Security, Democracy, and Civil Democratic Control', in D.P. Moroney, T. Kuzio and M. Molchanov (eds), *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*, (Praeger, 2002), p. 103.

noted by the same insightful observer James Sherr: ‘Within recent years, NGO research on the Armed Forces and defence sector has become bolder, better and more respected by the armed services themselves. One would be hard put to find any critical analysis, let alone an equivalent standard of analysis of the MVD [Interior Ministry], SBU [Security Service] or State Tax Administration.’⁶⁴

Indeed, while experts often generally speak about the need to build a democratic civilian control not just over the military, but over other security structures as well, it rarely becomes quite specific. This development prevails for many reasons. However, the question remains why no influential think tanks have ever come up with a specific analysis of non-military security structures, which could be distantly compared to the analysis of Armed Forces.

1.9.4 Existing Possibilities for Expert Formation

It should be stressed that important assistance in personnel training for the higher headquarters of security structures is already rendered by Ukraine’s foreign partners. Ukrainian representatives are regularly invited to attend training courses (undergo probation), all the more so as their organisers encourage the priority of participation for civilian specialists dealing with security issues. However, the bulk of specific training courses, provided by foreign partners for rank and file personnel, have been so far directed to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

For instance, the Armed Forces of Ukraine maintain military cooperation with 76 different countries; almost 300 documents on cooperation issues have been signed by the end of 2002; considerable assistance packages have been received from partners over the years of independence (the biggest from the US, amounting to some \$650 million overall). Ukraine enjoys very fruitful cooperation with the NATO as an organisation. Within the framework of the ‘Partnership for Peace’ Programme, Ukraine’s cooperation with individual NATO member states and NATO

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.105.

partners (including non-aligned Austria, Switzerland and Sweden), has been developing both promisingly and qualitatively. For example, about 600 joint activities between the NATO and Ukraine have been planned for 2002, and the most part of the costs is taken on by the USA, along with other developed democracies.

Indeed, Ukraine obtains a significant amount of assistance within the framework of the PfP Programme. Its representatives are invited to courses on civil-military relations, which are organised in Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey, Switzerland, Sweden and other countries. Many other type courses, including courses offered at the NATO Defence College, are regularly offered to Ukraine, too. One of the most promising PfP arrangements in terms of security sector expert formation is certainly the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes (US–German initiative supported by Switzerland) – an international organisation dedicated to the strengthening of defence and military education and research, through enhanced institutional and national cooperation. Currently, the Consortium consists of more than 200 organisations that are located in 42 countries, which comprise the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) region. This arrangement enables specific groups of experts to share and exchange knowledge within a particular field, which could be especially beneficial for Ukrainian instructors, scholars and members of different NGOs.

The Secretariat of the Consortium is located at the George C. Marshall Centre for Security Studies, which also offers significant opportunities for Ukraine's expert formation. By the end of 2002, a total of 155 representatives of Ukraine, including over 50 civilians, will be educated in all three main training courses at the Marshal Centre. In addition, more than 300 Ukrainians were trained in short-term courses, or took part in seminars in Ukraine and the Centre.

Many opportunities for expert training are offered by the governments of individual NATO member countries and partners. The US IMET (International Military Education & Training) programme also offers

vast possibilities for personnel training.⁶⁵ Between 1994 and 2002, Ukraine was allocated over \$10 million within the framework of that programme. This allowed for 357 people, including 81 civilians from the Staff of the Verkhovna Rada, government and security structures, the Ministry of Defence (see Table 13.1) to undergo training.

Table 13.1 The US IMET programme for Ukraine: general indicators⁶⁶

<i>Fiscal Year</i>	<i>Training expenses, \$ thousand</i>	<i>Number of students, total</i>	<i>Participating civilians</i>
1994	0,600	8	1
1995	0,707	40	23
1996	1,020	33	9
1997	1,015	37	9
1998	1,250	46	16
1999	1,250	48	4
2000	1,338	43	2
2001	1,443	49	5
2002	1,560	53	12
Total	10,493	357	81

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces provides another type of expert training support for Ukraine by conducting a continuous series of high profile conferences on a variety of important security subjects within the Ukrainian Parliament, and by offering financial and other types of support to many NGOs throughout Ukraine.

The Canadian Government has arranged a month-long course of Democratic Civil-Military Relations – in addition to language and other

⁶⁵ It is worth noting that special training within the framework of the I___ Programme and in the G. Marshall Centre was undergone by high-level civilian and military executives: among the former – top executive officials like K. Hryshchenko, L. Minin, V. Chumakov and some parliamentarians; the latter included high ranking generals I. Bizhan, M. Hudym, S. Malynovskyi, V. Muntiyani, V. Paliy, B. Pylypiv, V. Sytnyk, O. Shchykotovskyi and many more.

⁶⁶ According to the Office of Defence Cooperation of the US Embassy in Ukraine.

type courses – for mid level governmental officials and personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

There are examples of Western non-governmental organisations that also play a prominent role in the organisation of expert training in Ukraine. Since 1997, the Harvard Programme ‘National Security of Ukraine’, organised by Harvard University (USA) in cooperation with the London based International Institute for Security Studies, has involved over 100 of Ukraine’s representatives, including generals and their civilian equivalents. Among them were Ukraine’s People’s Deputies, representatives of the Presidential Administration, the staff of the Cabinet of Ministers, Ukraine’s NSDC, security structures, ministries and agencies, academic research institutions and NGOs.

Many countries, such as the UK, France, Germany, Hungary, Austria and others offer specific individual education, training and exchange programmes, which provide Ukrainians with the opportunity and pleasure to participate. For example, hundreds of Ukrainians have already graduated from colleges and courses abroad. Conversely, within the National Defence Academy of Ukraine exist provisions for the employment of foreign instructors. Currently, one French colonel and one Canadian major teach officer courses of a multinational staff committee. In the past, two American officers studied courses at the Ukrainian Army Institute.⁶⁷

It should be noted that within Ukraine certain possibilities for further improvement of parliamentary, governmental and NSDC Staff expert training exist. For instance, this situation is true for the National Defence Academy of Ukraine, the Academy of the Interior Ministry, or the Academy of State Governance under the President of Ukraine. One of the problems within the national dimension of security sector expert development could partly remain in the mere low interest and lack of

⁶⁷ In October 2002 there were more than 150 foreign military students from 7 different countries (including NATO member Hungary) studying at various Ukrainian military institutions. See V. Knysh. Our instructors and methods are valued. *Narodna Armiya*, 5 October 2002. Starting from 1992, over 1500 foreigners had undergone military training in Ukraine. See ‘Within the Framework of a United System of Education’, *Narodna Armiya*, 5 October 2002.

concern on part of the current Parliament's and other structure's leaderships, which then may result in low coordination and control. For example, the former Minister of Defence of Ukraine, Olexandr Kuzmuck (now member of the Parliament), recently complained⁶⁸ that almost all courses that are organised for civilian experts in the National Defence Academy of Ukraine were of an unacceptably low status. This statement undermined the idea of civilian expert education in the military.

However, besides the low status of expert education, the incompatibility of foreign diplomats with the standards of the Ukrainian educational system poses another major problem to the successful training of experts within this sector. The latter problem has been waiting to be resolved for years, but so far no attempts have been made.

1.9.5 Desired Possibilities for Expert Formation (What to Do?)

The key to further progress in the security sector of Ukraine is held by Ukrainian authorities. If the current plans shift more responsibilities from Presidential power to the Parliament (in forming the government and controlling the security sector), and if in the near future a meaningful progress in establishing potent civilian control can be accomplished (political secretariats included) within the security structure, then the new system will require many more qualified civilian experts than there are currently available, and consequently, more diverse (general and specific) courses would be desired.

Some room for improvement, even within the existing system of Ukraine does exist. For example, the National Defence Academy of Ukraine (and similar institutions of other security structures) could initiate regular seminars for journalists, specialising in security and defence matters. The Academy could invite authoritative Ukrainian and foreign civilian guest-speakers who have the experience of working at

⁶⁸ During the discussion at the International Conference 'Parliamentary Oversight over the Security Sector and Defence' held in Kyiv on 27–28 September 2002. Conference organisers were the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, NSDC of Ukraine and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

executive positions in the security structures or who are famous for their theoretical work.

The planned training of civilian specialists in specifically designed courses on the basis of the National Defence Academy should begin two years after those courses were announced. Civil servants of high executive categories, involved in the defence decision-making processes, should be trained at the Academy in relation with military servicemen.

The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, in cooperation with security structures, should work out a programme to establish a network of security research organisations (centres) in leading universities. Educational courses and research programmes dealing with civil-military relations, international security, conflict study, etc., should be introduced to Ukraine's higher educational establishments. The programmes of officer training for all security structures ought to include a mandatory course of civil-military relations.

Based on the current situation of help being offered to Ukraine from foreign countries, as well as by still existing needs of improvement of expert activity in specific areas, the following observation can be made: courses offered should be less general, more specific, and more coordinated and targeted towards the needs of a specific structure and activity. General knowledge about the foundations of civilian control over the military and other democratic mechanisms is already available to Ukrainian experts and mostly understood by those who were willing to receive new knowledge.

Therefore, the new courses should primarily focus on areas where external help can make a difference and where it is mostly needed. Those areas include the following:

- parliamentary staff;
- everything that helps to democratise law-enforcement and security service structures (their personnel, journalists writing

about these structures, NGOs analysing them, parliamentarians of the relevant committees etc.);

- civilian candidates for responsible posts in all security structures;
- experts, who practically deal with drafting budgets for security structures;
- experts working for Information-Analytical Sections of different security structures etc.

Language training for experts and all possible support regarding emerging security studies centres at universities should remain a major focus.

Currently, two groups of Ukrainian experts present the greatest need for additional courses. Those are: parliamentary staff and personnel of non-military structures. The other two groups are in need of better management and more money. The military probably receives enough money (keeping in mind that Ukraine's military continues to downsize), but is often unable to realise strategies that have been suggested by foreign partners. Non-governmental and university research centres, as well as journalists, often have plenty of new ideas and projects, but lack the money to realise and implant those plans.

Concerning practical measures, it helps to remember that an emphasis on different problem-solving approaches needs to be improved. For instance, the parliamentary staff should emphasise technical rather than ideological matters. They need to gain more knowledge on Western practices of the preparation of draft laws in the sphere of security and defence, expert analysis of such draft laws, and other country's practices and standards. Here, courses could be offered both in Ukraine and abroad, with the method of Advanced Distance Learning (ADL) as one very promising option.

However, for the non-military security structures of Ukraine, which still remain in the form and substance of unreformed Soviet era relics, courses on traditions of securing basic human rights, the rule of law, freedom of expression, Western practices of managing classified information, and working with the media should be considered. Practical experiences/courses abroad (especially instructor training) are of high importance in providing first-hand experience (most instrumental in changing psychology). Foreign advisors in ministries/headquarters are desirable, but the pragmatism of such a method should be tested in practice.

As far as the military is concerned, in addition to what has already been done, foreign instructors on the fundamentals of national and international security, theories in international relations, joint and combined operations and conflict studies for the National Defence Academy and other military educational institutions could help. ADL courses and internships should be offered whenever appropriate.

For non-governmental and university research centres, academia and journalists, more internships along with broader ADL opportunities would be desirable.

1.9.6 Conclusion

The problem of expert formation in Ukraine is complex and possible solutions are not simple. In many areas, prominent analysts and potentially capable young experts just refuse to serve due to humiliatingly low salaries, or other social as well as career difficulties. On the other hand, many retired servicemen after a career in the military or security structures, pull money from their retirement pension and adult children, which lowers the sensitivity issue of the salary and therefore reaches a completely different status than for younger civilian employees. So, the development of more effective personnel management and social reward cultures remain among the major challenges for the success of the security sector expert formation process at this point of transition in Ukraine.

The most urgent problem of security sector expert formation in Ukraine – in terms of focus and needs – goes beyond the pure military sector, to non-military security structures. As many top experts indicate, the majority of current security threats to Ukraine are of a non-military nature. The same kind of support in expert formation, which has been offered to the military so far, should certainly be offered to non-military structures as well.

Another key problem of this process is posed by the very slow development of the ‘class’ of civilian servants at responsible posts within security structures. This layer should serve as a driving force beyond security sector reform and expert formation. Ukrainian experience has proven once again the correctness of the dictum – military and other security structures cannot reform themselves. Until a meaningful process has been achieved in the creation of responsible civil insiders in the security structures, the talk about expert formation within these structures will remain largely irrelevant, and should probably be set aside until after this problem is solved in Ukraine.

While keeping these major problems in mind, let us first do what is doable. In the near future, a major focus should be held on the segments that are most receptive to outside support. Those include the following: parliamentary staff and parliamentarians' aids, journalists, university security studies centres and independent think tanks. The latter already proved its capability to expedite the reform process and raise an expert cadre for both legislative and executive branches of power. They will likely be producing more and more qualified experts given further Western support and further progress in democratic reforms in Ukraine. Let us hope that this support and this progress are irreversible.