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Strategische Analysen

The Union's Foreign, Security and Defence Policies and Austria's Ambitions

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This paper argues that due to the geopolitical changes of the 1990s, the United States is no longer preoccupied with security risks in Europe. This conclusion is reinforced by the events of 11 September 2001, the subsequent declaration of the war on terror, and the Iraq crisis of early 2003. Due to the new strategic realities the European Union must not only strike a new transatlantic bargain, but renew its attempts to develop a credible Common Foreign and Security (CFSP) and a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as well. As a consequence, there is an urgent need to develop the Unions Rapid Reaction Force (EURFF) into a credible force for peace support and combat operations. This paper concludes with an attempt to define Austria's role in this process and the consequences for the structure of its armed forces.

The Geopolitical Changes

The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union had important implications for transatlantic relations. During the Cold War European allies had got used to American engagement. However, this engagement was forced upon the Americans by the Cold War, which was an exceptional period in history, when America's interests in Europe were being threatened. After the Cold War America's interests were more likely to be at stake in the Far East (the Koreas and Taiwan), Central Asia (the oil-rich Caspian Sea region), the oil-rich Persian Gulf Region (Iraq and Iran), the Middle East (Israel and Palestine) and Central and South America (the war on drugs in Colombia). It is only logical that the United States refocused its attention on these regions. Moreover, as Europe no longer is America's number one security preoccupation, the transatlantic security relationship will change. Now that Europe is not threatened and the EU is economically an equal partner, the United States expects European to take care of their own backyard by means of their CFSP and

its ESDP. In addition, the Americans expect European support if their interests are being threatened. For the Europeans this requires a change from *security consumer* to *security provider*, for which they are mentally, organizationally and militarily not equipped.

Due to the geopolitical changes of the 1990s and response to the events of the early 21st century some fundamental differences have become visible between the United States and its traditional European allies, with the exception of the United Kingdom. First, there are considerable transatlantic differences in threat perception. On the one hand, the measures taken in 1998 and 1999 expressed a growing American fear of the consequences of the proliferation of missiles and WMD and the threat of catastrophic terrorism. This fear led to a feeling of vulnerability, as a result of which the freedom to act in foreign policy would be limited and the hegemonic position would be encroached upon. War against the United States was unlikely in the past and will be unlikely in the future, but United States territory is by no means safe. As far as WMD are concerned, their means of delivery and terrorism are the only applicable threats for the weak, the measures mentioned are logical. Enemies will not confront the United States head-on, because they are no match for its army, navy, air force and marines. They will exploit the inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities of its open, liberal, democratic and industrialised society through asymmetrical forms of warfare, most notably terrorist attacks on American soil but also on its interests abroad. Thus, for the US, terrorism and missiles are very real threats, although over the last decades only a small portion of the total terror-related casualties were Americans.¹

On the other hand, Europeans have learned to live with a complex security situation. Throughout its history Europe experienced numerous and disastrous wars as an essential

element of a continuous process of nation building. Apart from all this, Europeans are also not unfamiliar with terrorism and at present it is considered to be the only threat to European societies. Over the last decades Europeans have endured many incidents of terrorism, from the IRA in Northern Ireland to the Bader-Meinhof Group in Germany and from the Red Brigades in Italy to the ETA in Spain. Moreover, European governments are familiar with rogue states, for example, in 1986 Libya fired a missile at Lampedusa, an uninhabited Italian island. This was the only direct attack on NATO territory in the existence of the Alliance, but it did not result in a European call for missile defences. In Europe the security risks of WMD and missiles are just not perceived as great enough to justify the spending of taxpayers' money. Many European policymakers consider the NMD as a disproportionate measure against a distant threat.

Second, there are transatlantic differences in opinion about how security could be provided. European governments do not underestimate the threats of wars, terrorism, and rogue states, they are simply used to *managing* complex security situations. The problem of terror is managed through a combination of practical measures and political means. For example, Irish separatism was dealt with by the British armed forces by fighting militant IRA members and by political dialogue with Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA. European security management aimed at preventing wars has traditionally been done through engagement, i.e. regimes and treaties. The emphasis on multilateralism and loss of sovereignty go hand in hand. As a result of European integration Europeans have been steadily giving up powers to Brussels. Americans do not see any source of democratic legitimacy higher than the constitutional nation state.

This supports the view of Robert Kagan, who argued that the Europeans believe that peaceful world is one governed by law, norms, and international agreements. In this world, power politics have become obsolete. Americans, by contrast, believe power-politics is needed to deal with Iraq, Al Qaeda and other malign forces. Kagan argues that the Europeans do not understand that their safety is ultimately guaranteed by American military power.²

To put it over-simply, Europeans like international law and norms because they are weaker than the United States; the latter like unilateralism because it is the only remaining superpower. Consequently, European governments seek relative security whereas Americans seek absolute security. Generally speaking, Europeans try to manage the risks and minimise the problems whereas Americans seek military victory. Europeans put more emphasis on intent; the United States stresses capability. Europe overemphasises economics whilst the United States overemphasises political and military issues. As a result, Europeans and Americans differ fundamentally in the methods of dealing with contemporary security threats. Europeans put emphasis on 'soft security', i.e. diplomacy, sanctions and incentives such as economic aid and peace support operations. Americans emphasise 'hard security', i.e. limited wars of intervention to defend interests and promote regional security. Of course, the Americans got involved in diplomatic efforts and peace support operations, like those in the Balkans, but in most cases European allies asked them to. America's security situation is less complex because, with the exception of the Civil War, no war took place on its soil. By definition US armed forces are expeditionary forces for deployment outside the *Continental US* to defend its interests.

Third, in contrast to most European powers, the United States needs an enemy to focus its foreign and security policy. The United States

¹ A. K. Cronin, Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of Terrorism, *Survival*, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, p. 124.

² R. Kagan, Power and Weakness, *Policy Review*, no. 116, June-July 2002.

has a problem-solving, materialistic culture and without an enemy there is no problem to solve. American history is full of examples of its unwillingness and inability to organise its policy well until there is a specific threat. Watershed events in American history such as the 1942 attack on Pearl Harbor, the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea, the blockade of Berlin, the 1962 Cuba crisis and most recently, the September 11 attacks have had a catalysing effect on American society which mobilised political will to act decisively. European policy-makers, probably with the exception of the British, underestimate the effects of these events since they tend to interpret American action as 'unilateralist'.

Hard-liners Prevail

With the inauguration of George W. Bush as President of the United States in 2000 the difference between Europe and the US became even more visible. Already in its first six months in office the Bush Administration moved towards a hard-line unilateralist position. It decided to deploy NMD; abrogated the 1972 ABM Treaty; rejected the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; refused to ratify the Rio Pact on biodiversity, opposed the ban on landmines, withdrew from the Biological Weapons Convention ratified by the United States in 1975; and withdrew from the treaty on the International Criminal Court (ICC) which had been signed by the previous President shortly before leaving office. These decisions conflicted with European views on the value of regimes and treaties.

On 20 September 2001, Bush declared war on terrorism during a speech to Congress. This speech is considered to be the most important statement on grand strategy since President Truman's speech of March 12 1947 when the United States declared to fight communism world-wide. After September 11 the Administration refused an offer to help from NATO, which had invoked Article 5 (its collective defence

clause), for the first time in history. Bush reluctantly accepted British military aid during the war against the Taleban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Next, the American President wanted immunity from the ICC, which had been formed on July 1 2002, for American peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. For that reason, he threatened to block a UN mandate for the continued deployment of the International Police Task Force in the Balkans. This not only put the entire NATO mission in the Balkans at risk, but also led to severe criticism from America's closest allies. In the United States this policy was widely supported, because the ICC was believed to undermine American sovereignty. President Bush also put the nuclear issue on the agenda. He showed renewed interest in nuclear-armed missile interceptors in an NMD and nuclear ground penetrators to destroy hardened underground bunkers and tunnel complexes because conventional means would be less efficient. In this context the Nuclear Posture Review of January 8 2002 caused much unease among allies because it explicitly called for a capability to destroy "hard and deeply buried targets".³

The real policy change came with the State of the Union address on January 29 2002. Referring to North Korea, Iran and Iraq, Bush stated that "States like these constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic".⁴ Elaborating on the "axes of evil" speech, he announced a major policy shift during the Graduation Speech at West Point on June 1 2002: "For much of the last century, America's defence relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence

³ US Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review*, submitted to congress on 31 December 2000, pp. 46–47.

⁴ G.W. Bush, *The President's State of the Union Address*, Washington DC, 29 January 2002.

and containment (...) Deterrence –the promise of massive retaliation against nations- means nothing against shadowy terrorists with no nation or citizen to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorists (...) our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive action, when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives".⁵ Thus, a new unilateralist, first strike policy of 'defensive intervention' was announced. Vice president Dick Cheney underscored the need for such a strategy during a hawkish speech delivered to war veterans on August 26 2002. He argued that pre-emption against Iraq was necessary because "there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbours". Quoting former foreign secretary Henry Kissinger, Cheney argued that this produces "an imperative for preventive action." In addition, "our job would be more difficult in the face of a nuclear armed Saddam Hussein".⁶ This policy change was confirmed with the 2002 *National Security Strategy*, published in September.

Key officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, and Richard Perle and his colleagues of the now influential Defence Policy Board at the Pentagon support this grand strategy. Their thinking is clearly expressed in the *Statement of Principles* of the neoconservative Project for the New American Century. They gained victory over moderate officials who favour an approach based on

multilateralism, such as the then Secretary of Defence Colin Powell.

Bush' grand strategy is based on the principles mentioned above. It is based on the firm belief that the United States is powerful enough to go alone if this is in its best interest. According to the aforementioned Statement the United States must "shape a new century favourable to American principles", whilst national leadership must accept "the United States global responsibilities".⁷ According to the neoconservatists the strategy is aimed at maintaining America's pre-eminence, precluding the rise of a great power, and shaping the international order in line with American principles and interests. Institutions, treaties and rules are merely obstacles to this grand strategy. The events of September 11 reinforced the arguments of those favouring this grand strategy. September 11 was seen as an attack on America and everything it stands for and, consequently, America's vital interests are at stake. Indeed, this is a very powerful motivation to go alone and to adopt a new doctrine of 'pre-emption' and 'defensive intervention'. For that reason the current administration is reforming its defence apparatus to allow the United States to project force from Continental US, rather than from overseas bases in Europe, Asia and the Middle East and to be able to deal with contemporary challenges, including asymmetrical warfare.⁸

Balancing of Dominant American Power

According to the Realists school of thought in international relations coalitions, or great powers would try to counterbalance American hegemonic power in order to achieve freedom of action. There have been some attempts to counter balance American power indeed. In the mid-1990's, the Russian minister of foreign

⁵ G.W. Bush, Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy West Point, New York, Washington DC, 1 June 2002.

⁶ D. Cheney, Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, Washington DC, 26 August 2002.

⁷ Project for the New American Century, *Statement of Principles*, see <newamericancentury.com>.

Affairs, Yevgeny Primakov, put forward his theory of 'multipolarity'. He asserted that a counterbalance to the United States was necessary and he emphasised the importance of cooperation with China, India, Iran, Iraq, Syria and other states that were not kindly disposed towards the West.⁹ Primakov believed that cooperating too closely with NATO would impede the formation of a new, multipolar world. By means of an active dialogue with NATO, Russia would have to prevent, however, that the alliance could harm its interests. The decision to agree to the establishment of the Permanent Joint Council should therefore be seen in this context.

Furthermore, the special relationship between Germany and Russia, the 'strategic triangle' of Russia, China and India, the 'strategic partnership' of Russia and China can all be explained as attempts to counterbalance the United States. The CFSP and the ESDP can also be explained as attempts to counter balance American power and to come to grips with the new strategic reality.

So far, all attempts to counter balance have failed. Moreover, the rise of an international order dominated by American power has not yet triggered a global backlash and the strategic rivalry and competitive balancing among the great powers is actually quite limited. There are two possible explanations. First, balancing involves economic, military and political costs, which neither Russia, China or the European Union are willing to bear. Both Russia and China lack resources, whilst the European Union is not willing to spend more on defence to give its ESDP more substance. In addition, the blossoming of the relationship between Russia and the United States was one of the unexpected changes resulting from 9/11. The Americans need the Russians for intelligence gathering and cooperation in other areas; the Russians consider

the war on terrorism an unique opportunity to turn Russia into the indispensable partner for the United States and to gain economically.

Second, unlike Russia or the United Kingdom, the United States is not a traditional imperial power trying to enlarge its territory. America's 'imperialism' is of an ideological nature seeing as the United States considers itself as the champion of democracy and free market economy, whose values are universal and should be exported all over the world. Nevertheless, for other cultures, most notably the Islamic world, this behaviour could be threatening. It is one of the explanations that keep the struggle between the United States and the militant representatives of political Islam alive. Interestingly, in the United States a debate is emerging on American imperialism. Conservative Realists, like Andrew J. Bacevich argue that the United States should go its own way.¹⁰ It should not have its foreign and security policy restricted by international law and institutions. Rather, an 'empire of freedom' should be established, one that is ruled by the United States and founded on specific values and norms, such as democracy, free market economy and human rights. Thus a new unipolar order or *Pax Americana* will be created.

Revitalisation of the CFSP

Nevertheless, because of the geopolitical changes mentioned and the new realities of U.S. foreign policy, the Union has no other choice but to strike a new transatlantic bargain, one that is based on a strategic vision of equal partnership. If Europeans fail to do so, Europe and America will drift apart, Europe will be marginalized and run the risk of getting entangled in a security competition among Germany, France, the United Kingdom and possibly Italy.

In the present debate on European integration the consequences of American unilateralism

⁸ D.H. Rumsfeld, *Transforming the Military, Foreign Affairs*, May / June 2002, pp. 20-32.

⁹ O. Antonenko, *Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo, Survival*, winter 1999-2000), p. 128.

is usually overlooked or ignored. The initiatives for the ESDP not only have been the result of Europe's ongoing process of integration, but were prompted by the worry about America's security commitment to Europe as well. Many feared that European security would decouple as a result of probable American unilateralism and the consequences of the increased technological gap. EU Commissioner Chris Patten expressed this concern about American unilateralism explicitly in an internal paper for the European Commission. He asserted that the Union has the obligation to contribute to the increase of stability, because the world is one in which the United States increasingly acts without giving any thought to the concerns of others.¹¹

However, the Iraq crisis of early 2003 also demonstrated that disunity among the Europeans could undermine the integration process as well. Spain, Italy and most East Europeans supported the United States and the United Kingdom, whilst Germany and France were tried to prevent them from a quick decision to go to war. Thus the Union and the further development of the CFSP and the ESDP are a prerequisite for political stability.

Unfortunately, the historical record of the CFSP, established with the Maastricht Treaty on the EU (TEU) of 1992, and the incorporation of the ESDP in the Amsterdam TEU of 1997 are not very impressive. The only significant Europe-led operation was the WEU mine countermeasure force deployed in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988 during the Iran-Iraq war. During the early 1990s the WEU carried out a naval operation to enforce the UN embargo against Iraq. Since 1992, the WEU has been involved in the enforcement of the UN embargo on the former Yugoslavia, first in the Adriatic Sea, then along the river Danube. In 1994 the WEU was requested to organise a police force in the EU-

administered city of Mostar. During the late 1990s the Union asked WEU-support in planning the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) in Albania, organising a de-mining operation in Croatia, and monitoring the situation in Kosovo through imagery provided by the WEU Satellite Centre.

A chance to carry out more demanding operations came in 1997. Albania was on the brink of civil war due to the collapse of its pyramid investment schemes. As the WEU refrained from organising such a force it seemed that the organisation had no real role to play in the new Europe. There was evidently no political will to carry out a large-scale European-led military operation in what was considered a high-risk environment. For Dutch policy makers, this reinforced the belief that NATO should take the lead in the most demanding operations.

In March the Security Council authorised Italy to lead a 7,000-strong multinational peace force in Albania. This clearly undermined the development of the CFSP, as the 'S' of security within the CFSP remained in fact a dead letter. Not surprisingly, the Union was criticised by the Americans for being unable to deal with security risks in their own back yard.

In the late 1990s Britain and France took the lead in the Union member states decision to revitalize the defence component within the CFSP. Being unable to join the European Monetary Union, the new Blair government chooses to show its dedication to European integration through an initiative in the field of the ESDP. In addition Blair strongly believed that the Union should be a 'force for good', i.e. should contribute to a better world.¹²

At their meeting in December 1998 in St. Malo French president Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair agreed that the member states of the European Union should

¹⁰ Forthcoming: A.J. Bacevich, *American Empire* (Harvard University Press).

¹¹ *International Herald Tribune*, The EU Counterweight To American Influence, 16 June 2000.

¹² This view was expressed by Roger Liddle (Cabinet office London) during Paris Transatlantic Conference of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, 21-22 June 2001.

have a 'capacity for autonomous European action'. The importance of the St. Malo declaration is that it has complemented the debate on institutional matters with a discussion on capabilities.

The lack of such a European autonomous capacity was clearly demonstrated during the War on Kosovo in 1999. Operation *Allied Force* underlined the conclusion that Europe has no capability for autonomous action and should develop a force projection capability for operations in an out-of-area environment. The war on Kosovo showed that the countries of the European Union are largely dependent on the Americans for carrying out large-scale military operations.¹³ In practice the Americans led the air campaign. They carried out 65% of all the flights and, within that figure, 80 percent of all combat missions. In addition, the Americans dominated the command lines so that the air campaign was chiefly carried out according to an American recipe. This military-technological gap between Europe and the US has promoted the decoupling of European and American security, as coalition wars with the United States turn out to be a myth. The major reason for this gap is inefficiency in defence spending. While Union member states have collectively a gross national product similar to the US, they spend only 65 % of what Washington spends on its armed forces. Due to poor co-ordination and basically Cold War force structures, Europeans get a disproportional low return from their budgets in key areas such as procurement and research and development. In some areas the European allies have collectively only 10 to 15% of the assets of the Americans.

Of importance to the development of the ESDP has been the fact that during operation *Allied Force*, NATO's much-praised political consultation mechanism turned out to function unsatisfactorily. Compared to its role as a mili-

tary organisation, NATO played no role of importance as a political organisation. This led to considerable uneasiness among a number of smaller allies. Harmonisation of policies took place in the Contact Group for the Former Yugoslavia, the Quint (the five NATO members of the Contact Group) and the G-8 (the seven largest industrial nations and Russia). Apparently these were discussion clubs with honeyed decision-making processes, which were not crisis-resistant. The result was that institutions, which had been established for the prevention of conflicts and the management of crises, have actually become organisations that carried out the decisions of informal directorates. In practice the United States was in control. Consequently, many countries, particularly smaller ones like the Netherlands were left out. In some European capitals, including The Hague, this has led to the conclusion that decision-making should be less dependent on Washington and that Europe's decision-making machinery concerning security matters should be improved.

During the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the European heads of state and government declared that the union must have the ability and the capacity to take decisions for autonomous action on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks as defined in the TEU, irrespective of actions taken by NATO. For that purpose they decided that the EU should have the necessary military forces and the appropriate capabilities in the area of intelligence, strategic transport, command and control. To decide and conduct effectively EU led military operations, the EU leaders realized that this requires a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning. Thus during the 1999 Cologne summit the Heads of state and government already considered to hold regular formal and informal meetings of the defence ministers of the member states within the EU institutional framework, the creation of a Political and Security Committee of political and military experts as well as an EU Military Com-

¹³ For this see D.C. Gompert, R.L. Kugler and M.C. Libricki, *Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs*, (Washington, National Defense University Press, 1999).

mittee consisting of Military representatives that would make recommendations to the Political and Security Committee. The Union's leaders also realized the need for an EU military staff including a situation centre and other resources such as a satellite centre and an institute for security studies¹⁴.

These general guidelines for developing an autonomous capacity to take decisions and to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises were translated into more concrete decisions during the next European Council in Helsinki on December 1999. The member states decided that in order to be able to carry out the Petersberg tasks as defined in the TEU, the Union must have at its disposal by the year 2003 a military force of 50,000 to 60,000 persons, with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities as well as logistics and other combat support services. Such a military force has to be deployed rapidly within 60 days and then sustain for at least one year. This headline goal was supplemented by the decision to establish within the Council new political and military bodies that will enable the EU to take decisions on EU led operations and ensure the necessary political control and strategic direction of such operations¹⁵.

Under the Portuguese Presidency the EU defence ministers started to implement the Helsinki decisions. An Interim Political and Security Committee as well as an Interim Military Body have been established. The temporary bodies started to operate from March 2000 in the Council Building. The Secretary General of the Council of the EU also appointed the head of the military experts seconded by the member states to the Council Secretariat. The Military experts help the Council in its work on the ESDP, and will form the nucleus of the future Military Staff. The implementation process continued under

the French Presidency who organized on 20 November 2000 in Brussels a Force Generation Conference with the aim to establish a rapid reaction facility. During this meeting the EU defence and foreign ministers set a large leap forward in the EU determination to develop an autonomous military capability. Although they emphasized that such a capability does not involve the establishment of a European army, they agreed to commit the necessary military capabilities to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (EURRF) of 60,000 men, which constitutes a pool of more than 100,000 persons and 400 combat aircraft and 100 warships¹⁶.

Regarding the implementation of the CFSP and the ESDP a major breakthrough occurred during the Council Meeting in Copenhagen on 12 December 2002, when the Council reached agreement on the 'Berlin plus' arrangements and the implementation thereof. As the Union lacks military capabilities and planning facilities, these arrangements are a prerequisite for EU led operations. Now that the arrangements are in place, the Union could start the planning to take over the peace keeping operation in fYROM and indicated its willingness to lead a military operation in Bosnia, following SFOR.

The original Berlin arrangements were signed in 1996. The arrangements committed NATO to provide the WEU assured access to NATO planning and command structures and access to NATO collectively owned assets and capabilities, including 18 AWACS planes and two not yet fully operational Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters. The arrangements also identified the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) to lead NATO planning and operational efforts in support of EU operations. The original arrangements did not solve the some of the practical problems of transferring NATO's collective assets to the WEU. Consequently, some EU member states asked Washington for a 'Berlin plus' arrange-

¹⁴ Cologne European Council - Presidency Conclusions, Cologne, 4-6-1999, Press Release: Document 150/99.

¹⁵ Helsinki European Council - Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, 10 and 11 December 1999.

¹⁶ Council-General Affairs / Defense: Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, Brussels, 20-11-2000, Press Release Nr: 13427/2/00.

ments to guarantee a broader range of NATO support. The new arrangements spelled out the practicalities of 'assured access'. It also introduced a second category of 'presumed access'. In order to use the arrangements effectively, access to other, specific national assets is needed as well. For example, some member states may need access to satellite intelligence provided by others.

The arrangements mentioned will apply only to those EU member states which are also either NATO members or parties to the Partnership for Peace, and which have concluded bilateral security arrangements with NATO. Not all member states participate in the CFSP and a common defence policy. Denmark made a specific provision that it will not participate, while Cyprus and Malta will not take part in the Union's military operations with NATO assets once they have become members of the Union.

The Composition of the EURRF

Ground forces should be capable of executing the most demanding Petersberg tasks, i.e. large-scale sustained combat operations in a high-risk environment. This would include peacekeeping operations and the large-scale offensive operations for defending the Unions interests. Regarding the Helsinki decision there were, however, many unanswered questions. Firstly, did the figure of 50,000–60,000 include support units? A rule of the thumb suggests the following composition of armed forces:

- 1/3rd logistics (in the pre-deployment phase logistics could be as high as 50%);
- 1/3rd combat support forces;
- 1/3rd manoeuvre or combat forces.

The Council decision suggested that the numbers mentioned included both logistic and combat support units. Thus, only 20,000 combat forces would be available. Such a fighting force could not be deployed in the *most demanding* Petersberg Tasks. For relatively large-scale

sustained combat operations the EU would need at least 50,000 to 60,000 combat forces. This would require a pool of 150,000–180,000 troops.

These conclusions were underpinned by the operations plans for crisis response operations in Kosovo which were developed by NATO from 1998 onwards. One of the 1998 plans covered the deployment of 23,000 troops for border control to prevent smuggling of weapons and ammunition from Albania into Kosovo. Another plan, 'B-minus', covered an intervention in Kosovo, requiring some 75,000 troops. Subsequently, some 200,000 troops were needed to keep the province under control.

Secondly, what were the assumptions regarding sustainability? Member states should be able to sustain their contribution for one year. A distinction had to be made between sustained combat operations or war fighting and peace-support operations in a permissive environment with sporadic small-scale, low-intensity military actions. Regarding the former, most member states would not replace units which have suffered severe losses. As to the latter, member states are likely to replace their units after a deployment of six months. Consequently, the EU should double the figures mentioned. Given the nature of contemporary conflicts, it should be stated that a one-year sustainability period would be probably too low. In its 1993 White Paper the Dutch MOD took a three-year period as a starting point, requiring two reserve units for each unit deployed. Given the nature of contemporary crisis response operations, however the 2000 White Paper no longer mentioned this limitation. The Dutch contribution would now be for an indefinite period, requiring at least three reserve units for each unit deployed. In conclusion, the real world might require at least three times the number of active forces mentioned. If not, a European-led force can only be deployed for a very limited period, requiring replacement by other (NATO) multinational formations. Consequently, a three-year sustainability period should be considered a minimum,

requiring two replacement units for every one deployed.

The third question regarded the availability of forces. Only five of the fifteen EU member states had all-volunteer professional armed forces.¹⁷ The other states had mixed forces with an emphasis on conscripts. For political reasons, in most countries conscripts could only be deployed for collective defence. Other tasks, including the Petersberg tasks, require volunteers. Thus the availability of sufficient numbers of active forces for Petersberg tasks is substantially below the active strength of the EU member states.

In conclusion, a rapidly deployable armed force of 50,000–60,000, which includes logistics and combat support, cannot meet the headline goal. With such a force the EU could take over the KFOR operations from NATO in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but the full range of Peterberg tasks, including the most demanding would require at least 50,000–60,000 *combat forces*, implying a pool of 150,000–200,000 troops. Depending on sustainability requirements, these numbers should be doubled or tripled. In conclusion, the present force catalogue of 100,000 indicates that sustainability is a major shortfall. As only a limited number of member states have all-volunteer armed forces, it is unlikely that EU member states will be able to implement sustainability requirements, despite the fact that 1.9 million Europeans are under arms.

The characteristics of European forces are as important as numbers. As it is impossible to predict where and in what circumstances a European force will be deployed, the crisis response task requires an expeditionary force with significant power projection capabilities. But most European allies not only rely largely on conscripts, they still invest mainly in territorial defence. As a consequence few European countries possess armed forces with power

projection capabilities. For that reason it is necessary to identify European deficiencies. Only the British, the French and the Dutch seem well on track. Despite budget cuts and down-sizing, they have managed to restructure their armed forces. In their Strategic Defence Review the British announced various measures such as the creation of a pool of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces drawn from the three services to provide a quickly deployable and militarily powerful cutting edge in crises of all kind. Other measures include new capabilities such as larger aircraft carriers, improved strategic transport and deployable headquarters and communications.¹⁸ France and the Netherlands restructured along similar lines.

Germany in particular faces major challenges. It has one of the largest armed forces within Europe (333,000), but there is no sign of abolishing conscription or of an extensive restructuring of its armed forces. On the contrary, the Germans face budget cuts and a further down-sizing of the active and wartime strength of the Bundeswehr. One of the biggest obstacles for abolishing the draft is the consequences for Germany's social system. Many young men that refuse to do military service will have to perform duties in social service. As a consequence Germany will lose cheap labour, with important consequences for society as a whole.

In addition, conceptual thinking in Germany lags behind that in other major players in the EU. The organisation and structure of the armed forces are still mainly oriented towards traditional defence tasks. Nevertheless, Germany has set up a 60,000-strong reaction force comprising volunteer conscripts, short-service and regular personnel of the three armed services.¹⁹ Of this total there are some 50,000 army and 12,300 air force personnel. The number of navy personnel included in reaction forces is not known. It is, however, believed that some 40% of the navy's assets are assigned to crisis response operations.

¹⁷ Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom rely on volunteers. France, Spain and Italy have decided to abolish conscription.

¹⁸ Ministry of Defence, *The Strategic Defence Review*, London (The Stationary Office), July 1998.

It seems that these reaction forces can only be deployed for Petersberg tasks at the lower end of the spectrum. For political reasons ordinary conscripts cannot be deployed out of the country and volunteer conscripts can only be deployed in traditional low-risk peacekeeping operations.

EU member states collectively have a gross national product roughly comparable to that of the US, but spend only 65 % of what Washington spends on its armed forces. Due to poor coordination and basically Cold War force structures, Europeans get a disproportional low return from their budgets in key areas such as procurement and research and development. In some areas the European allies collectively have only 10 to 15% as many of the assets as Americans.

An Expeditionary Force for the EU?

The EURRF will be deployed in distant places for peace support operations and to defend interests. Consequently, the more demanding Petersberg Tasks ('peace making and tasks of combat forces) require an expeditionary force with power projection capabilities. Flexibility through modularity, interoperability, sustainability, (strategic) mobility and firepower are key characteristics of such a force.

In actual fact, only a small portion of EU member's military capabilities will be used for homeland defence, i.e. protection against international terrorism and consequence management. With the remaining forces the EU member states will contribute to coalitions of the willing and able, which are organized as Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The key question therefore is whether the EU could organize such a CJTF.

The shortfalls of Europe's forces are well known. The EU has no integrated military command and has no disposal of an electronic command and communication system to con-

duct large-scale military peace keeping and combat operations. In addition, European forces have limited expeditionary capabilities as well. In an attempt to correct these deficiencies the some member states committed themselves to improve the quality of their armed forces through NATO. This was done during the NATO Washington summit in April 1999 that launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The DCI identified the following areas of improvement: deploy ability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; effective engagement; survivability of forces and infrastructure; as well as command and control and information systems. As most European members of NATO are also EU members, the DCI is of great importance for the improvement in European capabilities.

Many of the gaps and deficiencies identified in the DCI were also recognized in the WEU "Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations", of which the preliminary results were presented to the ministers during their meeting in Luxembourg on 23 November 1999. Although the WEU audit concluded that Europeans, in principle, have the available force levels and resources needed to prepare and implement military operations over the whole range of Petersberg tasks, a considerable effort is necessary to strengthen the European capabilities.

According to the WEU audit the collective capabilities in the areas of strategic intelligence and strategic planning needs improvement. Regarding forces and operational capabilities improvement in areas such as availability, deployability, strategic mobility, sustainability, survivability, interoperability and operational effectiveness; as well as multinational, Joint Operation and Force Head Quarters (HQ), with particular reference to C3-capabilities and deployability of Force HQ.

The improvements of Europe's armed forces were not very impressive. During the 2001

¹⁹ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Reaction Time' 7 July 1999, p. 25.

spring meeting of the NATO defence ministers, a report was tabled indicating that the NATO allies will fully implement less than 50 percent of the force goals that is agreed to in the DCI.²⁰ A fresh attempt was made with the Union's Capabilities Improvement Conference of November 2001, which resulted in a European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), with the aim to improve the capabilities of the EURRF. The ECAP is an agreed plan to remedy these shortcomings. The ECAP is based on the following principles:

- The defence apparatus of the various EU-countries leave room for rationalisation, therefore enhanced effectiveness and efficiency through increased cooperation can be achieved;
- The required capabilities can be acquired by combining efforts, initiating national projects or developing new projects and initiatives;
- Avoiding unnecessary duplication with NATO, by ensuring cooperation and transparency will enable efficiency;
- Sustaining political will by creating public support.

Expeditionary warfare requires the EU member states to invest in a number of areas. A major challenge is how Europeans could spend their defence budgets more efficiently. The solution is the procurement of collective European capacities and improvement of specific national capabilities. Regarding collective capabilities the following areas need improvement or could be developed:

- *Strategic intelligence and information pooling.* The present EU centre should have better access to commercial and military high-resolution satellite imagery. The United States posses some 65 military satellites, the Europeans only 5. As it is unlikely that the EU-countries develop a comparable satellite system, they should put more emphasis on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Human Intelligence (humint). Due to the characteristics of contemporary conflict,

humint is of equal or even greater importance to satellite imagery. The EU-countries could exchange data gathered by UAV and humint for satellite imagery collected by the United States.

- *Deployability and mobility.* During the NATO summit it was decided to begin implementing a Multinational Joint Logistics Centre concept by the end of 1999. In addition, EU nations could pool their logistical assets, such as strategic lift capability. As it is unlikely that Europeans will procure additional lift capabilities soon, the EU could prepare the establishment of a European transport command ('Eurolift') which should review and improve arrangements for military use of commercial strategic lift assets. Europe lacks heavy air lift capabilities, such as the American C-5, C-17 and C-141 aircraft. Moreover, the Europeans have limited military sea lift capabilities, such as large roll-on-roll-off ships (US 12, Europe 2) and fast sea lift ships (US 8, Europe 0).²¹ As the Europeans will focus mainly on contingencies on their own continent they should put more emphasis on road and rail transport capabilities and light transport aircraft such as the C-130.
- *Sustainability and logistics.* Logistics include enhanced interoperability through increased standardisation of material and procedures and the implementation of common standards, with special emphasis on medical interoperability. European nations should give high priority to logistic support capability requirements, including shore-based facilities, to sustain their forces effectively.
- *Command, control and communications (C3).* The 1999 NATO summit decided to develop a C3 system architecture by 2002 to form a basis for an integrated Alliance core capability allowing interoperability with national systems. The EU-countries should harmonise their efforts in this field, to ensure that this

²⁰ International Herald Tribune, 7 June 2001.

²¹ IISS, *A Common European Military Policy* (Strategic Comments, vol. 5, issue 6, July 1999).

C3 system is compatible or can also be used for EU Operation or Force headquarters.

- *Combat-search and rescue.* During Operation Allied Force most of the CSAR capabilities were provided by the Americans. In Europe only the French have any CSAR capability. The EU could establish an European CSAR capability.
- *Air-to-air refuelling.* Operation Allied Force has demonstrated that Europe has very limited air-to-air refuelling capabilities. Most of the capabilities were provided by the United States. Sustainability requires enhanced European capabilities. One option is to develop a European tanker capacity of the required 350 aircraft. As a first step Europeans should pool their 52 tankers.

With respect to national capabilities a *de facto* role specialisation has emerged between the Europeans and the Americans. Consequently, a European capability for autonomous action requires enhanced capabilities in the field of:

- *Suppression of enemy air defences* and support jamming, including associated stand-off weapons and electronic warfare;
- *Air defence systems*, including ground-based air defence capabilities and a more effective capability against theatre ballistic missiles and cruise-missiles;
- All-weather *precision guided munitions* (PGMs) and *non lethal weapons* to reduce collateral damage and risks for own troops;
- *Stand-off weaponry*, such as cruise-missiles;
- *Composition of forces.* European forces lack sufficient engineers and deployable medical units;
- *Readiness and availability.* European NATO countries almost 2 million men and women under arms, but are unable to sustain an operation involving more than 40,000 over a period of years.

Finally, there should be (*deployable*) *European multinational force Headquarters.* A European headquarters will command an ad hoc *Combined Joint Task Force* composed of Forces Answerable

to the EURRF. Enhancing the deployability of (elements of) these headquarters has the highest priority. This requires investments both in equipment (e.g. deployable Command, Control, Communications and Computers: C4) and personnel. Additional spending on Intelligence and Strategic Reconnaissance (ISTAR) is required as well. Indeed, C4ISTAR is a major shortfall, one that needs to be remedied before the EU embarks on large scale operations.

At present only the Regional Headquarters North and South, NATO's two land-based CJTF headquarters, are capable of commanding ground and air operations. Transforming the three headquarters mentioned into CJTF headquarters requires in particular investments in additional C3. For reasons of sustainability at least three EU headquarters should be identified. The Eurocorps, and the bi-national 1German-Netherlands Army Corps are the most obvious candidates.

Early 1999 it was decided that the Eurocorps will command the successor to KFOR. Its headquarters however, will be able to deploy only 350 officers, while the KFOR headquarters which has a staff of 1,200. Moreover, the Eurocorps has to borrow command and control assets from the present NATO KFOR headquarters. Finally, Europeans must develop the skills to command complex, multinational crises response operations.

During the NATO summit in Prague, November 2002, the Prague Capabilities Commitment resulted in a capacity package aimed at improving European capabilities. This new commitment was deemed necessary because both the objectives of the DCI and some elements of the ECAP had proven to be unattainable. The following initiatives could remedy some of the European shortfalls listed above:

- All deployable NATO forces with 30 days or higher readiness will be equipped with nuclear, biological and chemical defence;
- A NATO air ground surveillance system

must be completed by 2004;

- A full set of deployable and secure C4-systems for deployable HQs will be developed;
- The number of precision guided munitions will be increased by 30 per cent by 2005;
- Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) will be increased by 50 per cent by 2005;
- Strategic air lift will be increased by 50 per cent by 2004;
- Air-to-air refuelling will be increased by 50 per cent by 2005;
- Deployable logistics and combat service support will be increased by 25 per cent by 2005.

There are new ideas to remedy shortfalls as well. First, member states will lead consortiums to remedy specific shortfalls. For example, the Netherlands takes the lead to increase the number of precision guided munitions. Second, pooling is another innovation. There will be a pool of jointly owned and operated jamming pods for electronic warfare, tankers, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Third, a short term solution will be the lease of assets, such as American C-17 heavy lift air craft.

The EURFF will greatly benefit from these initiatives, provided that they will materialize.

Austria's Contribution

As has been argued before, the EU member states armed forces will contribute to homeland defence and coalitions of the willing and able for peace support and combat operations. As these operations will take place in distant places, armed forces must be organized, trained and structures as expeditionary armed forces.

Apocalyptic terrorism is strategic, rather than a tactical threat. A tactical threat requires a response of the police, national intelligence services and national law enforcement agencies. Due to the magnitude of the threat homeland defence requires a response by the police *and* the

armed forces. It requires international intelligence cooperation as well. Regarding the military means, a small number of Special Operations Forces are needed for counter terror operation. Additional general purpose forces are needed to protect vital objects, such as power plants, government buildings and vital industrial facilities. In case of an air threat, member states may to keep a small number of combat aircraft and air defence assets on alert to defend against an '11 September scenario'. The threat of weapons of mass destruction, notably chemical and biological weapons, urges measures to manage the consequences of attacks.

Austria's contribution to a multinational expeditionary force depends on political ambitions. In general, political ambition is the expression of the risks the leadership is willing to defend the interests of the Union, to contribute to international peace and security and to contribute to the international rule of law. If there is lack of political will a nation will become a free ride. In practice there is a clear connection between the ranking of a nation in economic terms and its political ambitions. The prosperity of a highly developed, industrialized liberal democracy greatly depends on world stability. Instability could threaten trade routes, markets and access to scarce resources.

The connection between political ambitions the contribution to a multinational expeditionary force of peace support and combat operations is summarized in figure 1.

Austria's has an army of some 35,000 troops, including some 17,000 conscripts, and air force of almost 7,000, including more than 2,200 conscripts. In addition there is a considerable reserve force. In general expeditionary armed forces require volunteers. Only for some specific homeland defence tasks reserve forces and conscripts could be used, because in practice conscripts cannot be used for expeditionary combat operations. For that reason, the Netherlands abolished conscription when a

restructuring of the armed forces for expeditionary operations was deemed necessary. Dutch reliance on heavy material was reduced as well. For example, the number of tanks and other armour was reduced sharply. At the same time more emphasis was put on combat power that could be deployed easily in distant places and was logistically less demanding. For example, precision guided munitions will reduce the number of sorties, thus greatly reducing the logistical requirements for deployed combat aircraft. Land forces got new Patria armoured vehicles to improve protection of employed troops and increase mobility. *[Note: I couldn't do extensive research on Austria's force posture and capabilities. We will need to discuss this]*

Austria's land forces could contribute to a multinational peace force, but cannot –except for some niche capabilities (WHICH?)- contribute to more demanding 2nd generation peace keeping. This observation is confirmed by the nature of present deployments in Afghanistan (ISAF), Kosovo (KFOR) and Syria (UNDOF). This observation is confirmed by Austria's contribution to the ECAP as well. Except for the contribution to the improvement of infantry, Austria contribution to the ECAP is mainly in the field of logistics and protection.

Air forces could contribute to offensive operations with its ground attack air craft and its air to air missiles. However, the lack of air to air refuelling, precision guided munitions and deployable C4 severely restricts the expeditionary capabilities of Austria's air forces.

Contributions to more demanding operations will require new initiatives. First, is requires a restructuring of Austria's armed force, especially the transformation to an all volunteer, professional armed force, with emphasis on highly mobile, deployable infantry with considerable firepower. Second, Austria could contribute to the development of specific combat capabilities, such as precision guided munitions and special operations forces. Third, Austria could contrib-

ute to combat support capabilities, such as CSAR, SEAD and UAVs. Fourth, Austria could develop some of its niche capabilities further. (Which: mountain units??)

Conclusion

The geopolitical changes of the 1990s, the war on terrorism and the Iraq crisis had important implications for transatlantic relations. There is an urgent need for closer European foreign, security and defence cooperation. If Europe cannot strengthen this cooperation the political cohesion of the Union is likely to be undermined. To defend its interests, to contribute international peace and security, and to maintain the international rule of law, the Union's member states have no other choice but to strive for expeditionary military capabilities. This demands the Union to remedy some shortfalls through common procurement of assets, common funding, pooling of assets and national initiatives to remedy shortfalls. Genuine role specialization is only possible if member states have assured access to capabilities of other member states. Therefore, role specialization is only possible if there is a European defence and supranational authority.

Austria has limited capabilities to contribute to expeditionary armed forces. Austria's challenge, however, is not different from other Union member states. Only very few transformed their armed forces along the new requirements, i.e. the need for an all volunteer, professional armed force which could be deployed in distant places for all peace support and combat operations. As a first step Austria should rethink its political ambitions and define its contribution to a multinational coalition and consequently the type of armed force it would like to develop. If Austria decides to contribute to peace keeping forces only, it runs the risk of being considered a free rider. If Austria's political ambitions are higher, it has no other choice but to reconsider conscription and the transformation of its air force into a deployable, expeditionary force.

Figure 1: requirements for expeditionary forces

Political ambition	contribution to	type of force required	Required capabilities (examples)
Low	peace keeping operations	peace force	Infantry, air transport, C3.
Low/medium	2 nd generation peace keeping and defensive combat operations	force expeditionary force with defensive capabilities	Mechanized units, recce, air defences (ground based and fighters).
Medium/high	offensive conventional combat operations	expeditionary force with limited offensive capabilities	units for conventional warfare (artillery, tanks), specialized land forces (air manoeuvrable), combat air craft (ground attack)
High	all offensive combat operations, including counter terror/insurgency	full spectrum force	Special Operations Forces, niche capabilities (mountain units, counter terror / insurgency units, strategic reconnaissance.