Critical Security Points of Serbia/FR Yugoslavia

Developments in the country confirm that what transpired in Serbia on 5 October 2000 was not a revolution after all. By discarding Milošević the citizens of Serbia have created only the initial assumptions for an irreversible journey out of communism and war. Thus, they have avoided an internal conflict at the last moment and found hope in themselves.

It should be noted that the initial change occurred despite Milošević readiness to defend his power by force. It has also happened despite the Euro-American striving to end Milošević regime with sanctions and bombs.

The long exposure to cross fire brought the citizens of Serbia to a point of almost giving up on themselves. They saw a chance for liberation, only after Milošević had revealed his own political impotence by defrauding the elections. This also proved that the sources for the preservation and renewal of his absolutist power have run dry. That is why his regime clashing with the positive will of the citizens inevitably collapsed. The citizens’ action benefited from the readiness of the West to spare them its (military) assistance in critical moments.

The fact that the citizens of Serbia, even under unfavourable circumstances, managed to remove Milošević may perhaps, in a literary trance, be proclaimed a revolution. The gloomy reality, however, shows that they are today faced with the same tasks as ten years ago. Only now they have to find the solutions under incomparably more difficult circumstances.

In October 2000, the citizens of Serbia in fact went back to point “1990“, when they first had to break up with socialism and then embark upon an arduous task of modernisation. The key jobs awaiting the new regime and the citizens testify to that. They need to reconstruct the existing state and define the one they will be living in, as soon as possible. They must simultaneously initiate a general and profound recovery of the devastated society. At the same time they need to find a new place for Serbia in the region, as well as the Euro-Atlantic and the world communities.

(1) What are the initial security consequences of the changes?

It may still be too early for a serious assessment of security consequences the changes conceived in Serbia will produce. The positive effects, for the time being, can only be measured in Serbia and Montenegro. Salvation found in the elections diminished rather than eliminated the threat of the violent ending of the crisis. A sensitive period of power transfer and state reconstitution lies ahead, and may be susceptible to conflicts incited from numerous directions.

The direct and calculable security benefits brought about by the change of power in Serbia/FRY may be defined as follows:

- drastically reduced threat of an internal (civil) war in Serbia, substantially diminished prospects for the abuse of the Yugoslav Army in Montenegro or for the outbreak of a tribal war in it, largely limited possibility to export the Serbian crisis to neighbouring countries and the region, and elimination of the reason for NATO air-support to the democratisation of Serbia and the Balkans.

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1 The paper submitted at the Conference has been extended to cover the post-October period of change in Serbia and the FRY.
In this context a number of other collateral benefits are also mentioned, although the long-term effects of some of them may appear damaging to a number of internal or external actors. Many in the region have thus been deprived of the possibility to affirm their democratic legitimacy on an anti-Milošević basis. This has also blocked the road for the creation of new independent states through war. That is why the Montenegrin authorities will now have to offer their citizens, as well as the international public, plausible reasons for redrawing the borders anew.

Milošević demise resulted in diverse gains as well as losses for the West. In the first place, the West was given the chance to join the victors in the general celebration. Therefore, attempts to cover up the fact that the change in Serbia transpired despite the efforts of the Euro-Atlantic community to topple the country’s authoritarian regime by bombs and sanctions come as no surprise.

The initial damage the Alliance is bound to experience will be due to the loss of grounds to manage the Yugoslav crisis. The fiasco of NATO-management was, let us recall, the inevitable outcome of its desire to compensate for the lack of a valid strategy with reactive action; namely, its decision to use air-strikes against the consequences in order to avoid the toilsome removal of fundamental causes behind the Yugoslav wars. To make things more difficult for NATO, the (guided?) proclamation of the “Balkan syndrome” started a new cycle to re-examine the justifiability and scope of its intervention in Kosovo.

In all truth, Milošević already in October 1998, passed the “hot potato” on to the U.S.A. and NATO. After that, he defended the bomb showered Kosovo only to the point of his survival in power. The U.S.A used destructive ways to liberate Kosovo and Albanians in it also up to the point of Milošević survival in power.

In any case, the Alliance’s taking of Kosovo gave it an opportunity to prove the validity of its principle of “humanitarian interventionism”. Nominal attachment of the West to the principle of unchangeability of borders will once again be tested in Kosovo. That is where the scope of the thus far discriminatory Alliance’s attachment to democracy will also be tested. Simultaneously, the seriousness and efficiency of the Stability Pact shall be verified.

The West will therefore have to promptly define and apply an efficient strategy, including the involvement of local actors, to finally do away with the causes of the Yugoslav wars. This would help eliminate the key security risks in South Eastern Europe and this course of action gains in urgency since the expected consolidation of Serbia is bound to change the inherited array of security factors and parameters in the region.

(2) Initial inventory of critical points

The cross section of the new situation allows us to assume that Serbia is no longer the source of security risks in the region. To this extent, the external threats to its security have also been reduced. This certainly does not remove every danger for the security of Serbia and the region, but rather points to their changed arrangement, requiring a different approach to the Serbian and regional security complex.

To start with, an inventory of the points critical for the security of Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia should be made. The new map of risks has, ultimately, been drawn by the interaction of two basic groups of factors:

♦ first, the concentration of the fundamental causes for the violent disintegration of the second Yugoslavia in its eastern part, and
second, the surfacing of all the consequences of an abortive attempt of the Serbian citizens to escape from the need to abandon socialism and undergo a democratic modernisation, by plunging into a war.

That is why attention should be focused on the internal factors of (the lack of) security in Serbia, to assess the directions and scope of change. However, the fact that we are talking about a controversial and incomplete process impairs the validity of any such findings at the very outset.

The period between the October toppling of Milošević and the DOS power take-over in Serbia is marked by dual rule and lawlessness. The incomplete break with the former regime aggravated the tackling of the following urgent problems:

- restitution of the basic functions of the federal state pending the final agreement between Serbia and Montenegro concerning its future make up;
- employment of the remaining domestic and potential foreign resources for the economic and social survival of the population;
- start up of society’s pacification;
- checking the further criminalization of society;
- establishment of full co-operation with the KFOR and TJNMISK (NATO and UN) to increase the safety of non Albanian population in Kosovo as well as to prevent one-sided solution of its future status.

This means that the primary task of the new authorities is to stop the state and society from deteriorating any further. This should be followed by remedial action leading to gradual recovery and development but would necessitate prompt improvement of the internal security of society and safety of its citizens.

The entire period was marked by the legal change of main actors of the federal and municipal governments, but under conditions of an uncontrolled decomposition of the inherited system. The fact is that the October charge of the citizens and the DOS did result in the demise of the central potentate, but it failed to give them sufficient power to do away with the system he relied on. Furthermore, the disintegration of the system deprived them of the instruments for the fast change they wanted.

The tactical ambivalence of the DOS protracted the formative stage for too long a time. Apparently fearing a civil war, the DOS refrained from accelerating the (revolutionary turn of) post-election developments. Entering the legal channels, instead, the DOS allowed the old regime - otherwise based on constitutional and legal abuse - to obstruct the change even before it became effective. The opposition, too, was caught unawares by the speed of collapse of the former regime. Moreover, it seems that it did not even have an operational plan for the fast establishment and consolidation of its government. Thus, the DOS failed to rapidly dismantle and depose the elites of the former regime. As a result, the remnants of these elites, after a rite of mimicry, hurried to fit into the existing order.

A prolonged interregnum favoured the survival of the old and the emerging of the new security risks in Serbia and the FRY, making the complex of security issues the main source of threats.

Slow establishment of the supreme civil command over the Yugoslav Army prevented a thorough test of loyalty of the military top brass and gave the first generals a chance to attach their allegiance to the personality of the new FRY president. This interfered with the personnel change in the Army top ranks, indispensable for its radical transformation. The delayed formation of the federal cabinet and the malfunctioning of the parliament prevented
an effective reintegration of the Army into the system leaving it beyond any democratic control. Instead, the army and its generals continued to parade the public and political scene, although now clad in a democratic attire.

The October divisions in the Serbian police soon grew into a hidden disintegration of the police system, leaving substantial parts of it outside public control, most importantly the special Operations units. The fact that the consolidation of the police was, at least nominally, in the hands of Milošević’s associates gave rise to numerous uncertainties in the Serbian political arena. These uncertainties were heightened by the prolonged political games concerning the creation of a caretaker (transitory) government, dissolution of the parliament and the republic elections. In view of all that, the core of the police remained in the grey zone, and it is not inconceivable that it might be arbitrarily abused by unknown actors in case the situation aggravated.

As could be expected - in view of the experience of the transition countries - the state security services have undergone the smallest change. For reasons unknown to the public the DOS and its leaders failed to undertake even cosmetic personnel changes in these branches until February 2001.

An important reason for the protracted lawlessness and dual rule is in the fact that the new authorities have found themselves in the “Montenegrin scissors“ The lack of readiness of the current Montenegrin rulers to, at least temporarily, give up the numerous advantages of the acquired sovereignty is quite obvious. At the same time, the Montenegrin epigones of Milošević (The Socialist Popular Party) took the opportunity to compensate for the lack of legitimacy and power in their own republic by installing themselves at the federal level through the DOS. It is, therefore, not inconceivable that the third Yugoslavia may disintegrate even before it is given the chance to be democratically rearranged. This all the more since the “Montenegrin scissors” have activated the international ones built into the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, transferring Kosovo from Serbia into Yugoslavia.

The refusal of the Montenegrin elites to support the consolidation of the federal authorities, the only ones available to the DOS before the Serbian election, politically revived the idea on the secession of Serbia from the FRY. Although in that case Montenegro would also immediately formalise its sovereignty, this would affect the political map of the region and cause a domino effect. This would also remove the obstacles for granting Kosovo the status of a state, and create problems for the preservation of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania.

Tactical ambivalence and strategic deficiencies of the DOS cannot be properly understood without a brief political examination of this political conglomerate made out of necessity and at the last moment. This is all the more important in view of the gradual surfacing of the inherent, reform and administrative limits of the DOS.

Although most of the DOS parties emerged out of resistance to the former regime in the early 90s, they have never acquired a convincing social, political program identity. Their differences, in addition to those reflected in their respective names, were mostly based on the “icons” of their leaders. They were also distinguished by the changeable inconsistency in relations towards Milošević regime. That is why the easy switch of the key oppositionist of the time from a position of conflict into one of secret or overt co-operation with the authorities, ruined the idea of party pluralism and democracy in Serbia.

Having conceded to Milošević plan of national and state unification of all Serbs by force, the Opposition leaders, long ago, became political prisoners of his opportunistic moves. The public or tacit adoption of (un)known war objectives spared them the difficulty of developing alternative strategies. That is why the loss of initiative placed them into a reactive position,
which allowed them only to criticise the inferior (war) tactics of the regime and the wrong choice of means.

By creating an interest-based and political alliance during the Yugoslav wars, the leading Opposition parties and the regime became mutually dependent - one indispensable for the survival of the other. That is why the Opposition in all critical moments granted political legitimacy to the regime which tolerated it in return. This enabled the regime to gradually corrupt the top ranks of key Opposition parties by letting them have a controlled share in the spoils of war and positions of power. And as the greed of the Opposition party bureaucracies increased so did the blackmailing power the regime had over them.

That is why Milošević power in Serbia and the FRY was not seriously threatened by the autonomous pressure of the Opposition over the past ten years, and it was only the lost battles and/or accompanying internal mistakes that pressed him against the wall. Namely, whenever the regime was in trouble, the Opposition could not (or did not want to) take political advantage of the situation and possibly work out a change of power.

Political sterility of central Opposition parties in Serbia was, among other things, due to their inherent controversy. Although products of anti-communism and old-fashioned nationalism, they obtained an additional public legitimacy invoking the principles of freedom and democracy. However, they have never overcome the conflict between the collectivistic and individualistic (civic) approach to the Serbian state and national problem. Their belated pacifism therefore presented no obstacle to support the regime in all the wars throughout the former Yugoslavia and to keep silent about the disparate real and alleged Serbian objectives and the means used to attain them.

The essential impotence of the Opposition as well as its calculating nature were additionally laid bare in Kosovo. The final state and national defeat of the regime caught the Opposition by surprise. Despite the fact that, together with the regime, the opposition, at least verbally, linked the survival of the Serbian nation with the preservation of Kosovo, the loss of the “national cradle“ failed to stir it out of lethargy. True, the Opposition managed to disengage its political destiny from that of Kosovo and came out of this defeat unscathed.

When in July-August 1999 it seemed that a joint effort of the Opposition and citizens would easily end the regime, internal self blocking mechanism were activated. The absence of a common approach was once again justified by the thesis about the conflict of the leaders’ vanities – the bad lot of the Serbian Opposition. However, this thesis was merely an easily accepted and/or deliberately devised screen to hide the real conflict of opposition-party bureaucracies concerning the future division of power. That is why the Opposition leaders were more concerned with preventing the success of their rivals than with the toppling of Milošević. This situation actually concealed their early fears of losing the impending and desired share in the new government. This accounts for the fact that the opposition parties in all previous election campaigns invested greater efforts in fighting each other than in deposing the regime.

Although in power, the DOS members were not rid of their own inhibitions. The lack of operational programs to reform the neglected society added to their overt as well as secret discord concerning the pace and scope of the initiated change. The central line of political conflicts and a potential split reflected their attitudes towards the Yugoslav wars and their consequences. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Serbian public stage is now dominated by the discussion about co-operation with The Hague Tribunal and the degree of sanctioning Milošević and his regime. The same line forms the axis of political regrouping within the DOS which may soon end in its disintegration. Therefore, we cannot disregard the fact that the key DOS parties – the Democratic Party of Serbia and the Democratic Party – are already
more concerned with the grab for power as a security for their future than with an efficient reaction to the challenges of social crises.

The new authorities are now in a political stalemate, compelling them to scale the initial reform by the criteria of minimum risk for themselves. This necessarily leads to the prolonged coexistence of the emerging authorities and the inherited institutions of power which may sprout attempts to restore the former regime if the internal crisis intensified.

Therefore, the only assumptions we could make now without some degree of certainty are as follows:

♦ Milošević’s demise is only the first step to be followed by a period of toilsome transfer of government and power, brimming with security risks;
♦ second, the longer the interregnum the lesser the readiness of the West would be to provide efficient support and the more numerous its conditions for the announced help would grow;
♦ third, the degree of devastation of the Serbian and Yugoslav society and state exclude the possibility of fast and visible change and the citizens will not be able to measure or realize their gains soon. One should therefore expect a gradual decrease in their reform zeal, i.e. an increase in their dissatisfaction which may be channelled towards the new authorities.

On balance, these elements warn that Serbia and the FRY shall for a long time yet remain an unstable society and a security risk, primarily for the citizens. It would therefore be necessary to urgently establish democratic control over the armed forces — including, in addition to the police and the army, both para-police and paramilitary forces.

(3) Exclusion of armed forces from democratic control

On 5 and 6 October, the generals’ elites of the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian police, submitted themselves to the new authorities. A number of facts seriously indicate that they were forced to make that move, since the majority of soldiers and policemen, exposed to the pressure of the public, refused to maintain Slobodan Milošević rule by force. After that, the army generals set out to make political profit out of their new loyalty. Their remarkable attachment to the new authorities seeks to cover their former role of the Praetorian Guard. The generals of the police, on the other hand, withdrew from the public scene. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that most of them applied themselves to destroying the evidence of the previous abuse on the part of the police and the scope of its criminalisation.

The analysts have not sufficiently addressed the benefits deriving for the citizens from the restraint manifested by the Army and the police in critical moments. That removed the risk of the regime's use of the paramilitary and para-police formations, which, if involved in a possible internal conflict, would have necessarily turned it into a bloodshed and street terror.

Partial installation of the new government marked the beginning of pacification of the society and political space in Serbia/FRY. But the DOS could not have really established efficient control over the armed forces until it verified its victory on the Serbian elections. Its declared reform orientation allows for the assumption that the Serbian/FRY armed forces would be subjected to democratic control.

However, a degree of moderation in assessments is required in view of the lack of public evidence substantiating the proclaimed commitment of the DOS or its individual members to the concept of democratic control. The absence of a valid program for the change of civil-military and civil-police relations may still be a sign of their lack of knowledge on the model.
But the DOS can compensate for this handicap relatively easily and fast. It will be much more difficult to change the nature of the inherited armed forces and create the necessary preconditions for democratic control.

The first-line barriers are the central elements of the newly created environment. Economic and social capacity of Serbia and the FRY for pro-European modernisation have been reduced to the minimum. Simultaneous abolishment of Yugoslavia in Montenegro and in Kosovo, rendered its democratic reconstitution almost impossible and/or redundant. The incursion of the KLA Presevo flank into the Serbian south amounts to a war challenge to the new authorities, which may require their response with the use of armed force. To make things worse, this parallelogram of the diverse forces incorporates all the civilisation deficiencies of the three Yugoslav states, resulting in bestial consequences in the never-contained Yugoslav wars.

To this extent the current restraint of the new DOS government towards the Yugoslav Army and the police can no longer be explained by the enforced coalition with Milošević’s Montenegrin allies or its lack of power in Serbia. One should sooner say that the DOS wavering, which may take quite a while, is the result of the awareness that the important factors determining the survival and security of the federal state are beyond its reach.

For example, the new government dares not to make an autonomous response to the KLA activities without risking a new conflict with the Euro-Atlantic community. On the other hand, it is incapable of cajoling this community into observing the Resolution 1244 and the Kumanovo Agreement. This impairs its prospects for influencing the solution concerning the future status of Kosovo still further. The likelihood that the DOS may find a mutually acceptable solution to preserve a state bond, of whatever kind, between Serbia and Montenegro are also small. The DOS obviously postponed this as well as many other problems for after the Serbian elections. This increases the probability that it will be faced with a “take it or leave it” offer of the Montenegrin authorities. The Euro-Atlantic ambivalence towards the future independence of Montenegro as well as the latent dispersion of Montenegrin voters will not lessen the problem for the DOS one least bit.

It could be expected that under the prevailing circumstances the DOS may easily postpone the submission of the armed forces to democratic control. Namely, for this purpose it would first have to adopt new constitutions of both the FRY and Serbia. And, at that, fully aware that the federal statute will not be recognised in Montenegro and cannot be applied in Kosovo. However, if it rushed into adjusting the Serbian with the federal constitution it would be taking the risk of leaving Serbia without sufficient attributes of a state in case of the sudden dismantling of Yugoslavia. On top of that, the DOS would have to engage in a parallel and radical transformation of the armed forces. At this moment it has neither the time nor funds, nor for that matter, a valid program for this purpose. Its reformist will may be further reduced by the fear of a conflict with the inherited generals’ elites as well as the fear of resistance to change of a part of the officer corps.

We will therefore briefly list the dangers the DOS is bound to face in the reform of the armed forces. Its readiness to take the risk and its ability to neutralise these dangers will determine the pace of establishing democratic control over these forces. For methodological reasons my initial views will be grouped according to the structure of the armed forces, in the ascending order of the risk involved.

*(a) Para-military and para-police forces*

Serbia and Yugoslavia cannot become democratic countries until their party and para-police groups, are dissolved and disarmed. In order to achieve that the new government must
first have reliable knowledge on their origin, numbers, disposition, force, chain of command and mutual connections.

The way to find that out leads into the “grey Zone” of the Yugoslav wars. And in this zone, one will inevitably find the links between the para-forces, secret police and the underground. This will also require the uncovering of the lines of war mongering and the ways used to usher the citizens of the former Yugoslavia into an all-out war. This would impair the validity of official interpretations of the real causes and objectives behind the Yugoslav wars. This would be followed by an obligation to establish the responsibility of public political actors for waging the wars. The same package would include the need to measure the share of the para-forces as well as that of the hidden masterminds of their war crimes, and so on.

The magnitude of the risk involved in intervening into the “grey zone” is directly proportionate to the assumed share of the para-forces in causing and spreading the Yugoslav wars. Furthermore, the risks would rapidly increase with an attempt to sanction any such crimes of these forces. This would also reinforce their resolve to defend themselves using all possible means. This defence would be vertically structured with the political and state warlords in the first line. Their backs would be guarded by the military and police top ranks, protected by the operators of secret services, known as well as unknown. In this context one should not exclude the possibility of hidden trans-boundary cooperation and mutual assistance of those who joined forces in the violent destruction of the former Yugoslavia.

It does not take much effort to prove that Serbia/FRY and thereby also the DOS, lack almost all conditions to do this job. The new government may therefore be expected to at least block, or place under police control, the paramilitary and para-police groups for the sake of stabilising the security situation.

(b) Serbian Police

The entry of the sphere of civilian-police relations reduces the magnitude of the risk and increases the DOS interest to rearrange this sphere. The DOS has only become able to establish real power over the police, i.e. its command structure, after the elections in Serbia. An element which works in its favour is the reform orientation of most public security officers, as manifested during the critical moments of the power take-over. The restraint displayed by the special police units at that time is also encouraging. However, it is still impossible to tell the price the DOS will have to pay. Another fact which remains unknown, since the bill was drawn internally, is the “currency” of payment. It would not be illogical to assume that the price of loyalty would include partial protection of individuals and groups against responsibility for their previous (evil) doings.

The true nature of the affiliation of this part of the police to the reforms will not be revealed until the new authorities embark upon changing the concept and the structure of the entire service. Although the DOS has not yet announced the complete plan, it is only reasonable to expect that the strategic objectives include the numerical reduction and demilitarisation of the police. However, this job cannot be done without a systemic effort to decriminalise the police. In proportion to the depth of the reform individual and group resistance to change will increase. This all the more since the reform implies an internal redistribution of power as well as disciplinary and criminal responsibility of individuals, and all that in a situation marked by an increased existential and employment uncertainty of a large number of policemen.

The critical point of the future reform will be the DOS entry into the grounds of the state security. This is where the real readiness of the DOS for democratic change will be measured. On the other hand, it can only prove it by installing the parliamentary instruments to settle the
accounts with the State Security and establish future control over it. An additional guarantor in this job has to be the country’s public.

It would be difficult to anticipate just how strong a resistance to change will be offered by the state security staff, but there is no doubt that there will be some. It will be still more difficult to anticipate the means some of them will use for defence since the available arsenal is boundless. This all the more because the service, emulating its communist precursor, operated primarily as political police. On top of that, it has, over the past few years, been turned into a private service of the ruling couple and thereby necessarily involved in political terror, financial and other abuse.

In this business the DOS is bound to face the dilemma concerning the depth of its reform. A radical one demands a cut at the base which is located in the war production abilities of the Milošević regime. That is why it is more likely that the DOS will yield to political opportunity and scale the change in the Serbian police pursuant to its projected (power) needs.

A new set of problems emerges once we start considering the future status and role of the police in Montenegro. This police is, just like its Serbian counterpart, highly militarised. Both forces have been developed as alternatives to the internal army and have long gone far beyond the frameworks of a police force. It is unlikely that the Montenegrin authorities would easily give up their para-police and the power it guarantees, and still less believable that the federal authorities would be able to substantially influence the reform of the republic police forces.

(c) Yugoslav Army

The Yugoslav Army takes the last place on the scale of reform risks. But that is why it is clearly the first on the scale of complexity and the costs involved. The available evidence warns that the army reform ranges fairly low at the DOS scale of priorities. Possible change in civilian-military relations and the military-political entity of the Yugoslav army may be additionally deferred under the pressure of the Presevo KLA wing. The intention of the current authorities in Montenegro – to make their state sovereignty complete as soon as possible – works in the same direction.

However, the pace of change will be decisively influenced by the fact that the DOS has not, thus far, done more than declared its principled resolve to create a modern professional and numerically fewer army. As to the plan, the means and price of attaining these objectives, they still remain unknown. Be what they may, the DOS has to take the management of the army transformation from the hands of the generals as soon as possible and transfer it to the parliament and the government.

The key problem of the new authorities will also be to define the starting point. In order to place the Yugoslav Army under democratic control they would first have to prepare efficient constitutional instruments and procedures. This implies the knowledge of the state to which the army structure and size will be adjusted. Only on the basis of clear state (defence and security) parameters can the planning of transformation, reduction and modernisation of the inherited army be undertaken.

This also creates difficulties in anticipating the scope and magnitude of the risk emerging out of the civilian and military spheres. The one thing that is certain is that, in the initial stage, the resistance to change within the military will match the inherent resistance of a bureaucratic mastodon. The experience of transition countries reveals that the first obstacle may be overcome by shortening the time of compulsory military service. That is because this may cause a chain effect on the restructuring and reduction of the army and curb the costs of maintaining it.
Bearing in mind that the DOS may not take an independent decision concerning the destiny or the shape of Yugoslavia, it will be forced to accept the co-existence with the inherited army pending the final decision. After the Serbian elections the DOS may start dosed personnel changes in the military top ranks and the change will probably be done in the manner which will bypass the hot topics of political or war responsibility of the military leadership and individuals in it, although this will also apply to their political masters and supporters.

The initial assessments allow a general assumption that the DOS, having conquered the power in Serbia, focused on the institutional reinforcement of its political control over the armed forces. The pace of social and economic reform of the society and the creation of a democratic infrastructure will directly determine the prospects for irrevocable subjecting of the armed forces to democratic control. This, however, will not be possible unless the Serbian and Yugoslav war knots are unravelled. And when it comes to that, the DOS and its members will have to weight their own share in the Yugoslav wars.

(4) Prospects for integration of Serbia/FRY into Euro-Atlantic security structures

In order to establish whether it could join the “Western security structures” and to what extent, Serbia has to identify them first. And that certainly is not an easy task.

At this moment there are at least three security systems wherein the West plays a dominant or leading role. The offer open to Serbia/FRY includes first the United Nations and then also NATO and its branches. Next come the emerging European Union security structures. Each one of these systems is in a different state of readiness and efficiency.

After the collapse of the bloc structure the United Nations lost what little delegated power they had. Lingering on the margin for so long they are approaching the crossroads which may take them into historical archives or revival. But to all appearances the decision about the path to be taken will not be made on East River.

As for NATO, it found the reason for its existence in the Yugoslav wars and was thereafter promoted to the role of the world peace enforcer of dubious legitimacy. The Alliance reached its zenith in Kosovo.

However, ever since Kumanovo the dilemmas as to its purpose and reach suppressed by the Yugoslav episode are surfacing once again. It seems that NATO and its regulators will finally have to concern themselves with their own destiny.

The continental move of the EU is being made under the guise of taking its share of responsibility for Europe. Although the West European search for their own security identity currently relies on NATO, it seems to suggest a duality which cannot go on for ever.

The security offer is certainly interspersed with the OSCE, numerous regional initiatives and ad hoc groups.

Before deciding on that Serbia will have to take a stand on the Euro-American concept of the security integration applied to formerly socialist countries. The concept, on its part, proved deficient on two counts:

♦ first, it reduced the security complex, as interpreted by the Copenhagen school, to the military component of overall security,

♦ second, it limits the security integration to the military political link with NATO and/or its branches.

Therefore, from the point of country’s entry into the “western structure” the correlation between military security of an individual country and its actual integration into the Euro-
Atlantic community keeps dropping. Once they join the ranks they are confronted with countless interfering factors unknown in advance. All at once, the nominally precise criteria, e.g. into the EU, are relativized and subjected to the free will of decision-makers.

Immediately following October 5, the readiness of the FRY and Serbia to return to the UN, and the OSCE was publicly declared. The strategic Option of the DOS is to integrate Serbia/FRY into Europe. This implies its activation into the Stability Pact, i.e. stabilisation of the region. To general satisfaction the FRY was admitted to almost all main institutions of the international community in a summary procedure.

The DOS has, for quite transparent reasons, avoided to declare its position on NATO and the Partnership for Peace. These reasons may easily be classified into three groups. The following reasons, taken together, act against the prompt consideration of the possible entry of Serbia into the Alliance:

♦ first, the collective and individual trauma due to the NATO aggression on the FRY. Although the opinion polis on the eve of the elections indicated a drop in xenophobia and isolationism, or rather an increase in the European orientation of the respondents, NATO still stands for the metaphor of the undesired American hegemony;

♦ second, NATO is a hot and slippery political topic, used in internal political conflicts as a disqualifier. In addition, the attitude towards NATO is not on the agenda at all, and the general dodging of the subject should come as no surprise, and

♦ third, even if it wanted to join NATO, assuming it survives until then, Serbia cannot fulfil the admission conditions or sustain the costs involved.

To all this we should add a democratic reason: serious talks may ensue only after NATO itself has been placed under democratic civilian control.

In order for Serbia and the FRY to be able to engage in security co Operation with “western structures” the new authorities must apply themselves to establishing internal security. In this job, they may be assisted by the EU and the U.S.A. in two ways:

♦ first, by not attaching any conditions to their economic and political support, and

♦ second, by offering effective assistance in consolidating the state.

For this purpose they could, e.g. within the Third Table of the Pact, form a special fund to encourage the transformation of civilian-military relations in the countries of the region. In the case of Serbia this would mean first of all, the provision of professional assistance in developing procedures for democratic civil control over the Yugoslav Army accompanied, in parallel, by the financial support to army transformation and employment of the demobbed army staff.

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