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Swedish Baltic Sea Policies – Return to A Historical Role?

"Sweden's Security Situation has never been better..."

This line sums up the present Swedish security debate – emphasizing the possibilities and opportunities offered by the post-Cold War situation rather than dangers and threats. The latter, previously formulated in various "threat scenarios", have now been replaced by "risks" which may seem much vaguer and less menacing than the variations on the Third World War (with, in the final analysis, Soviet invasion of Sweden), with which we lived for some forty years. There is, however, an element of irony in this. The danger of invasion has been written off for some ten years at least (taking as its point of departure a restructured Russian military capability established about ten years after the initiation of full scale military reform – which has not yet started). Even during the most critical moments of the Cold War this still remained a surreal and highly hypothetical, although of course utterly catastrophic, threat if it were to come about.

Now, when our security, supposedly, is greater than ever before, we are seen as running an almost endless gauntlet of "risks", with each of them a lot less threatening than nuclear war but on the other hand a lot more likely to happen in one form or another: environmental disasters (great oil spills in and the quite possible "death" of the Baltic Sea, global warming, nuclear power plant blow-ups etc), terrorist attacks – also involving WMDs, epidemics, organized crime, drugs, ethnic, religious and sorts of social and political disturbances producing refugees and further disorders à la Yugoslavia. In toto, a host of dangers to both state, nation and society that would not necessarily be best countered by JAS aircraft, submarines or armoured brigades. But which, again, include elements of probability for societal breakdown more immediate than a full scale armed attack by the "arch enemy" across the sea. Thus, in the end, the world after the Cold War may seem even more dangerous than it was before. The most recent report from the Defence Commission, Gränsöverskridande sårbarhet – gemensam säkerhet (Transboundary vulnerability – common security; DoD Ds 2001:14) is much concerned with these new challenges and what is generally accepted as a "wider security" concept.

The analysts here have a job to put things into perspective and relate the present to past experience. Efforts to do so are not without risks: comparisons have been made between the present situation in the Baltic Sea region and that of the early 1920's when Sweden's security situation was also seen to be better than ever before and fifteen Swedish armoured ships were thought to rule if not the seas at least the Sea. As it turned out, unilateral Swedish disarmament and lack of adaptation to the changing circumstances of the 1930's placed the country in a rather awkward position in 1939. Our basic assumption should be not to look for analogies with specific events (or sequences of events) of the past but rather to take the new

situation on its own merits but also as circumscribed by certain structural factors.

Historical Structure – New Stage, New Actors

There is a remarkable continuity in terms of the "system". Since the 1600's there have been three more or less continuous "forces" impacting on the security and insecurity of the region: a Germany to the south, a Russia to the east, and a maritime power (first the Netherlands, then Britain) to the west. In between these minor, regional powers have manoeuvred on a stage of varying opportunities – occasionally with great success (the Swedish century 1621–1721) but always within limits set by the three major "forces". Today, the stage is again different, as are the names of the actors but the basic structure remains the same: the European Union (with Germany) to the south, post-Soviet Russia to the east, and the present maritime (and global) power, the United States (and NATO) to the "west".

Even though the historian may thus sit back comfortably in his chair relying on history to still apply, it is obvious that the changes over the last dozen years have been revolutionary as compared with the frozen landscape of the Cold War. Russia has been cut down to size in all respects, losing its position in Central Europe and also predominance in the Baltic where only precarious bridgehead (St Petersburg and Kaliningrad) remain; Poland restituted once again and in the future possibly a Spain of the North; Germany reunited and the major European Union power; and the three Baltic states restored and looking west for home. Finally, also with Finland and Sweden changing course from "neutrality" and "Alleingang" to membership of a political alliance, the Union, although still declaring themselves (and factually remaining) militarily non-aligned.

The Baltic Sea Region – A Place of Many Meetings

When we refer to the Baltic Sea region we usually include all the shore states. The membership of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) also includes Norway (as well as a line to Iceland). For geographical reasons it would not be unreasonable to include Belarus, which, however, for political reasons is just as reasonably excluded. From an environmental point of view, the Czech Republic ought to be included as water (and pollution) from that country also reaches the Sea. From a strategic point of view, the United States will have to be seen as a Baltic factor – and the region must also be understood to include the Northern Seas: the North, Barents and Arctic.

What is new since the days of the old European balance of power-game is, of course, international organization in its various functional and regional shapes. The European Union and NATO, the OSCE as well as sub regional arrangements – the Nordic Council, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Barents Cooperation, the Council of the three Baltic states – here meet and interact with national interests, superpower and former superpower concerns. Just as we talk about "European interests" and "National

interests" in our trilateral project we may here introduce a third dimension of regional interests, although they also tend to be identified by the major European organizations.

What makes the Baltic Sea region unique is the very fact that it is here, and nowhere else, that the West (NATO and EU) directly borders on Russia, where contacts are inevitable, implying both strain and opportunities, community building and confrontation. Because of this the region acquires somewhat of an "experimental living" or laboratory status.

We have referred to three "forces" - the Union (including Germany), the United States and NATO, and Russia - as providing the parameters for security, cooperation and possible conflict in the region. What may we assume, in broad terms, about interests and strategies in the case of these "forces"?

The Union is now engaged in the preparations for a fourth enlargement process after having admitted north western Europe (UK, Denmark and Ireland in 1973), the Mediterranean (Greece in 1979; Portugal and Spain in 1986), and the neutrals (Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995). Poland is the main candidate in the region - excluding Poland is inconceivable but including Poland is also a case harder than most because of its size (which will impact on the division of votes and influence between the larger EU states) and economic structure. Strategy will play a role with Poland's position as both NATO and EU borderland to the east. Poland will be a member, but here as in the case of other applicants the time-factor, transition arrangements etc will have to be considered. Of the Baltic states, Estonia has been placed ahead of the others on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria. Again, for Estonia, as for Poland, the border-keeping role will imply very substantial obligations which the Union, and also its Baltic region members, will insist on - strongly. The assumption, however, must be that both Poland and the Baltic three will, in due time, become EU members and that they will thus also add their interests and voices to the continuing process of EU-development. On the one hand, this may lead to increased emphasis on "security" aspects, on the other "peripheral" enlargement may also produce additional momentum for the establishing of an EU core group, the "real Union", which the newest members will not themselves favour.

It must be underlined that Union interests in the region, also in the eyes of the likely members of the potential "core group", are strategic. In the long term, the Russian market, in the struggle for which so much blood was shed from the mid-1500's to the early 1700's, is also of major interest to the Union - not least, of course, to Germany. Berlin (like Bonn), has so far played a deliberately low profile role avoiding any major political initiatives, beyond strong advocacy for Polish EU membership, but has certainly been active in the economic sphere, here as in the Balkans. Baltic and Polish EU membership is thus both a question about holding an EU boundary against the East (migrants, organized crime etc) and of building bridges and a zone of contact with Russia. Growing Western European dependence on Russian energy resources will add to this complexity.

From the Russian point of view there are two main goals: the first one is to prevent the further erosion of its strategic position on the Baltic Sea and to

secure as much as possible of the old arrangements. There is great sensitivity as to the status of Kaliningrad. Proposals have been to the three Baltic states, Finland and Sweden about a special arrangement of "confidence" or cooperation between Russia and this "group of five" as non-NATO members and neutrals – something that could be seen as a recognition of a Russian right to a "sphere" between itself and NATO. These proposals have also been rejected by the five, who have refused to be identified as such a group. Moscow may be expected to continue this line of approach which is also part of the strategy to keep the Baltics out of the NATO enlargement discussion.

The second goal has to do with the window towards the West that Peter the Great opened in the early 1700's, at the expense of the Swedes, through the conquest of the eastern Baltic coast line. Today, Russia's dependence on this window is greater than ever. The Union is Russia's main trading partner and the sea trade that runs through the Baltic Sea ports of Finland and the Baltic states (to a much lesser extent through Kaliningrad and St Petersburg) is of enormous economic significance. With the Putin administration having now put its cards on the table and proclaiming, even clearer than Gorbachev did, that its future lies with the Europeans and in being recognized as a European partner, without disregarding its Siberian and Asian interests, the importance of the Baltic zone of contact, trade, and interaction has grown. Again, this is for Russia a question of strategic interests and priorities, just as it is for the Union (including Germany). One cannot outright reject the possibility that another Russian administration, or some policy turnover in the Kremlin, caused by fear of the "militarisation" of the Union with NATO, might lead to a reversal of Russian policies. Still, today our assumption remains that Russia will not oppose Baltic Union membership.

The interests of the United States in the Baltic Sea region have been the subject of some debate, not least in Sweden, where above all advocates of Swedish immediate NATO membership have argued that American attention in general in northern Europe (all Europe?) have diminished significantly since the end of the Cold War, that America is going Asiatic etc. Our position, however, is that the United States has laid down strong markers with the Baltic Charters, which do not involve guarantees to the Baltic states but strong indicators of US interest in the region; also that nuclear weapons – and the fact that the relationship with

Russia remains strategically bipolar despite Russian decline in capabilities – will keep Washington's attention on the region. For the immediate future, this attention seems above all directed towards the maintenance of existing stability with northern Europe a reassuring contrast to the situation on the former southern flank. If Russia has its notions of a "sphere", in the Baltic Sea region the United States may have its own – but they do not necessarily have to be incompatible.

The problem arises, of course, over Baltic states' membership of NATO. All three have applied; Denmark is a strong supporter within NATO for all, while Lithuania also has special assistance from Poland. Signals from Washington are contradictory – general European support is not overwhelming. The outcome of the review in 2002 is difficult to predict. Arguments may be made for the necessity of including "at least one Baltic state" in a field that may

otherwise be limited to Slovakia and Slovenia, perhaps Romania. The consequences for the stability desired in Washington are uncertain - although not in Moscow according to unison statements there from. Baltic NATO membership may, however, bring a blessing: a new start for a Russian-US/Western dialogue about the long term relationship between NATO and Russia - recapturing some of the lost opportunities of the Kozyrev years which at least some of the Russian strategic experts still lament, while advocating a new discussion about Russia's share in the future NATO. Again, the Baltic Sea region provides both possibilities and the risk for major setbacks.

A few words about regional and sub regional cooperation. This can be no substitute for "European" solutions, above all in the security sphere. But regionalism has the advantage of cutting across alliance and union boundaries and may thus provide for bridging and community building. The CBSS has such potential, also by identifying particular issues and places (such as Kaliningrad) which require attention and support in long term regional interest. Enlargement of EU (and NATO) will probably give additional weight to regionalism as a form for international cooperation in the region; demands for "compensatory" measures may be expected but will have to be handled with caution.

From A Swedish Point of View

The Swedish decision in 1990-91 to apply for EU membership was a watershed in Swedish history - even though the full implications were certainly not understood at the time. The decision was the product primarily of economic and welfare considerations but also, which one tends to forget with Swedish public opinion now clearly EU negative, of substantial public enthusiasm for the building of a new Europe in which Sweden would also actively participate. In 1990, some polls showed a 60% or more support for the Union to become. Those figures have so far not returned.

It must, however, also be underlined that there was a strong strategic argument, perhaps better understood in Finland, where security was clearly a key issue, than in Sweden, for membership: with the former Cold War front stretching from the Arctic to the Black Sea now being transformed into a zone of societal reorganization, uncertainties, and possible instability, the Nordics would also have to face problems in their own region which they would prefer not to have to handle all on their own. Backup through EU membership, with the possibilities of mobilizing Union resources and political clout, was therefore a strategic question and Union membership not only an issue of Swedish pensions and healthcare.

The new conditions since the emancipation of Eastern and Central Europe began have thus forced Sweden out of its Cold War strategic concept of "Alleingang" and resulted in a whole set of new policies all on the theme of cooperation, or as official Sweden prefers to phrase it since the Palme Commission of the early 1980's, of "common security". Other concepts have been picked up and successfully integrated along the road: partnership for peace, peace support operations, NATO compatibility, revolution in military

affairs, Petersberg tasks, the Northern Dimension. The result is a "new look" which may at the same time with reasonable credibility be related to previous formulas of international solidarity, peacekeeping, Nordic internationalism within the UN etc. But also to a regional role that has not been tried for quite some time.

The European Union

The European Union was not the Swedish design for a European security architecture when the old order started to unravel. In 1990, the organization in which Sweden had invested its expectations for Europe's future was the CSCE which was seen as UN for Europe that would, upon the expected end of the Cold War through coexistence and cooperation between East and West, replace the fading alliances. There were also expectations, in an alternative vision, for a barrier of neutral countries – lots of Swedens – from the High North to the Mediterranean. Neither of these materialized. Negotiations over the Common Economic Area

gradually produced a realization of a new role for the European integration process based on Delors' widening circles. Since 1990-91, the Swedish visions of EU have progressed from what was essentially seen as a business club and an enlarged free trade area based on intergovernmental negotiations and with "integration" essentially meaning "more cooperation" to what is still seen as an intergovernmental organization but with isles of supranationalism and a political programme.

"Security", which was not on the agenda in 1990-91, or still during the debate preceding the referendum in 1994 (except for isolated efforts by the non-socialist parties to promote the EU as a peace project), has re-emerged in two ways: as a way of securing peace between an ever widening circle of members, and as a crisis management or peacekeeping proposition.

In 1997, a report commissioned by the Committee for EU enlargement was published under the telling title *Större Europa – säkrare Europa* (A larger Europe – a safer Europe; SOU 1997:143). The message is quite straightforward: the larger the Union, the better. All European states are, in principal, seen as potential candidates. The eleven candidate countries – Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia – are identified and the positive effects in the relations between some of these states caused by the necessity of improve chances of accession is underlined. The process as such is a good thing. Special attention is given to the Baltic states, suggesting that the "isle of peace" that the Nordic countries have constituted in Europe during the Cold War would be extended through Baltic EU membership. The possibility of enlargement producing a "thinner" Union is discussed but not given great weight.

This report still apparently guides policy. Enlargement as such will contribute to the building of a widening security community – war between members will be impossible and members will also gain additional self-confidence in their relations with non-EU neighbours. There are no hard

security guarantees but membership will still bring additional security as non-members will face risks of retaliation (albeit non-military) in case of aggression against members of the Union.

Sweden has a special interest in the Baltic states joining the Union; no less than any other states they have a right "to return to Europe". Russia does not oppose their membership of the Union.

In 1996, in connection with the CBSS summit in Visby under Swedish chairmanship, deliberate Swedish efforts were made to mobilize the Union (not least Chancellor Kohl's Germany) for the project of Baltic development and Europeanisation, thus avoiding to limit the responsibility for the Baltic questions to the Nordic group – as had been previously suggested by French spokesmen ought to be case. The Swedish strategy did not quite produce the full scale commitment desired in 1996 but should the enlargement process, within a plausible time frame, result in membership for the three Baltic states without Russian opposition and without major controversies among the older Union members this would undoubtedly be viewed as a major Swedish diplomatic victory. It would be, one might say the logical follow up to the Swedish CSCE-project of 1991–94 to secure the withdrawal of the ex-Soviet armed forces deployed on Baltic state territories, that was ultimately completed in 1998 with the dismantling of the Shkrunda radar base in Latvia.

The two non-aligned states, Finland and Sweden, have pursued somewhat different strategies as to Baltic states' membership of the Union. The Finns were initially in favour of limiting demands to the strongest candidate, Estonia, thus gaining a "bridgehead" and having the others wait. The Swedish position was in favour of all three at the same time – a logical position against the background of the Nordics having consistently argued for cooperation among the three Baltic states and being worried about possible differentiation between them which would open for "grey zone"-thinking that would make one or more of them vulnerable to Russian pressures.

Put very bluntly, the Swedish aim should be to bring the Baltic states into a safe haven that would prevent them from again becoming "Russian". This is obviously a Swedish national security interest just as much as in the interest of Baltic sovereignty. Hopefully, this would also be seen to be in the interests of Moscow given its own agenda of Europeanisation earlier referred to.

Sweden may thus be relied upon to stick to its guns on the issue of Baltic EU membership. This also implies strong demands on Baltic reform policies – changes in the political and business cultures, attitudes on minority issues, concluding boundary agreements with Russia etc. The consequence of this policy also has to be a generous attitude towards other candidate countries as long as the Copenhagen standards are being met with. Sweden would thus not object to Central European candidacies or even applications from the Balkans – again as long as defined criteria are applied.

Enlargement of the Union tends to be seen in different lights depending on what part of Europe you yourself inhabit – and where the enlargement is to take place. The Swedish approach is thus in principle quite "catholic" on the

issue with an all-European security community at the end of the road. In the Baltic Sea region, concerns over worker migration and job competition on an open Union market seems less than the worries about spill over across the Baltic-Russian and Polish borders.

Through the so called Finnish-Swedish initiative in 1998, the Petersberg tasks were written into the Amsterdam treaty thus making way for a new concept of the Union as an organ for crisis management and peace support operations – from civilian operations to peace enforcement. This initiative may be seen in two ways. On the one hand it did contribute to give the Union a new direction and new tasks – filling a vacuum embarrassingly obvious during the process of Yugoslav collapse since 1991. The Europeans were seen to need a military crisis management capability of its own – although interoperative and planned in conjunction with NATO. The Swedish (and Finnish) starting point was the lower rather than the higher end of the spectrum but once the idea got launched the headline goals process drove the Union members in a direction that few Swedes had anticipated in 1994 when the referendum on EU membership took place. Considering the fact that Sweden, among other UN members in the 1992–93 debates on the Secretary General's Agenda for Peace proposal had refused any earmarked units for UN peacekeeping, the commitments in 2000 to EU peacekeeping of mechanized battalions, surface missile ships, mine sweepers, a submarine, reconnaissance and transport air craft, engineer units etc. may seem a dramatic change.

On the other hand, all of this may also be seen as a "Flucht nach Vorn": by taking this initiative one also pre-empted more far going demands for European common defence that neither Sweden nor Finland (nor other members of the Union) would have been prepared to accept in 1998. "Peacekeeping" is traditionally an acceptable international activity – with more than 70.000 Swedes having participated in UN operations – and thus compatible with Swedish traditions also under EU direction. Such operations might even be conceivable in the Baltic Sea region.

During the Finnish EU presidency in the second half of 1999 the Helsinki meeting confirmed EU ambitions to act with its own military capabilities in Petersberg type operations. Another, Finnish initiative, the so called Northern Dimension was also accepted during the Finnish presidency – the rationale behind this proposal being to develop an EU formula for managing EU-Russian relations and thus also to secure what the Swedish CBSS presidency had been seeking in 1996: the mobilization of the Union for a regional commitment in the Baltic Sea region that would unload some of the burden from the Nordics and Russia's more immediate neighbours. This must also be seen as a success from the point of view of both Helsinki and Stockholm and a contribution also to regional security building.

Looking at the Union as an instrument also for regional security building, not publicly considered at the time of the Swedish application for Union membership, has thus become an important theme in Swedish EU and Baltic Sea region policies. We shall return to Swedish regional policies later.

NATO

There is no doubt that NATO – and even cooperation with NATO or NATO individual members on specific issues (intelligence) – played a very substantial role in Swedish strategy during the Cold War. Without NATO as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, the type of neutral policy pursued by Sweden would not have been possible. About this fact official Sweden was, for obvious reasons, rather silent. Since the end of the Cold War, however, repeated and frequent references have been (and are still) made to the role of the United States as a necessary stabilizing factor for European security. The end of the Cold War did not bring Sweden into NATO, however. But through the Partnership for Peace formula it brought Sweden (as well as Finland and many others) into cooperation with NATO, Sweden and Finland joining the programme together on May 9 1994. In 1995, once the Dayton agreement had been reached, Sweden also agreed to join IFOR in Bosnia under NATO command – a decision taken without much debate although it was unprecedented.

While the question of membership remains a non-issue, despite a certain debate, with a clear majority opposed to such a choice, Sweden is thus moving fast into cooperation and interaction with NATO in a growing number of fields. NATO concepts of compatibility and NATO standards for peacekeeping/peace support operations are now the guidelines, together with the most recent of concepts, the Revolution in Military Affairs, driving the reorganization of Sweden's military defence in directions totally alien to the old Cold War ideas about a unique national profile, with indigenous doctrines, Swedish designed and unique military equipment etc. Whether this is a revolution in military affairs or not it is certainly a revolution in Swedish military thinking with a transformation from defence against invasion to projection forces, usable both for national defence and for international operations. On the other hand, Gustavus Adolphus would have recognized the principle about defending the country not on Swedish territory but beyond!

NATO's PfP-programme has been seen as another instrument for contributing to regional security – a Swedish aim being to involve the Baltic Sea states together in partnership exercises designed to underline common interests in cooperation. Efforts to bring the Russians into these operations have, however, met with limited success.

For a non-member, NATO enlargement is a difficult question to handle. Sweden joined in the chorus identifying Polish NATO membership as a contribution to increased regional (and European) security and thus also to Sweden's advantage. The debate on possible Baltic state membership was somewhat more ambiguous – with clear Swedish reservations about whether the security sum total with Baltic NATO membership would really mean an improvement of the situation in the region. Statements about each country having a right to make its own security choice were tempered with comments about the need for each to consider the over all effects of such a choice. In 1996, Prime Minister Göran Persson made an about turn by assuring the Baltics that Sweden far from wanting to put obstacles in the way of Baltic intentions to apply for NATO membership would try to be of help. Since then repeated statements about Sweden in no way objecting to such a course

have been made – while among some security experts, most notably high military officers, comments have indicated that Baltic NATO membership would be detrimental to Swedish interests.

Our reading of these demonstrations is that they represent a misunderstanding of what the situation is all about. The problem by now seems more a question about the damage effects of not taking Baltic applications seriously, than of admitting them – again in due time and under arrangements involving confidence-building. Grey zone ambiguities would also suggest that it would be preferable to admit all three Baltic states at once rather than in sequence. Be this as it may, the decision is not one for the Swedes to take – or to obstruct.

What would no doubt be a challenge to both Finns and Swedes is the situation that may arise with de facto Baltic membership – or Baltic membership conditional upon Finnish and Swedish (and the two will hang together) NATO-relations. The Swedish solution to the NATO dilemma is thus so far cooperation, being available and compatible, up to the very point of membership, thus choosing one's level of engagement but accepting no binding obligations.

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When Sweden recently transferred equipment from three Swedish infantry brigades to the three Baltic states, frivolous comments were made to the effect that this seemed much like Sweden in an earlier age manning the ramparts of its Baltic empire. Such historical parallels are not likely to be uppermost in the minds of Swedish decision-makers. On the other hand, a Baltic self-defence capability is in the interests of Sweden – for Baltic self-confidence and regional stability's sake.

The Nordic countries as a group proclaimed an early responsibility (in 1992) for the development and democratic future of the Baltic republics. Investments have since then been made also in various Baltic enterprises with Nordic (and other Western) involvement: BaltBat, Baltic Defence College etc. Support in various forms for Baltic sovereignty and capacity to really exercise such sovereignty have been given priority.

At the same time, the Swedes have also declared their interest in supporting the development of what is termed North West Russia: Murmansk, Karelia, St Petersburg, Novgorod-Pskov and also Kaliningrad. These are the neighbouring parts of Russia where economic development, criminal activities, social unrest, environmental problems etc will inescapably influence the whole of the Baltic Sea region. "Conflict prevention" in the widest sense of the phrase is here a national interest also on the Swedish side of the Baltic.

When Swedish official spokespersons today give an explanation why they see continued Swedish nonalignment as a strategy still relevant they usually invoke particular services Sweden might be able to offer as non-aligned – mediating, bridge building, making specific proposals (usually in the disarmament field) – which would not be as open to alliance members. In our

opinion, much of this is open to questioning (comparisons with Danish, Norwegian and other achievements in these fields do not bear out the uniqueness of non-aligned competence). However, a case may still be made for a Baltic bridge building and confidence-building role during a period of transition from the Cold War to the shaping of a European system also involving Russia as a partner. The Europeanisation of Russia is for Sweden as for others in northern Europe a high level priority.

It is a role not without complications – we have already referred to the Russian proposals to identify a group of five Baltic Sea neutrals or special confidants of Russia and outside the "West", an identification that should be refused. It is not a new role but somewhat of an echo not of Sweden's century of greatness but of a much more recent age. At the beginning of the 1900's, the Swedish political elite saw a great challenge in the possibility – after the Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese war – to bring a weakened Russia by the hand into the West, assist in the development of its resources and industrial potential. Such a Swedish meeting with historical destiny was seen as a confirmation of Sweden still being an important country with a special mandate of its own in building European security. (See Gunnar Åselius, *The "Russian Menace" to Sweden. The Belief System of Small Power Security Elite in the Age of Imperialism*. Diss. Stockholm 1994.) Whatever the relevance of such comparisons – and there is no reason to assume that Swedish decision makers are aware of such a parallel – there is in Swedish efforts at security building in the Baltic Sea region no abdication from duty or initiative, something which the EU chairmanship position has also underlined.

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