

The Present European Security Situation with Reference to the Respective National Interests

Part 1: The Present European Security Situation with special reference to Austrian National Security Interests

I The Present Security-political Situation in Europe

Peace and stability in a 21st-century Europe are marked by the fact that a spirit of integration has replaced the century-long struggle for hegemony by individual European states. Within the last twelve years, the security-political scenario in Europe has been changed fundamentally through two milestones: the collapse of communism and the expansion of NATO and the EU. The political and security-political restructuralisation, however, has not yet been concluded. Zones of varying stability and security remain: first, countries within the stable and integrated Europe of EU/NATO, second, countries with a perspective to EU or NATO membership and finally those countries lacking any rapprochement to the EU/NATO stability core.

Under the present conditions, it has become impossible to consider the security situation of any European country isolated from the others.

The growing complexity of the security interests of European countries, the rapid and cost-intensive development of western military technology as well as the augmentation of the legitimacy and chances of success of a multinational approach in the realisation of security-political strategies have led to a reformation of the relationship of national to European security politics.

New security-political challenges and a complex combination of risks and threats have replaced the clear-cut scenario dominated by military threat. They may stem from a variety of political, economical, military, social, cultural, information-technological or ecological causes.

Risks for Europe are at the same time risks for Austria. Territorial distance to crisis regions has ceased to offer sufficient protection. Austria as a small, economically highly developed and internationally integrated country is dependent on the European security situation. New security risks can be faced best through stabilisation in the form of comprehensive political and economical support or of international military presence in loco.

Stability has become the common security-political endeavour of all European countries in our days.

European stability is primarily realised through the co-operation of a large number of European countries within the framework of the EU and NATO. The

proper functioning of both organisations is of vital importance for the security in and around Europe. It is guaranteed through the contributions of the respective member countries and the ability of the EU and NATO to co-operate and support each other mutually.

The future development of the European Union will be of decisive relevance for the future of Europe.

The EU is not only an economic community, but also an epochal peace project. In the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the EU member countries have decided on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in order to realise the common aims of the foreign and security policy of the Union, such as the protection and promotion of peace, human and civil rights as well as of democracy and prosperity. The Kosovo crisis has raised the awareness among the European governments that a credible CFSP and the role of a global player are impossible without Common European Security and Defence Policy. An effective CFSP requires credible military means.

II Austrian Security Interests in the New Europe

The range of the changes listed above compels Austria to a total reorientation of her security policy. The current defence doctrine of Austria – the National Defence Plan published in 1983 – was a reaction to the military threat scenario during the Cold War. Austria in its position between the Warsaw Pact and NATO had little space for security-political manoeuvre and was forced to pursue a passive and static security and defence policy.

Considering the political changes in Europe, Austria is challenged to outline her security policy from scratch. Within this context, the Austrian government has appointed a commission to develop a new Security and Defence Doctrine in May 2000. The arguments of this chapter follow chiefly the "Part 1: Analysis" of this new Austrian security doctrine.

Under present conditions in Europe, the securing of peace, freedom and democratic values requires a new security policy following the principles of comprehensive prevention and an active participation in structuring the own security environment. The situation demands a security policy that orients itself primarily along the structuring of its own environment so that threats will not arise at all in the future and that the vulnerability of the modern Austrian society will be reduced to a minimum.

The objective of the modern Austrian security policy is to preserve peace through the creation of a maximum of political, economical, military, social and ecological stability and security within the European environment.

The new Austrian Security and Defence Doctrine, the first part of which was accepted by the Council of Ministers on 23 January 2001 and which is now undergoing a process of political and public discussion, follows a security definition defined by national interests:

"Security policy in the sense of the doctrine comprises all measures and means to preserve the security interests of a country. Above all, this is guaranteed through the creation of external stability as well as through the prevention of the rise of external threats to the population and basic values; if necessary, through protection against external threats."¹

The precondition for such an active and comprehensive security policy is the clear definition of national interests and objectives. Well-understood security interests, which are a legitimate right of every democratic country, form the entirety of the value and aim complex of the national security policy.

One of the most prominent reasons for Austria joining the EU was the membership in the European free trade and stability zone. From this moment on, the security of Austria and the EU have been linked inseparably.

Common security interests that are based on common values and face new security risks lead to a common security policy of the EU member countries.

Today, Austria realises her security policy within the framework of the EU. She can only safeguard her interests within the framework of the EU and the realisation of her security-political interests is dependent on the solidarity of the other EU countries. The alternative to such an equal and joint integration would be a costly and counterproductive strategy of detachment or the abandonment of an independent freedom of action and the passive acceptance of security-political developments.

The concept of interests² of the new Austrian security policy is based both on the vital national security interests and the security-political interests of the EU. These interests define the strategy as well as the security-political instruments and means employed. The definition of the interests and of the means and measures required for their realisation are the central tasks of a modern and comprehensive security policy. Such a comprehensive national planning and leadership task requires an adequate internal security-political organisational structure. In order to achieve this purpose, a National Security Council will be established as one of the first explicit results of the Austrian Doctrine process.

The analysis part of the Security and Defence Doctrine lists the following vital Austrian security interests:

- The guaranteeing of the territorial integrity and the self-determination as well as the freedom of action of the Republic of Austria;
- The protection of the constitutional-democratic order;

1 Security and Defence Doctrine, Part 1: Analysis; Annex to the Report to the Council of Ministers on 23 January 2001, 44/39

2 An overview to the chapter 5.4 "The security interests of Austria" of Part 1: Analysis of the Security and Defence Doctrine can be found in the annex.

- The guaranteeing of internal security including the protection of the national border;
- The comprehensive protection of the Austrian population and of the interests of the Austrian society;
- The securing of the economical and social basis of the country and the protection of a natural environment worth living in;
- The guaranteeing of a stable political, economical and military environment and the promotion of European stability;
- The safeguarding of the interests of Austria within the EU and the realisation of the interests of the EU in the global framework;
- The protection and promotion of the basic values.

The safeguarding of these vital security interests is the uppermost objective and political-strategic guideline of the Austrian security policy.

The vital Austrian security interests are no longer structured merely along national interests. They take into account that security can no longer be guaranteed through protection of the borders and territorial defence: the creation of stable environment has become the central security-political objective.

A system of mutual interdependency exists between the national security interests of the member countries and the common interests of the EU. The member countries can no longer realise their security-political interests and aims autonomously and are dependent upon the solidarity of their European partners. The EU on the other hand depends on the solidarity and the contribution of the member countries in development and realisation of its interests.

Being a EU member, Austria supports and realises the security-political interests of the Union as laid down in Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the Treaty on the EU in the consolidated version of 1997. These include among other matters "... to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union ..." as well as "... to strengthening the security of the Union in all ways ...".

The important political-strategic aims of Austria can be deduced from the vital security interests and the security interests of the EU. Governmental institutions then rephrase these general aims of the Republic of Austria in order to define objectives.

At the moment, the Austrian government names the following central security-political objectives:

- The prevention of the development of relevant risks and threats to the continent and the extension of taking-over of more responsibility for peace and stability by Europe in the global context;

- The comprehensive promotion of stability and security as well as the prevention of the development or escalation of conflicts in the strategically relevant environment of Austria and of the EU, which might stem from political deficits and a lack of democracy as well as from economic, ethnic or religious tensions;
- The development of efficient civilian and military capacities and structures for the realisation of the security-political aims in the national range as well as a precondition for a credible and effective CFSP of the EU;
- The safeguarding and deepening of the transatlantic co-operation as a basis for stability and security in Europe;
- The balancing of the affluence differential especially in connection to the EU enlargement process to the East and with selected countries in the framework of development co-operation;
- The guaranteeing of vital resources and communication;
- The fight against transnational crime, terrorism as well as manipulation of technology and information.

When considering the above mentioned, the fact that Austria cannot but realise her security policy within the framework of the EU becomes indisputable. Any further development of the Austrian security policy will be influenced considerably by the European development in this context.

For deeper understanding of the future European – and in this sense also Austrian – security-political development the second part of this paper will offer a cursory overview of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. This relies on the fact that future developments find their basis in recent history and can be expected to follow the path in the foreseeable future.

Part 2: The development of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU

I Reasons for the Creation and Development of the CFSP/ESDP

The reasons for the creation of the CFSP/ESDP³ (Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy) are manifold. They are partly due to a long-term structural nature, such as the idea of pacifying Europe, and partly due to the thrust of specific events, such as the air operation against FRY in 1999 with the recognition of huge deficits in the European military structure.

Pacification and functional spill-over as long-term factors

One of the main reasons for the development of the CFSP/ESDP finds its roots in the original motivation in founding the Union. In its primary status, it was a European peace project aiming at stabilising a region that had triggered two world wars in the last century. This was the primary aim behind the economic integration and the main motivation for the alliance of six that integrated its steel and coal production in 1951 (ECSC) and founded an economic community seven years later (ECC/EURATOM).

The growing integration of the member countries on the economic level necessitated joint problem solving in other areas: as the common market led gradually to the establishment of a European monetary system and finally to a common currency, the expanding foreign trade – among other matters – enabled the Community to use it as an instrument of foreign policy. These developments were supported on a theoretical level by the different varieties of a neo-functional integration theory that found their common core in the reasoning that communalised tasks would naturally lead to spillover effects in other areas and issues and in due course further the integration. The long-term trend to European unification supports this hypothesis, at least until now. In spite of phases of a stagnation of the integration process, the long-term development at all times continued in a direction of a deepening of the co-operation and integration. It has to be seen whether this spirit can be kept up at the current level of integration and especially in the face of the substantial enlargement of the EU.⁴ The debate over a European Constitution or a

3 In the period between the Summit of Helsinki in December 1999 and the Summit in Nice in December 2000, the abbreviation CESDP (Common European Security and Defence Policy) was used.

4 C.f.: Beate Kohler-Koch, Europäisierung: Plädoyer für eine Horizonterweiterung, in: Michèle Knodt, Beate Kohler-Koch (eds.), Deutschland zwischen Europäisierung und Selbstbehauptung, Mannheimer Jahrbuch für europäische Sozialforschung, Vol. 5, Frankfurt / Main (Campus Verlag), 2000

Constitutional Treaty might be an indicator that at least parts of the political elite consider a further deepening of the integration indispensable.

From the perspective of the spillover theory, the freshly institutionalised currency union seems to recommend the restructuring of the EU into a powerful and comprehensive institution.

Balance of Powers to the USA

A further motive for the extension of the CFSP/ESDP is - above all for France - a balance of powers to the "hyper-power" USA. The efforts of a reactivation of the so-far slumbering WEU in the second half of the 80ies were based upon the idea of European self-confidence in the face of the dominant transatlantic partner. In the course of the 90ies the WEU, especially due to French and German efforts, developed into the germ of today's ESDP.⁵

Integration of Germany

The specific thrust that propelled the loose European Political Co-operation (EPC) into the CFSP at the beginning of the 90ies was based upon the thought of the integration of the reunited Germany. The wish for including Germany went hand in hand with the German will of self-integration into a multilateral security system. Above all, the Maastricht Treaty with its substantial steps towards integration was interpreted by Germany as a "postponed precondition" for the reunification that revolutionised the structure of the European state system.⁶ For Germany, this was the only way to evade the isolation perceived historically as dangerous and to maintain the faith of the neighbouring countries in the German politics.

Danger of a re-nationalisation of the foreign and defence politics

The decisive factor for the acceleration of the process described above was the collapse of the Soviet Union and with it of the entire Warsaw Pact. Next to the implications for Germany, this upheaval had profound consequences on the European state system. Countries so far solidly rooted in a block were looking for new political anchor points. This development triggered the question whether these countries should return to the old scheme of rivalling nation states under the heading of "re-nationalisation" - a process that could grapple and endanger the entire EU - or if it was feasible to put down some form of regional co-operation and integration, thus limiting or eliminating the connected risks and dangers to the European stability altogether. Next to

5 C.f.: Peter Schmidt: Drifting Apart? The EU's Emerging Security and Defence Dimension and the Transatlantic Connection, in: Strategic Yearbook, Stockholm 2000

6 Ibid.

NATO, only the EU with its high level of co-operation and intense integration was able to serve as a foothold in this endeavour. As the foreign and defence policy recommended an emphasis on non-military instruments after the end of the Cold War, the EU was to bear the central role in the stabilisation efforts.

Dependency on American Support

Since the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Europeans are faced with the question of how far they have to provide the required capacities for solving regional conflicts in the proximity of the EU autonomously. This is the result of the fact that Europe can no longer rely on the USA in meeting European interests on the required level. The USA demonstrated this in her reluctance to become engaged in Bosnia between 1991 and 1993. This is paralleled by the repeated American demand for the Europeans to bear the larger part of the military burden in Europe.

Enlargement to the East

The collapse of the Eastern Block advocates the enlargement of the EU. The perspective of gaining EU membership is a fundamental means of stabilisation for the young democracies in South East and Central Europe.⁷ A similar stabilisation strategy was successful once before in the case of post-authoritative Spain as well as of Portugal in the 80ies. If one wants to hold fast to a powerful EU, any enlargement requires a deepening of the co-operation and integration. Safeguarding the decision-making capacity of more than two dozen member countries requires an improvement of the decision-making procedures and mechanisms. In turn, a deepening of the CFSP/ESDP can be the consequence, which should not be endangered in their barely gained freedom of action by additional member countries.

Burden sharing within NATO

The last reason for the expansion of the ESDP can be found in the unbalanced burden distribution within the Atlantic treaty organisation in military matters. On the one hand, the USA expects a fair burden sharing of their European partners, which refers to the provision of military capacities in the case of action. On the other hand, the Europeans (especially France) have demanded more influence in security-political and military decisions. Although every member possesses one vote in the North Atlantic Council, one can hardly ignore the fact that in critical situations - as during the deployment of Stealth Bombers over FRY - the Americans will take decisions autonomously. In the last consequence, it is the well-understood interest of both sides to design the security- and defence-political means in a balanced way with a perspective

7 Leigh, Martin: Enlargement and European Security, in: Cafruny / Peters: The Union and the World. The Political Economy of a Common European Foreign Policy, 1998

towards a functioning partnership. Above all, this implies a well-equipped ESDP.

Eleven of the fifteen EU members are members of NATO. The population of non-NATO-members in the EU constitutes only 7.5 per cent of the entire EU population. NATO primarily takes security-political decisions. If the Europeans strive for more weight within NATO, they will have to improve their own military capabilities through concentration.

II Aims of the CFSP/ESDP

With the Maastricht Treaty the step towards a political union was concluded, thus developing the EU from the loose European Political Co-operation (EPC), dealing only with the political and economical aspects of security, to the far more binding framework of the CFSP comprising the full range of all security-political aspects. The Amsterdam Treaty broadened the aims and organisation of the CFSP considerably. Art. 2 of the Treaty on the EU (1997) defines the central aim of the Union: "... to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence ...". The CFSP as defined in Art. 11 of the Treaty on the EU comprises all matters of the foreign and security policy and aims at the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. For these needs, the actions set by the CFSP may include "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking" (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the EU).

The WEU has been tied up even closer to the EU in the Amsterdam Treaty as compared to the Maastricht Treaty. It has become no longer necessary to "request" the WEU for giving support to the EU with its operative capabilities, but it now can be laid claim to "comply". Next to this vision of an institutional coupling of the EU and the WEU there existed – mainly resulting from the German-French co-operation – the vision of fusing the two institutions. It soon became obvious, however, that a simple fusion would meet with two problems, at least from the momentary point of time:

On the one hand, not all of the formerly neutral countries are ready to define collective defence as a task of the EU and are prepared to renounce their status of non-alignment formally in that way. On the other hand, the question arises which tasks would be left for the Alliance if not only regional securing of peace but also collective defence became a task of the EU.⁸ Consequently, a path was chosen that transfers the crisis management tasks from the WEU to the EU, while at the same time leaving

8 C.f.: Schmidt, Peter: Neuorientierung in der Europäischen Sicherheitspolitik? Britische und britisch-französische Initiativen; SWP-AP, Ebenhausen 1999

the obligation of mutual assistance and the formal treaty framework (including the WEU Assembly) with the WEU. The European Council of Helsinki in December 1999 posed a milestone in matters of defence policy: next to the institutional preparations, a decision was taken concerning the military equipment. Until the year 2003, the member countries will set up contingents for a rapid reaction force of up to 60.000 personnel, deployable within 60 days and with the ability of remaining one year in the area of operation.

In the conclusions to the summit in Feira in June 2000, considerable attention was given to the non-military aspects of crisis management. The target was laid down to provide 5.000 police personnel (1.000 of those within one month) for a crisis region by the year 2003. In addition, definite priorities for the civilian conflict management were listed, among them the strengthening of the rule of law through reestablishment of the court and codes of criminal procedure as well as support to the civilian authorities.⁹ On the military side, the concretising of the institutional realisation of the decisions taken in Cologne and Helsinki was the emphasis of the EU. Among others, one could list the mechanisms of consultation with NATO and with non-EU members.

III Problems and Perspectives

CFSP and ESDP represent the unparalleled attempt to integrate a state system of currently fifteen and perhaps up to 30 members into a comprehensive system of security- and defence-political co-operation. This attempt has made enormous headway. A realistic politics must, however, not merely consider the potential, but also the problems and threats inherent to the current development.

Above all, the following issues have to be considered:

Within the framework of the scheduled Intergovernmental Conference in 2004, which will attempt to develop a form of a "constitutional treaty", the question will certainly be posed if and how an obligation of mutual assistance might be inserted in this treaty. This is by far not a simple decision, as this will undoubtedly touch functional domains of NATO. Can the transatlantic liaison be upheld if the EU pins common defence to its flag?

Around the middle of this decade, the first candidates can be expected to join the EU. It is still unclear which effects this will have on the decision-making ability of the EU in security- and defence-political matters. The summit of Nice has demonstrated that the current members show little inclination for taking steps into the direction of majority rule or even less into the direction a communalisation of the defence sector. This poses the question of how competent a decision-maker this system of states will be in times of crises.

9 Conclusion to the European Council in Feira

The structuring of the co-operation with countries that are not members of the Union poses another difficulty. The overall aim is to evade any discrimination, e.g. the exclusion of countries willing to share in the European crisis management. Thus, the EU attempts not to create a greater distance to others through the closer co-operation within the Union without eventually impeding the autonomy in taking decisions. This political tightrope act becomes apparent when considering Turkey, who refuses to agree to regulations defining the guaranteed access to NATO resources by the EU as long as her participatory possibilities within the framework of the EU are not defined adequately. In the political practice of the WEU, these rights of participation between members, associated members, associated partners and observers (like Austria) had been balanced progressively. It appears difficult to cut back on these rights.¹⁰ In the future, there will only be two separate consultation platforms with an emphasis on the contacts between the EU to the group of NATO members that are not members of the Union. There is some possibility that third party countries will be fully integrated in the consultation processes once the EU has decided autonomously over the execution of an operation.

Bearing in mind the liaison with America as well as the efficiency of the CFSP/ESDP system, a central issue will be in how far the EU countries will manage to develop an effective military potential. So far, stagnation or reduction is the feature uniting the defence budget of the EU members. Will it be possible to reach the goals under these conditions? Moreover, this has also great importance for the Atlantic alliance. America has always measured the capability of the ESDP by how much "bang for the Euro" Europe manages.

10 Associated members to the WEU: Iceland, Norway, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Turkey; the European NATO members that are not members of the EU. Associated partners: Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Rumania, Slovakia, Slovenia; countries which are neither in NATO nor in the EU but have applied for membership in both organisations.

IV The Contributions of the EU Members to the EU Crisis Reaction Force

The rapid reaction force the European Council decided upon in Helsinki should be able to carry out the entire range of the Petersberg tasks by the end of 2003. The Petersberg tasks were defined in 1992 within the framework of the WEU and by now have become implemented in the Treaty of Amsterdam. They comprise of peace keeping, humanitarian and rescue tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace making (peace enforcement in NATO terminology). For these purposes, 60.000 troops (ground forces) shall be deployable within 60 days and for a duration of up to one year. Further requirements include combat and reconnaissance aircraft, airlift capacity and marine forces. The following table lists the requirements (the Helsinki Headline Catalogue) and the respective offers by the EU member countries.

Table 1:

A comparison of the two columns shows the areas where materiel or troops are still in demand. Above all, the EU has deficits in electronic intelligence (satellite technology) and lacks transport capacity. Apart from these deficiencies on the strategic level, there are also shortcomings on the tactical level, although the number of troops offered exceeds the need. Until 2003, decisive problems as that of unit rotation, of availability of troops and logistics will need some in-depth evaluation. One has to accept, however, that the European intervention forces are definitely under way.

Force Elements	EU - Requirements (Helsinki Headline Catalogue)	Offers by EU member countries
Headquarters		
Operation HQ	1	5
Force HQ	3	4
Land Component Command	2	6
Maritime Component Command	3	5
Air Component Command	2	4
Land		
Division HQ	4	6
Armoured Brigade	3	3
Mechanised Infantry Brigade	6	8
Light Infantry Brigade	8	5
Amphibious Brigade	2	2
Air Assault Brigade	2	5
Maximum commitment (land brigades)		13
Maximum (personnel) for one year	60.000*	83.005*
Maritime		
Aircraft/Helicopter Carriers	5	5
Destroyers & Frigates	25	28
Submarines	3	11
Amphibious Ships	14	18
Mine Countermeasures Ships	12	27
Strategic Sealift	61	6
Air (including Maritime Aviation)		
Combat Aircraft in different roles	251	373
Suppression of Enemy Air Defence	60	28
AWACS	12	5
Air/Air refuelling	73	29
Electronic intelligence	12	5
Tactical transport	43	58
Strategic Airlift	188	122

*Ground forces only. The total number of forces comprises more than 100.000 soldiers

V The Relevance of the CFSP/ESDP on Austrian Security Politics

The new Austrian Federal Government has laid the emphasis in the field of security politics on the EU. In its government programme dating February 2000, the Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) and the People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) have decided on the participation of Austria in a European Peace, Security and Defence Community. This should dispose of efficient decision making structures and be able to rely on a credible military capacity. A clause of mutual assistance (as in a military treaty organisation) should be incorporated in the legal framework of the EU. Moreover, the co-operation between the defence industries of the EU should be strengthened.

Austria should participate in all the future security-political planning and decision-making structures of the EU and join in all multinational units of the European crisis management to be. Apart from national territorial defence, Austrian soldiers should be deployed for peace keeping and peace making operations (not, however, for wars of aggression). In the face of the fact that the European and transatlantic security are closely interlinked, Austria strives for – without stipulating definite aims – comprehensive institutional contacts and an effective co-operation between the EU and NATO.

Austria's current governmental policy is based on the assumption of a redefinition of the national security policy within the framework of the European Union. For EU members, national security policy exists but to a limited extent. The CFSP has been shaped to a much larger extent than realised in many places. While intense differences – mainly between Germany on the one hand and France and England on the other hand – marked the question of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia ten years ago, all EU members declared their unanimous support to the NATO air strikes against FRY during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. This was a fact especially remarkable as among the fifteen countries, four – Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Austria – are neutral or non-aligned for whom partisanship with a warring party should have been impossible. Austria and the other neutral or non-aligned countries, however, are in the process of recognising that stability on Europe has to be a national goal and that this stability is guaranteed not only by the EU, but mainly by NATO. The probable conflict management in the rim zones of Europe and in its near environment will have to rely in particular on NATO resources. For the smaller countries of Europe, well-understood security policy consists of their participation in the measures for the maintenance and expansion of European stability. The emphasis in security politics has shifted from national preparations for defence to a participation in a Euro-Atlantic crisis and conflict management.

The intentions of the Austrian security policy can be gathered best from the proposal of the analysis part of the new Security and Defence,¹¹ out of which some central theses are listed as a conclusion:

1. There is no "Austrian" security without "European" security.
2. The new security-political risks and challenges cannot be faced autonomously but only within an international structure.
3. The old policy of reaction to threats is being replaced by a comprehensive, precautionary, preventive and stability-oriented security policy.
4. Austria considers the EU most of all as an epochal security-political concept.
5. Austria realises her security policy within the framework of the EU.
6. The security of Europe – and thus also of Austria – depends primarily on the operability of the EU and NATO.
7. Austria promotes a co-operation as close and trusting as attainable between the EU and NATO.
8. The future political freedom of action of Austria depends on her proportionate contribution to European security.
9. Austria's challenge will be to contribute in a comprehensive as well as military way to the operability of the EU and NATO.
10. The concept of neutrality is outdated.
11. Austria is not neutral but non-aligned.
12. Non-alignment connotes limited political freedom of action.
13. Armed forces have a fundamental importance for the political freedom of action of western democracies, above all in times of crises.
14. The new emphasis of the Austrian defence policy centres on the strengthening of European security and stability.

11 Security and Defence Doctrine – Part 1: Analysis: Annex to the report to the Council of Ministers on 23 January 2001, 44/39

Annex I: The Austrian Contribution to the Military Operations of the EU (Helsinki Headline Catalogue)

Austria offers troops with a total strength of 3.500 to the European (task) force (rapid reaction force). Of those, 2.000 can be deployed in parallel operations at the same time. (The rotation period for each unit will be six months). Theoretically, an enlargement of up to 4.000-5.000 troops (equivalent to one brigade) is feasible. Basically, the Austrian troop contingent will consist of one mechanised infantry battalion (1.000 troops), mainly for peace making, as well as one battalion light infantry (800 troops), mainly for peace keeping missions. To the first, one tank unit, one armoured infantry unit as well as one short-range air defence unit may be attached. In addition, Austria offers one NBC-unit, tasked mainly for military NBC defence, but also prepared to work in disaster relief and urban search and rescue operations, as well as a humanitarian package for civilian assistance. The availability and loiter time in the mission area are of prime importance for the deployment of these troop contingents. Within the framework of a peace making mission, the mission time will be up to one year, in the future perhaps of up to two years, the forces will be deployable within 30 days. The mission time in the framework of a peace keeping mission, however, can be for up to several years given 45 days of preparation. Specialists and advance and quartering parties as well as NBC-troops will be deployable within 5 days.

Depending on the nature of the mission, headquarter, combat and logistic support modules can be attached. Parts of these modules will also be deployable in great variations. Interoperability will be guaranteed with consideration to the NATO PARP (Partnership Annual Review Process).

With these forces, Austria will be able to deploy troops with the total strength of two battalion-strong contingents for medium and long-term missions, a smaller contingent for one short-term mission as well as one for a disaster relief mission into four separate mission areas at the same time. The Austrian troops currently deployed with UN battalions and KFOR are part of these and will have to be considered in the overall strength of the 2.000 deployable.

The combined armoured infantry unit (one mechanised infantry battalion reinforced or cross-attached with the tank coy, the armoured infantry coy and the short-range air defence battery) will be set up from cadre units (at least 80 per cent of the deployable force within the units) from different units. For a mission period exceeding six months, cadre frame units (40 per cent) are necessary for relief.

The infantry battalion for peace keeping and humanitarian missions as well as the other units will be held ready as units to be formed (with at least 20 per cent cadre).

The political leadership of Austria faces the challenge to provide the necessary means in regards of financial means, materiel and personnel. Under the current conditions, a deployment within the peace making task will only be possible when accepting massive reservations, a reduced likelihood of mission success and consequently a higher risk for the troops deployed.

In order to meet the international requirements also from the personnel perspective, changes in the Austrian labour legislation will be indispensable: currently, plans for a contracting system are being discussed. In the future, an obligatory participation in missions abroad might be introduced for cadre and longer- or shorter-service volunteers. The equipment upgrades needed until 2003 cause a much larger problem for the Austrian Armed Forces: air transport capacities, technical reconnaissance, wheeled armoured tanks "Pandur" for force protection as well as combat equipment, engineer and signals equipment will have to be provided. Due to budgetary restrictions, the required purchases will not become effective before 2003.

Annex II: The Austrian Security Interests

I The Vital Security Interests of Austria

The safeguarding of the securing of the vital security interests is the highest aim and the highest political-strategic guideline of the Austrian security policy.

The vital security interests are:

- The guaranteeing of the territorial integrity and the self-determination as well as the freedom of action of the Republic of Austria;
- The protection of the constitutional-democratic order;
- The guaranteeing of internal security including the protection of the national border;
- The comprehensive protection of the Austrian population and of the interests of the Austrian society;
- The securing of the economical and social basis of the country and the protection of a natural environment worth living in;
- The guaranteeing of a stable political, economical and military environment and the promotion of European stability;
- The safeguarding of the interests of Austria within the EU and the realisation of the interests of the EU in the global framework;
- The protection and promotion of the basic values.

II The security interests of the EU

By joining the European Union, Austria has committed herself to engage in realising the security-political interests of the EU jointly and in solidarity with the other partner countries. These objectives are:

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
- To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including these on external borders;
- To promote international co-operation;
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

III Important Political Objectives of Austria

On the basis of the fundamental values and the vital national interests and with consideration of the security interests of the EU, Austria deduces the following important security-political objectives:

- The strengthening of democracy, human rights, the rule of law as well as the safeguarding of an efficient and powerful economic order, with special regard to an active support to the corresponding projects of the EU, of the OSCE and of the UN;
- The prevention of the development of relevant risks and threats to the continent and the extension of taking-over of more responsibility for peace and stability by Europe in the global context;
- The comprehensive promotion of stability and security as well as the prevention of the development or escalation of conflicts in the strategically relevant environment of Austria and of the EU, which might stem from political deficits and a lack of democracy as well as from economic, ethnic or religious tensions;
- The development of efficient civilian and military capacities and structures for the realisation of the security-political aims in the national range as well as a precondition for a credible and effective CFSP of the EU;
- The safeguarding and deepening of the transatlantic co-operation as a basis for stability and security in Europe;
- The strengthening and deepening of the regional and global disarmament and arms control as well as the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- The balancing of the affluence differential especially in connection to the EU enlargement process to the East and with selected countries in the framework of development co-operation;
- The guaranteeing of vital resources and communication;
- The fight against transnational crime, terrorism as well as manipulation of technology and information;
- The development and expansion of means and functioning international organisations disposing of the capacity to prevent negative developments and to give support to positive security-political objectives;
- The protection of an environment worth living in within the framework of a comprehensive environmental protection and through the minimisation of the negative effects of technical, ecological and natural catastrophes.

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